Cosmopolitics:
The Collected Papers of the Open
Anthropology Cooperative, Volume I
Edited by
Justin Shafner
and Huon Wardle
OPEN ANTHROPOLOGY COOPERATIVE PRESS
Open Anthropology Cooperative Press
Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies, 71 North Street, St Andrews,
Fife KY16 9AL Scotland, U.K.
http://openanthcoop.net/press/
Copyright © The OAC Press & individual contributors, 2017
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
This work is Open Access, which means that you are free to
copy, distribute, display, and perform the work as long as you
clearly attribute the work to the authors, that you do not use
this work for commercial gain in any form whatsoever, and that
you in no way alter, transform, or build upon the work outside
of its normal use in academic scholarship without express
permission of the author and the publisher of this volume. For
any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the
license terms of this work.
First published in January 2017 by
Open Anthropology Cooperative Press
ISBN-10: 1541348214
ISBN-13: 978-1541348219
Cover image by Max Wardle
DEDICATION
To Sidney Mintz (1922 – 2015)
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Foreword
by Keith Hart
i
iii
1.
Introduction: Comopolitics as a Way of Thinking
by Huon Wardle and Justin Shafner
2.
Cosmopolitics and Common Sense
(Working Paper #1, irst published 2009)
by Huon Wardle
44
3.
What Did Kant Mean by and Why Did He Adopt a
Cosmopolitan Point of View in History?
(Working Paper #12, irst published 2012)
by Thomas Sturm
72
4.
Can the Thing Speak?
(Working Paper #7, irst published 2011)
by Martin Holbraad
89
5.
Devouring Objects of Study: Food and Fieldwork
(Intervention #1, irst published 2011)
by Sidney W. Mintz
123
6.
Cosmetic Cosmologies in Japan: Notes Towards a
Supericial Investigation
(Working Paper #4, irst published 2010)
by Philip Swift
140
7.
Why do the gods look like that? Material
Embodiments of Shifting Meanings
(Working Paper #2, irst published 2010)
by John McCreery
170
1
CONTENTS
8.
An Amazonian Question of Ironies and the
Grotesque: The Arrogance of Cosmic Deceit, and
the Humility of Everyday Life
(Art of Anthropology #1, irst published 2012)
by Joanna Overing
209
9.
How Knowledge Grows An Anthropological
Anamorphosis
(Working Paper #3, irst published 2010)
by Alberto Corsín Jiménez
227
10. Lance Armstrong: The Reality Show (A Cultural
Analysis)
(Working Paper #17, irst published 2013)
by Lee Drummond
265
11. Ritual Murder?
(Intervention #3, irst published 2011)
by Jean La Fontaine
298
12. An Extreme Reading of Facebook
(Working Paper #5, irst published 2010)
by Daniel Miller
319
13. Friendship, Anthropology
(Working Paper #10, irst published 2011)
by Liria de la Cruz and Paloma Gay y Blasco
343
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The OAC Press is an ofshoot of an experiment begun
early in 2009 by Keith Hart and a handful of
collaborators. This group conjoined around the project of
bringing anthropology to people, and into the internet
era, via the communications technology of the moment.
So, they set about creating a social networking site for
the purpose, the Open Anthropology Cooperative (OAC).
Numerous academic anthropologists were attracted to
the scheme, and the formation of the OAC Press came
about in order to allow open access discussion of their
ideas via regularly held seminars. Since 2009 this body of
work has amassed on the press website as a sequence of
working papers,1 and on the OAC main website 2 where a
record of the related seminar discussions may be found.
In 2015 the editorial team – Keith Hart, Justin Shafner
and Huon Wardle – began to consider how to publish
them in book form. We aimed to do this in the same spirit
as the OAC itself – open access, open comment, free use.
We had always made these papers individually
downloadable; but thought that some readers would
value owning a hard copy of a collection of them. This is
why we are publishing this edition via one of the most
accessible and wide-reaching publication formats
available at present, Amazon.com’s CreateSpace. Finally,
the OAC has been forced to make its readers pay for
something, but we hope that this combined record of
some of its intellectually plural lines of conversation will
make its own way.
The theme for the irst collection, on Cosmopolitics,
takes this plurality as its starting point. A second
collection, on Political Economy, is in the pipeline. We
wish to acknowledge here with hearty thanks the
generosity of all those who have given time to this
enterprise and particularly to those who have generously
ofered papers for discussion and publication here—
Thomas Sturm, Martin Holbraad, Sidney Mintz, Philip
i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Swift, John McCreery, Alberto Corsin-Jimenez, Joanna
Overing, Lee Drummond, Jean La Fontaine, Daniel Miller
and Liria de la Cruz & Paloma Gay y Blasco.
Sadly one name on this list, Sidney Mintz, stands out.
Sid’s life spanned almost all the history of modern
academic anthropology: he was a student of Ruth
Benedict, colleague of Eric Wolf and many others, and a
towering igure in the American anthropological scene.
Already approaching 90 by the time we contacted him,
Sid became a irm supporter of the OAC Press’s eforts.
In a inal email to Huon Wardle in July 2015, on rereading
his own paper ‘Devouring Objects of Study’, he noted
with characteristic good humour that:
I thought it was quite interesting and even well
written, something I rarely am conident enough to
say about anything I write. You’ve made my day…
Do let me know when/if the book becomes a reality.
I’ll want to show it proudly to friends, if I have not
yet gone to my reward!
Our best wishes,
Sid
It was not to be and Sid’s style will be greatly missed.
The editors are now able to say that the book has become
a reality.
Notes
1. http://openanthcoop.net/press/publications/
2. http://openanthcoop.ning.com/
ii
FOREWORD
The digital revolution1
Michael Wesch, then an assistant professor of cultural
anthropology at Kansas State University, is well-known
for his inspiring YouTube lectures and documentary
shorts. In 2009 he received over a hundred applications
for his graduate course in ‘digital ethnography’ from
around the world. The only problem: no such course
existed. Wesch teaches undergraduates and had
organized a ‘digital ethnography working group’ for
them; and that was it, so far. But millions have seen his
creations on YouTube and people want more of it. The
world is changing all around us and anthropology must
try to keep up, not just because we study this world as
anthropologists, but because our students live in it and
they are rapidly leaving their teachers behind.
The new communications technologies are blurring the
boundaries of disciplines, transforming the content of
education, spawning new genres and sites of research,
demanding fresh intellectual strategies. And academic
institutions act as a brake on our ability to engage with
all this. Anthropology as a discipline has not yet grasped
the potential of this new world. When we contemplate its
future, we need to think again about its scope, reach and
impact, about the audiences we wish to address and how.
We are living through the irst stages of a world
revolution as signiicant for humanity as the invention of
agriculture. It is a machine revolution, of course: the
convergence of telephones, television and computers in a
digital system whose most visible symbol is the internet.
It is a social revolution, the formation of a world society
with means of communication adequate at last to
expressing universal ideas. It is a inancial revolution, the
detachment of the virtual money circuit from production,
linked to the West’s loss of control over the world
iii
KEITH HART
economy. It is an existential revolution, transforming
what it means to be human and how each of us relates to
the rest of humanity. It is therefore also a revolution in
anthropology that will make everything we have done so
far seem like the prehistory of our discipline, whatever
its name becomes.
Oswald Spengler observed in The Decline of the West
(1918) that the world historical moment you are born
into does not need you; it will carry on with or without
you. But he ofered a challenge to his readers “Do you
have the courage to embrace it?” So too with this
revolution: you can engage with it or you can hide from
it. And every person’s trajectory is particular to them,
even if some common outlines can be glimpsed as the
revolution unfolds. The revolution is based on social
networking:
Google,
Facebook,
Flickr,
Twitter,
Stumbleupon, Academia.edu, Instagram and all the rest.
Social bookmarking is especially important. Classiication
of knowledge was hitherto done by experts and every
piece of information had its unique place in a folder
somewhere. Now tagging makes it possible for anyone to
leave a mark on something they like or consider useful
and you can ind their guidance with increasingly
sophisticated software. The people are now generating
the categories. Even Google is becoming obsolete
because its millions of hits are impersonal, less attuned
to the user’s own proile.
Participation in all this has sharpened my appreciation
of the sociology involved. Twitter divides people into
followers and followed. For those of us brought up on
Fascism and Stalinism, the talk of leaders and followers
that animates Web 2.0 is something of a turn of. But
when the Latins invented ‘society’ to describe their
aspirations for collective order, the word they used had
as its root ‘to follow’. If anyone was attacked, the others
agreed to support them in battle. The hierarchy was
temporary; so too on Twitter. The idea of society as a
state with ixed boundaries came much later. The new
social networks are personal and unequal; they often
have a commercial feel that puts of many intellectuals.
iv
FOREWORD
But there is something exciting going on that it would
pay us to understand and use.
In May 2009, an unanticipated chain of events led to
the launch of the Open Anthropology Cooperative. Some
Twitter friends began discussing the possibilities for an
online anthropology network. Someone suggested trying
Ning and I jumped in. An administrative team drawn
from the launching group supervised its explosive growth
in the irst few months. In less than a year we had 2,000
members from an amazing diversity of backgrounds. Our
visitors settled down at around 500 a day; the largest
group came from the US, Britain and Canada (in a ratio
of 4:2:1), but the next batch made interesting reading, in
order: France, Portugal, Germany, Brazil, Georgia, Italy,
Greece, Australia, Switzerland, India, Netherlands,
Sweden, Turkey, Norway, Mexico, Spain, New Zealand.
We soon set up over a hundred discussion groups
(some of them in Spanish, Portuguese, German, Italian,
Russian, Norwegian, Turkish and Georgian), blogs, a
forum, a wiki repository, the OAC Press, a seminar series
and personal pages in all their multimedia variety.
Anyone can start anything on the OAC; some of them do,
many more stay quiet. The administrators got some
minimal rules generally accepted. In time, however, the
Ning platform became less heterogeneous (despite
having over 8,000 members today); the active users now
come mainly from the US and Britain; linguistic diversity
has vanished, participation rates are lower. This pattern
is not unusual in web networks. We later started an OAC
page on Facebook which is livelier, with 12,000 members
who keep up a daily low of announcements, links to
pages elsewhere, short posts and personal updates.
We already know that ieldwork will never be the same
again because of the digital revolution. It will be less
lonely for one thing. But what can anthropologists, with
our supposed expertise in social relations, do more
generally to help shape the future of our institutions?
Our students, readers and those we study expect to be
engaged through these new media. For some this will be
v
KEITH HART
an uphill struggle. We must move from monologue to
conversation, from guild disciplines to the lifetime selflearning that the internet afords. The universities now
lag behind the students in terms of media literacy. The
‘edupunk’ movement, armed with user-friendly digital
technologies, rejects the forced imposition of costly outdated software systems that universities have bought.
The latter face a threat to their monopolies when
teachers extend their classrooms to non-university
students. Anthropology has always been something of an
anti-discipline,
sitting
uneasily
with
academic
bureaucracy. We have a lot to gain, professionally and as
human beings, from joining this revolution.
What have I learned from all this? The two great
memory banks are language and money. 2 Exchanges of
meanings through language and of goods through money
are now converging in a single network of
communications, the internet. We must discover how to
use this digital revolution to advance the human
conversation about a better world. Our common task is to
make a world society it for all humanity. And
anthropology is indispensable to such a project.
The digital revolution is driven by a desire to replicate
at a distance or by means of computers experiences that
we normally associate with face-to-face human
encounters. All communication, whether the exchange of
words or money, has a virtual aspect in that symbols and
their media of circulation stand for what people really do
for each other. It usually involves the exercise of
imagination, an ability to construct meanings across the
gap between symbol and reality. The power of the book
depended on sustaining that leap of faith in the
possibility of human communication. The virtual is
abstract, but reliance on more abstract forms of
communication carries with it the potential for real
persons to be involved with each other at a distance in
concrete ways. The idea of ‘virtual reality’ expresses this
double movement: on the one hand machines whose
complexity their users cannot possibly understand, on
the other live experiences ‘as good as’ real.
vi
FOREWORD
If we would make a better world, rather than just
contemplate it, we must learn to think in terms that
relect reality and reach out for imagined possibilities.
This entails capturing what is essential about the world
we live in, its movement and direction, not just its stable
forms. The idea of virtual reality expresses this form of
movement — extension from the actual to the possible .
‘Virtual’ means existing in the mind, but not in fact.
When combined with ‘reality’, it means something that is
almost but not quite real. In technical terms, ‘virtual
reality’ is a computer simulation that enables the efects
of operations to be shown in real time. ‘Reality’ is present
in time and space (‘seeing is believing’); and its opposite
is imagined connection at a distance, something as old as
story-telling, but given new impetus by the internet.
Already experience of near synchrony at a distance, the
compression of time and space, is altering our perception
of social relations, of place and movement.
How might oline activities inluence what we do
online and vice versa? I have been inluenced by Martin
Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics:
World, Finitude, Solitude (1929). For Heidegger, ‘world’
as something whole is an abstract metaphysical category
and its dialectical counterpart is ‘solitude’, the idea of the
isolated individual. Every human subject makes a world
whose centre is the self. This opens up only when we
recognize ourselves as inite, as individual; and this leads
us to ‘initude’, the concrete speciics of time and place in
which we live. So ‘world’ is relative both to an abstract
version of subjectivity and, more important, to our
particularity in the world (seen as position and movement
in time and space).
Living alone in our own world seems more real when
we go online. But the two are imagined and reciprocal;
neither is a suitable object of inquiry. We experience
them from a relative location in society. Thus it is
unsatisfactory to study the social forms of the internet
without considering what people bring to them from
elsewhere. This of-line social life is an invisible presence
vii
KEITH HART
when people are online. We should not deny some
autonomy to ‘virtual reality’. Would we dream of
reducing literature to the circumstances of readers? And
this is Heidegger’s point. ‘World’ and ‘solitude’ may be
artiicial abstractions, but they do afect how we behave
in ‘initude’. The dialectical triad forms an interactive set.
Anthropology for the internet age
Like the editors, I start from Immanuel Kant’s (1795)
argument that the basic right of all world citizens should
rest on universal hospitality. We should be free to go
anywhere, since the world belongs to us all equally. We
are highly mobile today, but most human beings are more
restricted in their movement than ever. Kant’s conidence
in an emergent world order, when launching
‘anthropology’ as a modern academic discipline, was the
high point of the liberal revolution, before it was
overwhelmed by its twin ofspring, industrial capitalism
and the nation-state.
The world is much more socially integrated now than
two centuries ago and its economy is palpably unjust. We
have barely survived three world wars (two hot, one cold)
and brutality provokes fear everywhere. Moreover, the
natural consequences of human actions are severely
disruptive, if left unchecked. Kant (1784) held that “In
man (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural
faculties which aim at the use of reason shall be fully
developed in the species, not in the individual.” He meant
through libraries or the means of communication that we
have today. The anthropologist, Roy Rappaport (1999)
recently wrote that “Humanity is that part of the world
through which the world as a whole can think about
itself”. Or, in C.L.R. James’ (1938) words, “The distinctive
feature of our age is that mankind as a whole is on the
way to becoming fully conscious of itself”. The task of
building a global civil society for the 21st century is
urgent and anthropological visions must play their part in
this.
Copernicus solved the problem of the movement of the
viii
FOREWORD
heavenly bodies by having the spectator revolve while
they were at rest, instead of them revolve around the
spectator. Kant extended this achievement into
metaphysics. In The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) he
wrote, “Hitherto it has been assumed that all our
knowledge must conform to objects…(but what) if we
suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge?” In
order to understand the world, we begin not with the
empirical existence of objects, but with the reasoning
embedded in that experience as all the judgments we
have made. The world is inside each of us as much as out
there. We must bring the two poles together as subjective
individuals who share the object world with the rest of
humanity.
The cheapening of information transfers thanks to the
digital revolution makes it possible for much more
information about individuals to enter into commercial
transactions at a distance. This trend to customize
economic relations has its counterpart in many aspects of
contemporary social life. It involves a new idea of the
person, one based on digital abstractions as much as on
new forms of individuality. Academics’ dealings with
Amazon are at once remote and personal.
The use of new technologies means that learning can
now be more individualized and ecumenical at the same
time; and this poses a threat to the academic guild’s
traditions. Teachers must live with this radical revision of
subject-object relations. Learning anthropology would be
impossible if we were not human beings in the irst place.
Anthropologists must also cope with mass mobility and
media. What can we ofer that is not delivered more
efectively through novels and movies, journalism and
tourism? The rhetoric and reality of markets today
encourage individuals to choose the means of their own
enlightenment. Anthropological teaching must relect all
this; any new paradigm for the discipline must relect the
social and technological implications of the internet age.
ix
KEITH HART
The Open Anthropology Cooperative: between social
movement and the academy
Ever since the internet went public and the World
Wide Web was invented, I have made online selfpublishing and interaction the core of my anthropological
practice. The OAC promised to be the most powerful
vehicle for this project yet. The predominance of
academics there is relected in this collection. The
chapters
show
that
anthropologists
are
often
idiosyncratic individuals with an extraordinary range of
interests. But as a collective we are extremely
conservative. It is unsurprising then that publishing
papers for discussion in seminars was the OAC’s most
prominent achievement. Our network has not moved with
the times, as we once hoped. Nevertheless, the OAC has
been and still is a great leap towards bringing
anthropology into the 21st century. This book and its
subsequent companion volume on economy serve as
eloquent testimony to its hybrid originality.
In practical terms, the OAC is a place of online
interaction. It is also an archive where each member can
store photos, videos, music and texts on their home page
and post similar material around the site. The language
issue, however, is crucial. Despite the OAC’s worldwide
reach and initial linguistic variety, the trend has been
inexorably towards the dominance of a few native
Anglophones. Our inability to sustain a multilingual
community is particularly troubling given anthropology’s
global aspirations and the public impact the network
could have had. The OAC’s founders believed we were
launching a social movement; and the heady irst weeks
reinforced that feeling. But the network was born in
reaction to academic bureaucracy and its leadership has
since been trying to catch up with events.
The most useful lessons from the OAC experiment for
other online organizations (including public anthropology
web projects) are pragmatic. The social web ofers an
ever-evolving selection of sites, apps and services, many
x
FOREWORD
of which are free or relatively low-cost. Innovation is
rapid and open source is increasingly common. On the
other hand, the speed of application launches and
failures means that free sites are often not stable for
long. Most anthropologists feel powerless in the face of
technological
change.
New
software
and
web
applications (increasingly for mobile phones) are not
usually tailored to academic needs; but they are often
lexible enough, given basic technical knowledge; and
willingness to endure many bouts of trial and error helps.
You have to invest time and energy to ind out what
works and what does not.
The OAC opposed elitism, bureaucracy and academic
hierarchy; so we tried to avoid centralized leadership and
control. But what kind of leadership replaces hierarchy?
In a context of calls for less bureaucracy among
academic anthropologists, the site’s laissez-faire policy
privileged self-regulation over irm rules. But this is like
promoting the free market without rules of oversight. Noone would try to build a community on free market
principles; but in retrospect it seems that we did.
The OAC shows that anthropologists may be adaptable
bricoleurs online, piecing together communication
technologies for chatting, learning, teaching and sharing.
But it remains problematic to break with academic
prejudices about online publication and interaction. To
attract participants, we reproduced the very academic
values that we founded the OAC to escape from. The
network thus ofers an anomalous commentary on how
anthropology treats online and academic conversation as
being mutually exclusive.
The OAC became a
compromised
public
island
avoiding
academic
bureaucracy, yet populated by its denizens.
Social and academic networks are signiicantly
diferent in their need for time investment, volunteer
labor and long-term objectives, not to mention power
relations and status hierarchies. Much social web activity
does not concern itself with aims, intentions or long-term
goals. It's easy and can keep ticking over until boredom
xi
KEITH HART
or newness force change. Academic networks do not
work like that. The OAC mixes them together. Dabbling
on Twitter or Facebook is not analogous to what goes on
at the OAC. Being an active member there takes more
time commitment, at least some critical thought and the
shared expectation of pointed exchange or response.
The ethnographic model was never intended to inform
a movement to change the world. Contemporary
anthropology and social science relect the world and are
not designed to improve it. The internet’s growth has
generated a strong counter-movement to the status quo.
Anthropologists spent the last century – a time of
urbanization, war and the break-up of empires – seeking
out isolated places that we could study as if they were
outside modern history. Having realized at last that we
live in a world uniied by capitalism, we now spend our
time bemoaning the fate of the universities and our own
irrelevance to public discourse.
The OAC was born as a reaction more than a
movement. Its slogan of being ‘open’ turned out to be
contradictory. The leadership, who abstractly rejected
hierarchy, became managerial and half-hearted. We
preferred to maximize membership at the expense of
making rules that might exclude people. They left
anyway. We were always catching up, never ahead of the
game.
The OAC’s instigators, members and critics never used
anthropology or social theory to address the problems we
faced. Anthropologists, it seems, cannot catch up with a
changing world while they meticulously document it. We
are losing control of our master-concepts like culture to
other disciplines and even to web moguls who are not
afraid to engage with the popular media. Anthropologists
do have something to ofer the general public. It is just
that we are terrible at communicating it. More often than
not, anthropologists are confounded when interacting
with the world outside academia.
The OAC struggled to reverse this trend and reinforces
xii
FOREWORD
it by producing little to attract a general audience. Fear
of marketing our expertise, of ‘branding’ anthropology or
seeking out media attention undermined an innovative
project that once promised so much. Our web-based
activities closely resemble ofice politics. So a publicfacing anthropological experiment became inwardlooking, being by and for academics and subject to
prejudices and hierarchies similar to those in the
universities. Like academic anthropology, the OAC is
better at describing what happened than explaining it.
The social media have undoubtedly shaped the OAC’s
attempt to expand anthropology’s horizons to a global
level. Worse, we have not yet been able to draw on our
own discipline to help fulil its promise.
‘Anthropology’ and the new human universal
By ‘anthropology’ I mean a human teleology in the
sense of Kant, Rappaport and James above. We must
develop self-knowledge as individuals and as a species,
especially the relationship between the two. This
relationship is mediated by a bewildering range of
associations and identities which have been the prime
focus of anthropology conceived of as a social science.
The vast bulk of humanity is more interested in how each
of us relates to the whole.
For Kant a ‘cosmopolitan’ approach to world society
would lead us to the exercise of human reason at the
species level. For him, humanity’s last and hardest task
would be the administration of justice worldwide.
Meanwhile, anthropology explores the cognitive,
aesthetic and ethical universals on which human unity
might be founded. The categorical imperative to be good
provides a moral link between individuals and this
inclusive order.
Kant published Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point
of View in 1798. It was based on lectures he had given
for a quarter-century. He wanted to attract the general
public to his subject. Histories of anthropology rarely
mention this work, perhaps because anthropologists have
xiii
KEITH HART
since moved far away from Kant’s original premises. He
summarized “philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense of the
word” as four questions: What can I know? What should I
do? What may I hope for? What is a human being? The
irst question is answered in metaphysics, the second in
morals, the third in religion and the fourth in
anthropology. But the irst three questions “relate to
anthropology” and might be subsumed under it.
Kant conceived of anthropology as an empirical
discipline, but also as a means of moral and cultural
improvement. It was an investigation into human nature
and into how to modify it. He aimed to provide his
students with practical guidance and knowledge of the
world. His lectures were to be “popular” and of value in
later life. Above all, the Anthropology contributed to the
task of uniting world citizens by identifying the source of
their “cosmopolitan bonds”. The book moves between
vivid anecdotes and Kant’s sublime vision as a bridge
from everyday life to horizon thinking. Kant concentrated
on “what the human being as a free actor can and should
make of himself”. This is based on observation, but also
involves the construction of moral rules. Anthropology is
the practical arm of moral philosophy. It does not explain
the metaphysics of morals which are categorical and
transcendent; but it is indispensable to understanding
interaction between human agents. It is thus ‘pragmatic’
– “everything that pertains to the practical” – popular
and moral, being concerned with people’s motives for
action. His book’s value lay in its systematic
organization, so that readers could insert their
experience and develop new themes appropriate to their
own lives.
Academic anthropology is not equipped to inform
participation in the world today because its cultural
relativism relects the dominant nation-state structures of
the twentieth century. How might people ind a more
secure foundation for self-knowledge as individuals and
as a species? Anthropology for Kant relected both his
idea of a just world society and his vision of individual
subjectivity as a means to that end, as a branch of
xiv
FOREWORD
humanist education. Twentieth-century civilization placed
barriers between each of us as a subjective personality
and society as an impersonal object. Its anonymous
institutions – states, capitalist markets, science – left
little room for personal agency, beyond spending the
money we had.
We all embark on a journey outward into the world and
inward to the self. Society is mysterious to us because we
have lived in it and it now dwells inside us where it is
ordinarily invisible from everyday life. Wherever we have
lived becomes a source of introspection regarding our
relationship to society; memory allows us to synthesize
these varied experiences of the world. If a person would
have an identity, this requires making out of fragmented
social experience a more coherent whole, a world as
singular as the self.
Emergent world society is the new human universal –
not an idea, but the fact of our shared occupation of the
planet crying out for new principles of association. This
entails making a world where all people can live together,
not the imposition of principles that suit some powerful
interests at the expense of the rest. The next universal
will be unlike its predecessors, the Christian, bourgeois
and imperialist versions through which the West sought
to dominate or replace the cultural particulars that
organize people’s lives everywhere. We discover our
common humanity in great literature which aims for
universality by going deeply into particular personalities,
places and events. Good ethnography does the same. So
does case law at its best. The new universal will not just
tolerate cultural particulars, but will recognize that true
human community can only be realized through them.
There are two prerequisites for being human: we must
each learn to be self-reliant to a high degree and to
belong to others, merging our identities in a bewildering
variety of social relations. Western cultures emphasize
how problematic it is to be both self-interested and
mutual. When conlict between the two is expected, it is
hard to be both. Yet the two sides are often inseparable
xv
KEITH HART
in practice and some societies, by encouraging private
and public interests to merge, have integrated them
more efectively than ours. One premise of the new
human universal will thus be the unity of self and society.
It is now harder for self-appointed guilds to control
access to professional knowledge. People have other
ways of inding out for themselves, rather than submit to
academic hierarchy. Many agencies out there compete to
give them what they want, including the self-learning
possibilities aforded by the internet. Popular resistance
to the power of experts is moral – most people want to
restore
a
personal
dimension
to
knowledge.
Anthropologists’ dependence on academic bureaucracy
leaves us highly vulnerable and the OAC’s aspiration to
liberate anthropological discourse through online media
foundered because academic norms took it over.
‘Anthropology’ is indispensable to the formation of
world society. The prospects for the academic discipline
to contribute to this process are poor, given its prevalent
localism and anti-universalism. Kant’s vision of
anthropology as humanist education contrasts starkly
with the emphasis on scientiic research outputs in
today’s universities. We should emulate his program of
personal life-long learning to develop practical
knowledge of the world. Kant recommended both
systematic observation of life around us and that we
study “world history, biographies and even plays and
novels”. He aimed to integrate individual subjectivity
with the moral construction of world society.
The rapid development of telecommunications
networks today contains a far-reaching transformation of
world society. Anthropology is one way of making sense
of it. The academic seclusion of the discipline, however,
its passive acquiescence to bureaucracy, prevents us
from grasping this historical opportunity. We rightly cling
to our commitment to joining the people where they live,
but have forgotten what this move was for or what else is
needed if humanity can build a universal society. The
internet ofers a wonderful chance to open up the low of
xvi
FOREWORD
knowledge and information, already partly realised.
It matters less that an academic guild should retain its
monopoly
of
access
to
knowledge
than
that
‘anthropology’ should be taken up by a broad intellectual
coalition for whom the realization of a new human
universal – a world society it for humanity as a whole – is
an urgent personal concern. Rather than obsessing over
how we can control access to what we write, which
means cutting of the mass of humanity from our eforts,
we must igure out new interactive forms of engagement
that span the globe and make the results available to
everyone.
Keith Hart
Paris, 2016
Notes
1. I want to thank Fran Barone for writing Barone and Hart
(2015) together; Huon Wardle for providing the opportunity
to publish Hart (2010a); Justin Shafner for the help he has
given me in navigating the internet; and all three for their
companionship and work at the Open Anthropology
Cooperative and its Press. This essay also draws on Hart
(2009, 2010b).
2. The motto of my website, http://thememorybank.co.uk.
References
Barone, F. and K. Hart (2015), The Open Anthropology
Cooperative: Towards an online public anthropology, in S.
Pink and S. Abram (eds) Media, Anthropology and Public
Engagement. New York: Berghahn, 198-222.
Hart, K. (2009), An anthropologist in the world
revolution. Anthropology Today 25.6: 24-25.
xvii
KEITH HART
Hart, K. (2010a), Kant, ‘anthropology’ and the new
human universal. Social Anthropology, 18: 441–447.
Hart, K. (2010b), An Anthropology of the Internet,
http://thememorybank.co.uk/2010/02/06/ananthropology-of-the-internet-2/.
Heidegger, M. (2008 [1929]). The Fundamental Concepts
of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude . Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
James, C.L.R. (1989 [1938]). The Black Jacobins:
Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo revolution .
New York: Vintage Books.
Kant, I. (2008 [1781]). Critique of Pure Reason (Norman
Kemp Smith). Google Books.
Kant, I. (1993[1784]). Idea for a universal history with
cosmopolitan intent, in C. Friedrich (ed) The Philosophy
of Kant. New York: Modern Library.
Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch
(various editions).
Kant, I. (2006 [1798]). Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rappaport, R. (1999). Ritual and Religion in the Making
of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Spengler, O. (1962 [1918]). The Decline of the West
(abridged). New York: Alfred Knopf.
xviii
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION:
COSMOPOLITICS AS A WAY OF THINKING
Huon Wardle and Justin Shafner
From its launch in 2009, the Open Anthropology
Cooperative (OAC) and its publications series were
shaped by what we can reasonably call cosmopolitical
concerns. Weeks after its creation, the OAC gathered
hundreds, then thousands, of visitors and members from
every region of the world — everywhere there is a
networked computer at least. A lurry of discussion
immediately took place on the OAC forum around what to
make of the fact that within a few months an
unprecedented global assembly of anthropologists had
sprung into being. The whole world of anthropology
seemed to have arrived at one virtual site, and the
question was what to do with this singularity. From this
point of view, the numbers proved illusory — perhaps a
disappointment – if the expectation was that, like Venus
on her seashell, a new kind of global anthropological
politics would also spring up out of the waves. Many
people visited, read what was ofered, and left comments
– perhaps modeling their behaviour on how they used
1
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
other social network sites – but, for most, the OAC was
simply a launch pad to “go” somewhere else. (It is worth
remembering that like other websites the OAC is only
metaphorically “a place”, but then it is not “just a place”
either). The OAC had proved its global reach, sure
enough, but this did not initiate any deinable
architecture of social change itself. Thus, arguably the
OAC has not built on its initial promise of creating a
globally articulated forum, and in that sense, the ideas
fomented by this venue for openness and cooperation
have been more a sign of the times than an expression of
a realizable social future (Barone and Hart 2015).
One of the acknowledged successes of the OAC,
though, has been its open access publication series. 1
From the beginning,
the aim was to make
anthropological work available online without copyright
restriction and to use the social media platform to open
these essays (and now books) to discussion by anyone
who wants to participate. In principle at least, from the
start, this was anthropology for, and open to, the
“people”; the idea being that, since anthropology is the
study of humanity, anyone who is human would have an
interest in what that fact implies. Again, of course, the
results were more limited than the hubristic expectation.
The papers and surrounding dialogue that the OAC has
gathered together are nonetheless fascinatingly diverse,
all of them ofer at least a sideways (and often a front on)
view on the stroboscopic display of global humanity that,
in just a few decades, the new digital technologies of
mass communication have set in motion.
So, when the time came to put some of the OAC
papers together in edited form, this awareness of the
shifting meaning of the words “cosmos” and “politics”
immediately emerged as a key theme shaping our
editorial perspective. It is for this reason that with our
irst volume of collected papers we have brought
together work by Alberto Corsin Jimenez, Daniel Miller,
Huon Wardle, Jean La Fontaine, Joanna Overing, John
McCreery, Lee Drummond, Liria de la Cruz, Martin
Holbraad, Paloma Gay y Blasco, Philip Swift, Sidney
2
INTRODUCTION
Mintz and Thomas Sturm, that foregrounds the
“cosmopolitical” dimension of contemporary experience.
But what does this venerable compound word signify? In
contemporary social science we ind that at least two
distinct uses of the word are in play.
Kant and the cosmopolitical
The initial sense of the word is Kantian. It is fair to say
that from its beginnings the aims of the OAC were
imbued with a Kantian spirit. Thomas Sturm in this
volume explores Kant’s cosmopolitanism and his
anthropology in detail (“What Did Kant Mean…”).
Nonetheless, even now, Kant’s ideas on anthropology and
cosmopolitanism are not widely known (or understood)
within contemporary social science, so it is worth giving
a brief light-and-shade sketch of the Kantian position and
its contemporary relevance before entering more
complicated terrains of debate.
For Kant cosmopolitanism, and the cosmopolitics that
goes with it, delineates a irmly anthropocentric set of
problems ([1795]1988). First, at issue are the political
struggles of human beings who, whatever their
diferences (and also because of them), must inevitably
come to recognise themselves as occupying a common
world. Secondly, there is the historical awareness that an
already existing global community is ever more
integrated in politically complex ways; perhaps primarily
due to war, conquest and human displacement, but also
through mutually beneicial commerce and peaceful
movement. So, thirdly, questions arise about the
transformation in the thought and practice of individual
human beings as they become aware that, whatever local
communities they feel they belong to, whatever local
common sense they may adhere to, whether they wish it
or not, they are part of a human community at large. The
cosmopolitical sphere is, then, a scene of emergent
mutual recognition of this interconnection. In turn, the
cosmopolitical describes an arena for debating and
contracting certain general principles – rights, freedoms
– that should apply to all humans as such. Hence Kant’s
3
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
ius cosmopoliticum postulating a basic extension of
hospitality to all humans as citizens of a common
humanity in-the-making ([1795]1988:112fn).
The role of anthropology in this Kantian picture is to
discuss the pragmatics of what it means to be human in
the light of the cosmopolitical framework; in particular to
ind out what humans can make of themselves as “free
acting” beings who are nonetheless destined to share the
same world for better or worse with others akin to
themselves. Anthropology ofers a guide both to the
meaning of the diversity involved in this cosmopolitics
but also, crucially, regarding what humans have in
common, including their “unsocial sociability” — their
tendencies toward both love and violence. As Thomas
Sturm summarises Kant here:
We are citizens of the world in the sense that our
nature is partly plastic, and more speciically that
we ourselves produce our rules of action and,
thereby, our social world. This is a fact that holds, in
principle, for each of us, and which each of us
better recognizes in social interaction (Sturm,
"What Did Kant Mean…").
Kant’s sphere of cosmopolitical debate and action, and
the anthropology that goes with it, are, of course,
emblematic of an enlightenment view. Humans,
belonging as they do to one species, have an obligation to
care for their own kind. Recognising myself as an
instance of humanity becomes a duty toward human
beings at large. At the same time, by universalising the
signiicance of my individual life, this recognition ofers a
kind of personal liberation of my individuality from pure
historical contingency, while giving onto a genuinely
informed politics. Incorporating the cosmopolitan project
as
a
dimension
of
personal
world-knowledge
(weltkenntnis) is, meanwhile, a matter of developing
one’s own schemas and ideas for life and in this way
arriving at “maturity” (acquiring a “character” is another
way Kant puts it [1798]2006). What Kant opens for the
4
INTRODUCTION
kind of study we call anthropology, then, is the realisation
that the human being is a self-interpreting, selfconceptualising, hence a self-making, creature. 2 How this
human comes to interpret its own life – creating
schemas, analogies, symbols and concepts for it – is
inextricable from how its politics grow and take shape.
Because human nature is partly plastic, and the ideas
people live by are signiicantly an expression of their
freedom from natural constraints, anthropology is not a
natural, but rather a moral, science (an argument
developed by Dilthey). By relecting on their own ideas
people can change them. This, in turn, means that human
thought is not susceptible to the same kind of analysis
that natural objects are. Anthropology is itself an
extension of the desire and freedom people have to
understand and change themselves. This relexive
insight, in turn, gives the ground from which Kant argues
that, as they strive to deine who they are, humans must
sooner or later arrive at an awareness that they are
citizens of a common cosmos since this is the necessary
horizon for deining their own humanity. This rethinking
takes place in the midst of fundamental uncertainty
about the nature of the world as it is outside the
conventions of human perception and conceptualisation.
Hence, for Kant, anthropology has as its central concern
the creation of a cosmopolitan conceptual toolkit that can
be put to use to rethink the pragmatics of our everyday
individual experience. To adapt a phrase, whether we are
consciously aware of it or not, “the personal is
cosmopolitical”.
The utopianism in Kant's account – a peaceful world
society is possible – is justiied by his awareness that this
ever-intensifying social interdependence of human beings
globally – the inevitably inter-indemnifying struggles of
hospitality and hostility that humans engage in – has the
potential to lead toward moral institutions with greater
and greater inclusivity. From this stance, cosmopolitan
interaction (reasoned or unreasoned) is unavoidable, as
is the cosmopolitical debate that travels with it
([1795]1988). Hence, Kant gives the possibility of
5
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
peaceful cosmopolitan co-dwelling, within diverse ways
of life and out of particular conceptions of freedom, as
the widest ethical frame for his anthropology
([1798]2006). Living “wisely, agreeably and well” (as
Keynes would later put it) at a global level is not only
conceivable, there are some existing facts in favour of its
achievability.
In this way, cosmopolitanism is not just a provocation
constantly to review the global anthropological situation:
more than this, the as-if utopia ofered by a cosmopolitan
end-state provides anthropology with its outer meaning
as a type of knowledge and inquiry ( wissenschaft)
directed actively at the self-making of world citizens. It
should be noted that the ethical framings of the kind
Kant gave to anthropology were for the most part
deemed irrelevant or anathema (if they were noticed at
all) by the logical-positivist social science established in
the Twentieth century with its unrecognised outer
stabilising frame – nationalism. They were periodically
picked up by anthropologists, notably Malinowski in his
last manuscript, Freedom and Civilization. However, this
short nationalist Century – 1918-1989 – is long gone and
with it the implicit idea that the national boundary is also
a boundary on morality and truth, albeit recent global
events have again foregrounded a politics of isolationism
or ‘nativism’ as it is now sometimes termed.
Acquiring a cosmopolitan orientation becomes the
guiding ethical principle through which anthropology as
a search for knowledge gains meaning, as opposed to
being simply a pursuit of the Machiavellian or
meaningless in human experience. At the same time,
knowing that it is in the character of human beings to
create new distinctive ideas for life, Kant presents
anthropology as a quest on the part of humans through
which they acquire new understanding of the concepts
they are using, thereby gaining new insights and
widening the scope their own freedoms. To know or
understand something is to gain some autonomy with
regard to that thing (cf. Lino e Silva and Wardle 2016).
However, signiicantly, Kant's theory of the human is a
6
INTRODUCTION
theory of the limits on human comprehension: some of
these limits are set by the natural human capacity to
sense the surrounding world, some by the limited hold
humanly created concepts have on reality once human
sensations are schematised into thoughts.
Clearly, many of the ideas and freedoms humans
create for themselves and live by are delusional judged
by their incompatibility with the larger principle of free
and peaceful community with others world-wide; but who
is to decide which ideas and on what grounds? An
intercommunicating
world
entails
a
complexly,
chaotically interconnected politics whose radical
uncertainty threatens the rights and freedoms of all
humans in contingent and variable ways. Kant's answer
is cosmopolitan (self-)education (Hart 2010): learning to
live in the same world. Each individual educates
themselves to the best of their capacity in elements of a
common ethics for a global type of life in the midst of
fundamental mutual human uncertainty.
"A transgression of rights in one place in the world is
felt everywhere" states Kant in support of his demand for
a constantly re-initiated cosmopolitics ([1795]1988:119).
Equally, a growth of freedoms in one place may also
herald a like emergence elsewhere. We are wise to be
alert to either of those potentials. These are ideas
Simmel develops in the early Twentieth Century in his
neo-Kantian theory of ission and fusion in social circles
and the networks that connect them; and that Ulrich
Beck extends in the end of that century with his
conception of globally dispersed risks to the individual
(Simmel [1922]1955, Beck 1992). For Kant, anthropology
and cosmopolitanism answer a demand of rational selfinterest; they supply the kind of knowledge individuals
need to co-dwell in an increasingly interconnected and
politically threatening world. His view is also crucially
dialectical: new schemas, symbols and judgements about
life appear out of the often hostile interaction between
people and peoples. Hostility between ideas and
communities is never absolute though; the constant need
for re-envisaging humanness within a global frame comes
7
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
about because there are no absolute boundaries on
human interchange and community. Certainly, cultures
have some general, but not absolutely deining,
characteristics. Likewise historical epochs do not place
deining perimeters on human interchange, conceptual
elaboration, or on the kinds of relations of ethical
answerability that go with these.
Whatever the intensity of local common-sense
metaphors, sentiments and aesthetic judgements, the
real value of these are as conventional signposts
expressing the contingent relationship of the diversely
placed individual to their universal situation – the
ramifying network that is the human cosmos taken as a
whole (Kant [1790]1952, Wardle 1995). In his
anthropology and elsewhere Kant makes use of the
ethnological evidence provided in his day, but ethnology
is not an end in itself. We need to know about the ideas
and ways of lives of others, not because of their
fascinating linguistic or conceptual diferences to us as
such (themes developed by Herder and Humboldt for
example), but instead because the continuance and
development of their distinctive conventions, social rules
and freedoms are intrinsically interconnected with the
future of our own. Here begins Kant's daunting (some
will say impossible) task of cosmopolitan self-education.
Cosmopolitan awareness does not, then, rest in
knowledge of sui generis diferences, rather it involves
an exploration of diference toward a continuous
imaginative expansion of the area of our common human
truths and common human goods. In this way, the
narrower horizon of responsibilities to an immediate
circle of relationships widens into a duty to humans in
general allowing of highly diverse ways of thinking and
acting. Every individual has a stake in this kind of
cosmopolitical knowledge whether they realise it yet or
not (Wardle 2000, 2010, 2015). Kant would respond to
the oft reiterated jibe that cosmopolitanism is merely the
language of the elite or the narcissistic by answering that
we are all cosmopolitans (Josephides and Hall 2014).
Logically, and as a matter of fact, as humans we are all
8
INTRODUCTION
involved in creating the cosmopolitical institutions of the
future. What kind of future that will be, what our place in
it will be, we cannot yet tell. The common cosmos is
always an object of search and variable judgement, but
we can assume that our acts of moral imagining and
choice now will efect the outcome – the “kingdom of
ends” as Kant puts it.
Building a picture of the new cosmopolitics 3 –
ontologies, non-human agents and “decolonisation
of thought”
Whatever we make of Kant's cosmopolitics, there is,
however, a second, newer use of the “cosmopolitical” that
builds
on
a
deep-seated
modernist
sense
of
anthropocentric uncertainty and anxiety, one that casts
doubt on both the perceived unity of the human and also
the possibility of a shared common world. Puzzlingly this
newer cosmopolitics has tended to deny any relation to
the old. Stengers, who coined this newer usage, states
that she was unaware of Kant’s use when she irst
developed her own and that her alternative view denies
Kant’s applicability:
“I’m very likely to be told that… I shouldn’t have
taken a Kantian term… I was unaware of Kantian
usage… the cosmopolitical proposal, as presented
here, denies any relationship with Kant or with the
ancient cosmopolitanism” (2005:994)
Given that what she is describing claims no connection
to the older signiicance, what, then, do Stengers and
those who draw on her work mean by “cosmopolitics”?
As we will see, the question extends to this: is there in
fact a connection between these two distinct
understandings of cosmos and politics despite the claim
to epistemological distinctness; and if there is, what does
this relation consist in? What kind of dialogue can be
established and on what terms? The question demands a
further explication of the newer usage. This will also give
us an opportunity to see where the papers for this
9
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
volume it into, or ofer a perspective on, a revised
concept of the cosmopolitical.
If the kind of cosmopolitical awareness described by
Kant has been with us for so long, traceable to the Stoics
and beyond, why does the goal of intra-species
recognition and responsibility still seem so far away?
This turns out to be a key implicit quandary for the newer
cosmopoliticians. It is one which they answer by pointing
to the fact that for humans there is not a single cosmos
but rather many cosmologies, multiple changing
worldviews, and as such, there is no singular knowable
world or humanity. Rather, there are as many ways of
knowing what it means to be human as there are projects
of knowing. From Stengers viewpoint and those who
have expanded it such as Latour, the enlightenment
politics of human recognition is founded on a
transcendental
illusion
of
foundational
common
knowledge. The very capacity for self-interpretation that
Kant shows is key to understanding what we have in
common is also the ground for a fragmented, multidimensional, multi-foundational politics. “Perspective”
thence acquires the uttermost signiicance in this
approach; diverse perspectives ofer up multiplex and
chaotically juxtaposed ontologies, but no simple vista
onto a common world, nor a simple picture of the human.
In this newer view the “cosmos” in cosmopolitics
becomes charged in a way not seen since Diogenes and
the Cynics in ancient Greece (Turner 2015).
Questions of metaphysics, ontology and cosmology are,
indeed, in the air in Twenty First Century philosophy and
anthropology. The engagement with the ontic, with what
people studied by ethnographers take to exist, amounts
to something of a revitalization movement for an
ethnographically-driven anthropology if we are to judge
by contemporary heated debates (cf. Carrithers, Michael,
et al. 2010, Holbraad and Pedersen 2014), or the newly
formed journal Hau, whose stated aim is “to reinstate
ethnographic theorization in contemporary anthropology
as a potent alternative to its “explanation” or
“contextualization” by philosophical arguments”. 4 The
10
INTRODUCTION
literature has grown voluminously in this area, but one
symptomatic feature is the heightened awareness of the
“other-than-human-agents” active in the ethnographic
worlds in which anthropologists travel. We have become
attuned to identifying new kinds of entities, in particular,
new types of agents in places where they might not have
been noticed before; or where, in the past, we might have
dismissed their presence as poetry or reiication (trying
in this way to reduce them to preigured philosophical
“contexts” or “explanations” such as “myth”, “belief”, or
even “representation” itself perhaps). The newer
cosmopolitics is above all about rethinking inter-entity
relationships. We are no longer guided by looking at how
humans live in what we take to be “their” environment,
“their” umwelt; the other beings and things involved will
have their say. Their viewpoint must be taken into
account, including on what constitutes an environment or
unwelt in the irst place. Other than human entitites can
no longer be thought of as mere supports for “our” world,
or as symbols for human thought-consumption in general.
We will recognise too, though, the distinctly human
agents whose ideas are feeding these debates, especially
Bruno Latour and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro who have
become its main igureheads and provocateurs, at least
within anthropology. These two have diferent, but in
some areas compatible, theoretical agendas. Latour is
working with a theory whereby agency (the capacity to
create efects) appears as a facet of participation in a
network (originally ethnographically centered on the
actor-networks of scientists, e.g. Latour 1988). Some of
the agents involved are recognizably human and some
are not. One of Latour’s points is that the particular
capacities of the humans would be impossible without the
assistance of the non-human agents and “actants”.
Having established the great diversity of these networks,
he has called on Isabelle Stengers’ cosmopolitics to talk
about what happens at the boundary between diferent
projects and the cosmoses they bring into being, as well
as the work of translation that mediate them (Latour
2005a, 2005b).
11
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
Viveiros de Castro takes as his starting point lowland
Amazonian societies where human relationships with
other animal and spiritual beings are of the essence, and
the capacities of humans are again integrated with the
capacities of non-human-agents in the task of
regenerating society. Crucially, he has repositioned a
generic and deining feature of animist worldviews:
humans, animals and certain objects, despite their
outward appearance (their skins), share soul stuf (and
hence a single culture or worldview) and are thus
capable of transforming and exchanging their multiple
natural outer forms. The particularities of the “human
condition” are thus discovered through contrasts (and
transformations) with the condition of “beasts” and
“gods” (1992:304). This animist insight has a central
status in his specialised social theory, “Amerindian
perspectivism” (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2012).
The importance of these ideas for an understanding of
cosmopolitics comes from their power in combination.
Latour’s extension of network theory to include nonhuman-agents gains strength from Viveiros de Castro’s
revised exploration of an animist worldview. Viveiros de
Castro’s theory, speciic to Amazonian societies, takes on
much greater signiicance as part of Latour’s reappraisal
of modernity (Latour 2004, 2009), and vice versa.
Latour's critique of the moderns (1993) is newly
mobilized in Viveiros de Castro's generalized symmetrical
perspectival anthropology (see his “Manifesto Abaeté” 5)
and in his emphasis on the “controlled equivocation”
needed for conceptual translation and ethnographic
description (2004). Of itself, animism is hardly news in
the world of anthropology (even taking into account the
special turn Viveiros de Castro gives it) but Viveiros de
Castro’s ideas gain much greater force if it turns out
that, in one way or another, we are all animists, which is
efectively what Latour has been arguing for some years,
that “we have never been modern” (1993).
By removing the hierarchical order that makes a
singular nature the measure of every subordinate
worldview (cf. Wagner 1981), the new cosmopoliticians,
12
INTRODUCTION
in principle, democratize cosmology opening the door to
an ininite number of further universes. Rather than
trying to eliminate inadequate worldviews in the name of
nature, each cosmos is welcomed for the project it
describes; there is no best cosmology that all could aim
towards partly because there is no “totality”, only many
transforming networks and communities of actors and
entities. Even Hilbert’s hotel (Benardette 1964) with its
ininite number of rooms is full sometimes, but this can
easily be remedied — the guest in room 1 shifts one room
down along the corridor ad ininitum. Here, we can
knock on the door of Humanity1, H2, H3…, H∞. Thus,
theoretically at least, space is made for each new entry in
the cosmological encyclopedia – a splendidly baroque
scene of endless refractory courtyards, staircases and
corridors. At the same time, of course, the cosmopolitical
anthropologists present themselves in the special role of
describers, translators, negotiators and diplomats
(Latour 2005b) when it comes to neighbourly relations
between all these “rooms” or cosmoses. This image of
ininite space crumpled into the form of rooms is central
to Deleuze's account of the Leibnizian fold (1993), whose
language Vivieros de Castro transposes to his own theory
of “Amerindian” and “anthropological” perspectivism
(e.g. 2007:160). It is also the theme that Corsin Jimenez
takes
as
his
starting
point
in
understanding
anthropological knowledge practices (this volume).
Combined, a central feature of these new perspectives
is that they remind us how humans depend on otherthan-human agencies for their social projects. These
relationships are not peripheral. They are of the essence
in understanding how people gain a cosmological
perspective. In particular these relationships should be
understood as constitutive of what it means to be a
human actor because human capacities transform in
concert with the changing relationships between human
and non-human actors. Taken even further, then,
humanness (subjectivity) is relative to whatever
particular
networks
and
relationships
appear
situationally. We are reminded of Wagner's image of the
“fractal person” — “never a unit standing in relation to
13
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
an aggregate, or aggregate standing in relation to a unit,
but always an entity with relationship integrally implied”
(1991, p. 163). Hence, we may view these new
developments as, on the one side, subtracting from the
ethics of human recognition and hospitality that guided
the older cosmopolitics. However, perhaps we may come
to see them as having promethean qualities too. Certainly
(some) human voices will lose their right to speak for
everyone; but at the same time it may come about that
others gain a voice (cf. de la Cadena 2015). And there
may be similar losses and gains when we place the two
kinds of cosmopolitics in a conversation.
Both Viveiros de Castro and Latour are working out of
a structuralist-post-structuralist trajectory which involves
decentring and relativizing human subjectivity. Of course,
we have known about the relationships between humans
and other-than-human entities for a long time in
anthropology – as the extensive literature around
totemism, taboo animals and liminal objects shows. In his
book The Two Sources of Morality and Religion , (1935)
Bergson indicates that when we stare at the spinning
roulette wheel and rotate our hand to “make it” stop
where we want, then we are, in a generic way, invoking
the same kinds of animistic-magical-pantheistic forces
that we humans have always enlisted in pursuing our life
projects. Bergson adds that what we call religious
experience can lead both to “closed” and to “open” ways
of experiencing the material world and its psychic
properties. In an ecstatic open mode,
the soul opens out broadens and raises to pure
spirituality a morality enclosed and materialized in
ready-made rules: the latter then becomes, in
comparison with the other [the open mode of
experiencing] something like a snap-shot view of
movement … Current morality is not abolished; but
it appears like a virtual stop in the course of actual
progression (1935:46).
However, leaving the history of thought entailed here
14
INTRODUCTION
aside, combined, these newer expositions have allowed
us to clear some of the intellectual overgrowth; perhaps
enabled us to see some new wood beyond.
One key issue is this: as anthropologists our focus
often narrows to particular people and their relations
with each other, but for the people in question, their
world is not made up solely of other people or of human
relationships: it is engaged with a panoply of diverse
signiicant entities and relationships between them. In
this volume (“An Amazonian Question of Ironies and the
Grotesque”), Joanna Overing tells how the Piaroa of the
Amazon, must continuously try to clean up the poisons
left behind by the gods Wahari and Kuemoi in Mythic
Time so that they can live a human life now. The
practices of ingestion, excretion and cleansing involved
are absolutely of the essence in living a beautiful life of
wit and laughter in their present day cosmos. In a
diferent vein, but with a comparable degree of ethical
and aesthetic concern, Sidney Mintz’ gathers together
decades of his own interest in kinds of food and ways of
eating (“Devouring Objects of Study: Food and
Fieldwork”). All this ofers him the ground for a global
vision of human beings united in their dependence on
foodstufs (we know ourselves through what we eat); and
of the anthropologist as, in turn, a “devourer” of these
varying “objects”. Humans, we come to see, are uniied
by their fragile relations with a diversely edible world.
And, we may think here of the eforts made by space
scientists to domesticate extraterrestrial environments in
light of anthropocenic awareness that the earth may soon
become too toxic to support human life (Battaglia 2016).
The older cosmopolitics understood that the subject
knows itself by way of the objects that preoccupy it – that
make up its world. The aim is an “enlarged mind” (to use
Kant’s phrase; [1790]1952:153) capable of extending the
scope of its preoccupations. However, the newer
cosmopolitics goes further; subjectivity is co-dependent
— it is the kinds of exchanges between humans and other
agents and entities that are key to a cosmos: “humans”,
“beasts”, “things”, “gods” together compose particular,
15
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
mutually deining, worlds (collective “nature-cultures”).
Some of the entities we encounter in these worlds, as
strangers or guests, will feel familiar, others much less
so. Adjusting our ethnographic focus can, then, ofer
rewarding perspectives and remind us to consider, in any
given ield situation, “for this person, or for those people,
how is their community, their cosmos, made up?” And, in
talking of a community we will include not just the
relationships of human beings, but also all the other
agents and crucial objects that are clearly participating
and contributing to whatever meaning “society”,
“community” and “cosmos” comes to encompass.
The basic question that the newer cosmopolitics has
revitalized, then, is how do all these beings and things
(which were taken to have a merely semiotic status in
previous “cultural” accounts) participate actively in the
lives of the people anthropologists are studying? For
example, if someone says in a tragic tone that “society”,
“the healthcare system” or “the banks” have failed, then
the ontologically-oriented reader will feel entitled to raise
the question “what kind of other-than-human-entitites are
these that they can ‘fail’ a given person, shared project
or cosmos?” In this vein, Mitt Romney claimed during the
2012 US presidential elections that “Corporations are
people too my friend”. Corporations do indeed
increasingly present themselves as persons politically
and economically, but, of course, this is actually not new
(see Bashkow n.d. for an anthropological understanding
of modern corporations as a transformation of “house
societies”): social persons of this kind have long been
able to invoke their jural right to freedom of worship, for
example. The (quasi-)political claims of “bodies
corporate” were a prime object of enlightenment
critique, of course, as The Wealth of Nations (1776)
exempliies. This was because the political power of the
corporations in their day stood directly at odds with how
enlightenment thinkers understood individual freedom
and human moral agency. Adam Smith exempliies this
stance, but it is integral too to Immanuel Kant’s view and
hence to his understanding of how a cosmopolitics should
16
INTRODUCTION
proceed. So it seems worth our while (both as
anthropologists and as human beings) to treat claims on
behalf of corporations very seriously, and to treat the
power of other-than-human-agents likewise. Above all,
Stengers asks that, as makers of claims about a “good
common world” or of one yet to be composed,
anthropologists and others should “slow down”, and
exercise a certain Dostoievskian “idiocy”; we should
recognise and pay attention to the many participants and
cosmological interests involved in a situation before
assuming we can already know “who can be a
spokesperson of what, who can represent what”
(2005:995).
As ethnographers, if we can shape what is involved in
these kinds of concerns and questions into a method,
then the answers we uncover are likely to be revealing:
we will gain new concepts and frames for anthropological
comparison – new accents on what reality can be like for
a human being. Even for Viveiros de Castro, this seems to
be what is motivating his theory; he is interested in what
the world is like for Amazonians precisely because they
too are human. Their world is interesting “to think with”
precisely because it too is a “human” world, hence his
interest as an anthropologist (Viveiros de Castro 2014).
As we might expect, this kind of striving curiosity lies
behind many of the chapters in our volume: for example
John McCreery (“Why Do the Gods Look Like That”) asks
why, when divinity is known to be immaterial, there are
human-like statues of Chinese deities and why do the
gods difer as they do in the ways in which they are
depicted? Wei-Ping Lin has provided one answer:
“statues make the formless omnipresent gods settle down
and build a stable connection with the villagers”
(2008:460): McCreery tests the implications of this.
Again, questions of cosmos are answered by exploring
the inter-entity relationships involved, but the knowledge
derived is still very much knowledge about a human
perspective.
A few years ago, the BBC released a ilm made by
Emad Burnat and Guy Davidi called The Village that
17
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
Fought Back: Five Broken Cameras (2012). Emad Burnat,
a one time Palestinian farmer, is the narrator and the ilm
is made up of video footage edited to show the struggle
between people in Bil’in and the Israeli army and Israeli
settlers in this part of the West Bank. The ilm
foregrounds the efects this has on the villagers, many of
whom are arrested, some shot and one is killed by Israeli
soldiers, and on Emad Burnat himself. The “ive cameras”
of the ilm are quite explicitly presented as protagonists
in Emad’s narrative since they are either shot at or
otherwise broken. Emad’s compulsion to ilm, and the
fact of the camera constantly “ilming”, become cruxes
for understanding the reality of the situation. Other key
agents include the Israeli jeeps, the bulldozers and
excavators, the wire mesh wall that divides the
Palestinians from their former farmland, the newly built
high rise settlements that tower over the surrounding
landscapes, the olive trees that are torn up at the roots
or set alight. In the unfolding visual description we see
diferent objects acquiring prominence as components of
the “struggle”: the villagers build an “outpost” on what
they consider to be their own land and this building then
takes on a certain life of its own.
Looking at a situation of this kind, the new ontologists
will have us attend to the objects and people that are
cooperating (or otherwise) immediately in the unfolding
of this particular reality, this speciic montage of shots.
They would have us see all this, not in terms of the
mechanisms and structures of a static society, but as
elements of a process through which reality is constantly
being sutured together. There is clearly value in this way
of looking, because it takes us closer, in certain ways, to
what the people involved actually perceive. What they
envisage acquires greater signiicance than if we claim
that this is a “representation”, an “identity” or the
expression of a “system of symbols”. And, so,
anthropologists may be able to jettison some of the heavy
machinery of interpretation by which they mediate
between “reality” and “ideology” – structure, semiosis,
episteme, doxa, whatever. So far so good we may think.
This, for example, is a central concern of the chapter
18
INTRODUCTION
"Can the Thing Speak?" by Martin Holbraad, who has
taken a key part in arguing for a revised kind of
ontological awareness in anthropology. And here he
makes a further step. We should no longer perhaps think
of what we do as a study of (or an) “anthropos” —
perhaps what we need instead is a deep “thing-ology”,
one that gives us much more direct access to things as
they are, not as they are mediated by human-oriented
concerns about belief or representation.
That “things” can act independently of human
intentions should hardly come as too much surprise; the
question is of course which, when and where and who is
in control. In particular how is this awareness
operationalized and theorized in an ethnographic
account? Daniel Miller gives us one answer in his
“Extreme Reading of Facebook” (this volume). Facebook
is a body corporate, a “big bang”, whose powers of
engrossment may seem mind-boggling to anyone
(perhaps those very few remaining persons) of a fusty
enlightenment mind-set. Miller makes a crucial point
when he argues from Nancy Munn that the power of a
body like Facebook lies in its command of “negative
transformations of spacetime… any cultural form that
creates expansion has to have within itself the opposite
quality which would destroy and shrink spacetime”.
Titanic powers of this type may well remind us of
Overing's account of the Myth Time struggles of Kuemoi
and Wahari strewing behind them a world full of poisons
for the people of Today Time to sort out, re-ingest and
turn into a beautiful “human life”. However, these
questions of scalar expansion and contraction are taken
up in another register by Alberto Corsin-Jimenez in his
chapter (“How Knowledge Grows”) to talk about the
“optics of volumes” involved in being able to envisage the
state as a large body, speciically as “Leviathan”. The
most individualist of thinkers will accept that the State is
“something big”, it has “large proportions” thus its
efects on humans are large — how has this knowledge of
the state body come about? Corsin-Jimenez ofers an
erudite survey of the intellectual-technical means by
which the modern state acquired space and embodiment.
19
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
His intervention also reminds us that in the background
of the new ontology are “hyperobjects” — objects such as
“global warming” or “inance money” that are so large,
and whose efects are so ungovernable, that they defeat
traditionally “modern” scales of human thought and
action (Morton 2013).
The ideas underlying the new cosmopolitics are clearly
potent and have reach, but a few initial sounds of caution
are warranted. At the ethnographic level, applying the
kinds of insights that Latour and others are developing
via this programme still presents us with a politics of
explanation when we decide to generalize – when we
make claims at the “cosmological” level. In Ruth
Benedict and Margaret Mead’s joint research project –
The Study of Culture at a Distance – there is a case
where former Shtetl jews are being interviewed, and one
of the lines of inquiry concerns whether women have
souls or not. The male interviewees seem unanimously to
take the view that women do not have souls. When a
woman is interviewed about whether women have souls
she replies “certainly, more than men” (Mead et al.
1953:135-137). So immediately we can witness how
friction regarding the way the cosmos is constituted is
not just friction between diferent peoples and their
cosmologies, but also takes place within groupings and it
scales down to the level of individual meaning (see
Radin’s Crashing Thunder for more on this, 1926).
Joanna Overing, who has worked for many decades with
the Amazonian Piaroa, has indicated that Viveiros de
Castro’s interpretive emphasis on predation and certain
kinds of relationship with spirit-beings amongst the
Araweté has the efect of giving analytical preeminence
to adult men (shamans and warriors) in that world –
because prioritizing the signiicance of certain kinds of
ritual exchange with spirit-beings also foregrounds the
power of male human beings to make society (e.g.
Viveiros de Castro 1992:142; note the contrast with
Overing 1999, 2004, n.d.). Anyone who has read EvansPritchard’s The Nuer (1940) carefully will notice that the
point of view that predominates is that of a young adult
Nuer man. So, again, alongside the issue of subjective
20
INTRODUCTION
change and personal transformation, we are left with
dormant questions about how the community or cosmos
might be constituted otherwise from other subjectpositions.
In fact, many ethnographic accounts are written out of
the experiences of young, often single (or at least alone
in the ield), graduate students of perceived aluency,
already given to occupying certain social categories and
networks, both at “home” and in the “ield”, positions
that thus limit their perspectives and understandings.
When it comes to a vision of a kind of ieldwork that
might collapse these predictable categories of ield and
home, questioner and questioned, friend and informant,
the discussion here ("Friendship, Anthropology”) by Liria
de la Cruz and Paloma Gay y Blasco precisely helps us
reconsider the ieldsite and the ethnography that awaits
it as analytical artifacts built out of the experience of
particular kinds of human relationship. We are reminded
that the notion of “the gypsy woman”, the “middle class
Spanish woman” are precisely operationalized by the
type of intellectual apparatus that is an ethnography. In
this way, we come to recognise this artefactual character
of the ethnography when it comes to rethinking our
individual
experiences
of
friendship,
of
being
categorized, of categorizing; and the part these play in
our notion of “our” world.
What is valuable in all this “ontological” discussion,
then, is at least twofold: it reminds us of the purpose of
ethnographic work as Malinowski described it, which is
to understand “their” (the people with whom we as
anthropologists work) “vision” of their “world”; and, in
addition, when it helps clear out of the way some of the
mediating theoretical language. We cannot achieve the
basic Malinowskian insight if we have already decided in
advance what a “rationally” structured world looks like
and what kinds of actors are existent or non-existent and
how they really are, or ought to be, ordered and
interrelated. This is what the newer cosmopolitics is
challenging. Arguably, the highpoint of the rationalist
stance in anthropology came in the late 70s and early
21
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
80s. By then ethnography had become far less engaged
with understanding how people in a certain setting
viewed their world, and much more concerned with
identifying where those people it in preconceived
theoretical templates, whether that be Structuralist,
Marxist, Cognitivist, or Semiotic-Interpretive.
In this particular sense, the more rationalistic and
linguistically orthodox ethnographic writing became, the
more circular it became too; since it ceased to matter
how the particular people involved thought about and
acted on the questions at issue. The post-modern trend
certainly undermined conidence in what theory could do
by itself in that respect: but, as has often been noted,
post-modern writing, if anything, took us further away
from people and instead attended to the life and
concerns of the ethnographer, and a lot of what resulted
was facile and narcissistic. One positive reaction to this
has been to argue much more vigorously for the
phenomenological validity of informants’ concepts with
the aim of “rendering [their] categories analytical”
(Toren and Pina Cabral 2009:10). Ethnography thus
becomes the apparatus for an analytical “rendering” of
local terms – baloma, baraka, cargo, the corner, crab
antics, mana, mayu-dama, moka, naven, ofcomers –
concept-words which, for all their speciicity in capturing
a world outlook and a pattern of action, still yield insights
into universal human capabilities for the perspectives
they ofer on diferent “spaces of reason”. The new
cosmopolitics could be described as “neo-rationalist” in
this regard, highlighting the creative work that concepts
– whether “etic” or “emic” – do in diferent knowledge
practices (Crook and Shafner 2011). For instance, they
can enable us to put in question ideological principles
that have a similarly reiied status in our outlook (e.g.
marriage, productivity, mental illness, and welfare),
including those that act as an analogic base for modern
anthropology and ethnographic description, such as
“kinship” (Schneider 1984), “culture” (Wagner 1981), or
the “relation” (Strathern 1995). Cosmopolitics, then,
involves putting a more varied, and more jaggedly
juxtaposed, range of concepts into play to test out the
22
INTRODUCTION
parameters of our supposedly common world and the
experience of being human in it.
Given this awareness of the analytic value of terms like
these, what seems to be strikingly absent in the
ontological approaches we have discussed so far is a
consideration of imagination. For an anthropologist,
questions of the kind “which agents are participating in
the world of the people we work with?” fundamentally
comes back to a concern with how those people –
individually and in aggregate – imagine their world. So,
in asking that type of question, we are giving an
epistemological value to their ways of imagining and
reasoning. We are, after all, hoping to answer why these
people do the things they do; not from our preformed
theoretical template, but from what we understand to be
their pattern of thought and action. There is a problem
involved here that philosophers describe in terms of
“internalism” versus “externalism” (e.g. Williams 1981).
Are people’s reasons for action best understood in terms
of their motivations (internalism) or by reference to the
layout of the ield they ind themselves in (externalism)?
We can cut a long story short here by asking how far we
anthropologists will go in crediting our own external
gaze, and our capacity to model the given situation
(including its ontic properties), with the power to explain
the internal motivations and understandings of those we
are encountering (Wardle 2014: 280).
Concerns akin to these (and to those described by John
McCreery) are explored by Philip Swift (in his chapter on
“Cosmetic Cosmologies in Japan”). At Ise, Buddhist and
Shinto shrines “[e]verything happens as if the invocation
is simulated, seemingly going no further than the curve
and contact of surfaces – clapping, bowing, and the
pressing of palms together.” There is indeed “ something
happening here/What it is ain’t exactly clear ”6 since
responses to questions are frequently equivocal, but
whatever “it” is demands an inspection of our intuitively
held topology of internal versus external, motivation
versus outcome. This awareness of “something
happening” seems, in turn, to depend on a particular
23
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
understanding of the “surface” which, while it is literally
“supericial”, its very artiiciality is also “eficacious”. We
are led to ask what notional self or motivational state (for
example, what manner of “prayer”) is implied by this
particular mode of relationship to divine objects whose
divinity is often disavowed. A Protestant “man of action”
may feel uncomfortable here we guess, but there is
nothing inactive about Japanese social life; indeed the
gods do not want oferings that have not been “fabricated
by means of a device”. We are left with a puzzle and a
challenge.
We have seen that Latour’s interest in ontology has to
do with describing what kinds of coalition of human and
non-human agents are at work in creating a particular
reality – and hence what it is like to be a subject or agent
in this or that arrangement or assemblage, which is
where “cosmopolitics” has also entered the picture. If
particular situations throw up distinct coalitions of
subjectivity and agency, then these will show up as a
distinct “cosmology”. It is not obvious from Latour’s
description how the transition or translation involved,
from network to cosmological gestalt, comes about —
how the cosmological boundary is formed. Nonetheless,
diferent coalitions and cosmologies clash where some
key feature of their world is at stake. A mining company
conlicts with a group of forest users over the capacities,
meaning and value of the entities and forces present in
that setting. Latour points to the fact that this kind of
clash is not just one between Western technological
civilization and a “local culture” over the same resource;
it is a clash between two entirely distinct assemblies of
people and things for whom reality coheres in
fundamentally distinct ways. They cut the network
diferently (Strathern 1996).
In Tristes Tropiques, Levi-Strauss mentions a case
where Spanish colonists torture Amerindians to see if
they have souls, while Amerindians drown a conquistador
to see if he has a body: their worlds and their worldhypotheses – their cosmo-ontologies – are fundamentally
distinct. It should be noted though that the logic of the
24
INTRODUCTION
diferences involved indicates, for Levi-Strauss at least, a
common manner of structuring thought (1973:91). It is a
shared logical foundation of this kind that Jean La
Fontaine (this volume) draws on in her chapter here
when she critically assesses our fear the others are
engaged in profane acts of human sacriice (“Ritual
Murder?”). Ironically, inhumanity is ascribed to others
according to a universally available human thoughtscheme.
The outcome of clashes of understanding like these
will be, Latour suggests, that either one of these realities
is erased, or there will develop some kind of negotiation
and redeinition of terms. Notice that Latour is not an
internalist – the reasons the individual gives for whatever
is going on are insuficient because the truth of their
cosmology is not to be found in what one person thinks
about the matter, but is rather distributed across the
network, particularly in the co-activities of all the other
agents. But, nor is Latour an externalist either – that
which is exterior to the actor only makes sense if we take
into account what this actor is aiming at, who they are
trying to enlist and wherefore. The perspective on reality
is itself a fold of reality: what appears to be internal
knowledge is external seen from the adjacent position
that overlaps and encloses it.7 A lot of this feels quite
paradoxical and we may feel that this adds to its
attraction.
In his chapter here (“Cosmopolitics and Common
Sense”), Huon Wardle comments on this aspect of the
Latourian viewpoint. Indeed the question of “viewpoint”
is curious in all this. Latour is always careful to avoid a
claim to any special analytical position from which to
understand some other person’s network or cosmology.
He is certainly arguing against the possibility of any type
of “externalist” or transcendent stance from where we
might judge what is “really” going on. Me (and “my”
knowledge) are always inside the “social” according to
Latour. In this regard, he likes to use metaphors from
computing: as subjects we are always plugging in new
connections and downloading new signiiers that will
25
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
help us extend our network capabilities, nevertheless we
cannot reach beyond the horizon of our own particular
knowledge state because this knowledge is integrated in
a supportive network. We would, so to speak, be tearing
our own knowledge out of its own fabric of meaning by
doing so. We may add components and programmes to
enhance our capacity: either way, there is no view
“outside” our networked subjectivity. Following the
philosopher Leibniz, Latour thinks that I/we is always
already occupying whatever optimal reality it can at any
given moment.
This may remind us of Voltaire’s satirical creation, Dr
Pangloss, who lives “for the best in the best of all
possible worlds”. And, if we have understood Latour,
there really is no universalisable standpoint from which
subjectivity can take a view on and then critique its own
understanding in any foundational terms; which also
means there is no transcendent position from which an
anthropologist can critique the conditions of experience
of another person or group of people. The role of the
anthropologist is rather to describe the enfolding and
remaking of reality with certain actors in view. But let us
remind ourselves that the politics of cosmology, both
between cosmologies and amongst groupings of people is
usually precisely aimed at organizing and ranking certain
ways of understanding the world, and, in some cases, at
the extreme, this will involve the intentional eclipsing, or
erasing, of particular points of view.
Latour does, though, praise the potential in
anthropology to show that there are many ways of living
a life. This side-by-side diversity seems to ofer an
opportunity for a kind of critical appraisal; the process of
comparison involved might also contribute toward the
peaceful negotiation between cosmological views.
Sometimes Latour points to a special role for
anthropologists
in
mediating
between
clashing
cosmologies (a kind of disinterested third party?), but it
is not clear at what point this mediation might become an
externalist view vis-à-vis each side; hence the
anthropologist would be making claims to intellectual
26
INTRODUCTION
transcendence which Latour has seemingly already ruled
out of bounds within the game of asking and giving of
reasons. In what seems like a similar vein, Viveiros de
Castro has urged anthropology to be “as the practice of
the permanent decolonization of thought” (2014).
This, however, taking into account Latour’s argument,
feels incoherent. Viveiros de Castro appears to be asking
that we should relinquish “our” given view in favour of its
constant
variation
and
transformation
through
encounters with others’, and particularly, that we should
halt the colonisation of other people’s worlds through the
superimposition onto theirs of our own cosmological
models and concerns. We may well sympathise with that
proposition, but it does not seem compatible with what
Latour is telling us. Latour argues that we can negotiate
about our mutually incomprehensible cosmologies, but
we cannot absolutely “decolonise” our view because this
would involve jumping out of our conjunction in the
network into some kind of transcendent position. At best
we can adapt our view into something else: innovation
and transformation necessitate convention as an analogic
base, or starting point (Wagner 1981). Perhaps, then, we
would colonise in a new way but, it would seem, we do
not decolonise, per se. Maybe this is what Viveiros de
Castro already means by that phrase, one can only guess,
since here we are at the outer limits of understanding the
programme that they are laying out, sometimes in a
shared, sometimes in a distinct, register.
Some inal Remarks on subjectivity and imagining;
and the beginning of a critical response
There is a lot that is useful food for thought in the
approaches that “the ontologists” (Holbraad and
Pedersen 2014) are making available. We have mentioned
some features; the focus shifts from deploying a heavy
theoretical machinery vis-à-vis social reality toward
closely observing the kinds of aggregates of people and
things that ieldwork afords. All this is grist for the mill
of following the lines of interconnection that the people
that we are working with in the “ield” have themselves
27
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
established as important. Researching the ield from the
point of view that we are all animists may well yield
rewards – though further questioning is necessary when
we ask on behalf of a particular situation, “in what way is
that true? And how is it important?” Or, how to
recompose an understanding of the world or the human
in the singular from all of these diferent multiple
perspectives. Do they add up, and if so, how? So,
epistemologically, there are other kinds of concern too.
It is striking that, despite Latour’s claims, particularly
his insistence that subjectivity is always network-speciic,
there is in fact a universal capacity at stake here (already
mentioned) – imagination. Human beings live in distinct
worlds, at least in part, because they imagine them
distinctly. Some particular human being may recognise
agency in a stone or in their i-device; this will change
from scene to scene. In contrast, we know that all human
beings imagine things and that this activity is
constitutive of what the world is like for any given human
being. Imagining is a universal capacity of humans
(distinctive, though, we might add, not exclusive). My
empathic ability (or inability) to orient myself in
another’s world, a world that is foreign to me, is likewise
an imaginative capacity and a limiting condition (or an
absence of one; see Stein 1989). In contrast, the
particular agency of stones or i-phones varies depending
on the social set-up. Imagining and reality are sometimes
opposed to each other (as are empathy and psychological
naturalism), but we should also remind ourselves that
imagining is the ground from which reality is constituted
via experience – there is no experience that does not
involve imagining. To quote Mimica, “What we call
“reality” and “rationality” are its works” (2003: 282).
They are literally after the fact of the imagination.
If one is not philosophically a Leibnizian, one may ind
it hard to take Latour’s claims that objects have
intentionality as seriously as we do the fact that human
beings imagine and thence they conjure into being highly
diverse human scenarios. The imagination is constitutive
of our perception and experience of reality – and often
28
INTRODUCTION
realities clash: we are not calling here on the distinction
imagination versus reality, but rather on the synthetic
relation
imagination-and-reality.
However,
when
considering Leibniz’ central place in contemporary
“ontological” framings of the project of anthropology, his
role as a founder, arguably the founder, of ethnology in
the Seventeenth Century should also be acknowledged
(Vermeulen 2015); likewise the deep-seated diferences
from the very beginning between the projects of
ethnology and anthropology despite their common
origins in Enlightenment thought. Here, then, we may
note an antithesis: between ininite perspectival
extension of intellectuality versus the limits of reason,
between ethnology and anthropology, between Leibniz
and Kant.
We are all animists, then , in the sense that, in iguring
the world, and in living in it, we recognise ourselves as
enlisting the assistance of innumerable things, people
and non-human-agencies that help us continue the
project of a life with others. Our claim then is the
capacity for imagination is a human universal; one
possessed by anthropologists in common with the people
they work with. In contrast, the sense in which
cockatoos, khipu knots, corporations, i-phones, or
inancial instruments act and have intentionality varies
from ieldsite to ieldsite. This is not at all to dictate what
people should imagine, or to prejudge how their worlds
should look to them, let along why – certainly not to rule
out certain worlds or particular formations of reality a
priori. Nor is it to deny that other animals have their own
respective cognitions (e.g. de Waal 2016). There is plenty
of room to debate and celebrate how the imagination
participates in making reality. But it is clear that the fact
of imagining does ofer a universally available position of
(cosmopolitan) critique because all human beings share
this faculty. And here one is reminded of a comment by
Hannah Arendt:
Imagination… is the only inner compass we have,
we are contemporaries only as far as our
imagination reaches. If we want to be at home on
29
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
this earth, even at the expense of being at home in
this Century, we must try to take part in the
interminable dialogue with its essence (1953).
Anthropocentric
anxiety
is
also
anthropocenic
uncertainty. The older comforting perception of the
protecting hand of Leviathan supporting mid-Twentieth
Century anthropology’s notion of culture has fragmented
– with mechanical bits and pieces left in its place.
Meanwhile, intensiied awareness of being part of the
same human species beyond the older circles of
sympathy accompanies and triggers contemporary fears
that humans have altered the balance between
themselves and nature to such a degree as to set of
ungovernable ontological efects; perhaps most of all
irreversible chaotic environmental change forced forward
by the unstoppable inancialiation of the common human
landscape. Anthropologists were quicker than most to
diagnose the “runaway” character of global society and
the human as a “fearful god” in the midst of its creations
(1968); but in the interim the world ran away even faster
leaving the expert and their expert knowledge ever
further behind. The individual human, once mechanically
severed from those it loves, hates, eats and kills – beasts,
plants, things, gods – is also a homeless being, one
incapable of hospitality. This modernist insight,
accelerated by contemporary facts, surely underlies part
of the urgent activity of the newer cosmopoliticians.
What the clash between the old and new cosmopolitics
highlights, then, is a central and continuing problem for
anthropology — one that is at least as much a matter of
epistemology as of ontology: ways of knowing have their
own “ontogenesis” (Gow 2011), but our capacity to
comprehend this fact is epistemic. How, imaginatively,
are anthropologists to localize the places, people,
concepts and experiences that compose the intellectual
apparatus that is “a ieldsite” within a larger local-global
topology, or a common cosmos writ large? What kinds of
ideas of cause and efect should ground our accounts — a
scientiic conception of the cosmos? Our “common
30
INTRODUCTION
sense”, folk conceptions? Is it instead the cosmos as
expressed in the words and actions of our informants that
counts? In a world of massive human movement we can
hardly expect ethnographic concepts to stay in place.
And if so is the “informant” a speciic category of person
or can they truly be “anyone” (Rapport 2012)? The motto
that Leach adopted for anthropology was “only connect”
(1967), but how should we place their cosmology in
relation to our own? Should theirs be bridged to ours,
and if so, at what point? How to keep one from taking the
other hostage? Do we anthropologists have, anyway,
anything approximating to a uniied cosmology?
Ultimately, we may ask, what is cosmology? This renewed
problem of localization (cf Fardon 1990, Negarestani
2014), with its concern for how to establish a ground for
anthropological understanding, and hence ethnography,
in many ways re-plays the inaugural moment of “modern
anthropology”, which has haunted the history of the
discipline ever since, and here we return to Kant and his
original grounding of cosmopolitics in universal history.
“Humanness” is both given by nature and also a thing
of the human’s own making, Kant argues, saying this in
an era where other enlightenment thinkers, like Hume
took the make up of the human to be universal and given.
What we call “culture” is precisely the visible byproduct
of this human self-making, for Kant. He thus makes room
for freedom in his argument: there is freedom to make
diferent manners of life, distinct kinds of social truths on
top of, out of, and in addition to what is naturally given.
But his formulation has come back to haunt us in an
“anthropocenic” world, as Lee Drummond shows in his
chapter for our volume. When it comes to an athlete like
Lance Armstrong, whose seemingly “naturally given”
athleticism has been enhanced by drug use, the fault-line
is laid bare at the tense intersection of what is given and
what is plastic: the horizon where, as Kant would have it,
what humans may freely “make of themselves” comes up
against what nature “makes of them”. But to critique
Kant via Armstrong is, of course, to read Kant’s view of
the nature-culture distinction anachronistically. Indeed,
the Armstrong case exempliies a world where new
31
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
entities and their chaotic efects appear constantly and
ideas about how to humanize the conlicts that arise are
themselves diverse; branching of toward distinct
possibilities for a common human future.
Sturm's chapter (“What did Kant Mean… “) ofers a
context for Kant's pragmatic and cosmopolitan viewpoint
on history, placing it within discussions taking place in
the late 18th Century. He points to tensions that existed
during the enlightenment concerning the possibilities for
a cosmopolitan history. Amongst these were central
questions for historical inquiry such as: “what is human
nature?” and “how malleable is it?” “What constitutes a
cause in history?” “What part do human motives play in
historical change?” Figures such as Herder came to the
fore at this time to decry an enlightenment tendency to
project current values onto the history of other peoples
and epochs. Sturm proposes that Kant’s cosmopolitan
viewpoint simultaneously accepted human plasticity
without relinquishing the claim for a universal human
nature. He shows how Kant's intervention in debates of
his time about what constitutes a rigorous science or
discipline of history, precisely problematises the
givenness of the "human". In this sense, Kant, by
introducing the idea of mediating “categories” and
“concepts”, inaugurates the possibility of a modern
anthropology, one that could take humanity and human
society in all of his variability across all time and space
as its subject matter.
In that sense, Kant's opening move – his cosmopolitics
– is modern anthropology's facilitating and limiting
condition. All of the founders – Herder, Alexander and
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Durkheim and Mauss, Boas, and
Levi-Strauss – wrote in relation to his anthropological
concern. Contemporary critiques, even of Kant, are
enabled by his intervention. Kantian thought remains the
horizon of modern anthropology, even if remain mostly
unaware of it (Viveiros de Castro & Goldman 2012: 426),
just as we are unaware of Leibniz’ role in initiating
ethnology (Vermeulen 2015). In this way, one could, to
borrow a phrase from Whitehead, 8 say that the safest
32
INTRODUCTION
general
characterization
of
the
Euro-American
anthropological tradition is that it consists of a series of
footnotes to Kant. We may think here of Foucault’s
comment that while anthropologists may feel that they
can “do without the concept of man, they are also unable
to pass through it, for they always address themselves to
that which constitutes its outer limits” (see Piette 2015).
Hence, the necessity to come to terms with our own
Kantian heritage, afirming rather than disavowing it,
making it explicit.
Modern anthropology works from an implicit
assumption of a universal human architectonic, of the
constituting role that concepts play in mediating human
thought and experience. The assumption of the concept,
and of our particular image of it, both facilitate and limit
our capacity as anthropologists and ethnographers to
orient and navigate what we take to be others’ “worlds”.
“Localization is the constitutive gesture of conception
and the irst move in navigating spaces of reason”
(Negarestani 2014). For anthropology, this concerns the
problem of how to locate oneself in the ield, and
subsequently, the “ield” internal to ethnographic
description, with the added twist of having to describe
others’ concepts in terms of our own. It is a topological
problem through and through. As Wagner notes, “every
understanding of another culture is an experiment with
one’s own” (1981: 12).
Our accounts of others’ “concepts” are only as robust
as an anthropological concept of the concept (Viveiros de
Castro 2003; cf. Corsin-Jimenez & Willerslev 2007), since
the former is invented in terms of the latter (Wagner
1981). Our image of the concept acts as a control on the
kinds of concepts we allow ourselves to imagine to exist.
The moment we think we know a priori what a concept is,
ethnographic understanding is forestalled. We do not yet
know fully what a concept is, which is why it should be a
site of ongoing inquiry, rather than remaining given and
implicit. But what a concept is, is relative to where it is
within a general ecology, or space, of concepts
(Negarestani 2015). What the Kantian turn does then is
33
HUON WARDLE AND JUSTIN SHAFFNER
make explicit the assumption of the concept as both the
facilitating
and
limiting
condition
of
modern
anthropology (Zammito 2002), as both a means to and an
object of knowledge.
What is unique about the grand project of ethnography
is, hence, that it highlights or foregrounds other people’s
capacities – imaginations, gestures, practices, and ideas –
not as sites of intervention, per se, but rather as places,
moments or vantage points from which to recursively
intervene and transform our own concepts and thinking
(Holbraad 2012, Holbraad and Pedersen 2017). The
assumption that the other is analogous to us, that their
capacities (in particular their capacity for concepts) are
not only universal but also contemporaneous and
symmetrical with ours (Fabian 1992), rather than
subordinate, allows us radically to extend our
understanding of concepts as such, and thus to transform
our anthropological image of what it is to be human, or of
what is possible for humanity.
After Kant ([1798]2006), the hope has been that a
distinctively anthropological intervention in knowledge
about human nature will allow us not only to better
understand the unfolding of human history, but also to
make better interventions in it. “Our” here, in Kantian
terms, ultimately indexes no particular society, culture or
nation state, but rather a cosmopolitical anyone and "all
of us". The idea being that by relecting on human selfknowledge – the limits of humanity’s momentary
conception of itself and its world – may allow human
history to become a site of intervention that opens up
pragmatic potentials for further human co-dwelling in a
common world: earth. Here the two senses of
cosmopolitics, Kant's and Stengers' are not only closer
than they originally appeared to be, but also come full
circle in the historical moment where the anthropocence
and “world society” emerge as new universals (Hart
2010); ones that both implicate but also transcend any
given particular locale or region.
34
INTRODUCTION
Notes
1. For a full list of the OAC series see:
http://openanthcoop.net/press/publications/
2. See Charles Taylor on the pivotal role of Kant in re-orienting
human self-knowledge in this direction (1985: 81-83).
3. Our account of the “new cosmopolitics” intends neither to be
comprehensive, nor to imply that it exists as a homogenous
approach or ield. There are signiicant diferences say
between Descola’s program and that of the “recursive”
anthropologists (e.g. Wagner, Strathern, Viveiros de Castro,
etc), or between them and Latourian inspired “science
studies”, or even object oriented approaches. What we
intend instead is an account of the intellectual implications
of these positions, exploring what they have in common in
relation to the older Kantian sense of the “cosmopolitical”,
in order to bring them back into dialogue with each other.
4. See http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/index
5. See
https://sites.google.com/a/abaetenet.net/nansi/abaetextos/m
anifesto-abaet%C3%A9
6. Lyrics from “For What It's Worth” by Bufalo Springield
7. ‘a subject will be that which comes to a point of view… the
transformation of the object refers to a correlative
transformation of the subject’ (Deleuze 1993:21).
8. “The safest general characterization of the European
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of
footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1929).
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43
Chapter 2
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
Huon Wardle
HORATIO
O day and night, but this is wondrous strange!
HAMLET
And therefore as a stranger give it welcome.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
(Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 5)
The paradox of a ‘stranger’ welcoming something
‘strange’ was not lost on her Tiv audience when Laura
Bohannon recounted Shakespeare’s Hamlet to them in
1950s West Africa: without a relevant genealogy how
could they assess the meaning of the ghost King’s
relationship to Hamlet? (Bohannon 1966). The same
paradox looms in the idea of a cosmopolitan or world
anthropology: who plays host to whom intellectually in a
discipline
without
favoured
sites
or
privileged
genealogical matrices? Who will arbitrate which
‘spectres’ are honoured and which are relegated (Derrida
2006)? If we accept that both the ethnographic ield and
44
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
anthropology as a discipline are now not simply multisited but in truth ‘unsited’, then this paradoxical
predicament is already with us (Cook et al. 2009, Lins
Ribeiro 2006). Modern anthropological knowledge has
always been imagined in a certain way; it comes in emic
form from a ieldsite to a centre of knowledge where it is
welcomed for its potential to inform etic debates. But
who will play host and whom guest in an ethnography
and anthropology which does not distinguish ixed
intellectual loci or points d’appuis?
In what follows, I argue that pursuing the logic of a
cosmopolitan anthropology will inevitably open up a
renewed discussion on the meaning of subjectivity vis-àvis the social. I take as my focus a debate between Ulrich
Beck and Bruno Latour over the notion of the
cosmopolitan or cosmopolitical. Their contrary positions
signal the increasingly strong divergence between a
humanist and an organicist answer to the question 'what
is a subject'? On the one side, Beck stands for an
enduring humanism associated especially with Kant and
refracted in latter-day anthropology by diverse igures
including Firth, Mintz and Hannerz. For Beck, the human
subject is ‘a primary substance’ (Whitehead 1978:157): in
his stance, understanding the current condition of human
subjectivity is paramount for social science; other
questions are questions only relative to this substantial
one. On the other side, Latour ranks with proponents of
organicist philosophies and anthropologies including
Peirce, James, Whitehead, Bateson and, closer to the
present, Strathern. For these thinkers, subjectivity
derives its qualities from its distribution across emergent
networks: it is not a property solely or necessarily even
mainly of human individuals. The important discussion on
cosmopolitanism is not, in the irst instance, then, about
whether this term will replace other terms or even
whether cosmopolitanism is a ‘good thing’; it rather has
to do with the diverging conceptions of subjectivity it
engages, and the intellectual and ethical efects of these
engagements.
This paper begins with an excursus into the debate in
45
HUON WARDLE
question, looking irst at Beck’s cosmopolitanism then at
Latour’s contrasting cosmopolitics. We will see that
Latour’s critique revolves around the proposition that
Beck’s cosmopolitanism is too sociological and not
anthropological enough (Latour 2004). My worry is that
Latour’s comparative anthropology may itself be too
puriied
insuficiently
comparative,
plural
or
subjectivized, but I will leave those concerns until later.
However, Latour makes some points that we undoubtedly
need to consider in arriving at a distinctly
anthropological cosmopolitanism – one that accounts for
the common sense of ethnographic knowledge. Against
Beck’s humanistic cosmopolitanism, Latour posits a
cosmopolitics in which people, along with many nonhuman agents, create conlicting natures which they then
ight over. I suggest that the positions of Beck and Latour
may usefully be triangulated with a certain type of 19th
Century skepticism or ethical egoism. Via a discussion of
Kantian common sense I return to the issue in hand –
what might be distinctive about an ethnographically
informed
anthropological
cosmopolitanism?
What
assumptions concerning subjectivity might it presuppose
or
engage?
An
initial
rapprochement
between
cosmopolitics
in
the
Latourian
sense
and
cosmopolitanism may involve acknowledging the activity
of some of Latour’s non-human agents both in the
common sense of anthropologists and of their informants.
Zombie categories made visible
Ulrich Beck has described extensively the crisis in
‘methodological nationalism’ that he sees at the centre of
the fragmentation of latter-day social theory – and its
cosmopolitanization (2002, 2004, 2006). The roots of this
crisis lie in how the state has lost its metaphysical
priority as the cause, frame and context for all the social
phenomena that constitute it. There is an awareness that
most of the stock concepts of Twentieth Century social
science; the statistics that give mathematical meaning to
state practices; society (understood as a synonym of the
‘national fallacy’ 2002:29); the family; the household;
social class have become what Beck terms ‘zombie
46
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
categories’ under current conditions (2002: 24). Taking
their meaning each from the other, these concepts
continue to do intellectual work even though the lived
reality to which they refer no longer exists. The symptom
of these developments, and in certain respects the cure,
is the ‘clash of cultures and rationalities within one’s own
life’ (2002:35). Insofar as the awareness of attachments
across these supposedly bounded categories becomes an
ethical project, it lends itself to acknowledging a sense of
‘global responsibility in a world risk society, in which
there are “no others”’ (2002:35-36).
methodological cosmopolitanism implies a new
politics of comparison… The monologic national
imagination of the social sciences assumed that
Western modernity is a universal formation and that
the modernities of the non-Western others can be
understood only in relation to the idealized Western
model (2002:22).
In this new ield, ‘there is not one language of
cosmopolitanism,
but
many
languages,
tongues,
grammars’ (2002:35). However, on this point Beck is
wary
of
giving
value
to
culturally
relative
‘cosmopolitanisms’ since with this move we revert to the
conspectus of multiculturalism in which each individual
becomes ‘the product of the language, the traditions, the
convictions, the customs and landscapes in which he
came into the world’ (2002:35). In the speciic
intervention that becomes the object of Latour’s critique
(2004), Beck argues that rather than positing multiple
and incommensurable forms relative to one another,
cosmopolitanism must be based on a type of
contextualized universalism.
The true counterposition to incommensurability is:
there
are
no
separate
worlds
(our
misunderstandings take place within a single
world). The global context is varied, mixed, and
jumbled—in it, mutual interference and dialogue
(however problematic, incongruous, and risky) are
inevitable and ongoing. The fake joys of
47
HUON WARDLE
incommensurability are escape routes leading
nowhere, certainly not away from our intercultural
destiny (2004:436).
It is this ‘single world’ cosmopolitanism that becomes
the focus of Latour’s criticism. Beck, Latour argues, has
taken his cosmopolitanism ‘of the shelf, from the stoics
and Kant’ (2004:453). For Latour, Stoical and Kantian
cosmopolitanism both imply an ‘already uniied cosmos’
(Latour 2005:262,fn362). I will dispute this further on,
but it is certainly true that this represents Beck’s stance
– we have each internalized ‘jumbled’ versions of a single
world (Beck 2004:436). Further, in Latour’s view, it is no
use our continuing to say that if only we could agree
about the one world we all inhabit then our problems
could be resolved: we do not inhabit one world but
instead a pluriverse of divergently mediated worlds
(‘pluriverse’ being an adoption from William James,
1909). In the sense that people will not give up these
multiple worlds without a ight, then they are
incommensurable. In an ironic echo of Kant’s proposal
that enlightenment consists in throwing of a ‘selfimposed immaturity’ (Kant 1983:41), Latour tells us that
instead of continuing to appeal to a shared (human)
nature, Westerners need to jettison the Eurocentric
‘exoticism they have imposed on themselves’ (2004b:43);
that is to say, they need to join the others in recognising
many, variably mediated, natures.
As elsewhere in his writing, on this point Latour is
fulsome in his approval of Viveiros de Castro’s account of
Amerindian multinaturalism (Latour 2009). Unlike
Westerners who hold that there is one nature but many
cultures, Amerindians entertain many natures and a
single anthropomorphic culture. For Amazonian indians
the speciic natural form of an entity hides its general
anthropomorphic meta-structure. Latour presents the
parable
of
a
ight
between
Amerindians
and
conquistadores: Amerindians debate whether Spaniards
have bodies while Spaniards discourse over whether
Amerindians have souls – there is no shared nature
regarding which their arguments can be resolved. The
48
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
most important lesson here from Latour’s point of view is
that the stabilization of any given form of nature involves
the mobilization of hosts of non-human agents who
intervene, interfere and play diverse negotiative roles;
whether as divinities, test tube cells, DNA proiles, or
‘non-material couplings’ (1996). No purpose, then, in
invoking Amerindians as participants in a shared
cosmopolitan future: Amazonian Indians ‘are already
globalized in the sense that they have no dificulty in
integrating “us” into “their” cosmologies. It is simply that
in their cosmic politics we do not have the place that
“we” think we deserve’ (2004:457,fn13).
Latour’s cosmopolitics is, hence, not simply a struggle
between human individuals and their diverse worldviews,
it is a ight between human subjects plus all the nonhuman actors who participate (and can be thought of as
having
an
interest)
in
the
mediation
and
institutionalisation of speciic ields of nature-andculture. Thus Latour deines subjectivity in the following
pragmatic (some might say generous) way: ‘every
assemblage that pays the price of its existence in the
hard currency of recruiting and extending is, or rather
has, subjectivity’ (2005:218). This formulation has the
efect – and this is of course central to Latour’s project of reanimating, repersonalising and resubjectivising
numerous inert or ‘dead’ commodities, categories,
symbols, properties and objects, and making their
cosmopolitical role visible and analytically crucial.
Subjectivity
Demons?
amidst
a
multitude
of
Gods
and
This matter of redeining subjectivity is surely the
most fundamental point of divergence between Beck and
Latour. In Beck’s stance, subjectivity remains without
question a property of human individuals. For him,
cosmopolitanisation further pushes to the front the only
kind of subjectivity that counts – the subjectivity of the
thinking and acting human individual. As he states, ‘the
question “who am I?” is now irrevocably separated from
origins and essences’ (2004:449): cosmopolitanisation
49
HUON WARDLE
entails intensiied individualisation. Without resort to a
frictionless ethnic or national mandate, individual human
subjects increasingly must answer directly to (and
ethically for) the multitude of ‘gods and demons’
populating their versions of the world (Weber 1948:148).
At the same time, despite their divergence, an emphasis
on re-envisioning subjectivity is shared by Latour and
Beck precisely because both eschew Twentieth Century
social constructionism. Beck shows how the category
‘society’ has crumbled because the ‘transnational’ has
become so irrefutably knotted into every aspect of
subjective experience. The ‘national fallacy’ may,
nonetheless, become intensiied in these conditions. Even
while it has lost its ‘institutional or geographical ixity’,
the state continues to act – individuals are still forced to
build their practices around its manifold intrusions
(Trouillot 2001:126). But, Beck argues, nationality has at
the same time become decreasingly comprehensible in
value-rational terms: belonging to a particular nationstate has dwindling value as an explanation of anything
else. Latour, in the same vein, indicates the futility of
invoking a ‘society’ that lies behind, and at the same time
explains, every political manoeuvre apart from itself:
To insist that behind all the various issues there
exists the overarching presence of the same system,
the same empire, the same totality, has always
struck me as an extreme case of masochism, a
perverted way to look for a sure defeat while
enjoying the bittersweet feeling of superior political
correctness. Nietzsche traced the immortal portrait
of the ‘man of resentment’, by which he meant a
Christian, but a critical sociologist would it just as
well (2005:252).
Latour and Beck share something very signiicant,
then: they reject a cornerstone of classic sociological
critique and in so doing they reach back to social
philosophies that predate ‘society’ as an analytical
category. For Beck this involves an explicit return to
Kant. Meanwhile Latour, as we have seen, calls on the
pragmatism of Peirce and James in support of his revised
50
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
sociology of actors and networks. But this reaching back
takes them in distinct directions.
The reversed gaze beyond Twentieth Century social
theory is a highly signiicant facet of the current
intellectual dialogues around cosmopolitanism: there is a
search for a conceptual language and this can involve
either a redeinition of concepts already in play, new
coinings, or a return to parallel dialogues from the past.
Here I will briely triangulate the position of Latour and
Beck by introducing a relatively unknown mid-Nineteenth
Century social philosopher, Max Stirner, into their
controversy. Stirner, if not the most subtle of debaters,
nonetheless brings some of the relevant issues into
strong contrast. ‘Saint Max’ as Engels and Marx
nicknamed him (1963), was one of the Young Hegelians
who clustered in Berlin in the 1840s. It seems that he
was amongst the quietest of that group (Mackay 2005).
He published his only signiicant book, The Ego and its
Own, in 1844. The foundational stance of the Ego and its
Own is that the entire array of apparently humanizing
institutions – the state, humanity, human rights, man,
society, marriage, family and money comprise ‘spooks’ or
‘ixed ideas’ not absolutely diferent to the gods and
ghosts of previous eras. The idea of ‘man’ or humanity is
as much a ‘spook’ as is the ‘nation’ which it appears to
transcend. These concepts stand in an authoritarian
relationship to the individual ego which is unable to know
itself while they continue to dominate its consciousness.
Nationalist, revolutionary and humanist movements
evidence in common a generalized respect for Man, or
the Citizen, or the Party Member alongside a uniform
contempt for the individual as an individual ego.
The inability of the self to distinguish itself from its
own ixed ideas is ubiquitous, argues Stirner. ‘How
ridiculously sentimental’, he comments, ‘when one
German grasps another’s hand and presses it with sacred
awe because “he too is a German”’ (1907:302). Anyone
who rejects incorporation into marriage or fatherland or
humankind is labeled an ‘egoist’; but it is the label that
reveals the sanctity of the speciic category, the
51
HUON WARDLE
particular ‘spook’. As a young Hegelian, Stirner’s
narrative of how the ego (‘I who really am I’) comes to
know itself vis-à-vis these other lion-skinned ‘thistleeaters’ is historical and dialectical:
What manifold robbery have I not put up with in the
history of the world! There I let sun, moon, and
stars, cats and crocodiles, receive the honour of
ranking as I; there Jehovah, Allah, and Our Father
came and were invested with the I; there families
and tribes, peoples and at last Mankind, came and
were honored as I’s; there the Church, the State,
came with the pretention to be I, and I gazed calmly
on… so I saw I above me, and outside me, and could
never really come to myself. (1907:294-295).
To which a latter-day commentator might add: ‘here I
allowed multinational corporations, private security irms
and CCTV cameras to act extraterritorially as ‘I’; there
supermarkets, university ethics committees, banks and
lobby groups, web portals and credit agencies ranked
themselves unquestioned as ‘I’, while I, ‘who really am I’,
continued to draw money from the cash point.
Stirner’s ethical egoism demands that any principle or
idée ixe that I invoke I should appropriate as a principle
for myself alone. The ‘money’ I use is therefore not a
metaphysical money somehow independent of myself, but
is rather my money - money according to me; likewise
any of the other ‘spooks’ that are important for how I act
or think. The others likewise speak, not in the name of
some further ‘moral, mystical, or political person’, but
from their own unique ego (1907:294). In response to
Fichte’s humanistic ‘transcendental idealism’, Stirner
posits a ‘transitory egoism’ that rejects the assimilation
of myself into any other transcendent human ‘I’
(1907:237). Taking back ‘the thoughts [that] had become
corporeal on their own account… I destroy their
corporeity… and I say “I alone am corporeal”’ (1907:16).
I will act, then, only in accord with whatever principles
guide my action because those ideas alone truly exist for
me and I will assume that the others will act with
52
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
consideration to their ixed ideas and spooks.
Curiously, the more we read about Stirner’s ‘egoism’,
the more we may feel there is something self-less about
it. If, as Stirner suggests, I accept that my limits are
purely of my own subjective making then I relinquish the
fundamental egoist’s rationale that the remit of my idees
ixes should expand where and when I please because my
ideas must be true objectively for all. In contrast,
Stirnerian skepticism - the extension of an indiference
regarding the presuppositions of others into how I
consider my own principles - rather than exemplifying
egoism, suggests instead a stance that Bakhtin calls
‘playing a fool’. In Bakhtin’s account, a ‘selfconsciousness’ may emerge for the ego whereby, in its
attempts to extricate itself from the rhythm of its
relations with others, it ‘has passed all bounds and wants
to draw an unbreakable circle around itself’ (1990:120).
Hence, perhaps, the element of holy idiocy suggested in
Marx’s nickname for Stirner.
However, some important themes emerge here. On the
one
hand,
the
strident
emphasis
on
ethical
individualization connects closely with Beck, on the
other, the recognition of how non-human agents or
‘spooks’ participate as actors in the lives of individuals is
signiicantly Latourian, albeit that Latour is more
generous towards his ‘actants’ (2005). Speaking
teleologically, Stirner occupies a pre-Durkheimian world
where individuality can still be thought of without
reference to a society that preconditions it. He can
nonetheless cognise some of the forces that will coalesce
to establish that understanding. We should remind
ourselves that Stirner lived in a German milieu that was
ideologically but not socially or politically uniied – the
disparity between the exercise of power, subjective
imagining and shared sentiment was all too obvious to
him. Either way, Stirner would surely have agreed with
Beck about the historical processes leading to individual
self-recognition and no doubt he would have approved of
Beck’s description of ‘zombie categories’ so close as it is
to his own notion of the ‘spook’. Stirner would
53
HUON WARDLE
nonetheless have disapproved of the further idealistic
step towards a shared cosmopolitan project. With Latour,
he would have concurred that we live in many disparate
worlds in the company of a multitude of non-human
agents, though, again, he would strongly have disavowed
the intellectual decentring that enables Latour to equate
the subjectivity of these ‘spooks’ with my own self - ‘I
who really am I’.
The point in contention is not simply that Nineteenth
and Eighteenth Century intellectual conditions seem
suddenly
more
familiar;
that
these
parallel
conceptualisations appear more than ever synchronously
available and salient as part of our own apprehensions.
The problem can be posed another way: what stands
between these perspectives and our moment is Twentieth
Century mechanistic nationalism and the sociology and
anthropology that accompanied it. Perhaps there are
ways nonetheless of thinking through, round and beyond
that monolith.
To begin with we need to take heed of the conceptual
revision that is entering the foreground. The Twentieth
Century use of the word 'culture' familiarized us with the
idea of a system of signs that could be grammatically
ordered and exchanged at the collective and personal
levels. One thing that Latour - and Stirner too in
retrospect - tells us is that the matter is not so simple at
all: the entities we have come to call cultural signiiers or
symbols are not inert exchangeables, nor do they fall into
place within mechanical systems: instead they act on us
and for us; they are, in this sense, agents with
subjectivity of their own. And, as Beck indicates, they
may well - are likely to - have a life after their own death.
Whatever social science now emerges will have to
encompass those insights within its own common sense:
we need to rethink the common sense of anthropology
looking backward and forward.
54
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
The common sense of cosmopolitan knowledge and
ethics
The loss of interpretive power of social and cultural
constructionism is by no means a new predicament;
Hannerz has explored extensively the ecumenical
situations and orientations that this loss opens up for
view (1989, 1997, 2006). As long ago as the 1950s, Firth
had indicated how social boundaries are ‘in any case
arbitrary… [human beings] are continually overcoming
barriers to social intercourse’ (1951:28). Nevertheless,
Beck and Latour combined present us with new
challenges for how we rethink both the modes of
communication and the models of subjectivity that are
now in question. Since I want to bring Kant to my aid in
exploring these issues without jettisoning either Beck or
Latour, I must irst dispute Latour’s argument that Kant
ofers us the cosmopolitanism of an ‘already uniied
cosmos’ (Latour 2005:262,fn362). It seems one thing to
criticize Kant for his uniied architectonics of subjectivity,
rather diferent to suggest that the cosmos that this
subjectivity confronts is itself already completed for
Kant. My suggestion here, which builds on earlier work,
is that Kantian common sense ofers a distinctive frame
for iguring what is involved in a cosmopolitan imaginary
and by extension for understanding the current common
sense of anthropology (Wardle 1995, 2000).
Cosmopolitan ethics and knowledge are closely tied in
Kant’s writings with the capacity for relective judgement
[1. Kant’s teleological relection on world history in
Perpetual Peace (1795) pursues his detailed inspection of
teleological thinking in the Critique of Judgement
(1790).] (Arendt 2003, Kant 1983, 1952:96-97). Relective
Judgement, as Veblen tells us, can be understood as the
‘faculty of search… the faculty of adding to our
knowledge something which is not and cannot be given in
experience’ (1884:264). Those who consider Kant to have
taken for granted the outcome of this search (a uniied
cosmos) have in Veblen’s words ‘taken up the Critique
wrong
end
foremost’
(1884:263).
Subjectively,
cosmopolitanism exempliies not a world that is already
55
HUON WARDLE
uniied but a relective search for uniication which takes
place with others in mind. The shifting horizon of our
judgement at any given moment is whatever ‘everything’,
whatever ‘cosmos’ we can summon to encompass what
we know. Far from being uniied before the event, our
cosmopolitanism is fundamentally relative to each
situation of subjective judgment.
Hannah Arendt ends her essay ‘Some questions of
moral philosophy’ by drawing on what Kant has to say
about common sense in his Critique of Judgement (Kant
1983, Arendt 2003). She argues that what he states there
should act as a central point of reference for those who
wish to understand ethics after Nazism. In Arendt’s view,
this inal Critique of Kant’s, surpasses the rational ethics
of the Critique of Practical Reason. The fascist disaster
was not caused, Arendt suggests, by a failure of
rationality (Nazi functionaries were rational enough;
overly capable of applying a purely technical reasoning to
human afairs) the failure was rather one of judgement,
an incapacity to judge commonsensically that the rational
procedures in question were universally monstrous and
wrong. She points to Kant’s treatment of ‘common sense’
in aesthetic terms. Kant answers the potential
fragmentation and individualization of public knowledge
by examining the subjective ability to organize communal
knowledge through an aesthetics of common sense
judgement.
Arendt argues that each of my common sense
judgements, results from an imaginative process that
involves me in exploring the ield of associations that
make up the community to which I understand myself to
belong. Community is here radically relative to my own
striving and imagining; it could well include known
individuals but it might equally involve the heroes of
novels or ilms, dead relatives, igures I know from the
pages of wikipedia, people who I observe on the street
but whom I never choose to keep actual company with. I
am as a result ‘considerate in the original sense of the
word, [I] consider the existence of [these] others and…
try to win their agreement, to “woo their consent,” as
56
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
Kant puts it’ (Arendt 2003:142). I cannot communicate
concretely with Elias Canetti or Fellini’s ilmic hero
Guido, but I may well have them in mind in arriving at
certain judgements (the sense in which I try to woo their
consent is complex, of course). In this regard, when I
explored the cosmopolitan imaginings of my Jamaican
friends in earlier work, I realize in retrospect that I did
not always take full account of how the spirits of the dead
and other divinities can be interactively present in how
situations are imagined and common sense judgements
arrived at (Wardle 2000; I have explored these issues in
more recent work 2007). Particularly, given his early
lirtation with Swedenborgism (De Beaumont 1919), Kant
would have understood the part played by the voices and
visions that told Socrates to cross-examine the Athenian
pretenders to wisdom (Plato 1997).
Common sense (unlike pragmatic moral reasoning in
Kant’s view) is, again, an aesthetic faculty not a matter of
logic. The common sense of a particular individual
includes their distinctive gestus, their tonality, the
particular rhythm of that person’s modes of expression in
arriving at judgement. It describes a style of
characterising events and objects imaginatively and
applying these patterns judiciously to particular
situations. Of course how an individual’s common sense
expressiveness looks to an observer is incommensurable
with how common sense is experienced in the irst
person. Either way, this judiciousness is not simply a
matter of organizing perceptions correctly or not: on this
it is worth quoting Arendt at length.
The point of the matter is that my judgement of a
particular
instance
[depends]…
upon
my
representing to myself something which I do not
perceive. Let me illustrate this: suppose I look at a
speciic slum dwelling and I perceive in this
particular building the general notion which it does
not exhibit directly, the notion of poverty and
misery. I arrive at this notion by representing to
myself how I would feel if I had to live there, that is
I try to think in the place of the slum dweller. The
57
HUON WARDLE
judgement I come up with will by no means
necessarily be the same as that of the inhabitants…
but it will become an outstanding example for my
further judging of these matters. (2003:140)
Common sense is, hence, an active capacity: it entails
the ability to search out and organize the examples and
exemplars we need in order to form judgements about
people and situations.
True to his Copernican turn, for Kant, common sense
is hence a subjective faculty, not an objective body of
knowledge or a closed set of rules of thumb. And, from
the objectivist standpoint of social science, Kantian
common sense appears as, once more, radically relative.
There is no need to assume that we may be able to map
one individual’s ‘common sense’ onto another’s even
though, subjectively, common sense strives toward
universal validity. Common sense judgement may arrive
at a moment of objectiiable decisiveness (a box ticked or
not, for example) but it has of itself no measurable
properties only qualities: our understanding of common
sense must take account of the ‘very great diference of
minds’ as Kant puts it (2006:124). Nonetheless, as Arendt
argues:
The validity of my judgements will ‘reach as far as
the community of which my common sense makes
me a member – Kant who thought of himself as a
citizen of the world, hoped it would reach to the
community of mankind (Arendt 2003:140)
The exercise of common sense is, furthermore,
relexive. In his Anthropology, Kant encourages us irst,
to ‘think for oneself’; second, to think oneself ‘in the
place of every other person’ with whom one is
communicating; third, to think ‘consistently with oneself’
(Kant 2006:124,Wardle 2000:130). ‘Every other person’
surely means here not every person with whom I could
communicate in some concrete setting according to some
acknowledged standard of measurement, but rather
every other person whose personal standpoint I can
58
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
imaginatively ‘bear in mind’ in such and such a regard.
Hence, Kant construes a triadic process of relexive
reinement which consists in (1) knowing my own mind
(2) considering fully (enough) the standpoints of the
others (3) bringing this diversity into a kind of judicious
consistency (back to 1). Here is Arendt’s gloss: ‘while I
take into account others when judging, this does not
mean that I conform in my judgment to theirs. I still
speak with my own voice and I do not count noses in
order to arrive at what I think is right.’ (2003:140-141)
This reinement of common sense is, as Simmel would
say, a progressus ad ininitum: newer, more highly
diferentiated, diversely informed judgements constantly
come to mind even while others are forgotten or perhaps
remain only half cognized (1978:118). There is no point
at which I am able to say ‘I now possess as much
common sense as I need’. Arendt’s argument is that
ethics requires the constant intellectual traversing of the
community to which I imagine myself to belong. The
scope of common sense is a function of the narrowness or
broadness of association that I am capable of organizing
in this way and the judgements that result. She posits a
situation in which someone cites Bluebeard as their
moral exemplar – such a person we can try to avoid. The
far more dangerous individual is, instead, the one for
whom ‘any company would be good enough’, who is
incapable of considering others in the moral-aesthetic
frame of judgement. In conclusion, reiterating the wellknown phrase, Arendt comments how in ‘the
unwillingness or inability to relate to others through
judgement… lies the banality of evil’ (2003:146).
Note how Stirner’s ethical egoism observes stages (1)
and (2) of the Kantian progressus, but disables him from
engaging in (3). Kant saw beyond the predicament that
Stirner inds himself in. Stirner conlates thinking for
oneself (as a correlate of individualization) with the idea
that in my judgments I can only have myself in mind: on
the contrary, Kant suggests, I constantly displace myself
in favour of the others in order to judge in ways that have
the potential to be generally true, not merely true for
59
HUON WARDLE
myself. What Stirner sees as a monstrous relinquishing of
the self to fetishes and ghosts, Kant recognizes as a
necessary moment in the process of arriving at a moment
of judgement - so long as I am indeed thinking
individually. It seems unlikely, though, that Kant would
have guessed the degree of signiicance that all-ornothing decision-making would later take for the
existentialists whereby every choice is a test of the self’s
faith in itself.
How does this subjective picturing of common sense
help
us
to
consider
the
disputed
vision
of
cosmopolitanism versus cosmopolitics? There is already,
of course, a historical trajectory in which Kant’s
subjective sense of community meets and is transformed,
on the one side into Weber’s ‘subjectively believed’
ethnic belonging (1978b: 391) and, on the other, into
Simmel’s subjectively organized ‘web of groupafiliations’
(1955).
The
mid-Twentieth
century
interactionists with their emphasis on subjective choice
between cultural-symbolic options are also inheritors of
Kant, but they echo only rather distantly the qualities of
Kant’s original description. Their attempts to ind a
systematics as rationally convincing as Durkheim’s took
them further and further away from the aesthetic and
imaginative dimensions of the Third Critique. But if the
systematism of Durkheimian society is now redundant,
then this also throws doubt on the interactionists’
answer: interactionism as originally conceived will
always be on the look out for social systems to critique in
terms of rational subjective choice. Intersystems theory,
which starts with a similar problematic, relies, likewise,
on a ‘system’ that is then, so to speak, crossed out
(Palmie 2006:441).
A considerate cosmopolitics?
For the task in hand, instead of extending our
historical survey further (a useful mission), we need to
put some Latourian tests to Kant’s common sense. In
particular, we need to ask how incorporative can Kantian
common sense be of the kinds of non-human
60
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
subjectivities Latour demands that we include? However,
once we have pursued that question, it seems fair to turn
the tables and ask in return; how capable are these nonhuman subjectivities of making common sense
judgements? What capacities for moral aesthetic
‘consideration’ can we expect of these other subjects?
Let us remind ourselves of Latour’s generous deinition
of subjectivity. Agents and actants are characterized by
their ‘subjectivity’; the big issue is that there are many
more of these subjects in heaven and earth than were
dreamt of by Twentieth Century sociology. Subjectivity is
acquired by becoming a gathering point in a network and
by demonstrating the further ability to ‘recruit others’:
many, many actants can apply and become qualiied on
this basis (2005:218). And, whatever subjectivity is, it is
certainly not given a priori; on the contrary, as Latour
puts it, ‘[y]ou need to subscribe to a lot of subjectiiers to
become a subject, and you need to download a lot of
individualizers to become an individual’ (2005:216).
As Latour observes, non-human agents have always
held centre stage in the ethnographic worlds of
anthropologists; whether as baloma spirits, patrilineal
ancestors, yams or cassowaries. And as Strathern shows,
accounting for the relations making up these persons,
and the relationships between them, has been integral to
social anthropology as a project (1990). In ethnographic
accounts, non-human persons quite openly participate in
the day to day lives of the humans around them: Tallensi
ancestors punish recalcitrant entrepreneurs (Fortes
1959); yams decide to roam across the Dobuan gardens
during the night thus threatening the matrilineage
(Fortune 1963:108); or, in a case I am more directly
familiar with, Saints instruct city dwelling Jamaicans to
go out and warn of impending destruction (Wardle 2007).
In many respects, as anthropologists, we can agree with
Latour that ‘humans have always counted less than the
vast population of divinities and lesser transcendental
entities that give us life’ (2004:456). But the question in
response might be ‘counted’ for whom? ‘counted’ by
whom?
61
HUON WARDLE
First let us consider again some of the ethical
dimensions. What Latour is asking of Western cosmology
is a repersonalisation of the invisible agents – machines,
pandemic diseases, state practices which, while oficially
inert, act de facto as subjects. Would it help our
understanding of liberal ethics if we came to recognise
how Israel or Iran act not merely as a ‘symbols’ or even
as determining systems, but as subjects instigating and
authorising reactions? The anthropomorphism might at
least be more honest. None of this is in fact ruled out by
how Kant describes the aesthetics of common sense: we
consider the examples and exemplars who partake in the
community of our imagination and we make our
judgements ‘without counting noses’. The dilemma
derives not from this direction – my human subjectivity –
but from the other side: can I expect ‘consideration’ from
these non-human agents; will they consider me as part of
their community, a community of humans and nonhumans? What kind of ethical behaviour may I expect –
the unbending Tallensi ancestor? The humorous and
unreliable Jamaican Saint? Certainly if we able to
recognize their ield of associations as Arendt recognizes
Bluebeard, we can at least make some relevant
judgements.
However there are anthropological problems too, and
they take us back to where we began. Any anthropologist
who works closely with Amerindianists must surely view
as problematic the amount of weight a strikingly reiied
Amazonian Indian ‘cosmology’ bears in Latour’s account.
Let us consider the ive century long process that the
term ‘Amerindian’ represents, that is to say the process
by which people recognized as ‘Indians’ became
American Indians. Viveiros de Castro would have us
believe that this process has reached a point where
Amerindians have ‘no dificulty’ in integrating ‘us’ into
‘their’ cosmology (Latour 2004:457,fn13). Not for ‘them’,
then, the ‘self-relexivity of divergent entangled
cosmopolitan Modernities’ as Beck puts it (Beck
2004:36). In this vista, the Amerindians exist outside the
constant mediations, the typical interchange of
personnel, the repeated ‘overtaking’ that characterizes
62
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
the actor-network in Paris (Latour 2005). Perhaps more
pertinently, the Brazilian nation as an actant, for
example, is as utterly invisible in this Amazonian Indian
cosmology as is the cosmology’s role as an actant in
South American national mythology. Does Latour’s
pluriverse
necessitate
a
puriied
self-organising
cosmology for which Amerindians are the outstanding
metonym? These are, surely, ways of thinking that
anthropologists have learnt to treat with extreme
suspicion. Is it possible then that Latour’s pluriverse is
insuficiently plural? More consideration seems needed.
Conversing at the edge of time: an ethnographic
example by way of conclusion
It is March 2004. I am standing on the edge of the
road with Lazarus watching the early morning trafic
running into Kingston, Jamaica. Lazarus is an elderly
Blue Mountain cofee farmer of Middle Eastern
extraction: his parents led Southern Lebanon to the West
Indies in 1948. He owns about 25 acres of hillside crop
and, every Friday, brings his workers down to drink white
rum in the local bars here. Lazarus and I are talking
about the war in Iraq that we have been watching via
CNN news broadcasts over the last few days. Our
conversation begins with apparently shared common
sense assumptions and judgements. We both agree that
the invasion was illegal according to international law, it
will probably spark a civil war and is certain to breed
more violence. When I speak, I draw on the catalogue of
ideas and rhetorics that I have gleaned from the news
media and hearsay, shaped through previous discussions
with those around me. Lazarus concurs with what I say,
but his ield of examples and exemplars includes a range
of distinct elements and his narrative moves toward a
quite diferent, and in efect absolute, endpoint.
You see, Britain is the lost tribe of Israel: that is why
it ever run things in the world. But now America
take over. You know about the stone of Scone that
was under the throne of England in time past? It
hold the power. That stone send to America with the
63
HUON WARDLE
Maylower. Now America take over. You see the
British must control the Black because once
Hannibal have control over the British them. And
Black rule hard, man: them make the people bend
over and fuck him in the arse; fuck him, man. So
that is why the British must ever control the Black.
But now that power pass to America. Book of
Revelations - America, man, are the lamblike beast
come to rule the world in the last days.
For me to understand Lazarus’ way of framing these
issues requires a complicated exchange of standpoints.
For the moment, I am interested primarily in the form or
morphology of his discussion rather than its meaning.
When I, so to speak, step into my own shoes as a white
middle class European I am used to seeing the world
perspectivally. In a perspectival image the vista recedes
towards an actual-imaginative vanishing point. Things
nearer to me are larger, more sharply focused: objects
further
toward
the
horizon
are
decreasingly
distinguishable, less fully meaningful and smaller. This is
the ordering principle carried into our conversation both
by the CNN broadcasts that are its focus and by my own
ways of thinking and talking – the assumption of a certain
kind of relation between centre and horizon. What,
however, if my personhood were deined by being one of
those ‘distant’ subjects/objects nearer the horizon? It is
not that Lazarus disagrees with my presentation. His
response, though, suggests a transformation of my
perspectival ordering somewhat along these lines: to
take up his standpoint (more like a dream compared to
my initial version of reality) is to occupy a position
bizarrely close to the vanishing point. Looking outwards
from where Lazarus stands, I am confronted by actors
who become monstrously larger the further away they
are; their activities have no horizon, but their
overwhelming
centrality
makes
inevitable
my
disappearance.
In Lazarus’ account, mental objects familiar enough to
me from my childhood education - the Maylower, the
stone of Scone - have taken on radically distinct
64
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
dimensions, activities and relationships to their place in
the kinds of nationalist conigurations I am familiar with.
Hannibal, the threat to civilisation of my school days,
igures for Lazarus as a violent and sexually unruly
African who, briely jumping out of the correct ordering
of space-time, is quickly returned to the horizon once
more. America, a titanic entity, has come to hasten the
end of my fellow indistinguishable others – ‘the black’.
Social causality is certainly not here the measured
rippling outwards of beneits toward the periphery
posited by the perspectival politics of difusion or
modernisation: we might picture it instead as a kind of
implosion of forces as smaller actors are sucked towards
the larger body: an event that marks the end of all causal
relationships and all time, the End of All Things.
We are faced, then, with the Arendtian task of trying to
understand the common sense of others by getting to
grips with our own. A fundamental subjective work I
engage in with regard to my available knowledge is
surely that of folding cultural discordances back into my
common sense by way of the coherent judgements I make
about the present (the narratorial centre of which is
inevitably myself). This entails being able to map my
subjective experiences cosmologically; to gives these
elements universal, cosmic validity. There is a constant
traversing
between
my
pragmatic
subjective
engagements with others and a referencing and
legitimating of these engagements by reference to a
cosmos (whatever examples and exemplars are available
to me). That process provokes special dificulties and
resulting stratagems in a place like Kingston. Jamaicans
including Lazarus recognise themselves as thoroughly
modern. Fundamentally, they accept the all-importance of
the individual as both a claimer of rights and as a maker
of contracts with others. Tradition and habit are, by
contrast, contingent and subject to the transformative
power of free will (Wardle 2000). But within what
cosmological or metaphysical ordering can Lazarus
legitimately make these contracts and claim these rights?
His response is both cosmopolitan and cosmopolitical 65
HUON WARDLE
if we take the key elements of Beck’s and Latour’s
analyses. In a Beckian sense, he does not ask to be freed
from a world that holds the potential of being sharable.
In his worldview the process of making meaning is
thoroughly subjectivized, thoroughly individualized and
this certainly seems the aspect that corresponds most to
my way of seeing also. At the same time there is a
cosmopolitics here also which transigures the
fundamental spatial and temporal matrix of the ‘nature’
involved. There is, for instance, no deferring of moral
judgement historically in his nature because it is about to
come to an end. We both recognize, at least in broad
brush, the same actants – Britain, the United States;
constitutional symbols, but what we might call their
cosmological distribution, size and eficacy is quite
distinctly staged. When compared with Lazarus’ sharply
delineated view, my imagining of these entities becomes
a little confused and vague – historical time and a certain
kind of perspectival presentiment mediate it, but I am
now less able to grasp entirely how. Here we can echo
Latour’s approving citation of Viveiros de Castro:
Lazarus’ common sense is already global: it is simply that
in his cosmic politics I do not have the place I would have
predicted for myself. But we have to employ this rhetoric
with a proviso: the reinement of pristine indigenous
cosmologies - elaborately articulated symmetric ictions that provide the foil to a critique of ‘Western’ society is
unsustainable.
Concluding remarks
‘Fetishism’, remarks Gilsenan (paraphrasing J.S.
Khan), ‘infects us all, or rather it afects others, because
we always seem to escape it’ (2000: 603). Beck and
Latour combined present the challenge of an
anthropology that is simultaneously cosmopolitan and
cosmopolitical. Latour’s cosmopolitical challenge to Beck
involves disavowing cultural code as a neutral medium
exchangeable between individual cosmopolitan actors.
Cultural code becomes instead an actant in the world of
sociologists in the same way as spirits are actants in the
world of spiritualists, or Charles Darwin is an actant in
66
COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
the world of socio-biologists. In Latour’s view, scientiic
modernity involves constantly, in Gellner’s words,
‘invoking the processes of nature to underwrite social
arrangements,… allocate responsibilities, and settle
disputes’ (Gellner 1964:76). The resultant multiplication
of natures returns us ever closer to non-modern animism.
The anthropologist’s task becomes one of demonstrating
the moments or nexuses where this underwriting takes
place. The Beckian challenge to Latour may consist, by
contrast, in recognizing that the ‘others’, in their
generality, will no longer serve as stable points of
cosmological reference vis-à-vis ‘our’ unstable cosmology.
‘They’ also evidence internalized cosmopolitanism; the
rhetorical claim that ‘their’ cosmological forms evolve in
‘their’ terms is wearing thin. A comparative anthropology
that depends on building ever more rigid geometries
around the ideas that certain ‘peoples’ represent is itself
moribund.
If the systems of society and culture have gone then
what is left would seem to be divergent histories and a
conversation about the present and the future. Here we
surely have to agree with Beck that anthropological
dialogue can only be pursued on the commonsensical
basis that elements of cosmologies can be shared
between individual human subjects: human subjects
remain the only agents capable of the kind of mutual
consideration required. The danger here is the
reinvention of what Gellner sarcastically terms the ‘Pure
Visitor’ – an unmediated human ego whose role is to
‘quarantine’ and arbitrate social truths from a position
outside the social (1964:108). At the same time, it is no
use reinventing pristine ontologies to serve the same
quarantining function. Without resort to either of these
implausible guests we are left with an overcrowded
universe lacking the geometric simplicities of ‘our’ versus
‘their’ cosmologies. If culture is gone, then we need not
continue to be spooked by cultural fragmentation:
anthropologists will surely still employ diverse heuristics
of cosmology and social relationship, but their
ethnographies need to be imaginatively open to
previously unrecognized, or perhaps politically incorrect,
67
HUON WARDLE
types of agent as well as to new ields and forms of
interaction and exchange. Code made the lives of
anthropologists easy: ‘code presupposes content to be
somehow ready-made and presupposes the realization of
a choice among various given codes’ (Bakhtin 1986:130).
Now, by contrast, we ind ourselves ‘in it together’ but
with competing deinitions of ‘we’, ‘it’ and ‘together’.
How to understand subjectivity comes to the front at this
juncture as the crucial object of relection.
References
Arendt, H. 2003. Responsibility and Judgement. New
York: Schocken Books.
Bakhtin, M. 1990. Art and Answerability. Texas:
University of Texas Press.
De Beaumont, L. 1919. Emanuel Swedenborg. London:
Nelson and Sons.
Beck, U. 2002. ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its
Enemies’ Theory, Culture and Society, 19(1-2):17-44.
Beck, U. 2004 ‘The Truth of Others: A Cosmopolitan
Approach’ Common Knowledge, 10(3):430-449
Beck, U. 2006. The Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Engels, F. and K. Marx 1963. The German Ideology. New
York: International Publishers.
Bohannon, L. 1966. ‘Shakespeare in the Bush’ Natural
History 75:28-33.
Cook, J., J. Laidlaw and J. Mair. 2009. ‘What if There is No
Elephant? Towards a Conception of an Un-sited Field’ In
Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis, and Locality in
Contemporary Social Research. (ed.) M-A. Falzon.
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COSMOPOLITICS AND COMMON SENSE
London: Ashgate: 47-72.
Derrida, J. 2006. Spectres of Marx. Oxford: Routledge.
Fortes, M. 1959. Oedipus and Job in West African
Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fortune, R. 1963. Sorcerers of Dobu. New York: E.P.
Dutton and Co.
Hannerz, U. 1989. ‘Notes on the Global Ecumene’ Public
Culture 1(2):66-75.
Hannerz, U. 1997. ‘Fluxos, fronteiras, híbridos: palavraschave da antropologia Transnacional’ Mana 3(1):7-39.
Hannerz, U. 2006. ‘Two Faces of Cosmopolitanism:
Culture and Politics’ Barcelona: Documentos CIDOB:
Dinamicas Interculturales, 7.
Kant 1952. The Critique of Judgement. Oxford: Clarendon
University Press.
Kant 1983. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays .
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
Kant 2006. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Latour B. 1996. Aramis, or the Love of Technology.
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Latour B. 2004a ‘Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics?
Comments on the Peace Terms of Ulrich Beck’ Common
Knowledge 10(3):450-462.
Latour B. 2004b. The Politics of Nature. Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press.
Latour B. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction
to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford: Oxford University
69
HUON WARDLE
Press.
Latour B. 2009. ‘Perspectivism: “Type” or “Bomb”?’
Anthropology Today 25(2):1-2.
Mackay 2005. Stirner: His Life and his work. South
Carolina: Booksurge.
Palmie, S. 2006. ‘Creolization and its Discontents’ Annual
Review of Anthropology 35:433-456.
Plato. 1997. Apology. Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci.
Simmel 1955. The Web of Group-Afiliations. New York:
Free Press.
Simmel 1978. The Philosophy of Money. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Stirner 1907. The Ego and His Own. New York: Benjamin
R. Tucker.
Trouillot 2001. ‘The Anthropology of the State in the Age
of Globalization’ Current Anthropology 42(1):125:138.
Veblen 1884. ‘Kant’s Critique of Judgement’ Journal of
Speculative Philosophy 18(July): 260-274.
Wardle 1995. ‘Kingston, Kant and Common Sense’
Cambridge Anthropology 18(3):40-55.
Wardle 2000. An Ethnography of Cosmopolitanism in
Kingston, Jamaica. New York: Edwin Mellen.
Wardle 2007. ‘A Groundwork for West Indian Cultural
Openness’ Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
13(3):567-583.
Weber 1948. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.
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Weber 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of
Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Whitehead 1978. Process and Reality. New York: The
Free Press.
71
Chapter 3
WHAT DID KANT MEAN BY AND WHY DID HE
ADOPT A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN
HISTORY?1
Thomas Sturm2
Introduction
It is widely held – and not false – that Kant’s philosophy
of history expresses the Enlightenment hope for a
stepwise progress of humankind towards freedom or
morality. However, we are nowadays suspicious of models
of a stadial development of human history, especially
teleological ones. Furthermore, Kant’s model of historical
development is burdened with problems of its own,
concerning its epistemic status, and its position within
his philosophy in general. To deal with these issues,
scholars have mostly focused on connections between
Kant’s philosophy of history and his ethics or his views
about teleology. They have downplayed or neglected
another context, namely, the theories of historiography
that he was faced with. I shall show how Kant reacts to
debates about a theory and practice of historiography
highly inluential in his time, especially in his German
72
A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
environment. It was called “pragmatic history”.
In part I, I indicate what major versions there existed
of this approach. I then outline three crucial problems
that emerged with the requirement, set up by many
pragmatic historians, of a stage model of humankind’s
development. Among other things, I shall point to how
the debate about the meaning of ‘pragmatic history’
became connected to the idea of a ‘cosmopolitan
viewpoint’ in history, an issue that was discussed
particularly between August Ludwig Schlözer and Johann
Gottfried Herder. In part II, I report on Kant’s reception
of pragmatic history, and what he found lacking in the
most important versions of it – namely, an appropriate
understanding of human nature, which he himself
developed more fully in his lectures on pragmatic
anthropology. I shall thereby try to clarify how his own
“cosmopolitan” idea of the development of human nature
through history is likewise entangled with the notion of
pragmatic history, and that his notion of a cosmopolitan
idea itself has three diferent aspects, responding to the
three problems outlined. Thus, relating Kant’s philosophy
of history to contemporary debates can make his views
more intelligible than merely analyzing their connection
to other parts of his critical philosophy.
I. Pragmatic History
Historical Development
and
Models
of
Human
1. What Is ‘Pragmatic History’?
By the 18th century the study of history is growing
quickly not only in terms of institutions and literary
output but also in terms of the level of the debates about
its theoretical and methodological presuppositions. In the
German countries, this debate takes often shape under
the heading of a “pragmatic” orientation. To mention but
a few examples, eighteenth-century authors before Kant
write pragmatic histories of the Jesuits and Protestants,
the rulers of Braunschweig, the school reform in Bavaria,
of literature, medicine, the souls of humans and animals,
and even of sleep. And many historians at the time have a
73
THOMAS STURM
serious intention with this. As the Göttingen professor
Johann Christoph Gatterer, the most inluential organizer
of historical research in the eighteenth century, writes, in
“history, pragmatic is just what in the proper sciences is
called systematic”.3
But which requirements pragmatic historiography
need fulill becomes controversial. In the debate, the
following four requirements become introduced stepwise:
i. Most conceptions of pragmatic historiography take
it for granted that the object of investigation is
human action, particularly in more or less widely
conceived areas of social life (at certain times and
places).
ii. In methodological terms, a history can be
pragmatic if it studies the causes, particularly the
motives or intentions of human agents.
iii. A historical study can be called ‘pragmatic’ if it is
tied to a universal history of mankind – either by
helping to write that history or by presupposing it.
Being “universal” does not necessarily mean that it
has to cover all historical details, but at least the
major factors and/or stages of human history.
iv. Finally, history can be called ‘pragmatic’ if
practical consequences or lessons for human
(particularly social) action can be derived from it.
These elements are not mutually exclusive. However,
some pragmatic historians require only some of these
features, while others demand that all be satisied;
furthermore, some authors claim that a certain
requirement is more important than others; and,
occasionally, some requirements are developed and
discussed more closely and thereby become understood
in diferent ways.
For instance, in the early eighteenth century, Johann
David Kö(h)ler claims that a historical study is already
pragmatic if it treats of public matters, especially the
oficial and social deeds of rulers, and if it ofers practical
orientation in civil life, having in mind speciically
political action and the design of public afairs. 4 But no
later than in the 1750s, such a meaning of “pragmatic
74
A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
history” becomes viewed as overly narrow. This is
accompanied by a growing awareness that there might
be a pragmatic historiography of the “highest level” or in
the “truest understanding” of the term, which has to be
distinguished from lesser degrees and incorrect
meanings.5 To begin, a number of authors stresses that
pragmatic histories must also inform readers of
“impelling forces” (Triebfedern)6, motives, and other
causes.7 Gatterer himself, who voices this point with
particular emphasis, does not claim that previous
historians had never sought out “causes and efects,
means and intentions”. 8 Thucydides and Polybius clearly
did. Gatterer’s main criticism is directed at the genres of
mere annals, chronicles, and genealogies, and the
accompanying conception that history merely records
particular facts of the past. The causes behind historical
events seldom coincide with periods or commencements
of rule, and outcomes often extend beyond the dates
covered by annals.
Gatterer moreover argues that the “ highest level of
what can be considered pragmatic history” can only be
achieved by developing a universal history, by embedding
historical investigation in “the idea of the overall
connection of things in the world (Nexus rerum
Universalis)” – that is, causal explanations in history
must be embedded in a system of world history:
For no occurrence in the world is – as it were –
insular. Everything is connected, is produced, is
induced, and in turn produces and induces. The
afairs of the noble and the lowly, individual persons
and all of them together, private life and the world
at large, indeed, even those of reasonless and
lifeless entities and humans; all are intertwined and
interconnected.9
While these requirements are all repeatedly
emphasized by the majority of authors, requirement (iv)
remains relatively negligible for Gatterer, unlike for
others. He hints at it in one of his earlier writings 10, but
75
THOMAS STURM
later on clearly rejects the view that it would be
constitutive of the idea of pragmatic history. 11 He also
makes fun of the view, held by several authors, that one
could derive practically useful conclusions from mere
annals, chronicles or genealogies. 12 One might also think
here of Lord Bolingbroke’s well-known dictum that
“history is philosophy taught by examples”. 13 Obviously,
Gatterer denies that such views help to raise the rank of
history – to approximate it to the bona ide sciences.
While Gatterer becomes the most inluential German
historian of his times, his conception of pragmatic history
does not remain undisputed. For instance, the Church
historian Johann Matthias Schroeckh (1733-1808) favors
a combination of all four requirements: A truly pragmatic
history should focus upon human actions, provide causal
explanations, develop and use a system of universal
human history, and attempt to draw practical lessons on
the basis of the irst three requirements. 14 Also, other
authors raise questions about various requirements.
Some already discuss the possibility of giving causal
explanations in history, while others are concerned about
whether pragmatic histories ultimately have to study
humankind as a whole, and whether such histories – if
they aim at practical conclusions at all – should instruct
particular individuals or groups or humankind as a
whole.
2. The Requirement of a System of Universal History
Of special relevance here is the call for a system of
history as a whole (requirement iii). How should or even
could one write “the” complete history of humankind’s
development? Most authors agree that it will not sufice
to collect and order all existing special studies, and then
continue them. That had been tried before. Schroeckh
emphasizes that causal explanation demands various
kinds of weighting. It is not easy, he writes, to describe
the universal historical “Nexus” in a way that gathers
and lists all causes and outcomes. It is not necessary, for
instance, to note every historical detail or every slight
causal connection. On the contrary, it is the dificult task
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A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
of the historian to select the facts relevant for an
adequate explanation of events. As Gatterer remarks, one
has to identify and structure the “revolutions” of human
history. Only these will help to identify the really
important causes of human actions in history. 15
His colleague at Göttingen, August Ludwig Schlözer
(1735-1809) works out this approach in his Vorstellung
seiner Universal-Historie (1772-73). He claims that one
needs a unifying viewpoint in order to be able to select
and order facts and turn them into a system:
World history can be imagined from a double
perspective: Either as an aggregate of specialized
histories, a collection of which, if it is complete,
constitutes a whole in its own way; or as a system,
in which the world and humanity constitute the one
entity, for which from among all the parts of the
aggregate some are preferably selected and
ordered purposefully.16
Furthermore, Schlözer demands that for this we need
to single out factors that “interest not individual nations
or classes of the human race, but that are signiicant for
the cosmopolitan [Weltbürger], for man as such”.17 More
speciically, he claims that Roman history – from the
city’s founding, the formation and division of the world
empire, to its decline – provides the best focal point:
[Roman history] is the overall guiding thread
[Leitfaden] that throughout various concurrent
courses of almost innumerous peoples prevents
chronological confusion. Rom deserves this honor:
For which empire of the world has had greater
inluence on the fate of the world?18
3. Three Problems with the Requirement of Universal
History
While the requirement for a structured system of
universal history has its attractiveness for authors at the
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THOMAS STURM
time, it has several problems.
(I) A irst problem concerns an assumption about
human nature, and it can best be explained by the impact
of Hume. He does not, neither in his History of England
(1754-62) nor elsewhere, use the term ‘pragmatic
history’. Yet, German reviews praise the History as an
example of pragmatic work and applaud Hume’s skill at
“using his knowledge of human nature to enlighten and
promote the usefulness of history”. 19 Two of Hume’s
philosophical theses on human nature and history – to be
found in the Treatise and the irst Enquiry – are of
particular importance here. He claims, irst, that the
historian may and should presume that human nature is
constant, or subject to unchangeable causal laws.
Second, he advances the methodological claim that by
studying history we can discover these laws:
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and
places, that history informs us of nothing new or
strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to
discover the constant and universal principles of
human nature, by showing men in all varieties of
circumstances and situations.20
Pragmatic historians often follow Hume on these
points.21 But this raises problems for their views. Many of
these historians also stress that human history includes
“revolutions”, necessitating a system of the most
important developments. Also, as one reviewer of Hume’s
History points out, impartiality is seen as vital to causal
explanation: In order to reveal true causes, it is crucial to
assess the past not in terms of maxims of the historian’s
time, but in terms on those that held in the period and
place under investigation 22. However, these points only
make sense given that modes of human conduct change
substantially over time. Moreover, if pragmatic history
should be used to draw practically relevant conclusions,
then such conclusions may repeatedly lead to new
principles for conduct – which threatens the Humean
claim of the constancy of human nature as well.
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A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
(II) Second, how ought one to structure human history
as a whole? If you take dominant nations as in Gatterer’s
and Schlözer’s proposals: Should universal history irst
depict their histories and then turn to the subordinate
countries? Or should the mutual inluence of countries on
one another be examined together? 23 Moreover, besides
dominant nations, natural, economic, technological and
intellectual factors are important too. Schlözer himself
stresses that earthquakes, loods and epidemics, or also
“the discovery of ire, bread and alcohol, and so on, are
facts equally as important as the battles at Arbela, Zama,
and Merseburg”.24 Can all the factors be arranged within
a single system of human history? In a review of 1772,
Johann Gottfried Herder complains that Schlözer merely
presents a plan lacking clear execution. In 1774, Herder
furthermore suggests that what one reads “in almost all
so-called Pragmatic Histories of the World is nothing but
the disgusting tangled mass of ‘the time’s prized
ideals’”.25 In other words, Schlözer’s cosmopolitan
orientation may in the best case be useless and in the
worst case be the expression of an ideology.
(III) Finally, what is the epistemic role and status of
the stage models of human history? The views here are
quite divided. The outlines by Gatterer, Schlözer, and
others are shaped by tangible tasks of empirical history.
Claims about dividing the past into epochs, or questions
of chronology are viewed as subject to empirical scrutiny.
However, even the very same authors characterize their
historical ideas and frameworks as “conjectural” or
“philosophical”. This indicates that their function and
status is not clear.
To sum up: One can see that the shift towards
pragmatic history, reasonable as it was when compared
with other traditions of history writing, led into serious
new predicaments.
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THOMAS STURM
II. Kant on Pragmatic History and the Development
of Humankind
4. Kant’s Reaction to Pragmatic History
Now to Kant. First, a bit about his standpoint towards
pragmatic history. From the mid-1770s on, he presents
his views especially in his annual lectures on
anthropology. Here, he praises Hume’s History for not
conining itself to chronicles of wars and rulers, but
relating to humanity in general. 26 Also, Kant is familiar
with the Enquiries. And in his early statements, one can
see Kant as understanding and sharing the idea of
pragmatic history along Humean lines: as a study of
individual and social intentions causing actions, ideally
useful for a practical instruction of agents in the social
sphere. At least until 1775-76, he also accepts the
ontological thesis that human nature is constant, linking
it even to his own conception of anthropology. At the
same time Kant becomes also interested in the genre of
histories of the stadial development of humankind,
including the idea of genuine change in human history.
In the 1780s, he suddenly scathes pragmatic historians
for lacking the knowledge of human nature they pretend
to have:
… since the authors of many history books have
little knowledge of human nature, they have no idea
of pragmatic history and much less of how to write
it.27
I will explain in a moment what he means. Before this,
I need to briely comment on a related passage in the
Groundwork. Here, Kant irst distinguishes between
pragmatic principles as leading to prudence, and notes
that there are two diferent notions of prudence:
Weltklugheit and Privatklugheit. The irst is the
competence to use other human beings for one’s
purpose, the second is the competence to order one’s
purposes such that one approximates one’s own
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A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
happiness. He also says that Weltklugheit should serve
Privatklugheit, because knowing how to manipulate other
persons but not doing so for furthering one’s own wellrelected purposes isn’t very bright. But all this expresses
not his fully considered opinion on what ‘pragmatic’
means but, rather, a report on widely held views. Just one
page later he gives his own viewpoint:
It seems to me that the proper meaning of the word
pragmatic could be determined thus most precisely.
Pragmatic are called the sanctions which do not
properly follow from the law of states as necessary
laws, but from the precaution for general welfare.
Pragmatically written is a history if it makes
prudent, that is if it instructs the world how to
reach its advantage better, or at least as well as its
preceding world.28
So what he wants pragmatic history to do is not to
teach us how to use other human beings simply for our
personal purposes. But what would be wrong with that
(leaving moral concerns aside here)? And what does he
really have in mind with the „general welfare“? His
answers stem from the background of his then
developing anthropological views about what it means to
be a citizen of the world. This then leads him to a speciic
notion of a cosmopolitan standpoint in history.
5. Kant’s Response to the Three Problems of Universal
History
Let me explain this by reference to Kant’s response to
the three problems of the various approaches to
universal history described earlier on (section 3 above).
(I) First, Kant comes to reject a naïve view of the
constancy of human nature. He does so by means of
assumptions concerning basic factors of the dynamics of
social interaction developed in his anthropology lectures.
Six basic claims are necessary here.29
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THOMAS STURM
(1) Human dependency upon society. Human beings
need education, and later on other forms of social
cooperation to achieve our goals, to improve action
possibilities and to uphold our self-regard.
(2) Human egoism. At the same time, unfortunately,
human beings are mostly driven by self-interested
inclinations. We do not trust each other; we are
jealous; we try to manipulate and exploit one
another. The conjunction of (1) and (2) Kant
famously calls the “unsocial sociability” of
humankind.
(3) The irst-person point of view. That such things are
possible is rooted in other, basic human facts.
There is an important diference between our
having of mental states and our having of physical
states. Not only can we note that we are in suchand-such a mental state – say, that we feel a pain
or have a desire. Unlike mere animals, we can be
happy or sad about that, or we can view these
states – and those of other persons as well – with a
critical eye, relect upon and change them. This
requires a irst-person point of view upon irstorder mental states: To know that one is unhappy
about a certain pain, and that one wishes that the
pain goes away, requires knowing whose pain it is.
Also, egoism and self-regard as well would be
impossible without such a irst-person point of
view.
(4) Prudence and learning to adopt the third-person
point of view. But what can we do about the
dilemma of our unsocial sociability? Kant’s answer:
If I want to act prudently, I have to learn that
others have that egoism as well, and that it can be
useful to take into account their irst-person point
of view.
(5) Invention of new social roles and rules. Thereby,
however, social interaction becomes easily
extremely complex. Not only do I perceive others
as having egoistic motives and as having abilities
for hiding such motives; they perceive me in the
same way. Hence, our basic purposes of receiving
respect and support must not be exerted too
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A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
obviously, and we must be able to ind new ways by
which to pursue our goals prudently. This leads to
iterated forms of role-playing in society, to a
concealing and dissembling of egoistic intentions
before others.
(6) New roles and rules become “another nature” . In
this interaction, humans therefore develop new
rules of interaction, or “another nature”. 30 But that
means that our actions do not simply fall under
rules as if they were natural laws; rather, we
follow certain rules with a greater or lesser
amount of rational deliberation. We can thus be
producers instead of being mere products of our
development.
From all this derives a irst sense of cosmopolitanism
in Kant’s work, which is related to human nature: We are
citizens of the world in the sense that our nature is partly
plastic, and more speciically that we ourselves produce
our rules of action and, thereby, our social world. This is
a fact that holds, in principle, for each of us, and which
each of us better recognizes in social interaction –
instead of expecting to extract more supericial kinds of
egoistic prudence from history.
(II) How does this notion of cosmopolitanism relate to
the project of universal history? Kant – like Schlözer –
claims that the historian needs a guiding “idea”, and
again characterizes this idea by claiming that it centers
on the human being as a “citizen of the world”. But,
unlike Schlözer, Kant gives this notion a distinctive and
not implausible meaning: the knowledge about the
plasticity of human nature and its conditions is the
knowledge he inds lacking in many pragmatic historians.
In Idea Kant then irst outlines basic features of
human social dynamics and explains afterwards how an
adequate universal history would have to look like. It
should start with ancient Greek history, for the
contingent reason that only here a real source-based
historiography could start. But the further steps should
not look at dominant people and then wonder how to
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THOMAS STURM
include other important factors; they should focus upon
the development of forms of society that reduced
aggression and war (such as the introduction of
international commerce), introduced diferent elements
of a republican constitution (the French Revolution
becoming later on the outstanding “sign” of such a
history), and that may lead to the establishment of a
league of nations. This is obviously a second, richer
notion of cosmopolitanism, but one presupposing the
irst. It lows from the former in the sense that such
institutions help us to realize more fully the possibilities
inherent in our nature, and to cope with our unsocial
sociability.
(III) Finally, what about the epistemic role and status
of this cosmopolitan idea? The answer is not surprising.
No universal history should or even could aim a sum-total
of all past events. Instead, by using the idea as guiding
thread – another notion already to be found in Schlözer,
as cited above, but not clariied by him – helps to ind
concepts and principles for selecting, linking and
organizing historical knowledge in a certain way. The
idea thus has a regulative function. Still, history seen
from that perspective can be connected to empirically
discoverable occurrences and developments.
There might be other perspectives, of course; but
these have to be brought to the fore irst. Kant
emphasizes the sketchy nature of the Idea essay, it being
“only one of the thoughts that a philosophical mind (that
incidentally must be well-versed in history) might also toy
with from a diferent standpoint”. 31 Kant does not claim
that the propositions he sets forth about the development
of human capacities, the mechanism of unsocial
sociability, and the resulting sequence of forms of social
or political order of humankind are already to be taken as
full-blown developmental principles of history. Rather, he
explicitly aims to provoke contemporary historians to
develop better ideas and frameworks. This is further
evidence that his views should be seen as responding to
contemporary debates rather than internal problems of
his own philosophy only.
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A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
Conclusion
It would be a misunderstanding to view my foregoing
considerations as a complete defense of Kant’s views. I
tried to add an important facet to the existing
interpretations. What this contextualization cannot
explain (and, a forteriori, defend) are the strongly
teleological claims of his views on human history, or their
exact relation to his ethical theory. Even then, critics
might either reject the very demand for a grand-scale
model of human history, or at least claim that Kant’s
sketch is useless for, say, current historical research. But
note that I have tried to reduce his claims about human
social dynamics to their most simple, largely innocent
basic points. Given this, and given the epistemological
modesty of his claims about human development,
perhaps things look better for a kind of relection about
the question of how we could give meaning to the
fragmented masses of historical knowledge.
Notes
1. The OAC working paper that appears here was based on
chapters in Thomas Sturm's 2009 monograph and a similar
version appeared in Sturm, T. 2013. 'What did Kant mean
by and why did he adopt a cosmopolitan point of view in
history?' In: Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher
Absicht: Akten des XI. Kant- Kongresses 2010. Ed. by S.
Bacin, A. Ferrarin, C. LaRocca & M. Rufing. Berlin:
DeGruyter, 853-865.
2. Thomas Sturm is ICREA Research Professor at the
Department of Philosophy at the Autonomous University of
Barcelona (UAB). He specializes in Kant, theories of
rationality, and the history and philosophy of science.
Among his publications are two books, including Kant und
die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (2009) and articles in
Kant-Studien, Kantian Review, Kant Yearbook, Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, Synthese, Erkenntnis,
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THOMAS STURM
Metascience, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical
Psychology, History of the Human Sciences, Inquiry, and
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences.
3. Gatterer, Johann Christoph: “Vorrede von der Evidenz in der
Geschichtkunde.” In: Die Allgemeine Welthistorie die in
England durch eine Gesellschaft von Gelehrten
ausgefertiget worden. Ed. by F. E. Boysen. Halle. 1767, vol.
I, 1-38, here 12.
4. Kö(h)ler, Johann David: Lectorem benevolum programmate
de historia pragmatica. [Altdorf.] 1714.
5. See Anonymous [Abbt, Thomas]: “Hundert und ein und
fünfzigster Brief. Anmerkungen über den wahren Begrif
einer pragmatischen Geschichte.” In: Briefe, die neueste
Literatur betrefend 9 (No. 151, 1761), 118-125, here 119;
Gatterer, Johann Christoph: “Vom historischen Plan und der
sich darauf gründenden Zusammenfügung der
Erzählungen.” In: Allgemeine historische Bibliothek 1
(1767), 15-89, here 84; Anonymous: “J. M. Schröckh,
Christliche Kirchengeschichte.” In: Königsbergische
Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen (No. 79, September 30,
1768), 315f.
6. Anonymous: “Hundert und ein und fünfzigster Brief”, 118f.
7. See e.g.: Köster, Henrich Martin Georg: Über die
Philosophie der Historie. Giessen. 1775, 9 and 14.
8. Gatterer, “Plan”, 79f.
9. Gatterer, “Plan”, 84f.
10. Gatterer, “Plan”, 27.
11. Gatterer, Johann Christoph: “Ueber die Philosophie der
Historie, von H. M. G. Köster.” In: Historisches Journal 6
(1776), 164-166.
12. Gatterer, “Plan”, 77f.
13. Bolingbroke, Henry St. John: “Letters on the Study and Use
86
A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW IN HISTORY?
of History” (1735). In: The Works of Lord Bolingbroke. Ed.
by H. G. Bohn. 4 vols. London. 1844, vol. II, 173-334, here
177.
14. Schroeckh, Johann Martin: Christliche Kirchengeschichte.
Frankfurt a.M. 1768, vol. I, 251-278.
15. Schroeckh, Kirchengeschichte, 264-275; Gatterer, “Plan”,
86-88.
16. Schlözer, August Ludwig: Vorstellung seiner UniversalHistorie. 2 vols. Göttingen. 1772-73, vol. I, 14. – Schlözer
rejects to characterize his approach to universal history as
a pragmatic one, at least in the sense of giving practical
lessons to the reader – these, the reader should draw
himself (ibid., vol. I, 26).
17. Schlözer, Vorstellung, vol. I, 30. Similarly Schroeckh,
Johann Martin: Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Weltgeschichte .
Berlin. 1774, 24f.
18. Schlözer, Vorstellung, vol. I, 80f.
19. Anonymous: “D. Hume, Geschichte von Großbritannien. Dt.
Übers.” In: Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen 59 (July
23, 1764), 467f.
20. Hume, David: Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding
and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1748-51). Ed. by
L. A. Selby-Bigge (3rd ed. by P. H. Nidditch). Oxford. 1975,
83f.
21. See, e.g., Gatterer, “Plan”, 84f.; Schlözer, Vorstellung, vol.
I, 15 and 19; Schroeckh, Kirchengeschichte, 275-278.
22. Anonymous: “D. Hume, History of Great Britain, Vol. 1.” In:
Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen 147
(December 8, 1755), 1350-1354, here 1350f.
23. Köster, Philosophie der Historie, 55-62.
24. Schlözer, Vorstellung, vol. I, 29f.
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THOMAS STURM
25. Herder, Johann Gottfried: “A. L. Schözers Vorstellung
seiner Universal-Historie.” In: Idem: Sämtliche Werke. Ed.
by B. Suphan. Berlin. 1877f., vol. V, 436-440. – Idem: Auch
eine Philosophie zur Geschichte zur Bildung der
Menschheit (1774). In: Ibid., vol. V, 555.
26. V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 472. These references point to the
German original in the Academy edition (Kant, Immanuel:
Gesammelte Schriften. Ed.: Vol. 1-22 Preussische Akademie
der Wissenschaften, vol. 23 Deutsche Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. 24f. Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin 1900f.).
27. V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1212; see also V-Menschenkunde, AA
25: 857f. – As to how far Kant knew the works of relevant
historians, see Sturm, Kant, 332-338.
28. GMS, AA 04: 417, footnote.
29. For detailed textual evidence for the following points, see
Sturm, Kant, 429-446.
30. Anth, AA 07: 121.
31. IaG, AA 08: 30.
88
Chapter 4
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
Martin Holbraad
It may appear that the last thing that the study of ‘things’
needs right now is another manifesto, as the echo of
Spivak’s 1980s subaltern radicalism (1998) in my title
may suggest. As archaeologist Severin Fowles has
recently observed (2008, 2010), the rise of ‘the thing’ in
social theory at the turn of our century has emancipatory
tonalities that echo the emancipation of ‘the native’ (or
the ‘subaltern’) a generation earlier. If for too long
things, under the guise of ‘material culture’, had
‘hibernat[ed] in the basements of museology’, as Tim
Ingold puts it (2007: 5), their study in recent years has
been all about achieving their visibility: making the thing
manifest or, in Peter Pels’ phrase, allowing it to ‘speak
back’ (Pels 1998: x).
To see why these are more than echoes of expression,
consider the analogy of purpose. Notwithstanding their
variety, late 20th century arguments tagged as ‘postcolonial’ and valorised as ‘de-colonizing’ can also be
characterised as emancipatory (sensu Argyrou 2002).
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MARTIN HOLBRAAD
This insofar as they typically take the form of what I will
call ‘widening the circle of the human’. The move turns
on a basic diagnosis of the colonial condition as, in one
way or other, a deicient attribution of humanity to the
colonial subject (the native, the subaltern): a denial of its
history, its agency, its subjectivity, its rationality, in short,
its human dignity. The response, then, takes the form of a
more equitable distribution of these attributes, a move to
globalise the sense of justice which they express, in a
kind of extension of the global-political dominion of the
categorical imperative. The colonised subject is elevated,
its subjectivity recognised, its voice heard. The
conceptual mould of the agenda, if not its historical
precedent, is perhaps the emancipation of slaves, from
relative object-commodities to (relative…) subjectpersons (cf. Guyer 1993).
An analogous agenda, argues Fowles, is pursued in the
more recent literature on the rise of the thing (material
culture studies, thing-theory, ANT, speculative realism,
post-phenomenology etc.). Here too polemical writing
has been motivated in large part by a diagnosis of a
deicit of humanity – an obvious one when it comes to
things, of course, though all the more powerful for it.
And the remedy too has been various species of widening
the circle of the human. ‘Agency’ has been the most vocal
term, perhaps due to its relative neutrality, though its
corollaries of personhood, history, voice, freedom and
responsibility, and other dignities of the kind are never
far of in the emancipatory agenda. Indeed, the political
tenor of the move is certainly evident in these writings,
as is its post-colonial aesthetic. Fowles cites, among
others, Bruno Latour, who calls for a ‘democracy
extended to things’ (including a ‘parliament’ of them);
Danny Miller, who renounces the ‘tyranny of the subject’
and ‘the corpse of our imperial majesty: society’ in favour
of a ‘dialectical republic in which persons and things
exist in mutual self-construction and respect for their
mutual origin and mutual dependency’; and fellow
archaeologist Bjørnar Olsen, who calls his colleagues to
‘unite in a defence of things, a defence of those subaltern
members of the collective that have been silenced and
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CAN THE THING SPEAK?
“othered” by the imperialist social and humanist
discourses.’ (Latour 1993: 12, Miller 2005: 45, 37, Olsen
2003: 100, all cited in Fowles 2008).
Now, the faint sarcasm of calling all this an agenda for
‘emancipation’ is really more of an irony, since I have
subscribed to this agenda myself, along lines that are not
dissimilar to the ones Fowles describes – particularly in
the volume Thinking Through Things, which I co-edited
and co-introduced with Ami Salmond (nee Henare) and
Sari Wastell (2007), as well as in a couple of singleauthored publications related to it (Holbraad 2005 and
more explicitly 2009). In the latter part of the present
paper I revisit those arguments in some detail, in an
efort to clarify what I have since come to see as the
somewhat confused way in which they bundle together
the two parallel agendas of Fowles’s analogy. As I shall
argue, however, this is worth doing, not in order to recoil
from the agenda of emancipating the thing, but to move
it forward. In a nutshell, I want to show that while the
approach set out in Thinking Through Things (henceforth
‘TTT’) is ofered partly as a way of emancipating things
as such, the weight of its argument ends up subsuming
this task to that of emancipating the people for whom
they are important.1 If things speak in TTT, they do so
mainly by ethnographic association with the voice of ‘the
native’ – a kind of anthropological ventriloquism.
Hence the question: might there nevertheless be a
sense in which things could speak for themselves? And
what might their voices sound like? Suitably
reconsidered and improved, I argue, the approach of TTT
is indeed able to articulate answers to these questions,
complementing the anthropological concern with native
voices with what in the Conclusion I shall call a
‘pragmatological’ (cf. Witmore forthcoming) engagement
with the voices of things – voices which, to anticipate my
core suggestion, stem from the contingent material
characteristics that make things most obviously thinglike. In order to prepare the ground for this argument,
we may begin by leshing out, with reference to the
recent literature on things, the guiding distinction
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MARTIN HOLBRAAD
between emancipating things ‘by association’ with
persons as opposed to emancipating them ‘as such’ – a
pretty tricky distinction, as we shall see, and subject to
all sorts of caveats.
Emancipation as the entanglement of persons and
things
In line with Fowles’s analogy with writings in postcolonialism, the past twenty years’ or so literature on the
rise of the thing could be plotted as a trajectory of
increasingly (self-consciously) ‘radical’ attempts to
dislodge or even erase the line that divides things from
people. Consider, just as an illustration, the shift from
proposing that things acquire ‘biographies’ and a ‘social
life’ of their own through their complex involvement in
the lives of the people who engage with them (Appadurai
1986), to saying that the very distinction between people
and things (or humans and non-humans) should be
eliminated from the way we think about such
engagements (Latour 1993, cf. Pinney 2005). Or the
diference between suggesting that people and things
emerge out of each other dialectically (Miller 1987,
2005) and claiming that in certain contexts they are best
conceived as being identical (Strathern 1988, 1990).
Such diferences may be said to correspond to two broad
stages on the axis of radicalism, which, following
Haraway (1991, cf. Webmoor & Witmore 2009), I shall
tag as ‘humanist’ and ‘posthumanist’ respectively. The
distinction turns on contrasting stances to the ontological
division between humans and things. Humanist, then,
would be approaches that seek to emancipate the thing
in terms of this division, while posthumanist would be
ones that do so by going beyond it. The move from one
towards the other, I argue, can also be understood as a
move from emancipating things by association, i.e. by
letting some of the light of what it is to be human shine
on them too, to emancipating them as such, i.e. showing
that they can radiate light for themselves – though in a
way that, as we shall see, is not altogether satisfactory.
Let us explore this with reference to some of the most
inluential contributions to the literature.
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CAN THE THING SPEAK?
Danny Miller’s introduction to his edited volume
Materiality (2005, cf. Miller 1987) presents a transparent
example of what I’m calling a humanist approach, as well
as of the emancipation of things ‘by association’, with
reference to the role in the lives of humans, that such
approaches tend to imply. Miller is fully cognizant of the
importance to anthropological discussions of materiality
of ‘philosophical resolution[s] to the problematic dualism
between people and things’ (Miller 2005: 41), and
includes as an example his own preference for theorizing
the relationship between people and things in terms of
the forms that emerge out of a Hegelian dialectical
processes of objectiication, rather than through the
‘mutual constitution of prior forms, such as subjects and
objects’ (2005: 9). The job of the anthropologist, he
argues however, cannot be simply (or complexly) to
reinvent such philosophical wheels, not least because the
people he or she studies ethnographically so often have a
much more ‘commonsense’ understanding of things,
including all sorts of ways of distinguishing them from
people, spirits and so on. Ultimately, Miller is saying, the
role of an anthropology that is seriously committed to
relecting ethnographically on the world in which we live,
and to theorising what it is to be human, must recognise
and ‘respect’ (2005: 38) material objects and the implicit
as well as explicit ways in which they give form to
people’s lives. Its aim, through strategic combinations of
dualism-busting philosophical models and ethnographic
sensitivity and empathy, must be to show the myriad
ways in which ‘the things people make, make people’
(ibid).2
It is perhaps not entirely clear how Miller squares the
circle (not to say wheel) of the contrasting demands of a
philosophical impulse to overcome dualism and an
anthropological one to dwell on the myriad forms in
which it may play itself out ethnographically. 3 Still, what
he makes abundantly clear is that his heart lies with the
messiness of the ethnography, and the ‘vulgar’ study of
‘the way the speciic character of people emerges from
their interaction with the material world through
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practice’ (Miller 2007: 26), as he and his students at UCL
have been doing for some time. If he is interested in
emancipating the thing from the ‘tyranny of the subject’,
that is because doing so gives us a more profound
understanding of what it is to be human. Material culture
studies may displace an anthropology obsessed with the
imperium of the social, but only to replace it with a
better anthropology humble enough to recognise the
ways in which things also so pervasively contribute to our
humanity. Which is exactly the kind of stance I have in
mind when talking of humanism and its emancipation of
things by association.
Alfred Gell’s argument in Art and Agency (1998)
provides another example of this approach, though a less
straightforward one. Certainly, the idea for which Gell’s
landmark book most often gets cited, namely that things
can be understood as possessing agency in the same
sense as humans do, may well appear as an attempt to
emancipate things ‘as such’. In contrast to, say, Miller,
the lag of emancipation (if such it is) is here pinned not
on things’ role in making human beings what they are
(although this is a central concern for Gell too), but
rather on the extent to which things may themselves be
more like humans than we might assume. Insofar as
things (e.g. cars, bombs, efigies) can be construed as
indices of a prior intention, as they so often are (e.g. an
intention to make us late for work, Pol Pot’s desire to kill,
the blessing of a benign deity), they themselves become
something akin to humans, and thus could be said to be
emancipated as such rather than by association.
Nevertheless, as a number of discussions of Gell’s
argument have tended to show, there is some ambiguity
as to how far agency really attaches to things themselves
in his scheme. Indeed, in reading the book, one is never
quite sure how seriously Gell wants us to take the, after
all, rather scandalous notion that things can be ascribed
with intentions. Part of the problem is that in his analysis
Gell tends to treat as equivalent ascriptions of agency
that, ethnographically speaking, vary rather vastly in the
degree to which they are taken seriously by those who
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CAN THE THING SPEAK?
engage in them. Broadly put, if swearing at one’s car for
failing to start is meant to be a phenomenon of the same
order as praying to an efigy, then one wants to know
whether the latter ascription of agency is supposed to be
taken as lightly as the former surely should be (which
makes Gell look rather dismissive of devotees who take
their prayers and efigies very seriously indeed), or
whether the agency of the car should be imagined as
being as weighty as that of the efigy (in which case Gell
would look like a bit of a New Age mystic). Indeed, when
it comes down to it, it does seem that Gell’s scheme is
slanted towards the former option. As James Leach has
argued, a close reading of Gell reveals that agency for
him is only ever an indirect attribute of things, its origins
lying ultimately with a human agent, whose intention the
thing in question only indexes – hence, for example, the
signiicant
distinction
Gell
makes
between
the
‘secondary’ agency of indices and the ‘primary’ agency of
the intentions they are abductively surmised to index
(Leach 2007, cf. Gell 1998: 17-21). Things, for Gell,
cannot really be agents, if by that we mean anything
more than the kind of attribution of agency involved in
swearing at a car for making us late. As Miller puts it in
his own critique, ‘Gell’s is a theory of natural
anthropomorphism, where our primary reference point is
to people and their intentionality behind the world of
artefacts’ (Miller 2005: 13). Indeed, Gell’s emancipation
of things by conferring them with agency turns out to be
more similar to Miller’s than may at irst appear. Where
Miller raises the proile of things by making them
operative in the making of human beings, Gell does so by
making them operative in acts of human agency.
So, in sum: humanist approaches, which leave the
ontological distinction between things and people
unmodiied, cannot but emancipate things by association.
The whole point about the common sense distinction
between people and things is that the former are
endowed with all the marks of dignity, while the latter
are not. So if you want to emancipate the thing while
leaving the ontology untouched, then all you can do is
ind ways to associate it more intimately with the person.
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Post-human approaches, by contrast, can be seen as
taking up just that challenge: they propose a diferent
ontology of people and things and thus precipitate a redeinition of their properties (i.e. rather than merely a redistribution of them across the person/thing divide). This
tack does indeed raise the hope of an emancipation of the
thing ‘as such’, although one immediately has to add the
proviso that ‘the thing’, following its ontological reconstitution, is no longer the thing as we ordinarily know
it.
Think, for example, of Latour’s denial of human/ nonhuman puriication in favour of the lat ontology of the
Actor Network. All the ‘entities’ that modernist
puriication takes as ‘people’ and ‘things’ are refashioned
analytically ‘hybrid’ knots of mutually transformative
relations. Each element of which these relations are
composed (itself a relation – hence the network’s fractal
structure, à la Strathern 2004 [1991]) is an ‘actant’
inasmuch as it has a transformative efect on the
assemblage (i.e. the contingent and analytically localised
aspect or moment of the Network.)
So agency for Latour is not the efectuation of a human
intention (e.g. as it is for Gell). It is a property of
networks of relationships (hybrid ones, involving all the
elements that a modernist ontology would want to
distinguish from one another) that emerges as and when
the elements they involve make a diference to each
other. The classic and much cited example being Latour’s
discussion of the gun debate in the USA (e.g. see 1999:
180). The responsible agents are neither the guns
themselves (as the anti-gun campaigners argue) nor the
people who use them (as the gun-lobby would have it –
‘guns don’t kill, people do’). It is the hybrid assemblage,
or ‘collective’, which gun users and guns form together:
the ‘person-with-gun’.
There can be no doubt that, thus ontologically revised
or redeined, things are indeed emancipated ‘as such’.
The new kind of analytical entity that Latour proposes,
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the hybrid assemblage of humans and non-humans in
mutual transformation, is an agent in as serious a sense
one might wish to take that term: its very constitution is
deined by its ability to act as such. Indeed, the bold
political philosophy that Latour has been building on the
back of his move to networks of things-and-people in
recent years is testimony to this: ‘political representation
of nonhumans seems not only plausible now but
necessary, when the notion would have seemed ludicrous
or indecent not long ago’, he writes, and raises the
prospect of a ‘parliament of things’ (Latour 1999: 198).
Yet, in terms of the framework of the present
argument, there is also a signiicant irony involved in
Latour’s tack of emancipation. In order for him to avoid
emancipating things ‘by association’ to humans, as per
Miller or Gell, Latour ends up deining them, in a
as
associations
(assemblages,
revisionist
move,
collectives, networks), thus binding them to humans by
ontological iat. This, however, begs a question: to what
extent and, if at all, how does the dignity conferred on
the actants of a Latourian network rub of on the things a
pre-Latourian metaphysic would call ‘things’? Does the
Latourian revision of the constituents of the world get us
any closer to answering our question of whether the
thing can speak? Of course, from a Latourian point of
view, these questions are either meaningless or foolish.
There is no ‘thing’, other than in the modernist chimera.
To raise the very question – Can the thing speak? – is to
engage in an act of puriication. One should rather bite
oneself and ask, Can the thing – I mean the actor
network! – speak? (Answer: yes.)
Yet, I want to suggest that something important is lost
in this act of analytical (because ontological) censorship.
Far be it from me to propose any kind of return to
modernist ontology – not even for the sake of an
anthropological commitment to vulgar common sense à
la Miller. Indeed, I am not even sure at this stage of
thinking about the matter whether the sense of
dissatisfaction I express here points to a principled law
in Latour’s analytic or an accidental feature of the way
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Latourian analyses tend to get done. Still, so often when
reading such analyses one gets the impression that all
the qualities that seem peculiar to ‘things’ as one
ordinarily conceives of them – I mean the aspects of
things we would ordinarily tag is their ‘material’
qualities, such as those studied by material scientists –
somehow get muted, lost in the Latourian translation. I
am not saying they don’t get a mention, or that they do
not play a signiicant role in Latour’s often highly
sophisticated empirical analyses, as well as those of his
followers. For example, Latour’s refutation of the
technological determinism of saying that guns kill people
does not stop him from emphasising the particular forms
of agency that a gun’s technological characteristics – the
mechanics of detonation, velocity, accuracy and so on –
contribute to the man-with-a-gun assemblage. What I am
saying is that the net efect of Latour’s ontological
amalgamation of such characteristics with the people
they act to transform renders them (or at least tends to
render them) corollaries of projects and concerns that a
lay non-Latourian account would interpret as irreducibly
human: what is important about Boyle’s air-pump is its
contribution to modernity (1993a), the signiicant thing
about sleeping policemen is that their concrete curvature
participates in the patrolling of trafic (Latour 1993b),
what the elements that make for a gun’s iring power do
is they engender the potential to kill (1999).
All this may indeed be a contingent function of the
particular questions on which Latourian analyses have
been put to work.4 Nevertheless, one can make the
principled point that Latour’s prime ontological revision,
namely the ‘symmetry’ of treating the entities that a
modernist metaphysics puriies as persons ‘or’ things as
hybrid relations of persons ‘and’ things (see also Viveiros
de Castro 2002), renders any interest in those aspects of
things one would ordinarily view as distinctively thinglike considerably harder to pursue. Qualities one would
call ‘material’ are, as such, always in deep ontological
entanglement with the (also) human projects that they
help constitute, so one wonders whether in practice, let
alone in principle, a Latourian take on things could at all
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let one disentangle them and allow them to be explored
as such. One suspects that with the metaphysical
bathwater of ‘materiality’ (as opposed, that is, to
‘humanity’) goes also the baby of ‘materials’ as a
legitimate analytical concern.
This way of putting it shows how close this worry
comes to one expressed recently by Tim Ingold (2007).
Fed up with what he sees as perversely abstract and
intractably abstruse debates about ‘materiality’ in recent
years, Ingold urges anthropologists to ‘take a step back,
from the materiality of objects to the properties of
materials [... –] a tangled web of meandrine complexity,
in which – among myriad other things – oaken wasp galls
get caught up with old iron, acacia sap, goose feathers
and calf-skins, and the residue from heated limestone
mixes with emissions from pigs, cattle, hens and bears’
(Ingold 2007: 9). Ingold, we may note, makes no secret
of the fact that his manifesto for a renewed focus on
materials is itself metaphysically motivated, and bound
up with a particular way of viewing the relationship
between humans and things. Inspired by Gibson as well
as phenomenology, Ingold sees humans and things as
submerged on an equal ontological footing in ‘an ocean
of materials’ (2007: 7). He writes:
Once we acknowledge our immersion, what this
ocean reveals to us is […] a lux in which materials
of the most diverse kinds – through processes of
admixture and distillation, of coagulation and
dispersal, and of evaporation and precipitation –
undergo continual generation and transformation.
The forms of things, far from having been imposed
from without upon an inert substrate, arise and are
borne along – as indeed we are too – within this
current of materials. (ibid.)
One might say that Ingold’s tactic for emancipating
the thing involves a kind of inverse humanism (for this is
not materialism as we know it), in which, rather than
raising things to the power of the human, humans and
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things alike are factorised down to their primordial
material denominator: Life on Earth (ibid). Nevertheless,
my point here is that Ingold’s plea for materials can be
taken independently of the theoretical agenda from
which it may low, and heeded as a powerful reminder of
a whole terrain of investigation that any attempt to take
things seriously – even to emancipate them in the terms
developed here – cannot aford to ignore.
Indeed, it is with Ingold’s plea for materials that I
want to cut to the chase of what asking for things that
speak could mean. The problem is one of, if you like,
wanting to have one’s cake and eat it. Eating the cake, in
this case, is taking fully on board the post-human (e.g.
Latourian) point that a proper emancipation of the thing
must eschew any principled distinction between it and
humans as a starting-point. Having the cake is inding a
way nevertheless to credit the Ingoldian intuition that a
full-hog emancipation of the thing must place those
characteristics that are most think-like or ‘thingy’ (the
designation is purely heuristic, with no metaphysical
prejudice!) at the top of its agenda. Asking whether the
thing can speak, then, is to ask for it to speak on its own
terms – in its own language, if you like. Any interesting
answer to this question, I suggest, would have to start
form the rather blatant observation that it would be a
shame if such a language – call it ‘thingese’? – turned out
to have no sonorities of what we take to be the most
obvious distinguishing feature of so-called things, namely
their material characteristics. It is in answer to this
question that a critique of the argument of TTT may be
useful.
Rethinking through things
Plotted onto the trajectory of increasingly radical
attempts to erase the human/thing divide, TTT should
probably be placed at the far posthumanist extreme.
Indeed, were one permitted to compound this already
horrible term, the argument of TTT is post-posthumanist,
in that it takes on board the Latourian suggestion that
the distinction between people and things is ontologically
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arbitrary, but adds (contra Latour among others) that,
this being so, the solution for emancipating the thing
must not be to bind it to an alternative ontological order
(e.g. that of the Actor Network), but rather to free it from
any ontological determination whatsoever. TTT, in other
words, operates within the economy of the literature
announcing and articulating the rise of the thing, and its
self-conscious polemic purports to ofer a corrective even
to the most extreme proponents of this (otherwise)
common emancipatory goal. Let me indicate briely how
our attempt to emancipate the thing was supposed to
work
As put forward in the Introduction of TTT, the
argument involved two key claims – one critical and one
positive. The critical move, which took of directly from
Strathern (see above), went as follows. If in any given
ethnographic instance things may be considered,
somehow, also as non-things (e.g. an artefact that,
ethnographically speaking, is a human being, as per
Melanesian gifts, or a river that is a spirit), then the
notion of a ‘thing’, anthropologically speaking, can only
have a heuristic, rather than an analytical, role. So
attempts to analyse the things we call objects, artefacts,
substances, or materials in terms of their objectivity,
substantiality or, as has become most popular, their
‘materiality’, are locked in a kind of ethnographic
prejudice – they are, to use the dirty word, ethnocentric.
And this goes also for attempts theoretically to
emancipate things by attributing them with all sorts of
qualities earlier shacklers would take to belong only to
humans, such as sociality, spirituality, and again, most
popularly, agency. In other words, if what a thing may be
is itself an ethnographic variable, then the initial
analytical task must not be to ‘add’ to that term’s
theoretical purchase by proposing new ways to think of it
– e.g. as a site of human beings’ objectiication (Miller),
an index of agency (Gell), an on-going event of
assemblage (Latour), or what have you. Rather it must be
efectively to de-theorise the thing, by emptying it out of
its many analytical connotations, rendering it a purely
ethnographic ‘form’ ready to be illed out contingently
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according only to its own ethnographic exigencies.
Treating the thing as a heuristic (i.e. just as a tag for
identifying it as an object of study) was indeed, then, a
way for us to allow it to speak in its own terms – which in
ethnographic principle may be as varied as there are
things to listen to – from behind the clamour of social
theoretical attempts to theorise such a thing as the thing
as such. Things do speak, ran the thought, but the
problem is how to hear them past all the things we say
about them.
If half of the way towards addressing this problem is to
empty out the notion of ‘thing’ of its contingently a priori
metaphysical contents – thing-as-heuristic –, the other
half is to formulate a way of allowing it to be illed by
(potentially) alternative ones in each ethnographic
instance. This can be seen as the second and positive
emancipatory move of the TTT argument, which is
captured by a complementary methodological injunction:
‘concepts = things’. The move is complementary in that it
follows directly from the issue that motivates the
heuristic approach in the irst place, namely the
possibility – and in so many instances the fact – that the
things we call ‘things’ might not ethnographically
speaking be things at all, or not in the way we might
initially assume them to be. For note that the things-asconcepts injunction is determinedly not proposed as
some new theory of the thing. The idea is emphatically
not to propose some kind of revisionary metaphysic, to
the efect that, where people have so often assumed
things and concepts to belong to opposite ontological
camps, we should all from now on recognise them as
belonging to the same one (viz. the kind of approach
Latour and Ingold advance in diferent ways, as we have
seen). To the contrary, the ‘things = concepts’ formula is
ofered as a further methodological clause for sidestepping just such theoretical prescriptions. In particular,
it is supposed to foreclose a very real danger when it
comes to thinking anthropologically about the diferent
ways in which things may feature ethnographically,
namely that of parsing them as diferent ways in which
people may think about (represent, imagine, socially
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construct) them. This is to parse ethnographic
alternatives to our metaphysic of things in terms of it – in
fact, in terms of what nigh all-thing emancipators
consider its crassest version, namely the idea of inert and
mute things invested with varied meanings only by
human iats of representation. It is, in efect, to raise the
erasure of things to the power of a necessity for thinking
of them.
So the ‘concepts = things’ clause is meant to placate
just this danger. Put very simply: instead of treating all
the things that your informants say of and do to or with
things as modes of representing the things in question,
treat them as modes of deining them. The immediate
advantage of this way of parsing the issue is that it
renders wide open precisely the kinds of questions that
lie at the heart of the emancipatory agenda, namely
questions about what kinds of things ‘things’ might be.
Instead of merely ofering sundry ways of conirming the
base metaphysic of mute things invested with varied
meanings by humans, the things-as-concepts tack holds
up that very ethnographic variety as a promise of so
many ways of arriving at alternative metaphysical
positions – whatever they might be. If every instance
anthropologists would deem a diferent representation of
a thing is conceived as a potentially diferent way of
deining what such a thing might be, then all the
metaphysical questions about its character qua ‘thing’,
what materiality might be, objectiication, agency – all
that is now up for grabs, as a matter of ethnographic
contingency and the analytical work it forces upon us.
As we did in the Introduction to TTT itself, let me
illustrate the approach with reference to my own chapter
in the book, in which I elaborate an analysis of aché.
Aché is a mana-type term that Afro-Cuban diviners use to
talk both about their power to make deities appear
during divination, and about a particular kind of
consecrated powder that they consider as a necessary
ingredient for achieving this. The terminological
coincidence, I argued, corresponds to an ontological one:
a diviner’s power is also his powder and the powder ( qua
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consecrated) is also his power. Now, this is obviously a
counter-intuitive suggestion, of the order of ‘twins are
birds’ (Evans-Pritchard 1956, cf. Holbraad 2010). If we
know what powder is at all, we know that it is not also
power in any meaningful sense (it’s just powder!), and
much less can we accept that power (a concept with
proportions as grand as Nietzsche or Foucault) might
also be just powder (of all things!). Hence the classical
anthropological type of question: why might Cuban
diviners ‘believe’ such a crazy idea? For as long as our
analysis of aché remains within the terms of an axiomatic
distinction between things and concepts, we cannot but
ask the question in these terms. We know that powder is
just that dusty thing there on the diviner’s tray (see
below). So the question is why Cubans might ‘think’ that
it is also a form of power. How do we explain it? How do
we interpret it?
Alternatively, we could treat the distinction between
concepts and things merely as a heuristic device, as per
TTT’s irst move. This would allow us to ask questions
about that powder that we would intuitively identify as a
‘thing’, without prejudicing the question of what it might
be, including questions of what it being a ‘thing’ might
even mean. Answers to such questions, then, would be
culled from the ethnography of all the data we would
ordinarily be tempted to call people’s ‘beliefs’ about this
powder, including the notion that it is also power. As per
the second move of the TTT method (concept = thing),
we would treat such data as elements of a conceptual
deinition of the thing in question. So: Cuban diviners do
not ‘believe’ that powder is power, but rather deine it as
power. Note, crucially, how this way of setting up the
problem raises the metaphysical stakes. Since our own
default assumption is that powder is not to be deined as
power (it’s just a dusty thing, we assume), the challenge
now must be to reconceptualise those very notions and
their many ethnographic and analytical corollaries
(powder, power, deity etc. but also thing, concept,
divinity etc.) in a way that would render the
ethnographically-given deinition of powder as power
reasonable, rather than absurd. It is just this kind of
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analytical work I attempted to carry out in my chapter in
TTT (I shall cover more of that ground later).
At the time we presented this mode of analysis in TTT,
I for one imagined it as having cracked the problem of
the thing’s emancipation as I have been outlining it here.
Taken together, I thought, our argument’s two key moves
efectively opened up the space for things themselves, as
one encounters them heuristically in any given
ethnographic instance, to dictate their own metaphysics –
to dictate, if you like, the terms of their own analytical
engagement. Just what I have in mind when asking for an
approach that allows things to speak for themselves, in
their own language! Yet, to see why I may have been
wrong, one needs only to contemplate how the prospect
of things speaking in the ‘own’ language in this TTTsense measures up to the Ingoldian caveat, namely that a
proper emancipation of things ‘as such’, whatever that
may mean or involve, should place their material
characteristics centre stage – that things should speak in
thingese, and that thingese should somehow be an
expression of things’ peculiarly material qualities. In the
sometimes lamboyantly programmatic pronouncements
of the TTT Introduction, nothing is in fact made of such
qualities, and certainly their role in ‘thinking through
things’ is left largely unspeciied.
In fact, it is indicative that this irst dawned on me (at
any rate) when faced with a searching question by an
archaeologist in a conference at which my co-editors and
I presented our argument (see also Holbraad 2009).
Being himself consigned to working with things without
the beneit of rich ethnographic information about them,
he admitted, he found himself at a loss as to how
archaeologists might deploy our approach to any efect.
Notwithstanding our claim to have found a way to let
things speak for themselves, our argument seemed at
most a method for allowing the ethnography of things to
speak on their behalf – to set, indeed, the terms of their
analytical engagement. If what motivates the whole
approach is, as explained above, the fact that in varied
instances people speak of or act with things in ways that
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contradict our assumptions about what a thing might be;
and if, furthermore, it is just those ways of speaking and
acting around things that are supposed to provide the
‘content’ of their potentially alternative metaphysics;
then how might archaeologists, for whom, what people
might have said or done around the things archaeologists
call ‘inds’ is so often the primary question? If anyone
ever needed a way of letting things speak for themselves
that is the archaeologist, for whom things are so often all
he has to go on. Our unproblematised reliance on, and
unabashed love for, ethnography in our way of ‘thinking
through things’ is of no huge help. The clue is in the
book’s subtitle: ‘theorising artefacts ethnographically’.
These misgivings go to the heart of the problem I wish
to tackle here, and are tellingly connected to another
worry that as a social anthropologist I have had myself
(privately!) about the TTT argument, namely the fact that
the analytical experimentations it seeks to promote seem
in one way or other to be wound around ethnographic
phenomena one might broadly call ‘magical’ or even
‘animist’ in one sense or other. Cigarettes that make Port
Morsby inmates’ thoughts ly out of prison, Maori and
Swazi legal paraphernalia that have metaphysical
eficacy, shamanic costumes that transport Mongols to
legions of skies, and family chests and photographs that
contain their life force, divinatory powder that is the
power to reveal deities: these are the things contributors
to our volume thought through, along with the people
who ‘informed’ them ethnographically about them. In line
with the archaeologist’s comment, I suspect that this
‘magical realist’ tenor of the chapters is not accidental.
The leverage for thinking out of the metaphysical box
that so entranced us as editors was owed, at least to a
large extent and at the irst instance, to the chapters’
ethnographic magic, to coin a phrase, rather than the
speciically ‘thing-like’ character of their subject-matter.
It emerges, then, that TTT’s claim to ofer an
emancipation of the thing along the lines I have been
discussing is open to a critique that is analogous to the
one advanced earlier in relation to Latour. Latour, we
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saw, emancipates the thing by entangling it ontologically
with persons – subsuming both under the terms of his
revisionary ontology of networks comprising people-andthings. TTT does something similar, though now at the
level of analytical methodology. It emancipates the thing
by entangling it heuristically with all that the people
concerned with it say and do around it, subsuming things
and their ethnographic accounts under the terms of our
revisionary methodology. Indeed, just as a Latourian
might object that to demand an emancipation of the thing
‘as such’ is latly to deny the signiicance of Latour’s
ontology of networks, so we might want to contend that
that same demand merely contradicts our methodological
injunction of concept = thing. As far as TTT is concerned,
things as such just are what our ethnographic
descriptions of them deine them to be. Still, if this is
emancipation
by
ethnographic
‘association’,
the
Ingoldian bugbear remains: what of materials and their
properties?
Yet, I want to argue that the force of this line of
critique pertains more to the rhetoric of the TTT
argument than to its substance. Suitably reconsidered,
the methodological approach of TTT is indeed able to
give ‘voice’ to material characteristics, making analytical
virtue of them as such. The fact that this prospect
remained mute in the way we pitched the argument when
we wrote it relates directly to the guiding homology with
which I began this paper, between the postcolonial
agenda of emancipating the native and the thingtheoretical one of emancipating the thing. With
particular reference to Viveiros de Castro’s ongoing
project of de-colonizing anthropological thinking by using
ethnography to subvert its most domineering (because
ontological) presuppositions (see Henare et al 2007: 8-9,
cf. Viveiros de Castro 1998, 2002), ours was pitched
above all as an attempt to put the ethnography of things
at the centre of such an endeavour. If for Viveiros de
Castro the emancipation of the native in anthropology is
a matter of opening up space for her ‘conceptual selfdetermination’ (2002) within it, then the TTT argument
amounted mainly to the addendum that the ethnography
107
MARTIN HOLBRAAD
of (people’s engagement with) things is a prime site for
pursuing this goal. In other words, whatever
emancipation TTT might ofer to things was rhetorically
subsumed under the older (but surely no less pressing)
political agenda of emancipating the native. Indeed,
TTT’s two-step methodology relected this directly. The
‘thing-as-heuristic’ move opened up ‘things’ as a locus of
ontological self-determination, while the ‘concept =
thing’ clause allowed the ethnography of what natives do
and say around them to provide it with ontologically
variable contents.
What, then, of the substance of this argument? Might
it, albeit inadvertently, provide a way for things to speak,
not as proxies for ethnographic natives, but for
themselves? In a longer, fully written up version of this
paper I plan to use three examples of anthropological and
archaeological analyses of things in order to explore the
question concretely.5 Here I limit myself to making the
argument from irst principles, and illustrating it briely
with reference to my Cuban powder-is-power case.
It all depends, of course, on what one takes ‘things
that may speak’ to mean – what counts as a thing that
speaks for itself? It is on this point that I think the
homology with Spivak’s question about the subaltern is
most instructive. We have already seen that attempts to
transpose the humanist agenda of postcolonial
emancipation onto things by including them in ‘the circle
of the human’ provide only half-hogged emancipations,
‘by association’. But we have seen also that there is an
alternative to humanism in the struggle to de-colonise
anthropology – not least in the rhetoric of TTT itself, as
well as in the work of Viveiros de Castro. Captured by
Viveiros’s slogan of ‘conceptual self-determination’, this
is the project of constructing an anthropology that opens
spaces for natives to set the terms of our anthropological
engagements with them, positing them as producers of
concepts rather than, say, consumers of ours. Rather
than worrying about how far natives might (or should) be
considered as humans, agents, subjects and so on, we
should be asking what concepts of humanity, agency,
108
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
subjectivity and more our anthropological engagement
with them might yield, and be fully prepared to be
surprised by what we ind (sensu Strathern 2005). It is
this notion of emancipation, then, that I propose to
transpose onto things: things can speak insofar as they
can set the terms of their anthropological engagement by
acting as the originators (rather than the objects) of our
anthropological conceptualisations. Things can speak if
they can yield their own concepts.
This way of putting the matter already gets us much
closer to seeing why TTT might after all be suited to
stage such a move. Bracketing for this purpose the
underlying postcolonialist concerns to which it was put to
use, the ‘concept = thing’ formula speaks directly to the
problem at hand. All one needs to do is read the formula
backwards (in school we called this ‘symmetry of
equality’): ‘thing = concept’. Indeed, the thought is in a
pertinent sense the reverse (though not the opposite) of
the one advocated explicitly in TTT. If there the formula
‘concept = thing’ designated the possibility of treating
what people say and do around things as manners of
deining what those things are, here its symmetrical
rendition ‘thing = concept’ raises the prospect of treating
the thing as a manner of deining what we (analysts now,
rather than natives) are able to say and do around it. At
issue, to coin another phrase, are a thing’s conceptual
afordances.
Indeed, thinking of the present argument as a
symmetrical reversal of the one made in TTT also allows
us to lesh the thought out in Ingold’s direction, towards
the question of materials and their properties. As I noted
when outlining the TTT position, the promise of
conceptual experimentation that it holds up is grounded
in ethnographic contingency. Having emptied the notion
of ‘the thing’ of any conceptual presuppositions of what
may count as one, we ill it back up with alternative
conceptualisations
drawn
from
the
contingent
ethnographic data we ind around it. One way of
describing the procedure, it strikes me, would be as a
form of ‘empirical ontology’, where ‘empirical’ denotes
109
MARTIN HOLBRAAD
its ethnographic grounding. So we may ask: what is the
equivalently empirical grounding of the reverse
procedure that I seek to articulate here for things?
Following through on the symmetry of our reversalstrategy, the answer can be found only in the material
characteristics of the thing itself. What was empirical
about (ethnographically driven) concepts that deined
things
must
now
be
so
about
(let’s
say,
‘pragmatographically’ driven) things that now deine
concepts. With what other ‘stuf’ can things feed their
conceptualizations than the very stuf that makes them
what they are, as heuristically marked ‘things’? The data
that make a (conceptual) diference, in this case, are no
longer what we hear and see people say and do around
things, but rather what we hear, see, smell, taste and
touch of the thing as we ind it (heuristically) as such.
The diference from Ingold, however, is that, in line
with his phenomenologically inclined vitalism, he is
content to revel at this material and sensuous level of
things, to explore their mutual ‘enmeshment’ with people
and other organisms, as well as their ‘afordances’ for
them in the broader ecology of living. By contrast, in
raising the question of the conceptual afordances of
materials and their properties, my interest is not in the
ecology of their material alterations but rather in the
economy of their conceptual transformations: how their
material characteristics can dictate particular forms for
their conceptualization. At issue, if you like, is not the
horizontal trafic of materials’ enmeshment in forms of
life, but rather what one might imagine as a vertical axis
of materials’ transformation into forms of thought –
mainly for fun, I’d call this the ‘intensional vertizon’ of
things (to mark its orthogonal relationship to
phenomenological notions of things’ ‘intentional horizon’
in, say, Husserl). Simply put, this vertizonal movement
would be what ‘abstraction’ would look like were it to be
divorced from the ontological distinction between
concrete (things) and abstract (concepts). Indeed, this is
just what the ‘thing = concept’ clause of our analytical
method would suggest. Where the ontology of things
versus concepts would posit abstraction as the ability of a
110
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
given concept to comprehend a particular thing, external
to itself, in its extension, the heuristic continuity of ‘thing
= concept’ casts this as a movement internal to ‘the thing
itself’ (to echo Husserl again): the thing diferentiates
itself, no longer as an instantiation ‘of’ a concept, but a
self-transformation as a concept.
I am of course aware that this way of thinking takes us
into deep philosophical waters which I am incompetent to
chart (although one may note with pleasure that this is
exactly as it should be: one would hardly hope for the
scandalous idea of things that speak to have tamer
philosophical implications). Indeed, in my amateur
understanding, there is a line in Western philosophy,
which runs from Heraclitus through Leibniz and up to
Deleuze, that deals with many of the relevant problems.
Still, adopting a distinctively anthropological slant with
reference to Marilyn Strathern’s notion of ‘partial
connections’ (1991), Morten Pedersen and I have
elsewhere tried to articulate in some detail the analytical
implications
of
things’
capacity
for
vertizonal
transformation – we called this form of self-motion
‘abstension’, to indicate the intensive (as opposed to
extensive) character that abstractions acquire when they
are thought as self-diferentiating transformations of
things-into-concepts (see Holbraad & Pedersen 2009).
Rather than cover this ground again for present
purposes, however, I close by showing what this kind of
analytical movement looks like with reference to the
example of aché which I began to discuss earlier.
(Indeed, in retrospect, it seems remarkable that this line
of argument was pasted over, not only in the Introduction
to TTT, where the notion of a powder that is power is
used as an illustration as we saw, but even in my own
chapter in the book, where the actual analysis of this
material is carried out.)
If, as I have argued, the problem with TTT is that it
emancipates the thing only by associating it in
ethnography with an ontologically emancipated native,
then my analysis of aché in my TTT chapter is certainly
an instance of this. We have already seen, for example,
111
MARTIN HOLBRAAD
that the very problem that article was devoted to solving
– what might a powder that is also power be? – was
ethnographically driven: it was not powder that told me it
is power, it was my diviner informants. And certainly, a
host of ethnographic data serve to frame and develop the
problem itself, as well as parts of its analytical solution.
Crucially, for example, since what powder might be in
this instance depends on the notion of power, part of my
attempt to articulate the question involves developing its
various dimensions ethnographically. In a nutshell, I
provide an account of Afro-Cuban divinatory cosmology
based on informants’ responses, to show that for diviners
power consists in the ability to render otherwise absent
divinities present during the divinatory ceremony, and
that this power manifested in divination as the ‘signs’ the
diviners mark with their ingers on the powder that is
spread in the surface of their divining board, which are
called ‘oddu’, and said to ‘be’ divinities in their own right.
On the basis of this ethnographic information, I go on to
show that the notion of a powder that ‘is’ power emerges
as a solution to an age-old theological conundrum,
familiar in the anthropology of religion (e.g. Keane 2007):
apparently transcendent deities are rendered immanent
on the surface of the divining board, allowing those
present in the divination to relate to them directly.
Conceptualising powder as power, then, requires us to
understand analytically how Afro-Cuban divination
efectively solves this ‘problem of presence’, to recall
Matthew Engelke’s book on a related conundrum (2007).
And it is to this question that powder, inally, speaks:
Powder gives us the answer […]. As we saw, spread
on the surface of the divining board, powder
provides the backdrop upon which the oddu,
thought of as deity-signs, ‘come out’. In this most
crucial of senses, then, powder is the catalyst of
divinatory power, ie the capacity to make [deities]
‘come out’ and ‘speak’ […]. Considered prosaically,
powder is able to do this due to its pervious
character, as a collection of unstructured particles –
its pure multiplicity, so to speak. In marking the
112
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
oddu on the board, the babalawo’s ingers are able
to draw the coniguration just to the extent that the
‘intensive’ capacity of powder to be moved (to be
displaced like Archimedean bathwater) allows them
to do so. The extensive movement of the oddu as it
appears on the board, then, presupposes the
intensive mobility of powder as the medium upon
which it is registered. [In this way] powder renders
the motile premise of the oddu’s revelation explicit,
there for all to see by means of a simple igureground reversal: oddu igures are revealed as a
temporary displacement of their ground, the
powder. […] This suggests a logical reversal that
goes to the heart of the problem of transcendence.
If we take seriously babalawos’ contention that the
oddu just are the marks they make on aché-powder
[…],
then
the
constitution
of
deities
as
displacements of powder tells us something pretty
important about the premises of Ifá cosmology: that
these deities are to be thought of [not as] entities,
but rather as motions. […] If the oddu […] just are
motions […], then the apparent antinomy of giving
logical priority to transcendence over relation or
vice versa is resolved. In a logical universe where
motion is primitive, what looks like transcendence
becomes distance and what looks like relation
becomes proximity. [So, qua motions, the deities
have inherent within themselves the capacity to
relate to humans, through the potential of directed
movement that] aché-powder guarantees, as a
solution to the genuine problem of the distance
deities must traverse in order to be rendered
present in divination. (Holbraad 2007: 208-9)
It in not an accident that the content of this analysis
(i.e. the relationship between transcendence and
immanence) is recursively related to its form (i.e. the
relationship
between
analytical
concepts
and
ethnographic things) – in the article itself I made much of
this. Here, however, I want only to focus on the latter
113
MARTIN HOLBRAAD
question, to draw attention to the work powder does for
the analysis, by virtue speciically of its material
characteristics. If ethnography carries the weight of the
analytical problem, in this argument, it is the material
quality of powder that provides the most crucial elements
for its solution. If deities are conceptualised as motions
to solve the problem of presence, after all, that is only
because their material manifestations are just that,
motions. And those motions, in turn, only emerge as
analytically signiicant because of the material
constitution of the powder upon which they are
physically marked: its pervious quality as a pure
multiplicity of unstructured particles, amenable to
intensive movement, like the displacement of water, in
reaction to the extensive pressure of the diviner’s
ingers, and so on. Each of this series of material
qualities inheres in powder itself, and it is by virtue of
this material inherence that they can engender vertizonal
efects, setting the conceptual parameters for the
anthropological analysis that they ‘aford’ the argument.
As an irreducible element of the analysis of aché, it is
powder that brings the pivotal concepts of perviousness,
multiplicity, motion, direction, potential and so on into
the fray of analysis, as conceptual transformations of
itself, as per the ‘thing = concept’ clause. In that sense, I
submit, it speaks for itself – louder, in fact, than any other
element of the analysis presented.
Conclusion: anthropology and/or pragmatology
By way of conclusion, it may be worth clarifying a little
how I see the dividends, as it were, of the kind of
ampliication of things’ voices in anthropological analysis
that I have sought to articulate. In particular, it is
important at this point to be rather precise about the
degree and manner in which this way of sourcing
anthropological conceptualizations in things counts as a
way of emancipating them ‘as such’. Indeed: one might
be tempted to object that, whatever the merits of the
case I have sought to make for things speaking ‘as such’
in our analyses, their emancipation in this way
nevertheless remains unavoidably circumscribed by the
114
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
human-oriented agendas to which these analyses –
anthropological after all – are directed. Sure (the
objection would go): powder may be operative in the
analysis of my Cuban example, providing the material
source for my conceptual abstensions, as I called them,
of such analytical ingredients as perviousness,
multiplicity, intensive motion, and so on. Still, these
ingredients are part of a longer recipe, so to speak,
which includes not only things like powder, but also
divinities, diviners, their clients and so on. And what this
analytical recipe is meant to cook is an argument about
Cuban practitioners of divination – that is people, my
informants – and how we may best conceive of their
notion that powder, in a divinatory context, is a form of
divine power. While part of our answers to such
questions, in other words, might be driven by things ‘as
such’ in the manner I have indicated, their
anthropological signiicance is nevertheless a function of
their association, in the economy of anthropological
analysis, with people and the ethnographic conundrums
they pose to us. So the aforementioned archaeologist’s
bemused complaint, it seems, remains after all: could
things really speak without their association to human (in
this case ethnographically talkative) subjects?
The correct response, I would suggest, is to bite the
bullet. Anthropological examples such as the one on AfroCuban powder indeed do not demonstrate that things can
speak of their own accord, and seem bound to continue
to render them subservient to the analysis of the human
projects into which they enter. Arguably, however, this
line of scepticism is contingent squarely on the
anthropological – by which I mean also human-centric –
character of the example. Indeed, while admittedly
staying
within
the
economy
of
undeniably
anthropological analyses, what I have ventured to argue
is that such analyses may involve an irreducibly thingdriven component or phase – one we might call
‘pragmatological’, borrowing somewhat subversively a
term coined, tellingly, by the archaeologist Christopher
Witmore (forthcoming). Indeed, while the analytical
diference things can make pragmatologically might in
115
MARTIN HOLBRAAD
this instance be gauged with reference to the
anthropological mileage they give, the very notion that
things might make such a diference of their own accord,
‘as such’, does, it seems to me, ultimately raise the
prospect of pragmatology as a sui generis ield of inquiry.
Allow me, then, to indulge in a inal and absurdly
programmatic speculation. Might one imagine a thingcentric discipline called pragmatology in which things’
material properties would form the basis of conceptual
experimentations that would be unmediated by, and run
unchecked from, any human projects whatsoever? I have
to admit that my own conception of what such a
discipline might look like is hazy to say the least…
Certainly, notwithstanding my earlier comments, I don’t
think archaeology would be enough to provide a model, if
only because archaeology shares the anthropo-centric
slant of social anthropology, its problem being mainly
that its otherwise thing-oriented methodology sufers
from a deicit of human conformation. Theoretical
physics may come considerably closer, since so much of it
apparently takes the form, precisely, of radical
conceptual
experimentations
in
the
service
of
understanding the material forms of the universe. Still,
this also has problems, partly due to physicists’ still
encompassing demand for causal explanation (a demand
that is certainly distinct, and possibly incompatible, with
our pragmatological concern with conceptualization). At
any rate, there is no reason to limit our putative
pragmatology to physicists’ takes on matter, to the
exclusion of those of, say, chemists, biologists, engineers,
or, indeed, artists, sculptors or musicians. In fact, I
suspect the closest one might get to the kind of inquiry
pragmatology could involve would be an inverse form of
conceptual art – construed, of course, very broadly
indeed. If the labour of the conceptual artist is supposed
to issue in an object that congeals in concrete form a set
of
conceptual
possibilities,
the
work
of
the
pragmatologist would be one that issues concepts that
abstend in abstract form a set of concrete realities.
Pragmatology, then, as art backwards.
116
CAN THE THING SPEAK?
Notes
Acknowledgements. Versions of this paper has been presented
at departmental seminars in Aberdeen, SOAS and UCL, as
well as at the Things and Spirits conference in Lisbon
(September 2010) and the TAG 2010 conference at Bristol. I
thank James Leach, Ed Simpson, Victor Buchli, Ricardo
Roque and Joao Vasconcelos and Dan Hicks for their
respective invitations, and to the participants in each of
them for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to Lise
Philipsen for illuminating conversations during writing.
1. While my comments here speak to the argument as
presented by all three of its authors, I do not claim that
Salmond and Wastell would agree with the retrospective
critique I develop here (although they may well do so, at
least in part).
2. Chris Tilley (whose own dualism-busting eforts draw mainly
on phenomenology), puts it most simply, in defence of the
notion of ‘materiality’: ‘The concept of materiality is
required because it tries to consider and embrace subjectobject relations going beyond the brute materiality of
[things] and considering why certain [things] and their
properties become important to people.’ (Tilley 2007: 17)
3. On this point Miller, for one, resorts to a rather elaborate
metaphor about philosophical wheels and the
anthropological vehicles they help along which does not, to
my mind, express very clearly the relationship between the
two analytical demands (see Miller 2005: 43-46).
4. There may exist out there a Latourian analysis of an
assemblage of actants consisting only of the things we’d
call things, though the prospect seems more speculative at
present – see Harman 2009.
5. My favourite candidates are Pedersen’s forthcoming analysis
of shamanic costumes in Mongolia (Pedersen 2011), in
which he claims that these artefacts ‘provide an analysis of
117
MARTIN HOLBRAAD
themselves’, Strathern’s commentary on Battaglia’s
analysis of Sabarl pick-axes (Strathern 1991), in which she
argues that these artefacts ‘contain their own contexts’,
and the archaeological debate about skeuomorphism,
where, I want to argue, materials analyse each other
through translating prior forms into novel contents
(material analysis as concretions of abstractions).
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122
Chapter 5
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY:
FOOD AND FIELDWORK
Sidney Mintz
Back in 1978,1 when thinking about food seriously was
becoming a crotchet among scholars, Joseph Epstein
wrote a column for The American Scholar about the
subject:
Judging from the space given to it in the media, the
great number of cookbooks and restaurant guides
published annually, the conversations of friends – it
is very nearly topic number one. Restaurants today
are talked about with the kind of excitement that
ten years ago was expended on movies. Kitchen
technology-blenders, grinders, vegetable steamers,
microwave ovens, and the rest-arouses something
akin to the interest once reserved for cars.... The
time may be exactly right to hit the best-seller lists
with a killer who disposes of his victims in a
Cuisinart (Aristides 1978:157-8).
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SIDNEY MINTZ
If Professor Epstein was so in awe more than thirty
years ago, he must now ponder with added bewilderment
– as should we all – what has happened since. One keeps
expecting the fascination with food to fade away but it
has not – anyway, not yet. The anthropological study of
food-related behavior has also changed and expanded
radically during the last three decades, though no one is
ready to explain its momentum. Some years back,
Christine Du Bois and the author (Mintz and Du Bois
2003) sought to document briely in text, and with
bibliographical underpinning, some of the major problem
areas this interest has entailed, to enable us to highlight
a few changes. One such problem area has to do with
studies of single plants or animals, food substances, or
ingredients – buckwheat or quinoa, shrimp or muskrats,
collagen or lecithin, vinegars or oils. It is with that
problem area in particular, in relation to anthropology,
that the following remarks are concerned.
Redclife N. Salaman's remarkable History and Social
Inluence of the Potato appeared in 1949, yet the number
of kindred studies that followed it during the subsequent
three decades or so was small. I wrote a book on sugar
(sucrose), published now twenty-ive years ago (Mintz
1985). Since then, similar works have multiplied. We
have seen books on maize (Warman 2003), safron
(Willard 1999), rhubarb (Foust 1992). potatoes
(Zuckerman 2000), pasta (Sirventi and Sabban 2000),
bananas (Jenkins 2000), eels (Schweid 2002), codish
(Kurlansky 1997), wedding cakes (Charsley 1992), Coca
Cola (Pendergrast 1993, Foster 2008), two on guinea pigs
(Morales 1995, Archetti 1997), at least two on salt
(Kurlansky 2002. Laszlo 2001 [1993]), at least three on
rice (Ohnuki-Tierney 1993, Hess 1992, Carney 2001), at
least two on milk (Wiley 2010, Valenze 2011
[forthcoming]), at least three more on capsicums (LongSolis 1986, Naj 1992, Schweid 1999 [1987]), and even a
quintet, by a proliic popular food writer, on peanuts,
popcorn, ketchup, and two on tomatoes in America
(Smith
1994,
1996,
1999,
2000,
2002).
The
supplementary list of volumes since 2003 and now
forthcoming or in progress is, if anything, even more
124
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY
intimidating. Only some of these works are by
anthropologists (I have starred them above). But
anthropological books on food now loat amid a veritable
sea of food studies. The anthropological interest in food
came about by a distinctive route. If we go back to two of
the founding food-centered studies by American
anthropologists – Frank Cushing's essay on Zuñi
breadstufs (1920) and Franz Boas's work on salmon
among the Kwakiutl (1921) – we can see why. Though
each focused on a single food, one plant and one animal,
their aim was to describe that food in cultural context.
Otherwise said, each dealt with a subsistence mainstay
that was food for all, inside what was conceived of as a
small, speciic, geographically distinct society; and both
works were based on ieldwork. Most important,
production, distribution and consumption are treated in
each as integral – as coherent within a single social and
economic system. Trade was certainly known to the Zuñi
and was important to the Kwakiutl, yet food-linked
economic activity appeared to be mostly endogenous.
Of course social and economic boundaries between
them and their neighbors were crossed. But such
boundary crossing was noteworthy. Food-related activity
took place almost entirely within the society itself; and it
was, and was considered, absolutely critical to survival.
In both societies the issue of adequate food igured,
ceremonially and ideologically, in the lives of the people.
For anthropologists at that time, at least, the reasons for
studying food systems were crystal clear: how could you
know how the society worked, if you did not know how it
got and used its food? If one looks, for example, at Clark
Wissler's The American Indian (1917), in its time a bible
for beginning students of the indigenous peoples of
North America, one discovers that Wissler's culture areas
are above all food areas, built on Otis T. Mason's earlier
work on "ethnic environments" (Mason 1895).
How better to begin to sort out the complexity of
indigenous hemispheric life than to look at which people
ate salmon, which acorns, and which maize? While some
groups, such as those of the Northwest Paciic, lived
125
SIDNEY MINTZ
rather high on the hog (so to speak), most had it much
harder; none, especially to judge by their folklore, had it
easy. For all New World peoples food was, both literally
and iguratively, part of the central challenge of life.
Turning back to works on the aboriginal peoples whose
cultures most interested the anthropologists of a century
ago, we remember that those societies produced most of
what they consumed, and consumed most of what they
produced. Yet such societies were not isolates. Alexander
Lesser (1961) pointed this out in a brilliant paper, as had
others before him. Still, most of the economic activities
remained within deinable borders. When anthropology
moved away from societies that were largely selfsuficient (or that the ethnographers took to be largely
self-suficient), our task changed. Our ability to treat
production, distribution and consumption as a coherent
system ended, once that real (or in some cases spurious)
self-suficiency disappeared. One simply couldn't write a
monograph about Muncie, Indiana that made it look like
Malinowski's Coral Gardens and Their Magic, or Firth's A
Primitive Polynesian Economy, no matter what sorts of
blinders the ethnographer wore.
The enlargement of anthropological focus beyond the
so-called "primitive" came slowly, even painfully; and a
full recognition that the job requirements for
anthropologists had become diferent arrived yet more
uncertainly. I ask your forbearance, in commenting
briely on that shift, by referring to my own experience.
More than half a century ago, when such ieldwork by
anthropologists was still rare, I worked in a rural
proletarian community on the south coast of Puerto Rico.
Nearly everyone there worked in the sugarcane. Indeed,
one could argue defensibly that the community was
deined by the activities of a foreign sugar corporation,
which employed nearly every inhabitant. To have tried to
picture that community as some sort of isolate, selfcontained, deinable in terms of itself, would have been
as convincing as imagining it to be on the moon.
But understanding what had happened does not end
there. I discovered that much of the social fabric of that
126
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY
community would remind me more of what I had been
reading about in Malinowski and Firth than of Muncie,
Indiana, in spite of the industrial ambience. I would come
to conclude that this seeming contradictoriness was real.
Learning about sugarcane and sugar production was
essential to making sense of people's lives there.
Understanding something about the Boston corporation
that managed its production and sale clariied other
things about Puerto Rican life. Yet I knew I was making a
community study, even while realizing that the local
economy was utterly dependent upon forces external to
it. Its people were not tribespersons or peasants; they
were rural proletarians (Mintz 1951). They had no means
of production beyond their labor; they were nearly as
stripped of such means as any dishwasher in a New York
City restaurant. They sold their labor power to a North
American corporation. They produced hardly anything
that they ate, ate nothing they produced. That is an
exaggeration, but only a slight one. Economically
speaking, their lives would have been empty without
sugar.
Yet their lives as a community were real enough.
Indeed, in the tenor of daily life, they seemed to me in my
short life much more like a living community than
anywhere else I had lived up to that time. I saw sugar as
an element in the shaping of their lives, not as the
subject of my research. It was not until thirty-ive years
later, when I decided to write a book on the history of
sugar, that I irst began to think of myself as a serious
student of a single substance. It was lecturing on that
book that made me a student of food. In the question
period following a lecture on sugar history, I might be
asked what I had to say about salt – about which I knew
nothing; or about honey, of which I knew too little; or
about Equal, or HFCS, or maple syrup – or why people
everywhere seemed to like sweet foods, anyway. It was in
response to my listeners' questions that I became serious
about the study of food. I recount this only to indicate to
the reader how accidentally one can – or anyway, I did –
wander into something like the anthropology of food.
127
SIDNEY MINTZ
The truth is, of course, that Sweetness and Power is
not really about food – it is about the rise of capitalism.
Sugar (sucrose) was simply an illustrative instance of
that process, a long thread in the social and economic
fabric of Western history – and the histories of peoples
then buried by western historiography.
While I think that sugar is interesting in its own right,
in Sweetness and Power my interest in sugar was only
incidental. I was trying to uncover how holders of power
in the West were establishing themselves at an early time
in the world outside Europe on the one hand, and
relating themselves in new ways to their own laboring
classes on the other. I realized that one of the ways they
were discovering how to do so was by manipulating the
material universe. The one concrete substance that I
knew about personally was sugar.
As the governing classes learned to take the measure
of their own people and of subjected peoples elsewhere,
we are able to see how the fates of diferent lands and
their inhabitants as producers and as consumers became
linked in various ways to the fates of particular
substances. In efect, the ruling classes of the societies of
the West, who had long seen themselves as entitled to
enjoy both substances and experiences not available to
others, must have been beginning to think more
consciously about what ordinary people might want – and
then, more importantly, under what conditions it might
beneit them, the rulers, to see that ordinary people got
some of what they wanted. This is a highly original line of
thought if it turns up in societies where inequalities were
inherited – to control others and to beneit from their
existence, not by beating them with a stick, but by
ofering them some carrots. In practice this doesn't work
so well with donkeys, about whom it is commonly said;
but some persons thought maybe it would work with
humans. It did; and it does. Gradually a social and
economic system was born, within which people could
fashion their identities as much from what they
consumed as from what they could learn, work at, or
create.
128
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY
Of course such a line of thought is highly speculative,
even though it may sound persuasive. But what we knew
about how capitalism as a system of consumption had
taken shape, from writers such as Marx, Sombart and
Veblen; and what I knew already about the history of
sugar, made it seem worth my while to look harder. Even
without the inner story of sugar, some uncovering of its
nature in relation to human desires – and of the human
capacity to braid together desire and habit – the larger,
outer story of power might be narrated. But if I did only
that, we would not have an example of what I intended to
uncover. I hoped to show how, by looking at one revealing
niche of activity, an ever-larger economic system could
be discerned, operating pretty smoothly, though not
entirely visible.
To achieve my aim, there had to be – at least for me – a
deinable and concrete object of study. Of course there
were and are alternative ways to study sugar or any
other such product. Perhaps it would have been more
useful to do a discursive analysis of books on power and
the tropics; or to study the history of capitalism on a
larger canvas, such as the general nature of human food,
the ubiquitous power of capitalism, the generalized
hegemony of its leaders. I even wondered about writing
about the works of whoever wrote about sugar. I had
been studying those, and a lot of people, some of them
interesting, had indeed written about it.
But I would not have been able to do that work well.
Being of my generation, with a strong liking for the
concrete, I went ahead with my own plan. That involved –
though I did not anticipate it as such at the time – putting
my ideas and what I learned within a framework of the
sort sometimes now referred to, not very respectfully, as
a "master narrative." I suppose the truth is that I am a
sucker for master narratives. Back when I was living on
the edge of a sugar plantation in Puerto Rico in 1948, it
surely seemed to me that sugar itted within a larger
chronicle of the rise of capitalism, of the use of forced
labor outside the capitalist heartland, of in de siècle U.S.
129
SIDNEY MINTZ
imperialism, and of the long-term success of linking a
safe site of production and a guaranteed market for
consumption: at home and in the colonies, and preferably
without others quite noticing it.
This looked to me like a lengthy chronicle, going back
as it did for nearly ive centuries, involving Europe,
Africa and the tropical New World, using forced labor in
many guises, and perfecting a characteristic form of
industrial organization, one that blended ield and factory
into one eficient, productive and vicious enterprise. I did
not see any of those features in sugar's history as
inevitable. Indeed, I came to take positions on the
relationship of slavery to capitalism, and on the
geographical locus of the irst centers of industrial
production, that put me in positions that no orthodox
Marxist or economic determinist would want to ind
herself. And I surely did not believe that my version was
by any means the only such narrative of the past. In fact,
in a much earlier book, I had put together unawares
much of the same story, taken from the mouth of a single
narrator (Mintz 1960).
In chronicling sugar, I wanted to be as objective as I
could. At times I wondered whether there might be some
way to get enough distance from my subject to attain the
objectivity that apparently comes with successfully
situating oneself outside of, or above, the capitalistic
system. I admit that some anthropological scholars had
apparently succeeded at doing that, and at irst I wanted
to do it, too. But when I thought about where my
university salary came from; who pays for the fellowships
that my school supplies its graduate students; the light
that proper attention to politics still sheds upon
plantation owners in the right places, even today; and
other such truths (not opinions) in today’s world – I could
not elude my feeling that I, at least, was living within
capitalism, not loating invulnerably above it. I decided to
write my study of sugar in an old fashioned way: as if I
lived in a capitalist society myself, and so I did.
As Redclife Salaman's remarkable study of the potato
130
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY
eloquently demonstrated, the idea of studying a single
plant, animal, food, or food ingredient is by no means
new; and work such as Boas's and Cushing's in an earlier
era makes plain that anthropologists had thought of it
long ago. But it is worth noting afresh, because when we
look at Malinowski's work with the Trobrianders, or
Firth's with the Tikopia, we see much of the same,
because they could deine social groups that produced
what they consumed, and consumed what they produced.
In such analytical works production and consumption
were not amputated from each other; the near-obsession
with consumption that we have seen in food studies in
recent years was absent. Put simply, in those societies
the relation between supply and demand was much less
inluenced by market forces than is true for most of the
modern world. Missing from those monographs is
concern with the economic relationships among
producers, and their inluence over consumers. In those
societies producers did not aim at enlarging, changing,
or cornering a part of the market. They were not
competing for buyers, nor were the consumers searching
for alternate sellers. Each economic act in those societies
was also a social act. A diminishing supply did not
automatically result in price rises. When such indicators,
having to do with the nature of capital, of the market,
and of the market value of factors of production such as
labor, are not present, their absence signals that a fully
developed capitalism is still wanting. But I believe that it
is near impossible to study food production or
consumption almost anywhere in the world today without
taking such forces into account.
In the modern world, the extent to which economic
factors become deeply interwoven with the role of
government in the economy makes the picture
additionally complex. For example, where does proit
stop and the FDA begin? Should ephedra be taken of the
market, rather than being sold with warnings to the
consumers?
Should
we
regulate
the
so-called
nutraceuticals at all? To what extent should General
Foods lobbyists or sugar lobbyists – or for that matter,
congressmen underwritten by lobbyists – determine how
131
SIDNEY MINTZ
the food triangle is depicted graphically, and what
pictures and words go in it?
Now the interpenetration of government and the
private sector poses almost daily challenges to our
conceptions of individual freedom and the deinition of
general welfare. If one contemplates the facts about
food-borne diseases and what consumers can do to
protect our children from the “modern” system of food
production, we have a wordless but eloquent
demonstration of our near total helplessness.
But
these
are
questions
with
which
our
anthropological ancestors did not have to deal when they
studied food. They concentrated on other food-related
matters, such as coral gardens and their magic, or
salmon recipes on the Northwest coast. In very large
measure, the doing of the anthropology of that earlier era
is gone, even if – one hopes – not forgotten. But we can
still study the way human beings behave, and the rules
and patterns of their behavior, as did our forbears; we
can still learn about diferent value systems, and their
internal logics. We can, in short, still proitably do
ieldwork, which is what we are supposed to be good at.
I was reminded of our distinctive methodological gift a
few years back, when I asked two colleagues if I might
read their unpublished manuscript. Professors Frederick
Errington and Deborah Gewertz had based what became
their book (2002) on the New Guinea ieldwork they had
carried out over two decades and on their recent Morgan
Lectures. I asked to read the manuscript because it is
about sugar. In it they describe events leading up to the
creation of a plantation and the construction of a modern
sugar mill in Papua New Guinea. Since the history of the
industrial production of sugar goes back at least to the
17th century in the Caribbean region, I tend to associate
it with slavery and the destruction of cultural origins,
both Native American and African. But in Papua New
Guinea, making a sugar industry was intimately
associated with creating a nation – not so much with
destroying local cultures, as with aiming at the
132
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY
conception of a national culture.
The early planning discussions there, Errington and
Gewertz report, had to do with whether the Papua New
Guinea sugar industry would supply only the national
population, or undertake to export sugar besides. Much
discussion concerned the quality of sugar to be produced,
as well as the quantity. People wanted PNG to have a
modern industry, so the country would look modern to
the outside world. So both quality – in this case, to
produce fully-reined white, or the less “modern” brown –
and quantity were argued over. Once decided, the next
issue became that of location and employment. On
grounds of fair play, and to avoid localism, the labor force
for the new industry was to be drawn from peoples
across the nation – a deliberate attempt was made to
avoid provincialism or "wantokism" (“one-language-ism”);
and by aiming to treat individuals as equals, the hope
was to contribute to the building of a national identity.
With the work force recruited from every part of the
country, both to prevent kin, village or language-group
cliques from forming, and to impose equality of
treatment on all, the sugar industry became a bulwark
for fostering national feelings, as against local loyalties.
To at least some extent, the plan succeeded (or at least at
that time the authors thought it had.). Errington and
Gewertz had to learn about the sugar industry, as have
many other anthropological ield workers before them in
other places; but what they learned shows the way that
the world is changing, and the power of anthropological
ieldwork to document in detail the changes taking
shape. When one reads what was done with the labor
force for the PNG sugar complex – organized by the
Booker-Tate Corporation, one of the great capitalistic
enterprises that lay behind the development of Caribbean
sugar – one is stunned to see to what extent the eforts
made to create a genuine landless wage-earning
proletariat in Papua New Guinea paralleled those that
marked the coming of U.S. power to the Puerto Rican
south coast, a century before.
Even more remarkable, those eforts also reveal
133
SIDNEY MINTZ
provocative similarities to what happened sociologically
with the enslaved Africans brought in to work on
Caribbean plantations centuries earlier. What I mean
here is that a nation was being deliberately constructed;
in Caribbean history, pre-existing cultural patterns were
being deliberately broken down.
What I read about in Errington and Gewertz’s book
was the imposition of a time-conscious industrial process
upon people in a newly-emergent nation – people whose
vision had been, and in large measure still is, conditioned
by kin group, village and linguistic group that provide the
circles of meaning by which the people identiied
themselves, as individuals and as group members. The
sugar industry there reveals that they are now being
circumscribed by a still larger circle – one we social
scientists have variously labeled with terms such as
secularization,
industrialization,
urbanization,
acculturation or some other, but which also end up
meaning at some point “modernity” within global
capitalism.
I do not mean to suggest by this description that there
is some single interpretive or explanatory high road to
the study of food – any food – or toward our richest
understanding of human behavior and its past. If we look
at the work of other "sugar scholars," after this brief
glance at Errington and Gewertz, we see how rich and
varied are the approaches that serious scholars have
taken. Monographs by historians and anthropologists
about sugar, no two of them alike – Ortiz in Cuban
Counterpoint, Moreno Fraginals in El Ingenio, Attwood in
Raising Cane, Scheper-Hughes in Death Without
Weeping, Mazumdar in Sugar and Society in China, and
many others – have advanced our understanding of the
relationship among substance, society and behavior; and
though sugar igures importantly in all of their work, it
would be mistaken to claim that they wrote "books about
sugar." My intention in this paper was to keep the notion
of concrete objects of study – in this instance, foods and
food substances, and one in particular – front and center.
Yet none of these books is only about sugar, even though
134
DEVOURING OBJECTS OF STUDY
each of them is very much about sugar. Their authors'
eyes were irmly ixed on the substance through which
their protagonists, and the social forces of which they
were part, interacted. Of this list of monographs, all of
them excellent, two – Death Without Weeping and
Raising Cane – were written by anthropologists, and both
display handsomely how the study of the material world
and the methods of anthropology can meet fruitfully in
ieldwork. The purpose of these remarks was to relect
upon ieldwork and the study of foods or food-related
substances. But permit me to conclude by making a inal
point.
My aim was to suggest that there are still many
diferent ways to do anthropology, and within the subield
of food studies that is still true. We food anthropologists
need to do careful ieldwork and lots of it. But we want it
to help us to understand, if possible, something larger
than itself. That is not always possible; and the ieldwork
can still be well worth doing. But if we aim to reach a
larger readership than our colleagues; and if we want
what we have found out and think to serve some useful
purpose beyond self-education, we should aim at
exploring the larger messages our data ofer us.
Notes
1. This paper was irst delivered as the David Skomp
Distinguished Lecture on April 30, 2003, for the
Department of Anthropology, Indiana University. It was then
published separately, the same year and with the same title,
by the Department. I have made a few small changes in the
text for this online edition. It is posted here by permission
of the Department of Anthropology, Indiana University.
Requests for copies of the original lecture may be
addressed to the Department of Anthropology, Indiana
University, 701 E. Kirkwood Avenue, SB 130, Bloomington
IN 47405.
135
SIDNEY MINTZ
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139
Chapter 6
COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN:
NOTES TOWARDS A SUPERFICIAL
INVESTIGATION
Philip Swift
Tiger and Bond stood in the shade of the avenue of
giant cryptomerias and observed the pilgrims, slung
with cameras, who were visiting the famous Outer
Shrine of Ise, the greatest temple to the creed of
Shintoism. Tiger said, ‘All right. You have observed
these people and their actions. They have been
saying prayers to the sun goddess. Go and say a
prayer without drawing attention to yourself.’
Bond walked over the raked path and through the
great wooden archway and joined the throng in
front of the shrine. Two priests, bizarre in their red
kimonos and black helmets, were watching. Bond
bowed towards the shrine, tossed a coin on to the
wire-netting designed to catch the oferings,
clapped his hands loudly, bent his head in an
attitude of prayer, clapped his hands again, bowed
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
and walked out.
‘You did well,’ said Tiger. ‘One of the priests barely
glanced at you. The public paid no attention. You
should perhaps have clapped your hands more
loudly. It is to draw the attention of the goddess and
your ancestors to your presence at the shrine. Then
they will pay more attention to your prayer. What
prayer did you in fact make?’
‘I’m afraid I didn’t make any, Tiger. I was
concentrating on remembering the right sequence
of motions.’
‘The goddess will have noticed that, Bondo-san. She
will help you to concentrate still more in the future.
Now we will go back to the car and proceed to
witness another interesting ceremony in which you
will take part.’
—Ian Fleming, You Only Live Twice (1965) p.90-91
A supericial citation, to be sure, but deployed with a
more signiicant (I do not say deeper) end in mind: to pay
attention, in this essay, to the signiicance of
supericiality in Japan. By this, I mean the welldocumented tendency of Japanese sociality to invest a
serious amount of energy in the creation of surfaces. 1 For
the moment, though, let us stick with this trivial
epigraph, for it is instructive. In You Only Live Twice,
James Bond – on a mission in Japan – is instructed in
becoming Japanese by Tiger Tanaka, head of the
Japanese Secret Service. As described by Fleming, James
Bond’s Japan is a kind of technicolor theatre state,
parcelled up in ritual. A country of pure exteriority that
Fleming invents by papering it with clichés (so often
italicised): samurai, sake, Suntory whisky, ninja and
nightingale loorboards. How then to go undercover in a
world of surfaces? Not so dificult, when identity too is
just a façade. In a doubly dubious moment of mimesis,
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PHILIP SWIFT
Double-O Seven play-acts at being Japanese by the easy
expedient of cosmetics: black hair dye and skin-tanning
lotion. Later on, Bond gives up his Japanese disguise in
favour of something even more implausible. He pretends
to be an anthropologist! (Fleming 1965: 121)
Ironies aside, however, consider the scenario quoted
above; the prayer exercise at Ise Shrine. Suppose, for a
moment, that an anthropologist were present at the
scene, loitering perhaps behind a giant cryptomeria;
spying on the spy. Observing Bond perform a sequence of
actions and overhearing the subsequent bit of dialogue –
You did well…What prayer did you in fact make? – I’m
afraid I didn’t make any – our eavesdropping
anthropologist might well be led to ask herself the
following question: Did James Bond pray or not? After all,
he got the actions right, but then he says that actually he
didn’t pray; yet Tanaka, his mentor, seems to think that
he did. Which is it then? Our anthropologist is fazed, both
shaken and stirred. For while she is able to accept that,
on the surface, Bond seems to pray, what she most wants
to know is what’s really happening deep down. Perhaps
she remembers reading Geertz and his Rylean doctrine of
thick description. The job of ethnography, she recalls, is
to codify occurrences according to their particular
signiications, to sort out ‘real winks from mimicked
ones’ (Geertz 1993: 16). Well then, how to tell the
diference between someone making a prayer and
someone faking one?
If I indulge in these ictional speculations, it is in order
to create a conceptual space for the staging of analysis.
Fleming’s account is a fabrication – obviously – but it is, I
suggest, efective nonetheless in terms of delimiting
certain aspects of the ethnographic problem of prayer in
Japan. In fact, more than that – to deploy this ersatz
example as a means of enacting my general thesis: it is
efective to the extent that it is fabricated.
To see how this passage of Fleming might turn out to
be ethnographically useful – in spite of its evident
exoticism, its double-O orientalism – consider the
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
following description ofered by Thomas Kasulis (2004:
27-8). He reports on the sort of typical exchange he
would have with the businessmen he would often see
praying at a certain shrine in Tokyo.
‘“Why did you stop at the shrine?”’ asks Kasulis.
Says the businessman: ‘“I almost always stop on the
way to work.”’
Kasulis presses him further. ‘“Yes, but why? Was it
to give thanks, to ask a favor [sic], to repent, to pay
homage, to avoid something bad from happening?
What was your purpose?”
“I don’t really know. It was nothing in particular.”
“Well then, when you stood in front of the shrine
with your palms together, what did you say, either
aloud or silently to yourself?”
“I didn’t say anything.”
“Did you call on the name of the kami [divinity] to
whom the shrine is dedicated?’
“I’m not really sure which kami it is.”
So there you have it. Everything happens as if the
invocation is simulated, seemingly going no further than
the curve and contact of surfaces – clapping, bowing, and
the pressing of palms together. 2 Roland Barthes possibly
gestures at this image of prayer as pure exteriority at the
end of his famous meditation on the ‘system’ he calls
Japan. ‘Empire of Signs?’ asks Barthes. ‘Yes, if it is
understood that these signs are empty and that the ritual
is without a god’ (Barthes 1983: 108; 2005: 149).
Certainly, the model ‘Japan’ that Barthes engineers is too
heavily invested with the elements of an idealized Zen,
with the result that his system puts too much stress on
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PHILIP SWIFT
emptiness. At the same time, however, the merit of his
analysis is its disavowal of depth; instead, it traces planes
and sticks to surfaces. Consider, by contrast, a mode of
inquiry that moves very diferently; one for which
surfaces are encountered as obstructions, when what it
really wants is not more walls to run up against, but
windows to look through. Just such a model of method is
employed by a Cambridge Professor of Anthropology,
Alan Macfarlane, with stumbling-block consequences.
Writing of the goings-on at the Ise Shrine (where James
Bond ‘didn’t’ pray) and other such places, Macfarlane
registers confusion:
There is no God or gods and there is no other
separate supernatural world. With what can ritual
communicate? When thousands visit the Ise shrine
or go to Buddhist or Shinto shrines and wash their
hands, clap, make little monetary oferings, write up
their wishes and hang them on trees, what are they
doing?
There is a widespread attempt to communicate with
something spiritual…But it is dificult to ind out
what exactly is happening. (2007: 186)
This moment of incomprehension reminds me of
nothing so much as the opening lines of the song, ‘For
What It’s Worth’, by Bufalo Springield: There’s
something happening here/What it is ain’t exactly clear .
Here, from the point of view of a method ixated with the
location
of
foundations,
there
is,
as
Barthes
disconcertingly observed, ‘nothing to grab hold of’ (‘rien
à saisir’; 2005: 150). In other words, the problem would
seem to be that there are too many surfaces and no
evident way of accessing that subterranean zone of
motivations that would make them intelligible. This issue
of ‘access’ is one which, for example, scholars of
religious conversion – keener than believers in their need
to inally, really see just what is actually going on – have
rather quaintly called the ‘problem of observability’ (see
Cowan and Bromley 2008: 218). 3 In short, the problem of
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
what we might call the credibility gap between the
envelope of action (clapping, bowing) and the interior
intention.
The problem surfaces once more in Nelson’s
ethnography of the daily life of a Shinto shrine in Kyoto,
when he remarks of the various activities that shrinegoers engage in that ‘the observer cannot know for
certain what degree of belief accompanies such acts’
(Nelson 1996: 141; cf. 136). Now this is a perfectly
unobjectionable statement, quite in keeping with
Nelson’s sensible emphasis on the importance of allowing
for a wide range of motivations (where these can be
ascertained) of those who visit the shrine. But it is
precisely this statement’s seeming reasonableness that
makes me hesitate. That is to say, I am bothered by the
elementary epistemology it presupposes; for why, in this
particular case, should the observer suppose any degree
of association between such acts and certain inner states
(such as beliefs) that might authorise them? Certainly,
nothing in Nelson’s own data suggests that ‘belief’,
whether present or absent, has anything to do with the
activities that take place at Shinto shrines. If this is so,
then perhaps we have been using the wrong language,
for, as currently articulated, our analytical expressions
concerning these Japanese practices seem to be marked
by that ‘constitutive unhappiness’ that, as Latour (2004:
212) says, forever hangs over the language of
epistemology; the sense of regret that, although our
descriptions can never get beyond the surface of
practice, this is what they ought to be doing if they aim
to reach that real, interior space of explanation. To be
sure, as with other analysts of Japanese religiosity,
Nelson makes it clear that ‘praxical’ (rather than
‘creedal’) concerns count (1996: 121; cf. Reader 1991: 122), but he reaches nevertheless for a readymade
language of analysis in which a familiar space is
maintained for the possibility of the presence of belief. As
a consequence, the same doubts and concerns about
surfaces remain, because they are lodged in the language
itself; hence the sense of uncertainty, vis-à-vis belief, is a
problem of our own making, for, rather like a frustrated
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PHILIP SWIFT
dermatologist, who really wishes he had taken up
neurology instead, we are left with a feeling that the skin
is all there is; and even if it isn’t, we would never know
anyway.
But what if the problem of ‘what exactly is happening’
(as articulated by Macfarlane, for example) was a
problem best left at the level of the surface itself? In
other words, if the Japanese practices we have been
considering here appear to be much less cosmic than
cosmetic – if, that is, they strike us as supericial – then, I
suggest, that is because the cosmological in Japan is so
often constituted at the cosmetic level. This, anyway, is
the argument I intend to trace out in the rest of this
paper. Paper – the very thinness of which we take to be
proverbial in our everyday deinitions of the supericial.
But in Japan – and this is my point – surfaces might be
conceptualised very diferently. Paper, that is to say,
might not always be indicative of the trivial. Indeed, the
zigzagging strips of paper ( shide) often to be found in
Shinto shrines index the presence of divinities.
Cosmology
and
diference
anthropology of Japan
deferred
–
the
If my anthropological argument is inclined towards the
cosmological, then it does no more than follow a certain
recent trend within the discipline (e.g., Taylor 1999;
Viveiros de Castro 2001; and especially Handelman
2008). Of course, anthropological interest in cosmology is
by no means new – it goes back at least as far as Boas
(1996) who, in famously advocating the science he called
‘cosmography’, was himself taking a cue from
Humboldt’s Cosmos, that massive atmospheric project
that sought to relate the farthest star systems to the
thinnest skins of lichen ‘over the surface of our rocks’
(Humboldt 1860: 68). But if there has been a renewed
interest in the cosmological (a move not without its
critics, as I consider below), then this would not yet seem
to have had much impact on the anthropology of Japan,
that distant, disciplinary star at the outer arm of the
anthropological galaxy. While there are, assuredly, some
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
outstanding exceptions (including Clammer 2001;
Ohnuki-Tierney 1987; Yamaguchi 1977; 1991a; 1998), 4 it
seems to me that indiference towards cosmology as a
possible resource for thought might be related to a more
general disciplinary suspicion towards the invocation of
diference. To simplify considerably, the emergence of
these doubts about diference was in part the result of
the powerful attacks launched against orientalism
(spearheaded, of course, by Edward Said). But the
inclination to tone down diference was also a reaction
against certain indigenous discourses (the so-called
nihonjinron literature – or ‘theories of the Japanese’) in
which Japan is presented as so utterly other that only the
Japanese are capable of understanding it (Dale 1995).
Caught between orientalisms – ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ – the
easiest exit strategy has been to downplay diference
altogether. But this is merely a methodological dodge
that creates its own contradictions, for, as Clammer puts
it, the result has been that a discipline dedicated ‘to the
study of a particular Other, paradoxically fears the very
diferences out of which its object is constituted’ (2001:
94).
Maybe, therefore, we require new strategies, newfashioned languages of analysis; in other words, we need
other words (though this paper is no manifesto; I am just
trying to feel my way around). Hence, what I am in
search of is a style of thought that would – as the
philosopher François Jullien says of his own thinking on
Chinese thinking – succumb neither to a ‘lazy humanism’
that would eface all diferences, nor to a ‘lazy relativism’
that would make diferences absolute and inscrutable
(Jullien 2003: 17). Or, put diferently – if you’ll pardon my
revision of an old trope – we would need to avoid the
Godzilla of orientalism, on the one hand, and the
Charybdis of universalism, on the other. 5
It is therefore with an eye to the careful iguration of
diference that I aim to understand Japanese practices of
prayer, glossed as cosmological. But since, as Clammer
observes, ‘The question of diference will not just go
away’ (2001: 3), how can we address it? And what might
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PHILIP SWIFT
a cosmological angle add to the endeavour? One possible
way of clarifying these dificult issues would be to
consider some recent, programmatic remarks made by
Jennifer Robertson, which are enlightening for the very
reason that they are not concerned with the cosmological
at all.
In an introduction to a handbook on the anthropology
of Japan, Robertson draws attention to the persistence
(in Euro-American accounts of Japan) of a particular
igurative device used to evoke Japanese diference: the
metaphor of the mirror (Robertson 2005: 6-7; cf.
Robertson 2002).6 The device that Robertson has in mind
is the age-old trope of symbolic inversion; that is, the
perception and construction of other societies as being
exactly contrary to our own, of which a classic and
ancient instance is Herodotus’ description of the
Egyptians who (in opposition to the Greeks) do
everything back to front – the women urinate standing
up; the men urinate sitting down, etc. 7 It is the
enantiomorphic efect of mirrors – their exact reversal of
the image in relection – that makes them so obviously
attractive for the iguring of other societies (Fernandez
1986). And Japan came to be igured in the same way.
Indeed, inversion as a means of conceptualising Japanese
otherness became such a commonplace in Western
descriptions that Chamberlain was able to dedicate an
entry to ‘Topsy-turvydom’ in his quirky, turn-of-thecentury dictionary of Japanese culture (2007: 512-514).
To slightly diferent efect, Ruth Benedict (1967) took up
the mirror and deployed it for partly satirical purposes,
angling it at Japan and America in such a way as to make
one wonder which culture it was that was topsy-turvy.
While sympathetic to Benedict’s eforts, Robertson is
critical of ethnographies such as hers which resort to this
mirror-imaging technique, and she stresses the
connection between this Japan-as-mirror literature and
the popular conception of anthropology as a ‘mirror’ of
and for ‘culture’ (as it was for Kluckhohn, for example).
As she observes, mirrors are quite capable of other tricks
as well; so seemingly deep, they may act as solipsistic
traps, specular deceptions (Robertson 2005: 6; 2002:
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
786; cf. Fernandez 1986).8
In addition, according to Robertson, it is also the
ubiquity of this particular tropological technique that
accounts for the large number of books on Japan that
feature the word ‘mirror’ in the title (2005: 6-7).
Robertson only cites one example, but something of the
range can most easily be grasped in the most supericial
way possible, by simply tallying up the book titles:
Mirror, Sword and Jewel; A Japanese Mirror; The Empty
Mirror; The Monkey as Mirror, and so on and so forth. 9
To be sure, it is hard to see otherwise why these titular
mirrors keep reappearing, unless (the whims of
uninspired editors notwithstanding) we were to put it
down to some strange phenomenon of specular
proliferation. The latest addition to this mirror literature
is Alan Macfarlane’s Japan Through the Looking Glass
(2007), a curious kind of magical mystery tour of the
country; and, certainly, some of the criticisms that
Robertson levels at the Japan-as-mirror literature could
be applied even more forcefully here. For instance (and
with acknowledgement to Lewis Carroll), Macfarlane’s
Japan is seemingly a place where the people are able to
‘believe six impossible things before breakfast’ (2007:
153).10 It is an exceptional, paradoxical and therefore
almost unintelligible culture, which Macfarlane signals
many times over by saying that the Japanese ‘mirror’ is
dificult to see into (2007: 204, 212, 213, 215, 229, etc.)
As for the Japanese environment, it is:
a magical landscape of the kind which I had only
previously encountered in fairy stories and the
poetry of Wordsworth, Keats and Yeats. This is the
last great fairy-land on earth, but it did not take
Disney to create it. (2007: 47-8)
It is perhaps no great surprise why Macfarlane’s
mirror is dificult to look into, if it keeps getting steamed
up by sentimentality of this sort. In the end, however, for
all his talk about the incommensurability of Japan –
which, whatever one makes of it, at least has the merit of
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PHILIP SWIFT
stressing diference – he ends up saying that Japan can
only be made intelligible if it is ‘put into a universal
frame which would bring it back into our comprehension’
(2007: 213; italics mine). But then, whither diference?
Like the Cheshire Cat, it vanishes.
Returning to Robertson, her criticisms assuredly hit
the mark with regard to books like this. Her own concern
is, I take it, with inding a way of iguring diference
diferently, without recourse to mirror-imaging which,
she writes, ‘can delect recognition of the need to learn
more about Japan on terms relevant to the dynamic and
intertwined histories of localities and subjective cultural
formations and practices within that country’ (2005: 6). I
take her point. In addition, I freely admit that my efort
here, to try to imagine how a cosmology might inform
certain practices at shrines, necessarily abridges and
compresses all manner of local formations and histories.
And yet, Robertson’s critique is too all-encompassing,
linking, as it does, mirrors as tricky instruments for the
imaging of Japanese culture to the titular mirrors of so
much literature on Japan. Because, as she recognises
elsewhere (2002: 791), it is not only anthropologists who
do things with mirrors and, equally, their epistemological
capacity as imaging devices may be only one of their
functions (see Viveiros de Castro 2007: 165). For indeed
– the trope of mirror-imaging aside – Robertson overlooks
an alternative possibility that would account for the
prevalence of the mirror in writings on Japan, which is
that it might in fact be conceptually indebted to Japanese
thought itself. Thus, one such source of the mirror
metaphor is, I suggest, the historical Japanese practice of
naming descriptive or historical accounts as ‘mirrors’
(kagami) because they purport to ‘relect’ some place or
series of events.11 But the image of the mirror has
alternative sources as well, because in Shinto shrines it is
very often the case that divinities reside within mirrors.
This is exactly what I would regard as the crucial
cosmological angle that Robertson’s account passes over.
But before exploring what the consequences of this
might be for a cosmological understanding of Japanese
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
practices of prayer, I want to weigh up a speciic
criticism of cosmology as a resource for anthropological
thinking. In the irst paper published in this series for the
OAC, Huon Wardle (2009) takes up the topic of
cosmopolitics, by way of an evaluation of a debate
between Ulrich Beck and Bruno Latour that was enacted
in the journal, Common Knowledge. Wardle’s argument is
acute and powerfully stated, and – if I understand it
correctly – aims, by means of Kant’s notion of common
sense, to create a space for an ethical and relexive
subjectivity, as part of a more cosmopolitan conception of
anthropology.12 But the part of his argument that
concerns me here is his rebuke of the use of explicit
cosmological contrasts – ‘us’ and ‘them’ stagings – of the
kind made by Viveiros de Castro (whose work is often
championed by Latour). Says Wardle: ‘the reinement of
pristine indigenous cosmologies – elaborately articulated
symmetric ictions – that provide the foil to a critique of
“Western” society is unsustainable’ (2009: 22). I must
confess that inding an adequate response to this doesn’t
come easily, except to say, lamely no doubt, that I do not
wholly agree. I remain of the view that diference,
deployed tactically in something like this fashion, is still a
viable device for arriving at anthropological insights (see
Robbins 2002). Nevertheless, my intent here is much less
ambitious and I have no designs on scaling up a
cosmology and ascribing it to something massive called
‘Japan’. My aims are considerably more local and
supericial. But it is also partly for these same reasons
that I am not sure that Kantian insights would be of much
help to my argument either. Though I cannot claim to
know much about Kant’s thesis of common sense (beyond
Wardle’s excellent exposition), his writings on religion
make me hesitate. His universalizing pretensions and
strong moral sense of what should constitute reasonable
religion lead him to treat all manner of diverse practices
as the same in so far as they are equally inefective. For,
as Kant has it, ‘Diferences of external form [ den
Unterschied in der äußern Form ]…count equally for
nothing’ (1998: 168) in so far as belief in the sensuous
and transgressively technical nature of ritual or
adherence to inlexible dogma erases all diferences, as
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PHILIP SWIFT
he says, between the Tungus shaman, the Bishop and the
Connecticut Puritan (Kant 1998: 171).
But Kant’s anti-ritualism and thorough distrust of
surfaces allow me to foreground, by means of
cosmological contrast, the Japanese practices of praying
at shrines with which my inquiry is concerned. For here,
it is, in part, precisely the sensuous and technical aspects
– the surfaces – of ritual form that make it eficacious.
And this is where cosmology comes into the picture. Of
course, in our everyday talk, we might be liable to
assume that cosmology must refer to something of
gigantic size and ininite depth (deep space) or to stories
of absolute origin (Big Bangs) (Tresch 2005: 352), but the
cosmology I aim to model here is arranged along its
surfaces and is open to the eficacy of simulation. In
characterising it as ‘cosmetic’, I do not mean to refer to
make-up per se – though how curious that we give the
name of foundation to that thinnest skin of emulsion,
sponged across a face! Rather, what I intend is to exploit
this obvious etymological relation between cosmetics and
cosmos, in order to imagine how a cosmology might be
constituted in facades and fabricating practices. 13
Practices of prayer in Japan seem dificult to fathom
because, at depth, there appears to be little there. In
fact, such practices, we might feel, almost smack of the
theatrical (what Kant would denounce as ‘pious playacting and nothing-doing’; 1998: 168). But such feelings,
I would hazard, are arguably the kinds of anxieties
triggered when a ‘depth ontology’, as Daniel Miller
christens it, comes up against a counterforce of thought
that takes surfaces seriously. As Miller goes on to
observe, the devaluation of outsides, of the ephemeral, as
somehow lacking content ‘becomes highly problematic…
when we encounter a cosmology which may not share
these assumptions, and rests upon a very diferent sense
of ontology’ (Miller 1994: 71).
Belief or eficacy?
Japanese practices that centre on shrines are
thoroughly pragmatic engagements. I recall once, almost
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
ten years ago, paying a visit to the Hitomaru Shrine in
Akashi (western Japan). With me came Maeda-san (the
owner of a prominent local business selling soy sauce), in
his early seventies though very much genki (it and
cheerful), with a puckish sense of humour. Having made
some perfunctory prayers – tossing a coin into the
ofering box, clapping and bowing – I decided to buy an
ema, a votive plaque. With the felt-tip in my hand, still
thinking about what I ought to write, Maeda-san shouted
at me across the precinct, ‘The god won’t understand
English!’ (kami-san wa eigo wakarahen de); both a joke
and a dismissal. Notice here that there is no talk of
believing, just a half-serious concern with getting the
language right. It strikes me now that what Maeda-san
was getting at was the question of eficacy – the issue of
whether or not the message would work. And, in its way,
this crucial sense of eficacy, to my mind, recalls the
lesson of Niels Bohr’s horseshoe. The story goes that
someone once asked Bohr whether he believed that the
horseshoes hanging over his door would bring him luck.
‘No,’ he replied, ‘but I am told that they bring luck even
to those who do not believe in them’ (Elster 1983: 5). Not
belief then, but eficacy. As Pirotte points out, the famous
physicist was, at that moment, articulating animist
principles (2010: 203).14
I guess that, were we to take this story seriously – to
take it in and nail it above all our doors, as it were – our
accounts of Japanese shrine-going might gain a little
more felicity (to advert to a term of J.L. Austin’s; Austin
1962). This is so because, although much is made of the
sheer performativity and pragmatism of everyday
Japanese religious practice, scholars who write on these
matters often end up, anyway, in the position of
assuming some inner space populated by beliefs or some
similar ‘backstage artiste’ (another Austinian expression;
1962: 10). To give an instance: in an excellent and
thoroughgoing ethnography of quotidian religion in
Japan, Reader and Tanabe confront the well-documented
ethnographic problem ‘that people sincerely purchase
amulets but do not really believe in them’ (1998: 129).
From this they deduce that such activities do not involve
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PHILIP SWIFT
what they call ‘cognitive belief’ and they caution against
‘the common error on the part of investigators’ to
suppose that an inner domain of well-formed
representations must be motivating the surface of
practice (1998:130-31). Nevertheless, rather than draw
(what I would regard as) the obvious animist
consequences from this observation, they go on to
suggest that the system of practice is founded on what
they designate as ‘afective beliefs’, by which they mean
intimate and emotional attachments to such things as
amulets (1998: 129-31). Yes – but why persist in calling
these ‘beliefs’? Something of the confusion of their
position is, I think, evident when they try to explain that
there are, of course, multiple means of apprehending a
world, hence, ‘cognition and intellectual thought are not
the only ways by which the world can be afirmed and
believed in’ (1998: 129; my emphasis). But to say that
there are many ways, beyond the cognitive, in which a
world can be believed in is still to suppose that the
foundational relation is one of belief. This is exactly the
problem with the notion of ‘afective belief’; it merely
consecrates the concept of belief and establishes it at an
even more fundamental level.
In an argument that lacks even the nuance of Reader
and Tanabe’s discussion, Martinez, writing of a ishing
community
in
Western
Japan,
engages
in
an
inconsequential excursus on Japanese religion in general
in which she seems to say, on the one hand, that the
Japanese don’t believe, and then, on the other, that after
all, they do (2004: 70-72). In a mild rebuke of Reader and
Tanabe’s position, Martinez claims that Japanese popular
religiosity should not simply be understood as praxical
and pragmatic because, ‘the belief in spirits and ancestor
worship still holds a powerful place in the lives of many
Japanese’, and anyhow, she says straight away, to overly
focus on the pragmatic is to overlook ‘issues of power
and politics’ (2004: 72). The reader is then dutifully
referred to Asad’s (1994) seminal deconstruction of
Geertz’s thesis on religion. All well and good, perhaps,
but I ind it strange that someone who is able to cite
Asad’s argument can so casually and uncritically speak of
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
Japanese ‘belief in spirits’. In discussions such as these,
everything happens as if forty years of sustained and
critical anthropological attention paid towards the
concept of belief never took place.
Of course, none of this is to suggest that Japanese
practices do not involve the ideational, the conceptual,
etc. Rather, to chime in with the indings of Inge Daniels
(2003; 2010), relations with divinities in Japan are
neither established by means of belief nor are they
conceptualised in these terms.
The eficacy of the artiicial
And so, at last, on to matters cosmological. In an
inluential article (Yamaguchi 1991b), the implications of
which have not, I think, been fully appreciated, the
anthropologist Masao Yamaguchi draws attention to a
Japanese presentational technique known as mitate (lit.
‘seeing-standing’). This is a kind of imaging technique for
the conceptualisation of something presented in terms of
something else distant or absent. In the process, a kind
of conceptual contiguity is established that directs
attention to the invisible or virtual dimensions of the
thing so presented. To illustrate this, Yamaguchi cites an
example from the famous tenth century Pillow Book
(Makura no sôshi):
‘In this episode a princess asks her ladies-in-waiting
what name they would give a scene of a snowcovered mound in a garden. One of them
immediately replies, “The snow on Mount Koro in
China” (Koro is the mountain well known in the
classics for the beauty of its scenery after a
snowfall). The image of the snow-covered mound
was given a mythological dimension by associating
it with a well-known image from the Chinese
classics’ (1991b: 58).
Here, a relation of reference is established between a
present object (a snow-covered mound in the garden) and
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PHILIP SWIFT
an absent one (a Chinese mountain). The former playfully
‘quotes’ the latter. It is for this reason that Yamaguchi
refers to mitate as an ‘art of citation’. But as Yamaguchi
makes clear (1991b: 64), the technique of mitate is not
limited to rareied contexts such as this; it is extensively
deployed in the presentation of oferings to divinities
(kami). Thus, in her ethnography of ascetic practices on
Akakura Mountain in Aomori Prefecture, Schattschneider
(herself drawing on Yamaguchi) describes how
worshippers actualize this technique of mitate in their
presentation of oferings to the mountain divinities
(2003: 55-56). The oferings themselves are constructed
and arranged as microcosmic ‘citations’ of the mountain
itself; thus, glutinous rice cakes ( mochi) ‘are carefully
piled in the shapes of miniature mountains. Mounds of
raw rice are shaped into perfect cones. Ofered metal
bells are sculpted into vertical, mountain-like towers’. In
such ways, these ofered objects are so many simulations
of the mountain itself (2003: 56; cf. Nobuo 1994: 38).
Note that this bringing into relation that mitate
achieves cannot easily be reduced to a process of
metaphor. According to Yukio Hattori, mitate is rather ‘a
powerful procedure for the realization of novel creations’
(Hattori 1975: 192; my translation). In a similar regard,
Yamaguchi himself likens the notion of mitate to
Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum; in the sense, I
suppose, that the objects mobilized by mitate are not
merely copies, but things that are capable of establishing
their own realities (1991b: 66).15 In any case, what the
concept of mitate articulates is a notion of the eficacy of
artiicial, material creation. Artiiciality is efective,
because it is artiicial – to say this is merely to repeat the
insight of Chikamatsu, that great 17th century innovator
of the bunraku puppet theatre (see Bolton 2002: 739,
744). Or, to put it another way, we ind in this idea the
recognition that the deliberate mobilisation and
manipulation of forms, on a cosmetic level, can have
cosmological consequences.
All of this is especially pertinent to the Japanese
practices of prayer with which I began my inquiry,
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
because, as Yamaguchi remarks (borrowing his argument
from Masakatsu Gunji’s study of the aesthetics of festival
practices; Gunji 1987), ‘Japanese gods do not appreciate
true things; they do not accept things that are not
fabricated by means of a device’ (1991b: 64). 16 To recall
the Geertzian injunction that troubled our ictional
anthropologist, on the need to sort out real prayers from
mimicked ones, it is as if, in this case, the mimicked
prayer is the real one – so long as it is well fabricated.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we turn to mirrors again. Mirrors are
often the supports or containers ( go-shintai) within which
the kami (gods) reside – kami being almost always
aniconically evoked. The go-shintai (lit. ‘body of divinity’)
may actually be any number of things – a painting, a
mountain, a sword, a waterfall, etc. But mirrors are said
to be the most common containers; not that anyone
would know however. The go-shintai is generally
concealed at the back of the shrine, inaccessible to the
public. But there are mirrors that are regularly displayed
in shrines, as evocations of brightness and purity. These
visible mirrors are associated with the most important
object among the ‘three imperial regalia’ (sanshu no
jingi), this object being itself a mirror that permanently
remains, concealed in multiple boxes, at the Grand
Shrine of Ise, in Mie Prefecture. Ise enshrines the
imperial divinity of the sun, Amaterasu Ômikami – the
deity, incidentally, to whom James Bond did his simulated
praying. But it is with a myth of this mirror that I want to
end; a myth irst recorded in the early eighth century,
and systemically simulated ever since.17
According to this myth (called Iwato-biraki, or
‘opening of the rock door’), the kami of the sun,
Amaterasu, shuts herself up in a cave and so the whole
world goes dark. The other divinities devise a scheme to
lure her out again. Assembling before the cave door, they
suspend a mirror from the branches of a tree while one
of them, the divinity Ame-no-Uzume begins to dance in a
frenzy of possession. All the kami laugh and, hearing
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PHILIP SWIFT
their laughter, Amaterasu opens the cave door in
curiosity. On seeing herself relected in the mirror, she
believes she is looking at another, superior divinity; while
frozen in this moment of bewilderment, the other kami
block the cave mouth. Light is restored to the world.
Now, a lot could be said about this; but I feel I have
already said more than enough. The mirror, as a device,
is eficacious because it simulates. Commenting on the
myth, Schattschneider suggests that
‘Life itself is thus founded on an initially illusory act
of representation, a potent confounding of presence
and absence, merging the imitative image with the
represented thing itself’ (2004: 145).
If this myth contained a credo – which it doesn’t; it’s
not deep enough for that – we could well refer to it as the
Doctrine of Original Sim, the myth of the genuinely
artiicial.
As Arata Isozaki (2006: 154) observes, in a discussion
of the Ise Shrine and the eficacy of fabrication: ‘the gods
always reveal themselves at the invitation of mimicry’.
Notes
Acknowledgements. This paper was originally presented at the
Cosmology Workshop, Department of Anthropology,
University College London. Hence, once again, thanks are
owed to Martin Holbraad, Ioannis Kyriakakis, and Fabio
Gygi.
1. For example, Buruma (1995); Hendry (1993); Köpping
(2005); McVeigh (1997; 2000); Yamaguchi (1977). In
arriving at the ideas presented here, I have also drawn
inspiration from both Hay’s and Zito’s studies of the work of
surfaces in Chinese cosmologies (see Hay 1994; Zito 1994).
2. I should make it clear that this inference, that the
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
businessman’s prayer is merely supericial, in so far as it is
in want of something else, is emphatically not one made by
Kasulis. Indeed, he is intent on challenging any such notion;
his argument being that practice of this sort is an attempt
to establish existential connections with divinities in Japan
(See Kasulis 2004: 28-37). The problematic of prayer is a
useful entry point into issues of Japanese religious practice.
Reader (1991: 1-2), for instance, begins his own overview
on Japanese religion with a similar vignette.
3. For a critique of these sociological assumptions by means of
Japanese ethnographic materials, see Swift (forthcoming).
4. It is worth recalling that Sahlins (1999: 407-9) too made a
case for taking Japanese cosmology seriously, by way of a
critique of an argument (one of the contributions in Vlastos
1998) that much of the form of sumo wrestling can be
explained by the fact that it is a modern invention. Indeed,
the Japanese anthropologist Yamaguchi Masao (1998) has
explored the cosmological dimensions of sumo and its
relations to kabuki theatre and the emperor system. For
Yamaguchi, sumo is clearly a dynamic historical formation,
in which the cosmological and the commercial are mutually
implicated. I therefore fail to understand how the editor of
the collection to which Yamaguchi is a contributor can state
that Yamaguchi ‘implies that this very Japanese “tradition”
might well fall into the category of a modern invented
tradition’ (Martinez 1998: 13). Yamaguchi’s exposition is
certainly subtle, as the editor points out, and it is precisely
because it is that it contains no such simplistic implications.
5. The anthropologist John Clammer has argued this point
(with regard to the understanding of Japan) with singularity
clarity (Clammer 2001). But see also the collection of
papers edited by Gerstle and Milner (1994), a project by
various Asian Studies scholars to recover ‘otherness’ in the
light of Said’s critique.
6. These remarks that Robertson includes in her introduction
were, as she makes clear, in fact irst published in 1998
(Robertson 2005: 4).
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PHILIP SWIFT
7. Hdt. 2.35 (Herodotus 1988: 145). For the classic study of
such mirror operations in Herodotus, see Hartog (1988).
8. As Yamada (2009) has recently documented of what he calls
the ‘magic mirror efect’ of two-way trafic in
representations of Zen – when those others we thought we
were representing pick up our depictions in order to
represent themselves, then the mirrors multiply to such an
extent that all that would seem to be left is the dazzling
spectacle of representations rebounding endlessly.
Similarly, writing of the problems that foreign
anthropologists face in attempting to represent Japan,
Caillet (2006: 11) comments that it can seem as if ‘our
positions disintegrate into a game of mirrors without end’
(‘un jeu de miroirs sans in’).
Be that as it may, Robertson’s critique of mirror-imaging is
valuable, but it is hardly new. Horton and Finnegan (1973)
already raised a number of these points almost forty years
ago (see also Nagashima’s essay in the same volume).
9. The references are, respectively: Singer (1997); Buruma
(1995); Wetering (1987); Ohnuki-Tierney (1987); and
Vlastos (1998). And fanciful no doubt, but is Ian Fleming’s
title, You Only Live Twice, not also suggestive of a certain
mirror-like doubling?
10. Accordingly, Macfarlane deliberately identiies himself with
Alice (2007: 4), but he might just as well be Dorothy in The
Wizard of Oz, for, in its supersaturated strangeness, Japan
is the Emerald City and to be in Kansai is to be told, like
Toto, that we’re not in Kansas anymore.
11. Among numerous examples, one could cite the Great
Mirror (Ôkagami), a history of the Fujiwara aristocratic
lineage, or the Great Mirror of Love Suicide (Shinjû
ôkagami) that documented a series of scandalous double
suicides – a source of much popular fascination during the
early 1700s. Or the Complete Mirror of Yoshiwara
(Yoshiwara marukagami), a sort of guidebook (from 1720)
to the Yoshiwara pleasure quarters in Edo (i.e., Tokyo).
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COSMETIC COSMOLOGIES IN JAPAN
12. I haven’t the space to do justice to Wardle’s exposition,
except to say here that his observation (2009: 3; cf. 19) that
Latour’s ‘comparative anthropology’ may well be too
‘insuficiently comparative’ is, I think, especially well made.
13. I say that this etymological relation is obvious – it is, at
least, to classicists. But I have found little work in
anthropology that has explored its implications. An
exception is Lamp’s (1985) ine study of Temne ritual
masking in Sierra Leone. A further exception, recently
discovered, is, as I ought to have expected, Lévi-Strauss,
who puts it to use in his analysis of Caduveo body painting
(Wiseman 2007: chap. 6, esp. 146).
14. I cite Elster’s version of the anecdote. Needless to say, I do
not agree with his interpretation of it.
15. Joy Hendry (2000: 180) has attempted to utilize
Yamaguchi’s argument in her ethnography on Japanese
theme parks, but her ensuing analysis make abundantly
clear that she hasn’t understood it. Attacking a vague postmodernist position that she attributes to no one, she
attempts to counter it by employing Yamaguchi’s discussion
of mitate as simulation which, she says, is ‘close to the
original meaning of Baudrillard’s “simulacrum”, a term too
easily translated as “fake”’. Apart from wondering to whom
this inal caution is supposed to apply (who, after all, is all
too easily making such equations?), one can only imagine
Baudrillard laughing (somewhere in hyper-reality) about
this straight-faced appeal to his original meaning! Hendry
then goes on (in the same paragraph) to associate mitate as
simulation with Platonic Forms, seemingly unaware that
Plato was the arch-enemy of simulacra.
16. For Gunji’s original discussion see Gunji (1987: 88-89).
17. The myth and its subsequent history have very recently
been treated by Mark Teeuwen (Teeuwen and Breen 2010:
chap. 4).
161
PHILIP SWIFT
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169
Chapter 7
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
MATERIAL EMBODIMENTS OF SHIFTING
MEANINGS
John McCreery
Prologue
I invite you to imagine a tourist visiting Japan. She has
seen a number of Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines.
Friends take her to Yokohama’s Chinatown for dinner. On
the way to the restaurant they stop for a look at a
Chinese temple, the Guandi Miao. The vivid colors and
baroque decoration of the Chinese temple contrasts
sharply with the subdued simplicity of Japanese Buddhist
temples and shrines (Figures 1, and 2). The red face and
piercing eyes of the Chinese deity on this altar (Figure 3
difer dramatically from the lowered eye-lids and
meditative serenity of the Japanese Buddhas (Figure 4)
she has seen. In Japanese Shinto shrines, the gods are
not visible at all (Figure 5). The question she asks is
simple but profound: “Why do Chinese gods look like
that?”
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
When, however, we turn to the anthropological
literature on Chinese religion, we discover, as Wei-Ping
Lin points out, that anthropologists have paid little
attention to the material forms that gods take in their
statues on Chinese altars (2008:454-455). Instead of
looking closely at god statues to discover what they
might tell us about the gods in question, we have tended
to look through god statues in search of something else.
The statues themselves are treated as arbitrary signs, as,
in efect, texts, whose material form is of no intrinsic
interest.
If we adopt, instead, an art historical or connoisseur’s
perspective, we encounter a diferent approach. Here the
primary focus of interest is iconographic details that that
identify the god or the style in which the statue is carved,
with the style then further speciied geographically and
historically. Once again, however, the existence of the
statue is taken for granted.
In the Japanese context in which our tourist asks,
“Why do Chinese gods look like that?” her question
points to larger issues. We have noted that the
demeanour of Japanese Buddhas is noticeably diferent
from that of Chinese gods. The contrast sharpens when
we turn to Shinto shrines, in which there are no god
statues at all; Shinto deities remain invisible. If we go a
step further in enlarging our context, we encounter
Protestant Christianity, Judaism and Islam, religions that
taboo any attempt to represent deity in anthroporphic
images.
Lin tells us that in Wan-nian, the village in Taiwan
where she did her ieldwork, she was told that,
Gods are formless. When you call them, they come!
(2008: 459)
They are three feet above your head (Gia-thau sannchioh u sin-bing; Jutou sanche you shenming )!
(2008:460)
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JOHN MCCREERY
They have no shadows and leave no trace ( Lai boiann, khi bo-cong; Lai wuying, qu wuzong).
Why, then, are there statues of gods on Chinese altars?
Lin asks a spirit medium,
Why do people need god statues, and what is the
relationship between gods with and without form?
(2008:460)
The medium responds,
Everyone respects and prays to gods, but they ‘have
no shadows and leave no trace,’ so people carve
statues to make the gods settle down where they
want them. That means to contain them inside the
statues. People should worship the statues, so that a
special bond grows between gods and worshippers.
If the bond is strong, the spirit won’t leave.
(208:460)
As Lin points out, the medium’s interpretation has
several implications: people need images in order to
believe. Images are places for gods to reside. They also
facilitate a particular kind of relationship.
God statues make the formless omnipresent gods
settle down and build a stable connection with the
villagers, who worship them in return for
protection; this creates a strong reciprocal bond
between the villagers and the gods. (208:460)
The remainder of Lin’s paper provides a wealth of
evidence for this interpretation and focuses, in particular,
on steps taken to localize the god’s attachment to a
particular community. We may note, however, that while
this paper explains in detail how god statues are made,
consecrated, and localized, it contains no answer to the
question why Chinese god statues depict Chinese gods in
the way that they do. We are neither shown or told what
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
these particular statues look like. And one nagging, but
fundamental, issue remains. Lin’s informants tell us that
Chinese worshippers require images to reinforce their
belief and, further, that god statues contribue to creation
of strong reciprocal bonds. But why should this be, when
worshippers in other traditions do not require images —
in fact, their traditions forbid them?
We are still, then, at the point described by Alfred Gell
in “The Technology of Enchantment,” when he says of
Bourdieu’s
sociological
approach
and
Panofsky’s
iconographic approach that the former, “ never actually
looks at the art object iteself,” while the latter, “treats art
as a species of writing” and thus fails to consider the
object itself, instead of the symbolic meanings attributed
to it (2009: 10). My purpose here is to consider what we
might learn by going a step further and considering the
object itself.
Adding the Material, Thickening the Description
In this case the object itself is a god statue, the statue
of Guandi that sits on the altar of the Guandi Miao in
Yokohama’s Chinatown. To learn more about it, I
compare it with other representations of Chinese gods,
including, in particular, other images of Guandi himself. I
want to emphasize, however, that the approach taken
here is to add investigation of the material forms in
which Guandi is represented to advance a deeper
understanding that also includes the other approaches to
Chinese religion sketched above. It does not propose to
replace them.
The approach I employ is inspired by Claude LeviStrauss’ injunction in the “Overture” to The Raw and the
Cooked to search for the logic in tangible qualities
(1970:1) and by Cliford Geertz’ call for thick
descriptions in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973). The
model I attempt to follow, however, is that provided by
Victor Turner in The Ritual Process (1969), enriched by
recent discussions of the importance of material cultures
and objects to cultural understanding (Miller, 1998;
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JOHN MCCREERY
Candlin and Guins, 2009). It is, in other words, informed
by Turner’s approach to ethnography but also a
contribution to what Daniel Miller calls the second stage
in the development of material culture studies, in which
the goal is to demonstrate, “what is to be gained by
focusing upon the diversity of material worlds which
become each other’s contexts rather than reducing them
either to models of the social world or to speciic
subdisciplinary concerns” (1998: 3).
Context is, however, a particularly tricky issue. When
Levi-Strauss looks at tangible qualities, he is searching
for universal structures that shape cultures everywhere
and pointing to binary contrasts, e.g., the raw and the
cooked, that appear fundamental in human thinking
everywhere. His context is all of humanity. Geertz directs
our attention, instead, to the richness of layered
meanings that interpreters of culture must seek to
unpack in particular situations. He leaves unanswered,
however, a fundamental question: where does the
relevant context begin or end?
Is it found in that place and moment where the
observation is made or the informant’s comment
collected? Our tourist is looking at a statue of Guandi in a
temple in a Chinatown located in Yokohama, Japan. Is the
signiicance of what she sees conined to this particular
temple in this particular location? Or to what someone
she meets at the temple may tell her? Or, this being the
twenty-irst century, should we take as authoritative the
account provided on the temple’s Website? If not, how far
should we search for connections, in Chinese culture and
history? In speciic Chinese or religious traditions?
Across the length and breadth of Asia? There is, I
suggest, no a priori answer. Depending on the
observation, any and all of these contexts may be
relevant.
When working in a conventional social science
framework, the limits-of-context problem is easy to
overlook. We pre-select the scope of our research,
develop an hypothesis within it, then search for evidence
174
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
that conirms or contradicts the hypothesis we are
testing. The same is true when doing qualitative
research, if we start with a well-deined topic. The topic’s
deinition deines the limits of relevance.
Invert the problem, however, and start with the
observation, the tangible thing itself, a case of
something, but we don’t yet know of what. As
ethnographers we are not supposed to make
assumptions. But, as noted in The SAGE Handbook of
Case-based Methods,
From a trans-disciplinary perspective, what unites
diferent kinds of cases, regardless of the discipline,
is that all cases are complex and multi-dimensional
objects of study. Furthermore, all cases are situated
in time and space, as are the disciplines within
which they might be situated. Arguably, therefore
all cases, as objects of study, need to be described
in an ever-increasing and changing variety of ways,
and each of these ways may in fact be representing
something ‘real’ about the object of study as well.
(2009: 141-142)
Thus, for example, when I wrote “Why don’t we see some
real money here?” (1990) I began by observing the
diference between spirit money and oferings of food in
Chinese rituals. I wanted to know why the money was
mock money, while the food was real food. Combining
ideas from Levi-Strauss and James Fernandez and
looking at the ritual process, I developed the hypothesis
that the food asserts a relationship; the money restores
social distance. In “Negotiating with demons” (1995) I
began with the text of a Taoist exorcism and three
approaches
to
analyzing
magical
language,
as
performative act, metaphor, and formalized, restricted
code. Each did, in fact, show something real about the
case in hand, and together the three approaches
produced a richer thick description than any one
approach by itself.
175
JOHN MCCREERY
In this case, I will focus on why some representations
of gods are fully rounded igures, seated or standing,
some in dynamic poses, while others are literally lat
tablets on which a title is written. I will argue, in a LeviStraussian mode, that this contrast embodies the
diference between abstract, and thus absolute, claims to
authority and concrete, more personal relationships,
rooted in reciprocity that opens the way for exchanges of
gifts and favors. I will situate this argument in a
Geertzian thick description that builds on existing
scholarly analyses of Chinese gods that relate the ways in
which gods are envisioned to structure and change in
Chinese society. I will speculate on possible extensions of
this analysis to comparisons between Chinese popular
religion and other religious traditions.
First, however, we need some empirical grounding.
Here my model is Victor Turner, who taught us that
anthropologists always work with three kinds of data:
What we observe, what the people whose lives we study
tell us about what we see, and information from other
places, ideas and other data that inform interpretation.
All are parts of the puzzle from which the anthropologist
attempts to construct a convincing picture of the whole
of what he is writing about. The place to begin, however,
is the way in which the people we study explain their own
symbols. I begin, then, with the contents of the Yokohama
Guandi
Miao
website
(http://www.yokohamakanteibyo.com/).
A Twenty-First Century Chinese Temple in Japan
The
Yokohama
Guandi
Miao
website
(http://www.yokohama-kanteibyo.com/ ) is in Japanese. Its
intended audience appears to be Japanese tourists who
lock to Yokohama’s Chinatown to enjoy a local but exotic
experience. The top page displays a link to Yokohama
Chinatown’s
own
oficial
website
(http://www.chinatown.or.jp/). Three additional buttons
are indicated on the photograph of the temple’s main
gate that is the single largest visual element on the page.
Button No. 1 opens a description of the gate, which
176
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
towers 12 meters above street level. Its elaborate wood
carvings are covered with gold leaf, and two dragons sit
(one on each side) on the top of its roof. Button No. 2
opens a description of the stone slabs with images of
dragons cavorting in the clouds that frame the stairs
leading up to the gate. Imported from Beijing, the slabs
are single pieces of stone, each weighing four and a half
tons. A third, cloud-shaped blue button reads, “Go
inside.”
The camera has now moved through the gate, and the
temple proper ills the frame. Now there are ive buttons
that point to information on visually interesting details.
Button No. 3 describes the colorful tiles on the roof. Like
the stone slabs to which Button No. 2 pointed, these, too,
were specially ordered from Beijing. They are attached
with special hooks to enhance rain and wind resistance.
Dragons and other beasts made of glass complete the
rooftop decorations. Button No. 4 describes four
elaborately carved stone columns, two with dragons, two
with images of Guandi in action. These were imported
from Taiwan. Button No. 5 describes the main incense
burner and notes that it is one of ive incense burners.
Those who wish to worship are directed to purchase ive
sticks of incense, one for each of the burners. Button No.
6 shows the reception building where incense and spirit
money can be purchased. Button No. 7 describes the
stone lions that guard the temple, noting that they were
imported from Taiwan and survived the ire that in 1986
destroyed the previous version of the temple. Another
blue cloud invites the visitor to enter the temple.
Now the image contains ive pictures, each with a
button of its own. The largest, which ills three quarters
of the frame, shows the main altar, where a seated
Guandi, stroking his long beard, looks straight toward
the visitor. Button No. 8 reveals the following brief
description.
The divine form of Guanyu, a Chinese general who
lived around 160 a.d. His loyalty and idelity have
made him a god of commerce worshipped around
177
JOHN MCCREERY
the world. On his left stands his adopted son, Goan
Ping, on his right his faithful follower Zhou Zang.
Both also receive worship.
Beneath this description are four phrases highlighted in
blue, indicating prayers for which Guandi is especially
eficacious: trafic safety, business success, entrance
exams, and study.
Buttons No. 9, 10, and 11 point to descriptions of other
deities worshipped at the temple: Earth Mother, the
Bodhisattva Kwannon, and Tu-di Gong. These also
include areas in which these deities are particularly
eficacious. Earth Mother, for example, is especially good
for those who pray to be safe from disasters and to enjoy
good health.
To the left of screen is a menu ofering additional
information. Here we can discover that this temple is is
the fourth in a series, the irst of which was built in 1873,
shortly after the opening of the port of Yokohama in
1859. The site was enlarged in 1886 and a larger temple
built in 1893. That temple was destroyed in the Great
Kanto Earthquake of 1923. The second-generation
temple that replaced it was destroyed by Allied bombing
in 1945. Its replacement, the third-generation temple,
was destroyed by ire in 1986, though miraculously its
god statues remained unharmed. Construction of the
current temple was completed in 1990. We can also learn
that as Chinese began to emigrate overseas in large
numbers during the 19th century, temples dedicated to
Guandi were built in Chinatowns the world over.
With these facts in mind, we turn now to
anthropological and historical discussions of Chinese
gods.
Celestial Bureaucracy, The Limits of Metaphor
When our tourist asks, “Why do the gods look like
this?” the irst answer that comes to mind is that Chinese
178
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
conceive of their gods as celestial bureaucrats. They
wear oficial robes, and their temples resemble the
yamen from which imperial oficials governed the
Chinese empire. Their ranks correspond to the scale of
the territories for which they are responsible. On closer
inspection, however, all of these propositions turn out to
be dubious.
The idea that Chinese conceive of their gods as
celestial bureaucrats was forcefully articulated by Arthur
Wolf in the “Introduction” to Religion and Ritual in
Chinese Society (1974), a collection of papers that
marked a pivotal moment in the anthropological study of
Chinese religion and framed subsequent debates. Should
Chinese religion be treated as an integrated whole tightly
linked to Chinese social structure or a motley bricolage
of traditions that, as Donald Deglopper put it (Personal
communication; see also 1974: 43-69), stood in relation
to Chinese society as the colors refracted by the oil on
the surface of a puddle stand to the water in the puddle,
a far looser and more liquid relationship?
When this collection appeared, the dominant theories
in the anthropology of Chinese society were the
structural-functionalism of Maurice Freedman’s studies
of lineage organization and the standard marketing
regions of G. William Skinner. Synthesized by Stephen
Feuchtwang, they provided a plausible grounding for the
notion that Chinese spirits fall into three broad
categories, gods, ghosts and ancestors. Ancestors were
kin whose descendants looked after their worship and
afterlife. Ghosts were prototypically hungry ghosts
without descendants, angry at their fate. The gods were
the spiritual counterparts of government oficials, the
celestial bureaucrats in charge of dispensing both favors
and punishments to those whose lives they ruled. Like
their earthly counterparts, they formed a spatial
hierarchy, with oficials at diferent levels in charge of
smaller or larger geographical areas.
Subsequent research, however, would enormously
complicate this picture. Shahar and Weller’s Unruly Gods
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JOHN MCCREERY
(1996) provides numerous examples of deities who slip
betwixt-and-between Wolf’s categories. Gods, it turned
out, frequently started their careers as demons. The
Wang-yeh, whose demonic role is to spread plagues, are
one example (Katz, 1995). Powerful females like Guan-yin
and Mazu had no obvious place in what should have
been, in principle, an all-male oficialdom. The local gods
of the soil, Tu-di Kong, were frequently said to have been
virtuous individuals raised to divine status after death;
but the territories they governed were at a level far
below that to which imperial China’s bureaucracies
extended. There is also the awkward fact that the last of
the Chinese empires on which the celestial bureaucracy
is supposed to be modeled had, by the time that the
anthropologists cited here began their research in the
1960s and ‘70s, long since ceased to exist. The Republic
of China had been founded in 1911, and the Peoples
Republic of China had followed in 1949.
A case might be made for similarity between the
powers and habits of modern Chinese bureaucrats and
their imperial predecessors. That argument could then be
extended to the proposition that Chinese worshipers
approach Chinese deities in a way analogous to that in
which they approach mortal oficials. But as Steve
Sangren asks, “If gods are modeled on peasants’ images
of oficials, why oficials so diferent from any in most
peasants’ experience?” (1987: 130). Adam Chau, writing
about his observations in Shaanbei, notes that in
northern China, too, people liken deities to bureaucrats.
He then goes on to note, however, that,
The relationship between local state agents and
ordinary peasants in Shaanbei is strained, to put it
mildly. Indeed, the image of local bureaucrats in the
minds of Shaanbei peasants is most negative: they
take things away from you but rarely give anything
back (2006:73).
Expectations of bureaucrats and expectations of gods
appear to be strikingly diferent. In Way and Byway
180
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
(2002), historian Robert Hymes proposes that Chinese
deities are conceived in terms of two analytically
separate models, one bureaucratic, the other personal.
On the one side are oficials. Described abstractly, in
terms of name, rank, and title, these gods are temporary
appointees who represent a multilevel authority imposed
from the outside. On the other are individuals with rich
biographies; stories about their miracles are legion.
Instead of appointed oficials, these are extraordinary
persons, with inherent powers enhanced through selfcultivation. They enter into direct, dyadic relations with
persons and places and are see as permanent ixtures in
the localities where they are worshipped. In these
respects, they resemble the gods worshipped in Wannian, the community studied by Lin Wei-ping, who like
the Daoist immortals studied by Hymes, traveled to a
particular place where they settled, where their statues
are not only consecrated to bring them to life but also
localized through rites that attach them to this particular
place.
From this perspective, however, the Guandi who sites
on the altar in the Guandi Miao in Yokohama’s China is
problematic. He is, on the one hand, an intensely
individual god. He has a rich biography, elaborated with
stories of numerous miracles. He epitomizes abstract
virtues, loyalty and righteousness; but is also said to be
particularly eficacious in dealing with problems related
to trafic safety and achieving business and academic
success. His virtues and powers are his own; but the god
who occupies his statue may, in fact, be only a delegate,
like those said to be worshipped in his place in thousands
of temples throughout China and around the world.
Neither his virtues nor his stories attach him to one
particular place. He is, on the contrary, a favorite deity of
overseas Chinese, who have taken him with them as
traveled to new places in search of new opportunities.
From from being a deity with strong local ties, Guandi is,
arguably, the most cosmopolitan of Chinese gods.
Not surprisingly, how Guandi is perceived and the
stories told about him vary from place to place and
181
JOHN MCCREERY
speaker to speaker. How he is seen and represented has
been subject for centuries to a process that Prasenjit
Duara calls “superscription,” elaboration and editing to
suit a variety of purposes (1988:778). In this respect he
resembles Lü Dongbin, the Daoist immortal of whom Paul
Katz writes that, “more than one Lü Dongin existed in the
minds of the late imperial Chinese” (1996: 97). One way
of summarizing the argument of this essay would be to
say that, like the murals of the Yongle Gong studied by
Katz, god statues that represent Guandi are works of art
that “have not been adequately used as sources for the
study of Chinese hagiography” (1996:72); with the
additional caveat that, like the historical documents
analyzed by Duara, Chinese god statues are also subject
to superscription. They, too, can be elaborated and edited
to it various purposes. These depend, in at least one
important respect, to how the relationship between
worshipper and god is conceived.
The Importance of Being Ling
One point on which anthropologists of China and their
informants appear to agree is that gods are supposed to
be ling, i.e., eficacious. How ling should be interpreted is
the focus of several attempts to explain the relationship
between Chinese deities and the mundane realities of
Chinese society.
To Sangren, ling embodies a logic that pervades the
whole of Chinese culture and, “can be fully understood
only as a product of the reproduction of social
institutions and as a manifestation of a native historical
consciousness” (1987: 2). Ling refers to situations in
which Yang, the principle of order, encompasses and
overcomes Yin, the principle of disorder. Deities are ling
because they operate at the margin where Yang
confronts Yin.
Chau ofers a more mundane interpretation that turns
on a familiar saying, ren ping shen, shen ping ren (people
depend on gods and gods depend on people). A god, he
says, is ling, eficacious, when the god responds
182
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
efectively to his worshippers’ prayers, which leads to the
hong huo (red heat) of ritual celebration, which enhances
the god’s reputation and makes the god appear more ling
(2006:9).
In his review of Miraculous Response, Feuchtwang
agrees that Chau is onto something by focusing on the
Durkheimian social efervescence that relects and
sustains a god’s reputation for being ling. What is left
unaccounted for, he observes, is the “disavowal of human
agency” involved in attributing eficacy to the god
(2006:978).
Like Sangren, Feuchtwang bases his own analysis on
the notion of collective representations that precede and
deine the attribution of ling to deities. Feuchtwang,
however, is not content with a cultural logic that, while
pervasive in Chinese rites and religion, is so pervasive
that it ceases to account for the diferent local and
historical contexts in which ling appears. He agrees that
ling appears at the margins that deine the spaces and
times in which Chinese individuals ind themselves but
argues that the frames of reference are multiple —
household, community, region, and, only ultimately, China
as a whole (Feuchtwang, 2000).
These brief summaries hardly do justice to the
complex and subtle arguments of which they are, at best,
caricatures. The gods may be Yang overcoming Yin, mark
boundaries on several levels of territorial hierarchy, or
have won reputations for eficacy reinforced by lavishly
decorated temples and noisy celebrations. But, why do
they look like that? Why do they display the particular
tangible qualities that motivate our tourist’s question?
What if, in fact, some representations replace ling,
eficaciousness in addressing speciic requests, with
uncompromising authority? This is an issue to which we
will soon return. First, however, we consider
iconography, the details by which art historians and
collectors identify particular deities and styles of
representation.
183
JOHN MCCREERY
The Collector’s Eye
Keith Stevens is a collector. According to his Chinese
Gods: The Unseen World of Spirits and Demons (1997) he
became interested in the iconography of Chinese deities
in 1948 and, by the time he wrote this book, had visited
more than 3,500 Chinese temples in China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Macao, and across Southeast Asia. His personal
collection included over 1,000 god statues and 30,000
photographs of temples and images. He had documented
the legend and folklore surrounding approximately 2,500
deities.
Stevens candidly describes his book as, “An
introduction to the imagery of Chinese deities and
demons and their legends and beliefs in relation to the
common people, as observed from a Western point of
view” (1997:11). His description of Chinese popular
religion is consistent with what anthropologists have
written. There are, he notes, two orders of deities: a
higher order of gods associated with Daoist and Buddhist
pantheons and a lower order of humans deiied for
exceptional accomplishments while alive or miraculous
powers after death. The deities on Buddhist altars
generally appear in conventional sets; those on Daoist
altars or in the temples of popular religion tend to be a
more mixed lot. Broadly speaking, he says, there are
three standard forms of images.
1) In Buddhist images, the faces are calm and
characterless, lacking distinctive features. The
deities are dressed in simple priestly robes and
cross-legged.
2) Daoist images may lean, stand or be seated.
Characteristic features include black beards, tiny
Daoist crowns, and hands holding either a gourd
or ly switch.
3) The standard deity of popular religion is a seated
scholar-oficial with a full black or red beard,
holding a tablet with both hands in front of his
chest. Alternatively his hands may rest on arm
rests or his knees, or one hand may clutch his
184
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
oficial girdle. Alternative elements include the
cap, crown or helmet.
These standard forms are only prototypes with
numerous variations. Buddhas may be depicted standing,
and the deities who serve as their guardians may be
demonic in appearance. Daoist images include igures on
mythical beasts, like Zhang Dao-ling on his tiger. As
previously noted, the deities of popular religion include
females and demonic igures whose scowls and gestures
are inconsistent with oficial restraint.
Of particular interest, however, is the way in which
Stevens describes his research. Deities can, he notes, be
identiied in several ways, including titles on placards
associated with them or the names of their temples. The
groupings in which they appear may also be indicative.
Some are easily identiied by distinctive iconographic
features. But for others there is no recourse but what
informants say, and this may be problematic. Here it is, I
believe, worth quoting Stevens at length.
A major problem has involved the contradictory
stories and legends, with the temple staf giving
diferent versions during successive visits. These
contradictions would appear to be due to sheer lack
of interest on the part of the temple custodian or to
an unwillingness to admit to a foreigner ignorance
of the identity of the deities in their temple.
Suggestions are usually ofered in a conident voice,
suggesting unequivocal accuracy. It is only later, on
revisiting and perhaps talking to others, that the
positive identiication becomes less certain. It has
been somewhat surprising to me how little many
temple watchmen, devotees and even god-carvers
know of the myths, legends and histories behind the
deities in their own temples and shops (1997:11).
Our second collector, Liu Senhower ( 劉 文 三 ), the
author of The God Statues of Taiwan , brings an insider’s
perspective to Chinese popular religion. Born in 1939,
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JOHN MCCREERY
Liu was a child during World War II. He has vivid
memories of his mother, a true believer in popular
religion, who made sure that everyone in his family knew
how to light incense, bow and worship properly. These
memories were reinforced when his father was drafted
by the Japanese army and sent to Hainan and his mother
prayed day and night for his safety. Then came the Allied
bombings and hearing his mother repeating the names of
the gods as the family huddled together in their air raid
shelter. A story circulated among their neighbors about a
bomb that fell into a ishpond instead of the village,
diverted by divine intervention. As an artist, author and
collector, Liu knows intellectually that god statues are
simply blocks of wood, brought to life as works of art by
the god-carver’s craft. When he’s tired or troubled,
however, they seem to be something more. Liu has a
Chinese intellectual’s mixed feelings about the gods, with
nuances added by his personal history. He has, however,
no trouble identifying the thirty gods whose statues,
background and iconography he presents in his book.
These are all among the most popular and best
documented gods.
With these two collectors to guide us, let us return
now to our tourist in Yokohama, looking at the statue on
the altar of the Yokohama Guandi Miao (Figure 6).
Describing Guandi
What our tourist sees is an image consistent with the
classic description of Guanyu, the hero who would later
be deiied as Guandi, in The Romance of the Three
Kingdoms.
Xuande [Liu Bei] took a look at the man, who stood
at a height of nine chi, and had a two chi long
beard; his face was the color of a dark jujube, with
lips that were red and plump; his eyes were like
that of a crimson phoenix, and his eyebrows
resembled reclining silkworms. He had a digniied
air,
and
looked
quite
majestic.
186
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
(http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Romance_of_the_Thre
e_Kingdoms/Chapter_1#11)
The irst of our collectors, Keith Stevens, notes that
the legends surrounding Guangong have become the
subject for prints, story tellers, operas and plays. He
recounts two examples with a more earthy tone than the
stories that appear on the Yokohama temple’s website.
According to the irst, Guanyu was a simple bean curd
hawker who rescued a girl from an evil magistrate, whom
he killed. He then led and joined the army. Near Beijing
he encountered a butcher who challenged passersby to
lift a 400-lb stone of the well in which he stored his
meat. Guanyu lifted the stone, took the meat, and was
pursued by the butcher, who turned out to be Zhang Fei.
The two were ighting when Liu Bei intervened.
According to the second, when Guanyu was captured by
Cao Cao, he and the wives of Liu Bei were given a single
room to share. Guanyu stood by the door all night
holding a candle, to avoid any hint of impropriety.
Liu Senhower provides two additional tales. According
to one, collected in the countryside in Taiwan, the Jade
Emperor, the supreme god in the popular pantheon, had
come down to earth to investigate conditions there.
Appalled by the human misbehavior he discovered, he
was about to punish humanity with devastating disasters
and plagues. Hearing of these plans, Guangong
prostrated himself before the Jade Emperor and tearfully
begged the Jade Emperor to show mercy instead. That is
why, the tale says, Guangong’s face is red, from all the
crying he did. According to the second, which, I note,
also found its way into my ield notes, some Chinese
believe that Guangong became the Jade Emperor,
promoted to the position during the 19th century.
The
efect
of
these
tales,
considered
as
superscriptions, is to further humanize Guandi. The aweinspiring general starts out as a simple beancurd hawker.
He may have inhuman self-control; but, like other men,
he is subject to sexual temptation. He can cry until he is
187
JOHN MCCREERY
red in the face. He may, like the founder of a new
Chinese dynasty, rise from humble origins to the highest
power in the land. But as Robbie Burns once said, “A
man’s a man for a’ that.” This god remains approachable.
The opposite is
described by Duara.
true
of
another
superscription
In 1914 the president of the Republic, Yuan Shikai,
ordered the creation of a temple of military heroes
devoted to Guandi, Yuefei, and twenty-four lesser
heroes. The interior of the main temple in Beijing,
with its magniicent timber pillars and richly
decorated roof, was impressive in the stately
simplicity of its ceremonial arrangements. There
were no images. The canonized heroes were
representedby their spirit tablets only (1988: 779).
Here there is no mention of ling, no humanizing detail.
The message is clear and unequivocal, a pure and
uncompromising assertion of the value of loyalty.
Neither wholly abstract and dehumanized nor
dynamically ling in appearance, the seated Guang Di on
the altar of the Yokohama Guandi Miao falls between
these extremes, nicely positioned for a god who is both
an epitome of classic virtue and willing to lend a
worshipper a hand with a trafic accident, a business
problem, or passing a school entrance exam. What
happens to the god, however, when his image is
globalized?
When Liu analyzes the historical and cultural
background to Chinese popular religion in Taiwan, he
frequently employs a style of functional analysis that
anthropologists associate with Malinowski. The central
premise is that Chinese emigrants to Taiwan, struggling
to reach and then to carve out new lives on the island
found themselves in uncertain and frequently dangerous
circumstances. They venerated gods who ofered
supernatural aid: Mazu, for saving them from the
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
dangers of the four-day sail from the mainland to Taiwan;
Tu-di-gong for protecting against storms, drought or
other threats to the harvest; Bao-sheng-da-di for
protection against and cure of illness.
In this context, Guandi stands out as the epitome of
values essential to social order: 仁 (ren, benevolence), 義
(yi, righteousness), 禮 (li, propriety), 智 (zhi, wisdom), and
信 (xin, honesty). His legendary strictness in keeping his
promises has made him a favorite deity of businessmen
as well as soldiers. His lack of association with any
particular set of material dangers may, in addition, make
him especially apt as a symbol of morality elevated above
the sorts of worldly concerns that motivate worshippers
looking for ling. It is thus, I suggest, that since the Qing
dynasty, we have found him paired with Confucius, with
his wu miao (military temples) built alongside the wen
miao (temples of culture) in which Confucius is
venerated. It is thus, too, I suggest, that of all the gods in
the popular pantheon, he is the one being celebrated
globally as a symbol of Chinese culture.
Divine Body Language
At this point we should all be ready to concede of
Guandi what Robert Weller (1994) has said about
Chinese religion and ritual in general. The forms are
familiar. The possible meanings ascribable to them seem
endless. They resemble the chemicals suspended in
saturated liquids, ready to precipitate in a multitude of
forms depending on what is added to them.
Are we left, then, with a generalization of Adam
Chau’s conclusion about his Longwanggou case in
Shaabei?
No “interpretive community” has emerged out of
the cacophonous and “saturated” jumble of texts to
present clearly “precipitated” meanings and
ideological or theological statements (2006:97).
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JOHN MCCREERY
Let us look once again at the tangible qualities of the
statue of Guandi at which our tourist is looking and
compare them with other images, irst of Guandi and
then of other deities.
Google searches for “Guandi, ” “Guangong,” and
“Guanyu” yield thousands of images. In most of those
clearly identiiable as god statues, we see what we might
call “sedate dynamism.” In the seated igures the god
seems alert but relaxed. He strokes his beard. His feet
are planted on the ground, but his legs are spread but
not rigidly squared of. In standing poses the right leg is
thrust forward.
The signiicance of these poses emerges in contrast
with other deities. The Jade Emperor is represented
sitting four-square, looking straight ahead, his hands
joined in front of his chest (Figure 7). In some
communities, he is represented only by a tablet bearing
his title. He is seen as “too awesome and too powerful to
be represented by an image….Among the Fukienese in
particular, his spirit was believed to reside in the ash of
the main incense pot on the primary altar table in the
temple dedicated to him, and not even a tablet is
permitted” (Stevens, 1997: 53).
Other spirits who are typically represented by tablets
include ancestors and Confucius. In the case of
Confucius, we know that until 1530 sculptural images of
the Sage were found in state-supported temples all over
China and, “the icons’ visual features were greatly
inluenced by the posthumous titles and ranks that
emperor conferred on Confucius and his follows,”
treating them, in this respect, like Daoist and Buddhist
deities. This treatment aroused the ire of Neo-Confucian
ritualists, who led a successful campaign to replace
images with tablets and posthumous titles with the
designation “Ultimate Sage and First Teacher” (Murray,
2009: 371).
Compared to the Jade Emperor, Guandi seems more
relaxed, more human. But compared to other, more
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
dynamic, images, his statues seem sedate. Consider, for
example, Zhen Wu, Lord of the Dark/Profound Heaven,
possessor of spirit mediums, who is barefoot, with his
feet resting on the snake- tortoise who symbolizes the
North, the most Yin of all directions (Figure 8). We have
noted the legend that describes Guandi as a tofu maker
before he became a soldier. A similar legend describes
Zhen Wu as a butcher and the snake-tortoise as his
intestines, torn out in an act of repentance for killing so
many living things while plying his butcher’s trade.
Guangong is sometimes depicted standing, but his
statues are never so dramatically dynamic as those of
Nazha, the Third Prince, whose statues depict him
standing on his wheels of ire and wielding his spear
(Figure 9). In some images, Guangong appears to be
frowning, but his face is never so distorted as those of,
for example, the goddess Mazu’s demonic attendants
Shungfenger, Fair Wind Ears, and Chianliyan, ThousandMile Eyes (Figure 10).
With these examples I have, I would argue, briely
sketched an iconographic continuum that stretches from
tablets inscribed with text to demonic or once-demonic
igures whose dynamic poses or expressions express
more humanized, more magical forms of divine power.
The statues of Guandi mentioned here represent
authority humanized, accessible to human sentiments,
but fundamentally righteous. But what of other
superscriptions more tailored to the modern world?
Guangong Globalized
Google searches turn up a number of images from
manga and video games in which the pre-divine Guanyu,
the hero from The Romance of the Three Kingdoms is
depicted as a warrior superhero. He glares with intent
fury at enemies outside the frame. His robe is slipped of
one or both shoulders to reveal a heavily muscled body.
In some his pose is similar to that of Nazha on Taiwanese
altars. He is shown swooping down thrusting with his
halbred. Here, however, I turn to another superscription,
Guangong (not, we must note Guandi), as a symbol and
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JOHN MCCREERY
salesman for China and Chinese culture.
I refer here to another website, World Guangong
Culture ( 世 界 關 公 文 化 , http://www.guangong.hk/). Here,
the hero deiied as Guandi (Emperor Guan) is presented
as Guangong (Honorable Guan). Di, a Chinese character
associated with divine or imperial status, has been
replaced by gong, which, while formerly the the highest
of ive orders of nobility and translated “Duke,” is now a
common honoriic, applied, for example, to a father-inlaw.
First up in the list of dignitaries whose statements
appear on the site is PRC President Hu Jintao, who says,
In current era, culture has increasingly become the
important source of national cohesion and
creativity. In addition, it has increasingly become
the important factor of the comprehensive national
power competition.
He does not mention Guangong by name.
Next is Lui Chun Wan, chairman of the board of
directors of the World Guangong Culture Promoting
Association, who, after reviewing Guangong’s history,
concludes that,
We believe that the rich and colorful Guangong
Culture will become a strong force to unite the
Chinese people from home and abroad!
There is, however, no mention in his comments of
miracles, of magical response, of ling. In this
superscription, however, Guangong is not reduced to a
title on a tablet, an impersonal abstraction.
The standing image of Guangong chosen to brand the
World Guangong Culture Promotion Association shows
the god standing and striding conidently forward (Figure
11). In this conspicuously cleaned up version of more
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
traditional depictions of the deity, all traces of armor and
glittering gold have been removed. The green of the robe
is a paler, more subtle hue than the the blue or green of
the more traditional representation. The overall green
tone of the image may relect, I speculate, current
“green” concerns with the state of the global
environment.
While he does carry his halberd, this version of the god
has a warm, modern look, more like a prosperous
businessman striding forward to shake your hand than a
model of warrior virtues. The “magic” in this image is no
longer the traditional ling but instead, I suggest, the
economic miracles to be expected from doing business
with China.
Beyond China
As we return to where we started, it is, I believe,
important to recall that our tourist is looking at the
statue of Guandi in a Chinese temple in Yokohama. Our
analysis so far has included only Chinese data. Our
tourist’s question, however, is motivated by the contrast
between what she sees at the Yokohama Guandi Miao
and what she has seen elsewhere in Japan, especially
when visiting Shinto shrines. There the gods are
invisible, posing the question why Chinese temples are
illed with god statues, full-igured anthropomorphic
representations of gods, while Japanese shrines are not.
Some might question whether an anthropologist
should consider such a question at all. Isn’t it wrong,
especially when studying religion and ritual, to rip what
we see from its cultural context? Isn’t this the kind of
speculation for which such 19th century predecessors Sir
James Frazer, the author of The Golden Bough, were so
roundly condemned by such critics as Sir E. E. EvansPirchard who called their work telling “If I were a horse”
stories?
But no, this is not what our 19th century predecessors
were up to. Frazer and his contemporaries were
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JOHN MCCREERY
constructing speculations about the prehistoric origins of
religion, a topic for which the direct evidence is very
slim, indeed. What I propose here is to extend the
method that Robert Weller describes when, having shown
that Wolf’s thesis that Chinese gods are bureaucrats is,
at best, only party true, then goes on to say,
At a deeper level these cases force us toward some
position like Wolf’s: that Chinese religious
interpretation moves hand in hand with social
experience (1996: 21).
The classic Durkheimian vision in which religion mirrors
society may be too simplistic. We now recognize that,
Religion is not a relex of Chinese social structure,
or even of class, gender, or geographical position. It
is instead part of an ongoing dialogue of
interpretations,
sometimes
competing
and
sometimes cooperating (1996:21).
We can, however, go a step further and recognize that
the on-going dialogue that Weller describes extends
beyond the borders of China. Chinese ideas and images
have been absorbed and adapted throughout East Asia
and, in some cases—one thinks of Chinese medicine,
martial arts, fengsui, the Yin and the Yang—have spread
worldwide, carried now by ilm, video games and the
Internet as well as overseas Chinese and other East
Asian diasporas. To explore these transmissions and
transformations in search of pan-human patterns is far
from telling “if I were a horse” stories. It is, instead, the
sort of thing that historians do all the time when
engaging in comparative research within or across
regions or eras, a task that can now be grounded in a
rich and growing body of scholarship. In the case of
China, we are not dealing with speculation about what
happened in prehistory. If anything, we confront the
opposite problem; the relevant literature is enormous
compared to the number of scholars who research it
(McCreery, 2008: 304-305).
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
In this context, there is, I would argue, much to be
said for embracing the “methodological fetishism” that
Arjun Appadurai (1986:5, cited in Brown, 2009:142)
ascribes
to
material
culture
studies.
Brown’s
“Praesentia” (2009: 177-194) and Michael Taussig’s “In
some way or another one can protect oneself from the
spirits by portraying them” (2009: 195-207) ofer
numerous opportunities for close comparison with Lin
Wei-Ping’s indings concerning the consecration and
localization of god statues in Wan-nian. Closer attention
to Chinese god statues reveals not only a richly detailed
iconography but also general principles that have
broader implications. They make inescapable the larger
question: Why are Chinese gods, like the gods of Hindu
India and ancient Greece and Rome, Christian saints and
Christ himself represented in human form?
The kami venerated in Japanese shrines are concealed
from their worshippers. Only priests may see the sacred
regalia in which they reside when invited to participate
in Shinto ceremonies (Nelson, 1997). We have seen that
when held in greatest awe, the Jade Emperor is also
invisible: a feature he also shares with the gods of the
Old Testament, Calvin and the Holy Koran.
What we see here in tablets, books and other nonanthropomorphic forms of material representation is, I
would argue, a precise analogue to Maurice Bloch’s
description of ritual language as a language deliberately
impoverished to force particular interpretations (cited in
McCreery, 1995: 158). Abstraction and formalization
assert unimpeachable authority. Conversely, however,
concrete representations, and especially those that take
a full-igured anthropomorphic form, render the gods
approachable, transforming them into patrons with
whom it is possible to form particularistic relationships in
which both emotion and exchange can be used to secure
the gods’ favor.
In this paper we have seen anthropologists whose eyes
are focused beyond what they see, on theories that
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JOHN MCCREERY
purport to explain how Chinese culture or society works.
We
have
seen
collectors,
whose
iconographic
perspectives draw our attention back to the visual
evidence that our eyes provide and noted the diversity of
stories that add meaning to what we see. The author has
sketched one dimension of a visual grammar, a
continuum that extends from authority abstracted in
inscribed tablets to power expressed in near-demonic
forms.
There are no inal answers here. If, however, we open
our eyes to the tangible qualities we ind in Chinese god
statues, we will, I suggest, be able to write thicker
descriptions, descriptions that challenge our theories and
demand more subtle ones, theories that may, at the end
of the day, enable us to situate Chinese religion more
irmly in relation to religion as a human phenomenon.
References
Appadurai, Arjun (1986), “Introduction: Commodities and
the Politics of Value,” in Arjun Appadurai, ed., The Social
Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective .
Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.
Brown, Peter (2009) “Thing Theory, ” in Fiona Candlin
and Raiford Guins, eds., The Object Reader. London:
Routledge, pp. 139-152.
Brown, Peter (2009) “Prasentia, ” in Fiona Candlin and
Raiford Guins, eds., The Object Reader. London:
Routledge, pp. 177-194.
Byrne, David and Charles C. Ragin, eds. (2009), The
SAGE Handbook of Case-Based Methods. Sage
Publications, Ltd.
Chau, Adam Yuet (2006) Miraculous Response: Doing
Popular Religion in Contemporary China . Stanford:
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
Stanford University Press.
DeGlopper, Donald (1974) “Religion and Ritual in
Lukang,” In Arthur Wolf, ed., Religion and Ritual in
Chinese Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Feuchtwang, Stephan (2001) Popular Religion in China:
The Imperial Metaphor. Richmond, England: Curzon
Press.
Feuchtwang, Stephan (2006) “Miraculous Response:
Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China.” In
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute . 12:4:978.
Geertz, Cliford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures.
New York: Basic Books, Inc.
Gell, Alfred (2009) “The Technology of Enchantment and
the Enchantment of Technology, ” in Fiona Candlin and
Raiford Guins, eds., The Object Reader. London:
Routledge, pp. 208-228.
Katz, Paul R. (1995) Demon Hordes and Burning Boats:
The Cult of Marshal Wen in Late Imperial Chekiang
(Suny Series in Chinese Local Studies) New York: State
University of New York Press.
Katz, Paul R. (1996) “Enlightened Alchemist or Immoral
Immortal? The Growth of Lü Dongbin’s Cult in Late
Imperial China,” in Shahar and Weller, eds., Unruly Gods:
Divinity and Society in China. Honolulu: U. of Hawaii
Press, pp. 70-104.
Lin Wei-Ping (2008) “Conceptualizing Gods through
Statues: A Study of Personiication and Localization in
Taiwan,” Comparative Studies in Society and History,
Vol. 50, No. 2: pp. 454-477.
Liu Senhower (劉文三) (1981) The God Statues of Taiwan
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(台灣神像藝術). Taipei: Yishuchia Press.
McCreery, John (1990) “Why Don’t We See Some Real
Money Here? Oferings in Chinese Religion. Journal of
Chinese Religion 18:1-24.
McCreery, John (1995) “Negotiating with Demons: The
Uses of Magical Language. American Ethnologist
22:1:144-164.
McCreery, John (2008), “Traditional Religions of China”
in Ray Scupin, ed., Religion and Culture, An
Anthropological Focus, 2nd edition. Upper Saddle River,
New Jersey: Pearson Prentice-Hall.
Miller, Daniel, ed. (1998) Material cultures: Why some
things matter. Chicago: Chicago University Press
Murray, Julia K. (2009) “‘Idols’ in the Temple: Icons and
the Cult of Confucius.” The Journal of Asian Studies
68:2:371-411.
Nelson, John K. (1997) A Year in the Life of a Shinto
Shrine. University of Washington Press.
Sangren, Steven (1987) History and Magical Power in a
Chinese Community. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Shahar, Meir and Ropert P. Weller, eds. (1996), Unruly
Gods: Divinity and Society in China. Honolulu: U. of
Hawaii Press.
Stevens, Keith (1997) Chinese Gods: The Unseen World
of Spirits and Demons. London: Collins & Brown Ltd.
Taussig, Michael (2009) “In some way or another one can
protect oneself from the spirits by portraying them, ” in
Fiona Candlin and Raiford Guins, eds., The Object
Reader. London: Routledge, pp. 195-207.
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WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
Weller, Robert P. (1994) Resistance, Chaos, and Control
in China: Taiping Rebels, Taiwanese Ghosts, and
Tiananmen. University of Washington Press.
Wolf, Arthur, ed. (1974) Religion and Ritual in Chinese
Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Figures
Figure 1: The Yokohama Guandi Miao (Exterior)
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JOHN MCCREERY
Figure 2: Sengen Jinja (a Shinto Shrine)
Figure 3: Guandi on the altar of the Yokohama
200
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
Figure 4: Japanese Buddha
201
JOHN MCCREERY
Figure 5: Shinkoyasu Jinja (Interior)
202
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
Figure 6: Guandi at the Yokohama Guandi Miao
203
JOHN MCCREERY
Figure 7: The Jade Emperor
204
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
Figure 8: Xuantianshangdi
205
JOHN MCCREERY
Figure 9: Nahza, The Third Prince
206
WHY DO THE GODS LOOK LIKE THAT?
Figure 10: Thousand-Mile Eyes
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JOHN MCCREERY
Figure 11: Guangong on the Guangong World Culture
208
Chapter 8
AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND
THE GROTESQUE:
THE ARROGANCE OF COSMIC DECEIT, AND
THE HUMILITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
Joanna Overing
The place of humour
My strongest memories of Piaroa people of the
Venezuelan Amazon Territory involve experiencing their
humour. The ludic was vital to their everyday life. These
were people who were lovers of slapstick and witty,
outrageous play on words. There was their punning, their
satire and irony, where the use of the apt and
mischievous trope was given especially high value. It was
through hilarity that I felt I actually understood my
Piaroa teachers. It was then that I felt at one with them.
I will dwell upon the connection between this love of
slapstick, the apt pun and their egalitarian antipathy to
hierarchy, rules and regulations. To begin to understand
this link between a love of laughter and the feeling for
social and political equality of both men and women, it is
209
JOANNA OVERING
necessary to consider the absurd grotesqueries of
creation time hubris, which the Piaroa shaman unfolds
through his singing narrations of mythic time, as he
conducts his daily healing ceremonies. My main interest
is in this telling of the monstrous modes of power set
loose in creation time by the creator gods – and of course
their repercussions. We ind that the stress upon the
grotesque in these healing narratives is strongly related
to the shaman’s thorough understanding of the dangers
in the present day of the monstrous modes of power
unleashed by the gods when they created the world. It is
through exploring these mighty, but highly dodgy, powers
of creation time that we (as anthropologists) can begin to
understand their connection to the rich social
philosophies of folly that are attached to the egalitarian
practices of Piaroa people as they interact in ‘today time’
sociality.
Along the way, I shall unfold the two diseases of folly
and madness that Piaroa people may experience in the
course of everyday life. The names of these two illnesses
are ki'raeu and ke'raeu. The former, ki'raeu, was a
comparatively minor disease of social irresponsibility
which could lead to such errant behaviour as crazy
laughter, promiscuity, wandering at will – and also
diarrhoea. Suferers of such symptoms are considered
victims, led to their waywardness (such as their excessive
use of oriices) by the social irresponsibility of others who
perhaps taunt, or are unduly arrogant toward, them. The
taunter blatantly displays a lack of regard to familial
matters and good etiquette, which leads their victim into
a state of minor madness.
Ke'raeu – in contrast to ki’raeu – is a much more
serious threat to the social fabric: its symptoms involve
more violent display, such as accompanies the madness
of hubris, paranoia, extreme arrogance – and also
murder. As happens today, characters in mythic time also
fell foul of both illnesses, with behaviour becoming truly
grotesque when ke'raeu seriously set in. We ind a major
irony here. These stories speak of the original violent
creation, acquisition and stealing of grotesque powers
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
that would allow for the culinary arts. However, it
these very toxic powers that led eventually to
creation of beautiful, but dangerous culinary skills
enable Piaroa people today to achieve the sort of life
they could consider to be human.
was
the
that
that
Sociology, Political Anthropology
It is important to note that my exploration of Piaroa
understandings of the grotesque and other modes of
power is intended as a foray into political anthropology.
For instance, I ind that certain comparisons of modes of
power can be highly enlightening. For example, in Greek
myth, Zeus, who becomes sovereign of the whole
universe, gets away with hubris and excessiveness, while
Wahari (the creater god of Piaroa people) does not. Why
this diference? To answer such a question, we need to
widen our horizon of concerns greatly to understand its
importance. Obviously, the cultural context (for instance,
the aesthetics of living together) and histories (within
which modes of power are enacted) vary considerably
with regard to matters of social and political value. It is
certainly legitimate to question the worth of comparing
the political values of a Greek city state with those of an
Amazonian village. On the other hand, with our horizons
expanded, we might well ind gold. In comparing the
political concerns of the citizens of Thebes with those of
a Piaroa village I discovered that they shared a number
of egalitarian values and practices. For instance, in both
cases it is particularly the women, as chorus, who take
responsibility for unfolding to the people the
irresponsible actions of a tyrant – or a shaman – gone
mad.
Perhaps we need to understand that an aesthetic of
living may well play a large part within most political
agendas. For quite a long time political anthropology has
been deeply in need of new sociological ways of thinking,
talking, examining – and most importantly imagining.
Exploration of this kind is needed to open up
sociological categories and ways of thinking and even to
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JOANNA OVERING
begin to understand the extraordinary political
repercussions (and lessons) emerging from the
respective fates of these two creator gods – Zeus and
Wahari. The former is king of hierarchy, teaching its
‘wonderful attainment’. As for Wahari, it originally was
his desire to create for his world a moral order
comprised of equals. However, it was his plight that he
was foiled in following through with his plan. On the
other hand, he did succeed in creating a people who held
tight to his original dream of creating a moral order of
equals. They also had the intelligence to understand how
dificult it is to actually achieve this state of existence –
one capable of creating beings who were actually human.
Modes of Power
I shall begin by sketching some of the basic characters
within Piaroa cosmology and the modes of power
attached to each:
First there is Tapir/Anaconda: This monstrous,
almighty, subterranean Tapir/Anaconda let loose all those
mighty powers that eventually allowed for an animated
existence on earth. The great granite outcrops of the
ancient Guianese landscape are the result of his
defecation: Lying beneath the earth, he propelled his
waste upwards, like worm casts, to sit on Earth's surface.
His granite shit became the source on earth for all 'life
force' of a sensual sort: it thus plays a crucial role in the
empowerment of each Piaroa individual: the casing for
their beautiful, interior 'beads of life' is made of these
potent defecatory granite upcastings of Tapir/Anaconda.
It is this casing that allows for their 'life of the senses'
and thus all of their physical capacities. When the
terrifying and violent Tapir/Anaconda wandered along
the earth's surface, s/he wreaked mayhem in his/her
wake.
Next there is Kuemoi: Tapir/anaconda was the father
of Kuemoi who became the Master of Rivers and Lakes.
Tapir/Anaconda grew Kuemoi within the womb of the
Mistress of the lake, feeding him with wildly poisonous
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
hallucinogens from the rust of the sun and the centre of
sky down of the sun. Through these hallucinogenic
powers from the dreadful heat of the sun, Kuemoi
became the father of all cultivated food. He was the
creator of all those forces that belong to the culinary
arts: gardening, hunting, curare, cooking ire. He is also
a tyrannical, grotesque, little madman and is portrayed
as a diabolical bufoon, raucously laughing with each plot
he hatches, shrieking in outrage when foiled: he stamps
his feet when foiled: a igure of high comedy , not tragedy.
When overtaken by total madness, he runs endlessly
around in circles. (He reminds me of Robert Nye's
depiction of the devil in Merlin: “He grins like a fox
eating shit out of a wire brush; the Devil is 'snoring as
loud as a pig'; 'he giggles and he writhes'”). This is the
hilarious, absurd and mockable side of wickedness.
The main aim in life for Kuemoi is to gobble up as
many beings of the domain of the jungle as possible.
Coming out of water, he was the evil cannibal predator of
all beings of the jungle. He stalked all jungle beings as
food. He lusted after their meat. He devoured them raw,
he ate them cooked. To catch them used cunning and an
odious use of guile and sorcery. He was the master of
horrid traps! The king of stealth! The trap he enjoyed
most was his own daughter, 'Maize'. When she was
sleeping, he illed her womb with piranha ish and
electric eels - as a seductive trap for the handsome young
men of the jungle, who then became his meal at night. He
created all creatures nasty to jungle beings, each as a
trap to catch them for a meal: the jaguars and all other
cats, ticks, biting insects, the stingray, poisonous snakes.
He is the father of opossum and electric eel, the
grandfather of bat, vulture, quarrelling, sting ray and
boils.
He was the owner of what the Piaroa call the 'crystal
boxes of tyranny, treachery, and domination' . He
epitomizes excessive power – the power of the true
tyrant. Kuemoi released all the horrors from these boxes
of primordial powers full blast into this world. Kuemoi
was the owner of the ‘crystal boxes of Night’. It was he
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JOANNA OVERING
who in great glee released night and all its dangerous
creatures into earthly space. All of these vicious beings
are Kuemoi's weapons. In fact all of Kuemoi's creations
serve as his weapons, including the culinary arts. All
have powers either to kill or to poison. He transformed
himself during his escapades as jaguar, vulture, mudish
or anaconda.
Through all this he achieved the clothes of physical
might. A small, but monstrous two-headed igure, Kuemoi
had one head to eat meat raw, and one to eat meat
cooked. Kuemoi is the archetypically evil igure of
creation time – and its most ridiculous. This very foolish
god who has all the knowledge of the culinary arts
speaks nonetheless to a highly sophisticated theory of
ethical behaviour and to the side of human nature (as the
Piaroa perceive it) that gives all human beings the
potential for odious and wicked behaviour. A deep cruelty
drove Kuemoi and the use of his might. The power of his
thoughts, that had their source in the poisonous
hallucinogens he took, though suficiently mighty to
create the culinary arts, continually poisoned his will.
Overtaken by total madness, Kuemoi always acted
without reason. He had no dignity . Evil here is clearly
associated with knowledge and thus with too much
power. Kuemoi had far too much of both. He ever
experienced an extreme poisoning of his emotions (the
disease that the Piaroa call ke'raeu – paranoia, hubris,
the desire to murder). This condition of sufering
poisonous unmastered knowledge is irmly attached to an
imagery of madness and bufoonery. The political lesson
is clear.
Then there is Wahari: The greatest adversary of
Kuemoi in creation time was Wahari, the Master of the
Jungle, and the creator god of the Piaroa. As such,
Wahari was the opposite side of the coin to Kuemoi's evil
– at least at the start of creation time. Wahari, who was
also created through Tapir/Anaconda's eforts, was fed on
diferent hallucinogens from those given Kuemoi. Wahari
was given the power of earthly space, of the day, light
and sociality (although in the end it all went wrong). He
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
with his brother, worked together to create many of the
aspects of terrestrial space that made it habitable. They
took the sun and moon from their homes beneath the
earth, and jumped with them into the sky to give
themselves light by day and night. Wahari created air,
breeze and the skies for the comfort of the earthly
creatures of his domain. He created all branch animals
and birds of the jungle. The hummingbird, eagle hawk
and the lapa were the most important manifestations of
his power. They were his transformations, his thoughts
and as such his sons. He used the force of the
hummingbird to ly above and beneath the earth in his
lying canoe. He, like Kuemoi, had mighty powers of
transformation. He too had the power of cunning, guile
and the arts of trickery, combined with mighty sorcery.
But Wahari had the benevolent desire to create a good
life for his inhabitants of the jungle. He wanted to
provide them with the civilised conditions for a human
life on earth, including the culinary arts, and the
capabilities for civilised sociality and social virtue. He
spoke the principles of a moral social life for his people.
Certainly at the beginning of creation time, he was the
god of unity and accord, including that which should hold
within the family. But Wahari strongly wanted to capture
the culinary arts from his father-in-law, Kuemoi. With this
desire began a treacherous cosmic comedy of errors.
None of Wahari's benevolent desires were accomplished
in creation time – and that is its tragic irony. The
narrations tell how Wahari begins mythic time with the
gift of social inesse, but the moment he tries to trade
with Kuemoi, cosmogenesis becomes a bag of tricks, a
high comedy (then tragedy) of errors. The genre of the
bawdy grotesque slips in the end to true tragedy.
Creation Time
Monsters
Hubris
and
its
Landscape
of
This we can gather through the tales about creation
time and the shaman's skilled performance of the
hilarious, bawdy, grotesque episodes of mythic time
through which the ludicrous conditions of being human
215
JOANNA OVERING
are disclosed. The narrations disclose the subtle lessons
of two-edged folly – that which is good, engendering
health and well-being, and that which is disastrous.
Erasmus' sermon on Lady Folly would it well here.
Creation time, much as with Sophocles’ Oedipus cycle,
moves from a kind of naughty irony, illed with crazy
jokes such as reversing heads and buttocks or grabbing a
penis hovering in the air in order to create men. They
also tell of mistakes that lead to intentions backiring, for
example when putting up the sun and moon, and in the
antics of monkeys. Finally, a more grotesque, dark place
of the tragedy of hubris emerges, where excess pride,
arrogance, greed tend to lead to the ruin of the
transgressors. We here ind similarities with Foucault's
reading of Sophocles’ Oedipus, whereby the downfall of
Oedipus is caused not by innocence, but a monstrous
excess of knowledge, and too much power. This rings
true with the experiences of Wahari. There are also
similarities to the often erratic destiny and sufering
found in the historical tyrants of Sophocles’ time, with
their tendency to rely on their own solitary knowledge,
rather than solving problems by conversing with ‘the
people’ and other ‘knowledgeable’ advisors. Such lack of
regard can lead easily to ‘real’ tyranny, which is
associated with the tendency to excess. This in turn leads
to the hubris and asociality of tyrants who misuse power.
In dwelling on these problems, classical Greece comes up
with democracy as a solution.
All of the vignettes from the shamanic narrations
below come from the cycle on the origin of the craziness
disease, k'eraeu. This disease gives you delusions of
grandeur and paranoia. It is the 'fall down’ disease, the
'go round and around disease', the 'twirling circles'
illness. K'eraeu is the most deadly illness you can get and
the most destructive malady of folly imaginable. It leads
to deranged intentionality. You can die from it and with it
you are very likely to damage and kill others.
Here is the history: Creation time becomes the
battleground between the two powerful creator gods,
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
Wahari and Kuemoi, and ends with a cannabilistic war of
all against all. Wahari tries to trade with Kuemoi, to
acquire his powerful hunting spells and powers for the
cultivation of plants; in turn, Kuemoi tries to poison
Wahari with his powerful hallucinogenic drugs, in order
to capture and eat him. So Wahari stealthily tries to steal
from Kuemoi the means to civilised life. He tries to rob
all the edible fruits and vegetables from Kuemoi's great
tree of life. But sufering from the poisons of Kuemoi's
spells, Wahari instead becomes desperately ill, thirsty; he
lusts after women and spends many years chasing after
foreign beauties. He becomes insuferably arrogant,
destroying all of his personal relationships with kin. He
sells his sister to the Master of White Man's Goods for 6
boxes of matches; he sodomises her, an event that leads
to the birth of his son Diarrhoea, whom he tries to kill.
He sufers hubris: his mockery infuriates his relatives,
who take revenge, by further zapping him with Kuemoi's
disease, k'eraeu, the craziness illness: his head hurts, he
runs in circles. It makes him want to kill. The terrible
twirling circles of k'eraeu really captures Wahari:
maddened, he announces that all of his own creations
(people) will sufer this disease. He wanders in the world,
lost, arrogant, beautiful. However, he returns again and
again to steal Kuemoi's powers for civilised eating. He
manages to steal Kuemoi's daughter (after cleaning her
womb of piranha ish). Next comes a god-awful series of
battles between Wahari and Kuemoi, where they both
indulge in villainy, thievery, trickery, deceit and disguise,
traps and general mayhem. In hilarious episodes, Wahari
often outwits Kuemoi because he foresees his intentions.
He manages to give Kuemoi diarrhoea and causes him to
rape his own daughter (Wahari's wife). Kuemoi runs
round and round in circles.
Wahari becomes crazier and crazier as he becomes
increasing zapped by Kuemoi's poisons. On one occasion
Wahari becomes locked in the midst of a k'eraeu circuit
comprised of the narrow translucent streams of k'eraeu
descending from four of Kuemoi's mountains. He then
falls into Kuemoi's trap of poisoned hunting charms, illed
with vulture down, sky rust, centre of the sky down. He
217
JOANNA OVERING
goes of hunting and then ishing, through yet other traps
set by Kuemoi, and manages to kill, not a deer, but his
much beloved old grandmother. He cries and wails at this
mistake.
Wahari then decides to create his own culinary arts:
He tries to create his own ire, his own sweet and wild
fruits and hunting paraphernalia, but he fails badly,
These are tales usually told with rather hard-edged
slapstick comedy. Each and every creation was false and
perverse because of Kuemoi's poisoning of his will,
making Wahari crazy. At one point he tries to kill his own
brother. The more he tries to create the culinary arts, the
more Wahari proclaims his own greatness – as master of
the universe, the jungle, and the rivers. It was his hubris
that created the forces of a monstrous, perverted
culinary arts. His 'ire' blossomed as skin disease, burns,
and boils, a ire that scorched but could not cook; his
cures backired on the user and became the miscarrying
of women and the bleeding of adults from the mouth, the
anus, the vagina; his hunting charms became paralysis,
his ish hooks, sore throat... All these useless, poisonous
creations became the diseases that human beings sufer
today and not the useful artefacts for civilised living that
Wahari so desired for them. These creations today
impregnate human beings with disease. As in Greek
myth, life for human beings is not easy; the gods made it
so.
How do humans receive all these horrors? This is
the story:
It was when Wahari invited most of the people beings
of the jungle to a great feast. He gets them drunk and
then transforms them into animals, to become game for
him to hunt and eat. He takes away all their powers for
thought and intentionality and gives them instead all of
his perverse creations. The animals will not sufer them,
but instead they will pass them on to human beings.
Piaroa people thus do receive Wahari's artefacts, but in
the form of diseases given to them by the animals.
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
Wahari, the star of mythic time, becomes its worst villain,
all due to his mistakes and his arrogance.
Today, human beings (ironically) have to use the
dangerous forces for the culinary arts that were
originally let loose by Kuemoi, not Wahari. All of Wahari’s
eforts turned out to be useless. In fact, it is only earthly
human beings who can use the powers created by
Kuemoi. There are all sorts of dangers there for folly
(their intentions can so easily be poisoned by Kuemoi's
deadly powers). Today, human beings must, through
everyday hard work, manage the culinary arts on their
own, transforming the ugly and dangerous powers for the
hunt and the gardens into beautiful forces, safe for a
civilised life. They must cleanse their vegetables and fruit
from the poisons of Kuemoi and all their game and ish
from those of Wahari. And, they must deal with the fact
that the game they eat is really human in origin.
The relation between the culinary arts and the arts
of conviviality:
This everyday work of the culinary arts and civilised
sociality is at the same time accomplished through a
good deal of practice in the comic arts. Indeed the
practice of the arts of conviviality become a sign that the
powers they use are those of civilised eating, a practice
which keeps hubris at bay. The wisdom of folly is highly
valued.
On the other hand, there is no resolution of the great
conlicts of mythic time. The villainy of the ludicrous,
ironic, treacherous practices of creation time generate
the ambiguous conditions for the humans who live today
on earth – civilised eating, civilised sociality – are all to
be acquired at great cost, with great dificulty, with great
sufering, and with a good dash of treachery. We who use
the powers of the cannibal god, Kuemoi, can also be
poisoned
into
greedy,
arrogant
behaviour.
The
domesticated Piaroa can hardly separate themselves in
any absolute way from the animal other. As human beings
they are hardly innocent. This takes us to the genre of
219
JOANNA OVERING
the grotesque, that genre that retains to the bitter end its
unresolved conlicts and ambiguities.
The Genre of the Grotesque: the mythic narratives
and the unresolved incongruities of history:
Mythic imageries of the grotesque and the absurd are
not unusual. The French scholar, Vernant, speaks of the
robust, multi-layered imagery of mythic narrations, their
hilarity and the intellectuality attached to them. And, we
may add, their strong connection to particular social
philosophies, to distinctions of moral worth, to treasured
ways of doing things. He calls for deeper cross-cultural
comparison of mythic styles (with which I strongly
agree). Is there a particular style of mythic
presentations? I suggest that the genre of the grotesque
is one such widespread style. The powers suficiently
mighty for creation are typically violent dramatic stories,
as we see from Vernant's own disclosure of the ancient
Greek mythology, and ours from Amazonia.
The story of creation time is one of poisoned
intentionalities, of cosmic follies: it is a story of greed,
hubris and mental derangement.
The genre of the Grotesque is calculatingly used by the
narrator of Piaroa myths in unfolding, disclosing, evoking
the deep absurdities of human existence and its preconditions as played out in creation time. Wisdom
depends on understanding the message of the grotesque.
We need to pay attention to such messages.
The 18th and 19th centuries had a pejorative view of
the grotesque, judging it a vulgar species of the comic,
deprived of the serious. In general it was viewed as a
genre of ludicrous exaggeration, a genre of the fantastic.
However, more recent responses (Kayser 1963, Thomson
1972) have understood it otherwise, stressing its power
to speak to reality. They note that its explosive force
serves to make us see the real world anew. It jolts one
into a transformation of perspective on what reality
might be.
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
Some relevant points with regard to this re-assessment
of the genre of the grotesque to our understanding of the
mythic narration performances are the following:
1) The genre of the grotesque (also read as the genre
of mythic narrative) is more attached to realism
than fantasy. It is extravagant, but not fantastic.
However strange the grotesque world is, it is also
our world. The mythic narration, in partaking of
this genre, has as its irst and foremost aim to
express the problematic nature of existence, and
its preconditions, to unfold the absurdities of our
life, its ambivalences, as played out originally in
the ironic grotesquery of creation time.
2) The comic is necessary for the genre of the
grotesque to work. There is its playfulness and its
terror,
its
confusion
and
interplay
of
heterogeneous elements: the monstrous and the
ludicrous; humans, animals, and vegetables. There
are its paradoxes and ironies (the creator of ire
devouring meat raw), and also its shock tactics
(Wahari eating stew discovers he is eating his own
son). We react to the slapstick experience of such
horror with glee, as opposites continually clash.
We laugh at the tale of deceit, trickery, mischief,
hubris, illness, death, cannibalism, treacheries,
greed, general mayhem. Part of the glee comes
from the question ever rising over 'who are the
victims? who the victimisers?
3) There are the physical deformities, the (bawdy)
bodyliness of it all (see Bakhtin). We have the 2headed god of culture; the huge sexual organs,
male and female (Think of Cronus' enormous
member). Wahari, creator of people, transforms
himself into the monster supreme deity beneath
the
earth,
the
dangerous
chimerical
Tapir/Anaconda, preying intently on his own
kinsmen.
4) The most distinctive trait of the grotesque,
according to Thomson (1972), is the unresolved
nature of grotesque conlict, separating it out from
neighbouring genres (e.g. the absurd). In Piaroa
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JOANNA OVERING
myth, this grotesquery of the origin of culture is
never resolved – Wahari did not succeed (Zeus did,
but earthlings didn't). Thus, the forces for creation
continue into today as the uncleaned product of
the deadly hallucinogens that the creator god of
the culinary arts withdrew from the rust of the sun
andthe heart of the armadillo. The gods were
creators and as such, killers.
5) The emotional and intellectual tension continues
through the story: it is one of poisoned and
poisonous intentionalities. Despite the human
capacities of Piaroa people (their capabilities for
the culinary arts, for reasoned intentionality and
therefore sociality), there remains this deep
ambiguity to being human. For as humans they are
hardly innocent. Their relections upon alterity
recognise that the violence of foreign politics
demands from the start an unleashing of poisonous
forces from themselves not so very diferent from
those of exterior others – or the gods (Overing
1996).
Ironic practices of the everyday
How should we as anthropologists interpret the Piaroa
reactions to their absurd universe? We have then the
ironic performances/rituals of everyday life among an
egalitarian people who love their freedom and also their
sociality. These are a people who are very fond of the
comic; they ind the practice of folly essential to their
well-being: a very Amazonian way of thinking. My
interest is how such a cosmogenesis and the philosophy
of the absurd that comes from it (as understood by the
Piaroa) are linked to their social psychology and to their
egalitarianism. As we know, our own social theory of the
comic is indeed weak, as too that of the grotesque.
For insight, we might be wise to turn to the likes of
Vico on the political use of tropes (the more hierarchical
people’s values the more literalness is approved of) and
Kenneth Burke on true irony being attached to a deep
humility with regard to our own frailties . We need to
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
think about an irony that does not make us 'superior' to
the enemy, for we have some of the same attributes as
he/she – and indeed we are indebted to this enemy. (For
Piaroa, the gods are cannibal predators, and so are the
Piaroa themselves).
Perhaps it is with lessons from the Taoist Monks (e.g.
see Peter Berger) that we might begin to understand the
comic as a mode of knowledge . Thus perhaps the
Amazonian case is not totally alien. Let us look at the
connections:
1) The role of the jokester shaman leader has much in
common with the raucously laughing Taoist Monk.
For both, the comic is a mode of knowledge .
2) The humour of both is forthcoming from a
profound sense of the incongruities (lack of
reason) of the universe, and of human behaviour
within it.
3) There is a strong use of tropes. According to Peter
Berger, the Ch'an/Zen way of teaching is through
parables, through riddles, and most solutions are
in the form of jokes.
4) What is more, a self-mocking humility is taught.
The Piaroa shaman is the teacher of this attitude of
the world – he starts with the children when they
are ive years old. Success in the ability of not
taking oneself seriously is a good test of whether
liberating, true learning has taken place, one that
is conducive to the deconstruction of reality, with
the disclosure of all its incongruities – albeit the
shaman's job, but to a lesser, yet important extent
by each individual.
Berger lists these components of
philosophy (as followed by the Taoists):
a
comic
1) The diagnosis of the world as a mass of
incongruence
2) The radical debunking of pretensions of grandeur
and wisdom (the breeder of hubris)
3) A spirit of mocking irreverence
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JOANNA OVERING
4) A profound discovery of and appreciation of
freedom
Such a list its as well the attitudes and teachings of
the Piaroa shaman who teaches of the importance of
humility – in light of the enemy within – and stresses at
all times the craziness of the expression of anger and
arrogance, true signs of a tyrannical temperament
destructive of the accomplishment of a human sort of life.
These are the lessons of the two diseases of craziness:
k'iraeu and k'eraeu.
These are also philosophical insights that lead to a
stress on the immense importance to sociality of the
accomplishing afective comfort. The hierarchical and the
literal are both too direct for afective comfort and wellbeing. The hierarchical and the literal can too easily and
treacherously poison intentionality.
The comic, the
counterworld
social
and
the
creation
of
a
Finally, a word on the notion of comedy as a
counterworld and as 'anti-rites'. See M. Douglas and
others on the notion that jokes are an intrusion of the
comic into everyday life. They see jokes as 'anti-rites',
rebellious of ordained patterns of social life. They
understand the comic as a temporary suspension of
social structure!
However, for many Amazonian peoples, folly lies at the
heart of the social. Far from the comic as an intrusion
into everyday life, the view is that the human social
condition can only be accomplished through the spirit of
folly. Through an understanding of an ironic, grotesque
cosmogenesis, Amazonian peoples tend to stress the
value of playing out in social life a sociable 'humble
irony'. For example, with Piaroa, ludic practices allow for
sociable living and working together. They enable the
bringing up of children, feeding them, curing them, and
most important, teaching them the arts and decorum of
Folly. In other words, ironic practice allows them to deal
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AN AMAZONIAN QUESTION OF IRONIES AND THE GROTESQUE
with the poisonous forces within that are at the same
time conducive to a human way of life. These are a
people who recognise well the happiness of foolery, its
poetics and also its necessity, its health-giving properties.
In Amazonia often the achievement of the social forms
a counterworld that protects against all those absurdities
of the universe. Thus the ironic practices: a spirit of
mocking irreverence, a debunking of all those
pretensions of grandeur and wisdom, but coated with a
good dose of well-considered humility in the face of it all.
For those absurdities not only always intrude upon the
everyday, they also rest within each person, corporeally
so to speak. At any moment, and you never know, anyone
can sufer k'iraeu (promiscuity, crazy laughter...) and any
shaman could be attacked by k'eraeu (paranoia). This is
the misery of cosmic Folly. It is the comic as a mode of
knowledge that provides insight into this downside of
folly: by knowing it, and practising in its light, we can, for
a time at least, fool the cosmic comic incongruities of
existence and of this world on earth. The latter being an
environment created by means of poisonous, deadly
hallucinogens.
References
Bakhtin, Mikhail (1968) Rabelais and his World,
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Berger, Peter (1997) Redeeming laughter: The Comic
Dimension of Human Experience, New York: Walter de
Gruyter.
Douglas, Mary (1975) Implicit Meanings, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Fernandez, James & M.T. Huber eds (2001) Irony in
Action: Anthropology, Practice, and the Moral
Imagination, Chicago: the University of Chicago Press.
225
JOANNA OVERING
Kayser, Wolfgang (1963) The Grotesque in Art and
Literature, Bloomington.
Meyer, Michael (1995) Literature and the Grotesque,
Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Overing, Joanna (2000) 'The eficacy of laughter: the
ludic side of magic within Amazonian sociality', in
Overing & Passes (below), The Anthropology of Love and
Anger.
Overing, Joanna (2006) ‘The Stench of Death and the
Aromas of Life: Poetics of Ways of Knowing and Sensory
Process among Piaroa of the Orinoco Basin’, Tipiti,
Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland
South America, Volume 4, numbers 1& 4, June &
December.
Overing, Joanna & Alan Passes eds (2000) The
Anthropology of Love and Anger: the aesthetics of
conviviality in Native South America, Routledge.
Thomson, Philip (1972) The Grotesque, Methuen & Co.
Zijderveld, Anton (1963) On clichés: The supersedure of
meaning by function in modernity , Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Note
1. Paper originally presented in Santiago Chile, July 2003.
226
Chapter 9
HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS:
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANAMORPHOSIS
Alberto Corsín Jiménez
‘the most admirable operations derive from very weak
means’
– Galileo Galilei (1968: 109)
‘Not just judgments about analogy but judgments about
proportion inform any organization of data.’
– Marilyn Strathern (2004 [1991]: 24)
‘A strange thing full of water’
– Michel Serres (1995: 122)
I open with a myth of origins:
All political thought evinces an aesthetic of sorts.
Dioptric anamorphosis, for instance, was the ‘science of
miracles’ through which Hobbes imagined his Leviathan.
An example of the optical wizardry of seventeenth
century clerical mathematicians, a dioptric anamorphic
device used a mirror or lens to refract an image that had
deliberately been distorted and exaggerated back into
227
ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
what a human eye would consider a natural or normal
perspective. Many such artefacts played with pictures of
the faces of monarchs or aristocrats. Here the viewer
would be presented with a panel made up of a
multiplicity of images, often emblems representing the
patriarch’s genealogical ancestors or the landmarks of
his estate. A second look at the panel through the optical
glass, however, would recompose the various icons, as if
by magical transubstantiation, into the master’s face.
Noel Malcolm has exposed the place that the optical
trickery of anamorphosis played in Hobbes’ political
theory of the state (Malcolm 2002). According to
Malcolm, the famous image of the Leviathan colossus
that furnishes the title-page of Hobbes’ book came as an
inspiration to Hobbes following his encounter with a
dioptrical device designed by the Minim friar JeanFrançois Nicéron. Nicéron’s design involved a picture of
the faces of twelve Ottoman sultans which, on looking
through the viewing-glass tube, converged into the
portrait of Louis XIII (Malcolm 2002: 213). Seduced by
the structural symbolism through which such optical
illusions could be used to represent relations between
political persons (e.g. between the state and its subjects)
(Malcolm 2002: 223), Hobbes commissioned an
iconographic representation of similar efects for the
title-page of his book. Here the image of the colossal
Leviathan rises over the landscape energized by a mass
of small igures. These morph by congregation into the
body of the monarch, that hence takes a life of its own. A
projection onto a one-dimensional surface of the dioptric
trick, the igure of Leviathan aimed to capture the
political innovation of Hobbes’ theory of representational
personiication. For Hobbes, the aggregation of the
political will of multiple individuals into an overarching
sovereign
person
brought
about
a
political
transubstantiation: the Many became the One, which
contained, but also transcended, the Many. This is why
for Hobbes the theory of (political) representation is a
theory of duplicity and duplication: it calls for the critical
capacity to see oneself as both the creator of a political
object (the body politic) and its subdued servant; both a
228
HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
distant outsider to the body and in partial identity with it.
This entails, as Malcolm puts it, ‘a curious structure of
argument that requires two diferent ways of seeing the
relation between the individual and the state to be
entertained at one and the same time.’ (Malcolm 2002:
228)
Building on the implications of Malcolm’s analysis for
our theories of the state, Simon Schafer has recently
ofered a phantasmagorical reinterpretation of the place
of optical illusionism in political perspectivism (Schafer
2005). For Schafer, the dioptric capacity to ‘see double’
is in fact but a irst step towards the cancelling of all
visions but the sovereign vision. According to Schafer,
dioptrics enables this parallax shift because it
rationalizes as illusory all political perspectives that do
not conform with the One: outside the body politic all
visions are but the visions of political phantoms (Schafer
2005: 202; on parallax shifts see Žižek 2006). In
seventeenth
century
politics
this
was
easily
accomplished, according to Schafer, because outside the
rule of sovereign law – as Hobbes noted – lay only a
chaotic state of nature, shaped by mistrust, fear,
witchcraft accusations and the mischievous play of
invisible phantoms. The rise of Leviathan exterminated
the invisible, neatly aligning, in a supreme gesture of
political illusionism, the planes of the natural and the
phantasmagorical.
***
This paper ofers anthropological insight into a certain
fashion of Euro-American intellectual practice, namely,
the operations through which knowledge comes-untoitself as a descriptive register (of other practices). I am
interested in the cultural epistemology that enables
knowledge to become an enabler itself: what the growth
of knowledge – or its rise as an expression of enablement
– looks like. What does knowledge need to grow ‘out of’
for such an escalation to become meaningful or, simply,
visible?
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
The making visible of knowledge as an object of
growth has an anthropology to it.1 It involves playful
operations with social ideas of size and vision, and is
materialized in a practical epistemology where the
optical plays an intriguing culturally salient role 2. Optics
makes size an efect of exploration. It makes things big
and small in diferent proportions, intensities and shapes.
It provides a form or carrier for the expansions and
contractions in/of knowledge. There is a seductive
analogy between how knowledge has been rendered a
mode of enablement in some Euro-American social theory
and the perspectival technique known by art historians
as anamorphic illusionism. (This should not be taken as
pejorative: an illusion can be both hopeful and delusive.)
As a praxis or craft of optical deformation, the
anamorphic ofers a useful imago for the cultural
comportment of some aspects of Euro-American
knowledge (De la Flor 2009).
As will come evident throughout, a source of
inspiration for what follows has been the work of Marilyn
Strathern. Of her own experimentation with narrative
and analytic strategies in Partial Connections, she
described the use she made of the imagery of the fractal
(Cantor’s Dust) in that book as ‘an artiicial device’ that
allowed her to ‘experiment with the apportioning of
“size” in a deliberate manner.’ (Strathern 2004 [1991]:
xxix) My interest in the anamorphic lies likewise in its
use as a tool for making explicit how social theory and
critique size themselves – that is, how ‘size’ has become
an idiom for what theory does.
A rather obvious and yet rarely acknowledged route
through which the imagination of ‘size’ has made its way
into the sociological canon is via the descriptive and
analytical purchase aforded by relations of magnitude
known as ‘proportions’. The analogy between enablement
and escalation that I drew above – the image of
knowledge as an expression of escalating enablement – is
a case in point. There is an important and not-always
acknowledged current in Euro-American social theory
and philosophy that refracts the work of knowledge
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
through the operations of a proportional imagination.
Proportionality becomes the enabling mechanism of
knowledge: how knowledge escalates out of itself.
Take the Leviathan. Hobbes’ iconographic choice
makes the Leviathan appear as a supreme trickster
igure, at once enabling and concealing its own source of
agency. The state’s power igures as an aesthetic efect:
the efect of a parallax shift, the alignment of two
perspectives in one optical illusion. Importantly, the
illusion is held in place through the work of a
proportional imagination: ‘the relation between the
individual and the state’, as Malcom puts it, is tricked
into view and held stable as a proportional artiice. The
One and the Many stand in a political relation to each
other because of their proportional relationship. As a
symbolic form, the meaningfulness and ‘comparability of
phenomena rests on preserving proportion or scale.’
(Strathern 1990: 211) Nicéron’s dioptric lens generates
the perspective from which knowledge of the political
surfaces. ‘The political’ emerges as a modern theoretical
object thanks to the efect of the anamorphic artiice: it is
what the world looks like from the point of view of the
lens. Anamorphosis situates and aligns the world of
political theory for us.
The anamorphic operates a second efect on the
workings of knowledge, which I shall call ‘reversibility’.
Reversibility describes the double and simultaneous
vision required to grant theoretical status to an object.
When commenting on the illusionary character of
Hobbes’ Leviathan, Malcolm described it as ‘the curious
structure of argument that requires two diferent ways of
seeing the relation between the individual and the state
to be entertained at one and the same time.’ (Malcolm
2002: 228) The relational character of sovereign power
emerges thus as another efect of the anamorphic
artiice. It is a produce of having to hold simultaneously
an internal and external vision on the images of the
twelve sultans and Louis XIII’s emblem. Not without
reason, Simon Schafer described the methodological
exigency underpinning our encounter with the phantom
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
qualities of the Hobbesian body politic as ‘seeing double’
(Schafer 2005). Moving in and out of the dioptric lens –
performing the anamorphic – lends political theory its
relational purchase.
The rest of this paper explores the hold that
proportionality and reversibility have over the make-up of
social theory. It may be read as an exploratory foray into
the cultural analytics of some aspects of Euro-American
knowledge,3 and in this sense as an investigation into the
novel anamorphic devices through which contemporary
social theory may be generating its escalatory efects.
Some comments are also made in passing about the
contemporary economy of knowledge as, itself, an
anamorphic coniguration.4
***
Let me start with a rich and evocative account of how
architects visualize their building projects by sociologist
Albena Yaneva. Her ield site is the Ofice for
Metropolitan Architecture (OMA), the workplace of the
famous Dutch architect, Rem Koolhaas; and her focus is
the work carried out by architects at OMA during the
design and development of a number of models for the
new exhibition hall at the Whitney Museum of American
Art in New York (Yaneva 2005). Yaneva writes from a selfconfessed social studies of technology perspective, and
indeed declares that in her account ‘the architectural
ofice will be studied in the same way that STS has
approached the laboratory.’ (Yaneva 2005: 869)
The ethnography starts from the premise that
‘knowing through scaling is an integral aspect of
architectural practice’ and the author sets as her task to
describe ethnographically the so-called enigma of the
‘rhythm of scaling’ (Yaneva 2005: 870, 868). The scales
that Yaneva takes to task here are diferently sized
models of the Whitney building project. Architects in
OMA work with two scale models of the projected
building: a small-scale model, which is quickly put
together by architects to provide a sketchy and abstract
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
materialization of the basic concept guiding the project,
and which includes a number of site constraints, such as
urban
and
local
zoning
regulations
or
client
requirements; and a much larger scale model, which is
used to ine-tune the small model by leshing-out its
concrete details.
The small and large models are set up in two adjacent
tables and architects spend a good amount of time
moving from one table to the next, “‘scaling up’, ‘jumping
the scale, ‘rescaling’ and ‘going down in scale’”, in the
vernacular terminology used by Yaneva’s informants
(Yaneva 2005: 870). In moving between tables and
models, architects spend a considerable amount of time
working with an instrument known as a ‘modelscope’,
which is used to explore the inside of the small model. By
inserting a miniature periscope into the model, architects
redeploy themselves as human users of the building. ‘The
modelscope’, an architect tells Yaneva, ‘gives you a view
that is like the scale of that model. So, you get to express
the space at that scale. It gives you the opportunity to
move around spaces you ordinarily can’t get into and to
see how they look… We are able to see how space is
inside.’ Yaneva further notes that ‘minimized to the scale
of the tiny model, [the architect] is exploring these
microscopic spaces like in Gulliver’s travels, he ‘enters’
the spaces and experiences them.’ (Yaneva 2005: 876)
Having cruised the inside of the small model, architects
then assemble to discuss possible changes in the
architectural layout of the building, which are later given
concrete expression in changes made to the large model.
The scoping in and out of the small and large models is
a recursive process: ‘Scaling up’, writes Yaneva, ‘is
immediately and reversibly followed by scaling down.’
(Yaneva 2005: 883) However, as times goes by, the larger
model inevitably amasses more information and detail
than the smaller one, for it is to the larger model that the
insights gained from exploring the small model
eventually get transported and where they get relected.
Thus, the larger model grows in power and information
by gathering the produce of the recursion. But
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
importantly, Yaneva insists, this does not mean that the
design involves a linear or evolutionary movement from
the small model to the large model. The small model is
not a pre-condition, or an evolutionary antecedent, for
the revelation of proper and useful knowledge at the
level of the larger scale model. Rather, the design is
simultaneously present in the small and the large, the
before and after of every recursion, the scoping in and
out through which architects multiply the versions and
the trajectories of the design. According to Yaneva, the
shape the project inally takes emerges gradually as a
form of extended and ubiquitous co-presence in the time
and space of all such scalar operations. As ‘it passes
through these trials,’ she says, ‘it becomes more and
more visible, more present, more material, real. ‘Scaling’
is not a way to it into reality; rather, it is a conduit for its
extraction.’ (Yaneva 2005: 887)
There are two points I would like to make about the
architects use of scaling as a method of knowledge and
design. One is the extraordinary ease with which it sits
next to Gulliver’s Travels. The second is what this igure
of scale takes for granted.
It is certainly worth noting how Jonathan Swift and
Yaneva resort to a similar imagination of size to make
their arguments carry force. For both size is important; it
helps render certain insights valuable and visible. In fact,
literary theorist Douglas Lane Patey has described
Gulliver’s Tales as ‘laboratory experiments based on
diference of size’ (Patey 1991: 827), much like Yaneva
describes her ethnography of architecture as a
laboratory study in the ‘rhythm of scaling’.
Of course, Swift’s use of size has long attracted the
attention of literary theorists for its satirical efects. It is
satire that size aims for. I want to suggest, however, that
one may explore the use of size in Swift not for its efects
on something else, but for its efect on itself – that is, on
its own self-apprehension as a body of knowledge. Size,
then, as a vehicle for making knowledge an adequate
expression of itself.
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
There is a wonderful episode in Gulliver’s Travels that
captures something of what I am hoping to convey here,
namely, the extent to which knowledge comes in diferent
sizes. At Brobdingnag, the land of the giants, Gulliver is
taken to court for the diversion of the Queen and her
ladies. Impressed by Gulliver’s demeanour, the King,
‘who had been educated in the Study of Philosophy, and
particularly Mathematicks’, suspects of Gulliver being ‘a
piece of Clock-work… contrived by some ingenious
Artist.’ He therefore sends for three great Scholars to
examine Gulliver’s shape and make-up. The scientists all
agree that Gulliver ‘could not be produced according to
the regular Laws of Nature’. However, an opinion that he
was an ‘embrio’ was rejected, as was his characterisation
as an ‘abortive Birth’; nor could he be a dwarf, because
his ‘Littleness was beyond all degree of comparison; for,
the Queen’s favourite Dwarf, the smallest ever known in
that Kingdom, was near thirty Foot high.’ (Swift 2002
[1726]: 86-87) Thus, ‘After much debate’, the scholars
inally sentenced that Gulliver
was only Relplum Scalcath, which is interpreted
literally, Lusus Naturae [a freak of nature]; a
Determination exactly agreeable to the Modern
Philosophy of Europe, whose Professors, disdaining
the old Evasion of occult Causes, whereby the
Followers of Aristotle endeavour in vain to disguise
their Ignorance, have invented this wonderful
Solution of all Dificulties to the unspeakable
Advancement of human knowledge. (Swift 2002
[1726]: 87)
The episode is emblematic of Swift’s mordacity, and in
particular his dislike of the new Modern science of the
Royal Society, epitomised here in the igure of the three
scholars. For Swift, modern science falls trap to tautology
(circular and self-explanatory arguments, such as
something being a ‘freak of nature’) inasmuch as ancient
science did. But the episode is further remarkable for its
defence of size as comparative epistemology. Gulliver
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
does not survive comparison, not against dwarves,
embryos or abortive births, so he is in the last instance
catalogued as a freak of nature. Not even the use of a
‘Magnifying-Glass’ can help the scholars reach an
agreement on what Gulliver may be. They size him up
and they size him down, only to conclude that he is not a
product of nature.5 Thus, for Lane Patey, ‘Swift’s play
with perspective (relative size and its implications)’
ultimately enacts the question: ‘what is there in us that
survives comparison – what that cannot be rendered
ludicrous, shameful, or disgusting when magniied to
Brobdingnagian proportions or shrunk to Lilliputian?’
(Patey 1991: 826) Said diferently, in Brobdingnag
country, Gulliver lacks ontology because he is out-ofproportion with the world.
My second remark on architects’ use of scaling as a
method of knowledge builds on this question about size
and the proportionality of the world. In Yaneva’s account,
what is at stake is how the project grows and
consolidates its own size, or how it inds in the small and
large models diferent capacities to deploy diferent
aspects of the design. The qualities of the design are
therefore allowed to emerge through the recursive
travelling between models of diferent size. Thus, the
scale that dominates is that of size. I want to suggest,
however, that Yaneva’s ethnography provides some room
for speculating about an alternative scale; to imagine the
architects looking into the models for certain qualities
other than those of adjustment to size. For example,
when the efect that a giant red escalator has on the
interior of the exhibition hall is examined through the
modelscope, the architects agree that the escalator
needs to be moved to a diferent spot within the hall. We
are left in shades as to what exactly motivates the
relocation, although Yaneva intimates that the ‘scaling
team engages in a dialogue… [about] dispositions,
objects they see inside the model, spatial transitions,
material properties of the foam [used to build the model],
proportions and shapes.’ (Yaneva 2005: 875) Things do
not quite it together for the architects, but it is no longer
clear that this it is a question of scale. Thus, the
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
adjustment that the architects appear to be looking for
now seems to aim for a diferent kind of harmony, or an
equilibrium of diferent proportions. 6
Adjustments to scale
In an age of computer technology, the use that OMA’s
architects make of the use of scale models may appear a
little surprising for those of us who are new to the ield of
architecture. But in fact, as historian of architecture Paul
Emmons has shown, the use of scale and scalar drawings
has played a fundamental part in architectural practice
throughout history (Emmons 2005). For example, from
‘the middle of the second millennium BCE,’ writes
Emmons, ‘a statue of Gudea, leader of the City State of
Lagash in present day Iraq, is seated with a building loor
plan resting on his lap. Also on the tablet are a stylus and
a scale rule, showing ine divisions of the inger
measure.’ (Emmons 2005: 227). Like Yaneva, in his
historical survey Emmons draws too an analogy between
the use of scale in architecture and Swift’s Gulliver
travels, and the 17th century scalar imagination at large.
Thus, he compares Swift’s use of scale with that of
Voltaire’s in Micromégas, and identiies further in Robert
Hooke’s Micrographia a locus of general inluence for the
period. Hooke, who was a Surveyor for the City of
London and designed himself a number of buildings
along with his friend Christopher Wren, ‘transferred his
familiarity with scale from architectural drawing to the
microscope.’ (Emmons 2005: 231) Published in 1665,
Micrographia described Hooke’s use of a microscope to
make observations of miniature aspects of the natural
world, such as ly’s eye or a plant cell. The book became
an immediate best-seller of its day.
Of interest for our purposes here is Hooke’s mode of
use and relationship to the microscope. Emmons cites a
passage in the Micrographia which echoes in fascinating
ways how Yaneva’s architects scooped in and out of the
small and the large scale models. ‘Hooke organised his
microscopic
observations’,
writes
Emmons,
‘progressively from simple to complex, like a geometer
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
ascending from point, line, plane to volume and the chain
of being from mineral to vegetable and animal. He began
with observing the point of a pin under the microscope…
He next analysed a dot made by a pen, and in a scalar
reverie imagined this dot as the earth in space.’ However,
Hooke was also aware that this amassment of detail –
from the simple to the complex – required a second
operation to remain epistemologically productive. He
went at quite some efort to keep the observations made
inside the scale of the microscope at a par with those
made outside the microscope. As Emmons puts it, ‘Hooke
explained his method determining the microscope’s scale
of magniication by looking with one eye through the
microscope as the other naked eye examines a ruler,
simultaneously engaging both scales.’ (Emmons 2005:
231, emphasis added) This simultaneous engagement of
both scales echoes the parallax shift of Hobbes’
Leviathan: an illusion of epistemological and political
eficacy enabled by the dimension of reversibility at work
in the anamorphic. I shall come back to this point later.
Emmons concludes his observations on the historical
importance of scale for architecture by commenting on
architects’ contemporary use of computer software to
generate 1:1 or full scale CAD projections of
architectural designs. For Emmons, the use of CAD
technology emulates a Cartesian approach to the
generation of objects, where things can be described or
plotted through systems of notational or algebraic
relations. Thus, the use of CAD-enabled full scale
drawing ‘makes it more likely that the designer looks at
the image as an object rather than projecting oneself into
the image through an imaginative inhabitation. Scale
sight is not an abstraction; it is achieved through judging
the size of things in relation to ourselves.’ (Emmons
2005: 232) His ‘handbook advise’, then, is to ‘learn to
think within a scale rather than translate from actual
measure.’ (Emmons 2005: 232) Against Cartesianism, for
Emmons, the ‘empathetic bodily projection’ of scale is
‘critical to imagining a future ediice.’ (Emmons 2005:
232)
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
Of Emmons’ description of the history of architectural
practice there are two aspects that I would like to hold in
view. The irst deals with the proportionality of
architecture as a skill and trade; the second, to which I
shall return later, with the deployment of the ‘double
vision’ that is entailed in the practice of scoping in and
out of scale.
Emmons’ concern is with current architectural
practice, where scale fares as a context-free metric, and
advocates instead a return to ‘judging the size of things
in relation to ourselves.’ This form of empirical judgment
echoes what Yaneva called a ‘rhythm of scaling’: an
iterative re-proportional exercise through which the
world sizes its ontology (its human and non-human
landscape) to a proper shape and form.
In fact, architectural practice provides in this context
an interesting place for seeing not only the work of
proportionality at play, but its recurrent entanglement in
larger debates about the epistemic structure of scientiic
knowledge. David Turnbull, for example, has described
how in the absence of knowledge about structural
mechanics the use of proportionality in medieval times
enabled the construction of imposing and majestic Gothic
cathedrals such as Chartres. According to Turnbull,
In the absence of rules for construction derived
from structural laws problems could be resolved by
practical geometry, using compasses, a straightedge, ruler, and string. The kind of structural
knowledge which was passed on from master to
apprentice related sizes to spaces and heights by
ratios, such as half the number of feet in a span
expressed in inches plus one inch will give the
depth of a hardwood joist…. This sort of geometry is
extremely powerful; it enables the transportation
and transmission of structural experience, makes
possible the successful replication of a speciic
arrangement in diferent places and diferent
circumstances, reduces a wide variety of problems
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
to a comparatively compact series of solutions, and
allows for a lexible rather than rigid rule-bound
response to difering problems.... Essentially it
enables a dimensionless analysis precluding the
need for a common measure. Geometrical
techniques in this case provide a powerful mode of
communication
that
dissolve
problems
of
incommensurability that the use of individual
measurement systems might otherwise have.
(Turnbull 2000: 69)
Turnbull is interested in the constitution of what he
calls ‘knowledge spaces’. These are the ‘kinds of spaces
that we construct in the process of assembling,
standardising, transmitting and utilising knowledge’
(Turnbull 2000: 12). Western science is in this respect no
diferent from other knowledge systems, such as
indigenous or amateur knowledge systems. What
distinguishes the epistemic robustness of technoscience,
rather, is its development of a corpus of techniques and
protocols that enable knowledge to move and travel
beyond localised sites of production. The further
knowledge can travel, the more coherent and robust its
epistemic make-up. This is why for Turnbull one can
imagine the architectural site of a cathedral in no
diferent terms from those of a laboratory (Turnbull
2000: 66-67). All that it takes is identifying an analogical
‘scalar’ denominator: something that can operate the
changes in scale required for knowledge to cohere and
travel. For Turnbull, in the context of medieval cathedral
building this task was performed by the ‘template’:
Three major ‘reversals of forces’ are achieved with
this one small piece of representational technology;
one person can get large numbers of others to work
in concert; large numbers of stones can be erected
without the beneit of a fully articulated theory of
structural mechanics or a detailed plan; and
incommensurable pieces of work can be made
accumulative (Turnbull 2000: 68).
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
Turnbull’s focus on proportionality as a tool for sensemaking provides a vivid example of the terms through
which knowledge is said to ‘grow’ as an epistemic object.
The work of proportionality sufuses knowledge with an
ontological structure. In Turnbull’s account this is
actually so in two senses. On the one hand,
proportionality is what masons used to calculate the it
between spaces and heights. The proportion is the
vehicle for lending the world a certain height, length and
width. But the imagery of proportionality is also what
underpins Turnbull’s very own analytical explanations.
Thus, in an echo of the Galilean epigram that heads this
paper – ‘the most admirable operations derive from very
weak means’ –, Turnbull writes of how the use of the
template by masons enabled ‘one person… [to] get large
numbers of others to work in concert’. This is a truly
Archimedean metaphor, where a sociological efect is
made visible by imagining agency as a leverage of sorts.
Architectural optics of volumes
The
movements
in
size,
the
dynamics
of
aggrandizement and miniaturisation that Turnbull
describes as characteristic of the epistemic work of
science, are nowhere rendered in so vivid a style as in
Bruno Latour’s historical ethnography of Pasteur’s
microbiology. According to Latour, amongst Pasteur’s
greatest achievements is his translation of the interests
that nineteenth century farmers and veterinarians had in
the anthrax bacillus into the discourse and practices of
bacteriologists. This Pasteur accomplishes by becoming
himself a ‘microbe farmer’: by removing a cultivated
bacillus from the ‘outside’ real world of farming and
veterinary science and isolating and culturing it ‘inside’ a
sanitised laboratory space. Whereas in the former the
‘anthrax bacilli are mixed with millions of other
organisms’ and therefore practically invisible to the
scientiic gaze, in the latter ‘it is freed from all
competitors and so grows exponentially’, ‘growing so
much’ that it ‘ends up… in such large colonies that a
clear-cut pattern is made visible to the watchful eye of
the
scientist.’
(Latour
1983:
146)
The
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
inside:outside::visible:invisible equation creates and
enables diferent zones of empowerment and agency for
diferent actors. Thus,
the asymmetry in the scale of several phenomena is
modiied: a micro-organism can kill vastly larger
cattle, one small laboratory can learn more about
pure anthrax cultures than anyone before; the
invisible micro-organism is made visible; the until
now interesting scientists in his lab can talk with
more authority about the anthrax bacillus than
veterinarians ever have before. (Latour 1983: 146)
Translation works therefore as a sort of rebalancing
mechanism, where Pasteur stands as fulcrum: the messy
and cloudy world of outside farming and veterinary
diseases is funnelled through the inside of Pasteur’s
laboratory to crystallise and make visible a new balance
of powers. Pasteur’s laboratory becomes a lever for a
new distribution of power. In Latour’s succinct
formulation:
The change of scale makes possible a reversal of the
actors’ strengths; ‘outside’ animals, farmers and
veterinarians were weaker than the invisible
anthrax bacillus; inside Pasteur’s lab, man becomes
stronger than the bacillus, and as a corollary, the
scientist in his lab gets the edge over the local,
devoted, experienced veterinarian. (Latour 1983:
147)
In these and other accounts Latour uses the imagery
of scale to produce sociological explanations. He sizes
objects and agencies up and down vis-à-vis each other to
make certain sociological efects visible. A similar
appraisal of the Latourian project has been ofered by
Simon Schafer, who has remarked on the extent to which
‘The model of the lever plays a fundamental role
oeuvre:
scientists
achieve
throughout
Latour’s
astonishing reversals of force by rendering lab objects
commensurable with the forces of the world, then
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
manipulating the former to shift the latter.’ Schafer
notes how in his descriptions Latour chooses an
‘Archimedean point’ around which he then proceeds to
efect an ‘inversion of scale’ letting certain beings
(human or nonhuman) ‘move forces apparently more
powerful than’ them (Schafer 1991: 184).
Latour is certainly aware of the choice of imagery
through which he leshes-out his epistemology. Of his
Pasteur article, ‘Give me a laboratory and I will raise the
world’, he writes that ‘I used in the title a parody of
Archimedes’s famous motto’ because ‘[t]his metaphor of
the lever to move something else is much more in
keeping with observation than any dichotomy between a
science and a society.’ (Latour 1983: 154) His point, quite
rightly, is that the reception and endorsement of
Pasteur’s scientiic advances by French society cannot be
explained by a simple dichotomic framework of ScienceSociety encounters. Rather, one needs to attend to the
diferent strategies and practices through which a variety
of partisan interests are recruited and converted into
laboratory skills and techniques, and vice versa, the way
in which the laboratory and its infrastructural equipment
gets deployed and travel outside the laboratory walls
sensu stricto. In other words, the way in which Pasteur
becomes a farmer and farmers becomes Pasteurians.
Notwithstanding this declaration of epistemological
self-awareness, what remains intriguing is the long
lineage of proportional epistemologies to which this style
of sociological reasoning and argumentation belongs. In
We have never been modern Latour comments on the
Hobbes-Boyle controversy by observing how Hobbes
insisted on denying what was ‘to become the essential
characteristic of modern power: the change in scale and
the displacements that are presupposed by laboratory
work.’ (Latour 1993: 22) For Latour, the laboratory
performs for modernity the role of a ‘theatre of
measurement’ or instrument for size-making, and indeed
it is the self-explicitation of size that in his own work
becomes his analytic trademark. His sociology fares as a
sociology of size, or rather of the luctuations of size.
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
The term ‘theatre of measurement’ is Michel Serres’
(1982). It is used by Serres to describe ‘the scene of
representation established for Western thought [by
ancient Greeks] for the next millennium.’ It marks the
‘instauration of the moment of representation’ by
philosophy, an instauration brought about through the
use of ‘a perspectival geometry, of an architectural optics
of volumes’ (Serres 1982: 92). This is a wonderful phrase
that captures much of what I have been dwelling on up to
this point. Serres’ argument builds on the tale of Thales’
measurement of the height of the great pyramid. Thales
accomplishes this feat by placing a post in the sand. As
the sun sets, the triangular shadows cast by the pyramid
and post are then compared. In so doing, Thales invents
thus ‘the notion of a model’ (Serres 1982: 86):
By comparing the shadow of the pyramid with that
of a reference post and his own shadow, Thales
expressed the invariance of similar forms over
changes of scale. His theorem therefore consists of
the ininite progression or reduction of size while
preserving the same ratio. From the colossal, the
pyramid, to the small, a post or body, decreasing in
size ad ininitum, the theorem states a logos or
identical relation, the invariance of the same form,
be it on a giant or a small scale, and vice versa.
Height and strength are suddenly scorned,
smallness demands respect, all scales and
hierarchies are demolished, now derisory since
each step repeats the same logos or relation
without any changes! (Serres 1995: 78)
Steven Brown, who has commented on the originality
of Serres’ oeuvre for social theory at large, glosses
Serres’ analysis thus:
Here truly is the ‘Greek miracle’ – one man
dominates a mighty pyramid. In this ‘theatre of
measurement’ invented through the simple act of
placing a peg in the sand, it is as though everything
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
changed place. The weak human overcomes ancient
hewn stone, the mobile sun produces immobile
geometric forms… There is an interaction or
communication between two diverse partners
(Thales, Pyramid) which involves a switching or
exchanging
of
properties
(weak/strong,
mortal/durable). (Brown 2005: 220)
We are back, then, to the Archimedean image of the
leverage. The world’s intelligibility holds itself together
through an image of ontological balance. Whatever the
world turns out to be – however and wherever we locate
its sources of agency – this will always ‘net-out’ as an
exchange of equations: weak/strong, mortal/durable,
cathedral/template, gigantic/ininitesimal, etc. The use of
a proportional imagination allows social theory to net-out
its descriptive projects in ontological fashion. 7
Proportions in perspective
Of course, in some sense, the importance of
proportionality for architectural, and indeed socio-spatial
relection at large, has always been a matter of
perspective – of optics. The origins of perspective in the
ifteenth century have long been traced back to the
renaissance of classical proportionality. As Martin Jay has
observed, ‘Growing out of the late medieval fascination
with the metaphysical implications of light - light as
divine lux rather than perceived lumen - linear
perspective came to symbolize a harmony between the
mathematical regularities in optics and God’s will.’
Pictorial and aesthetic preoccupations shifted from a
religious interest in objects to ‘the spatial relations of the
perspectival canvas themselves. This new concept of
space was geometrically isotropic, rectilinear, abstract,
and uniform.’ (Jay 1988: 5-6) Thus, famously, for Erwin
Panofsky Renaissance perspective realised relexivity as
a spatial gaze (Panofsky 1993 [1927]). The diference
between classical and renaissance perspective is one in
the mode of occupying space and imagining spatial
relations. In the Renaissance, the perspective marks a
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
mode of taking the world in by looking through it. This is
diferent from the classical disposition of bodies in space,
which remains anchored in the physical mimesis of
experience and bodily movement (Iversen 2005). We may
say that
Renaissance
perspectivalism
introduces
epistemological gradients to the way we look at the
world: perspective does not drive us to a singular
epistemological residence. There are diferences between
‘looking at’ and ‘looking through’ something; the
movement of the gaze through space – the achievement
of depth and the skewing of vision through of-centred
displacements – generates diferent sorts of friction. In
this context, rather than, or beyond its comprehension as
a geometrical or symbolic form, the way Panofsky did,
perspectivalism may be seen instead as a ‘general
capacity for producing efects’ (Damisch 1997 [1987]: 41,
my translation).
What kind of efects are those the deployment of
perspective produces? Very early on in the theorisation of
perspectivalism, Renaissance writers already described
Brunelleschi’s architectural use of perspective (for it is
Brunelleschi who is widely acknowledged for discovering
the technique of perspectivalism), for its very special
efects on making objects diminish in size. Hubert
Damisch cites Antonio Filarete’s famous Trattato di
archittettura, where the use by Brunelleschi of a mirror
to help frame the lineaments of whatever the architect
needs to represent is praised for ‘making easily
observable the contours of those things closer to the eye,
whilst those that are farthest away will diminish
proportionately in size.’ (cited in Damisch 1997 [1987]:
68) The observation is common: Antonio di Tucci
Manetti, an early biographer of Brunelleschi, likewise
describes perspective as a ‘science which requires to
determine well and with reason the diminutions and
augmentations… of things close and afar’ (cited in
Damisch 1997 [1987]: 70-71). An acknowledged novelty
of perspectivalism, then, seems to lie in the cultural
salience lend to the technical capacity for making
variations in size visible . Moreover, size becomes an
efect of scoping: a consequence of zooming-in and out of
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
representation. A spectator can enter a picture’s plane so
long as she can keep certain proportions in place. The
world inside the painting is therefore made to appear
geometrically co-extensive with the world outside. An
ontological continuity between pictorial and world space
is obtained through the friction and play entailed in
making things big and small.
In its original formulation, the question of perspective
raised yet another cultural complex with epistemological
signiicance, namely, the problem of relexive distance.
The experiment or demonstrations for which Brunelleschi
is regarded as the discoverer of perspective involved two
paintings of the Baptistery of St. John and the Palazzo de’
Signori, both long lost. The only eye-witness account
describes the Baptistery painting as being executed on a
small
wooden
panel.
Once
the
painting
was
accomplished, Brunelleschi drilled a small hole in the
panel at the point which would represent his equivalent
viewpoint on the Baptistery’s plane (the vanishing point).
He then invited spectators to peer through the hole from
the back of the panel at a mirror held in front to relect
the painting. (In passing, let me draw attention to the
emphasis that Filerete’s account of the drawing places in
how it is the sharp use of ‘one eye’ that will best bring to
life the full power of the perspectival illusion (Damisch
1997 [1987]: 69).) It remains uncertain whether
Brunelleschi realised he needed to control the viewing
distance for spectators to replicate his original point of
view on the Baptistery (Damisch 1997 [1987]: 98; Kemp
1990: 13, 344-345). What Brunelleschi’s experiment did
accomplish, however, was to throw into relief the
signiicance of distance as an epistemological igure.
There is a proper distance between our holding the world
in view and the world’s presentation or disclosure of its
forms. A subtle shift is introduced: between the point of
view on the world and the relational variance through
which the view obtains.
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
Anamorphosis
The
relation
between
perspectivalism
and
proportionality assumed a number of forms from the
ifteenth to the seventeenth century. 8 In keeping with the
optical trope, Martin Jay has identiied at least three
scopic regimes of modernity: Cartesian perspectivalism,
of the symbolic kind analysed by Panofsky; the so-called
art of describing, where the viewer is drawn to the
surface or material qualities of objects and not their
relational disposition in space; and, inally, baroque or
anamorphic modernity (Jay 1988). It is with the latter
that I am concerned here.
Anamorphic illusionism deployed the epistemological
power of relational variance to its full. Anamorphic
projections of objects are distorted such that it takes the
use of a special device or manoeuvre to have the object
restored to its original form. Remember the Leviathan
and Nicéron’s dioptric device. Sometimes it is the use of
a special kind of lens that does the trick of
reconiguration; sometimes the observer is required to
skew her vision, for example, by approaching the picture
at a particular angle. As Lacan famously argued, vision is
here confronted with a blind spot of conscious perception
(Lacan 1979). The object stares back from a point of view
that remains oblique to us. In the Brunelleschian
demonstration, what is excluded is the other eye: the eye
that does not look through the peephole and yet which is
relected back from the vanishing point. This one-eyed
optics is intriguingly reminiscent of Hooke’s microscopic
vision, where one eye holds the scale of the miniature in
view whilst the other is focused on the scale of
representation. It further echoes the ‘seeing double’ at
play in the Leviathan’s optics. An eye is constructed that
is therefore simultaneously internal and external to
vision.9 The eye becomes the optical metaphor through
which the body is made visible as a conduit of
dis/proportional relations: the bodies of the architect, the
micrographer and the perspectival illusionist holding the
world to account by virtue of a ‘double vision’. Double
vision foregrounds thus the body as a igure of scale
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
between the natural and the social worlds. In Margaret
Iversen’s formulation, ‘The real in the scopic ield is
formed when the eye splits itself of from its original
immersion in visibility and the gaze as objet petit a [as
unattainable object of desire] is expelled.’ (Iversen 2005:
201) A split eye that signals in turn the birth of the
Baroque as an aesthetic of the uncanny: an aesthetic
‘which consisted in making something visible, in being a
pure apparition that made appearance appear, from a
position just on its edges’ – and which citing Paul Klee,
Christine Buci-Glucksmann describes as ‘to see with one
eye and consciously perceive with the other’ (BuciGlucksmann 1994 [1984]: 60).
Under the scopic regime of the anamorphic, then, the
illusions of knowledge undergo a transformation from a
concern with proportionality to an obsession with
reversibility – with the illusions of double vision – the eye
that sees inside/outside itself. It is indeed in these terms
that Deleuze described too the anamorphic as the
condition of possibility of the Baroque age – and by
extension of our neo-Baroque contemporary. In his
lectures on Leibniz about the rise of perspectivalism in
the development of projective geometry Deleuze asks,
recalling Leibniz’s thought, ‘What produces a point of
view?’, to which he answers, ‘That regional proportion of
the world that is clearly and distinctively expressed by an
individual in relation to the totality of the world that is
expressed confusingly and obscurely.’ (Deleuze 2006
[1980/1986/1987]: 37, emphasis added, my translation)
However, in his book on the expressiveness of Baroque
thought as a philosophy of curvature and sensuous
shadows, which represents Deleuze’s mature relections
on Leibniz (Deleuze 1993), this very same thought is
rendered somewhat diferently: ‘every point of view’,
writes Deleuze there, ‘is a point of view on variation. The
point of view is not what varies with the subject… it is, to
the contrary, the condition in which an eventual subject
apprehends a variation (metamorphosis), or: something
= x (anamorphosis).’ (Deleuze 1993: 20)
What is at stake in the holding of the world as an
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
ontological ininitude of variance, Deleuze realizes in
editing his lecture notes on Leibniz for publication, is not
the movement of proportional changes through which the
world transforms itself, but the condition of variance
itself: ‘The ininite presence in the inite self is exactly
the position of Baroque equilibrium or disequilibrium.’
(Deleuze 1993: 89) What is of interest to Baroque
thought, therefore, is no longer the proportions through
which the world holds itself together, but the distortions
and disproportions (the shadows) that call for its
deformation (anamorphosis). 10 It is the anamorphic, the
politics of the gigantic and the exaggerated – of variance
as a sense of amplitude, expansion and/ or subsequent
contraction – that characterises and is worthy of
commentary in modernist thought. The anamorphic
becomes the distinguishing characteristic of modern
society.
The economy of knowledge
Let me change registers for a moment and turn to the
knowledge economy.
Much has been written about it so I will be very
selective today on the aspects I want to focus on. My
concern is the relatively recent discourse on knowledge
as a social product. It is the explicitly ‘social’ dimension
of knowledge that I am interested in here.
Prompted by recent developments in intellectual
property law, legal theorists and information and
knowledge economists have turned to the Internet for
understanding the emergence of new distributed and
collaborative platforms
for
the production and
consumption of online media. There is a sense in which
the velocity of distribution, circulation, modiication and
consumption of new media by an expansive community of
users imprints the nature of such an exchange economy
with a distinctive ‘social’ dimension (Benkler 2006;
Lessig 2008). The social is here identiied with a sense of
expansion, velocity and online presence. This is a
relational economy of knowledge where the social is the
outcome of people being partners in the exchange of
knowledge for one another. We may push the analogy by
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
saying that if there is no knowledge and no exchange,
then, in this economy, there is no sociality – or at least no
productive sociality (Shirky 2008). It appears that
knowledge, economy and the social are therefore
conceptualised as some kind of substitutes for one
another. Karin Knorr-Cetina and Alex Preda have
described this allegedly mutual transparency of
knowledge, economy and the social to each other as
being founded on (again using an optical metaphor) a
‘specular epistemology’ (Knorr-Cetina & Preda 2001: 34).
The work that the specular performs here reminds us of
Emmons’
rendition
of
CAD-enabled
full
scale
architectural drawing, where a computer-generated
object is presumed to map transparently, one-to-one, to
the future ediice. Architects work with the model as if it
was the real building. Thus, both the specular and the ‘as
if’ function seem to operate with an underlying principle
of substitution which regardless of the changes in scale
does not neutralize the importance of size. The computergenerated building is scale-free but it is sizeable
nonetheless; as Michel Serres said of Thales’
accomplishment, it ‘expresses the invariance of similar
forms over changes of scale.’ (Serres 1995: 78) Social
theory and philosophy thus no longer need scale to
deliver impressions of size. We could say that the
substitution has efected a sort of proportional
equivalence that allows one to stop thinking of size in
terms of scale but which retains a sense of
dimensionality. In the context of the new economy of
knowledge, this is patently obvious: knowledge has a size
because the economy has a size and because society,
naturally, has a size too!
Such specular epistemology points to a second
characteristic of those approaches to knowledge that
take for granted its sociological condition, as if
knowledge were indeed a sociological object per se.
Knorr-Cetina distinguishes between ‘interiorized’ and
‘exteriorized’ theories of knowledge. The former focuses
on knowledge as something to be wrought and struggled
with, sometimes with care, often with efects that are
distressing, maybe even painful. Knowledge is something
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
that is put together through time and whose permanency
and stability is often transitory and contingent.
Exteriorized theories of knowledge, on the other hand,
see knowledge as a ready-made object upon which other
forces exert their pressure. Knowledge is here imagined
as an object of sorts, a commodity or resource to be
transacted, stored, managed or appropriated in diferent
ways. The idea that knowledge can be put to work
alongside other objects of political economy, such as
governance, interdisciplinarity or user-centred designs,
partakes of the specular epistemology described above,
because insofar as knowledge is treated as a selfcontained object it can sit comfortably next to other
political objects. ‘Knowledge’ and ‘governance’, for
example, are specular to each other because arguments
can be made about one as if refracted or optically
accommodated through the other. They function as
proportionate forms for each other.
If exteriorized theories of knowledge treat knowledge
as an ‘unspeciied ‘it’’, ready to be grasped and deployed
in policy circles, interiorized theories, on the other hand,
bring ‘into focus knowledge itself, breaking open and
specifying the processes that make up the ‘it’’. (KnorrCetina & Preda 2001: 30) In her study of the cultures of
contemporary
science
(molecular
biologists
and
physicists), Knorr-Cetina has unpacked some the
processes that interiorize knowledge as an epistemic
form (Knorr-Cetina 1999). Her focus is what laboratory
work does to scientiic knowledge: the reconiguration of
objects and human relationships that take place in
laboratory settings. According to Knorr-Cetina, what
laboratory work accomplishes in essence is the
adaptation and reconiguration of natural processes and
objects to suit the spatio-temporal requirements of
scientists. In a laboratory a scientist can resist the
natural tendencies and properties of an object in at least
three ways: (i) she ‘does not need to put up with an
object as it is, it can substitute transformed and partial
versions’; (ii) she ‘does not need to accommodate the
natural object where it is, anchored in a natural
environment’, and; (iii) she does not need to
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
‘accommodate an event when it happens’; she can
‘dispense with natural cycles of occurrence and make
events happen frequently enough for continuous study.’
(Knorr-Cetina 1999: 27) Under such conditions
Laboratories recast objects of investigation by
inserting them into new temporal and territorial
regimes. They play upon these objects’ natural
rhythms and developmental possibilities, bring
them together in new numbers, renegotiate their
sizes, and redeine their internal makeup … In short,
they create new conigurations of objects that they
match with an appropriately altered social order.
(Knorr-Cetina 1999: 43-44, emphasis added)
The image of re-combinatorial and re-conigurating
processes draws of course on a familiar genealogy in
science and technology studies. The ‘partial versions’
that are substituted for natural objects in laboratory
experiments echo for example the ‘partial connections’
that relate diference in Donna Haraway’s famous cyborg
assemblages (Haraway 1986: 37). Manipulating a
laboratory object’s internal rhythms and developmental
possibilities is not unlike what a cyborg’s prosthetic
extensions realize by way of supplementary or
accelerated capacities. The experimental and the cyborg
both operate as scale-shifting devices: they bring about
enhancements that are of a diferent order of magnitude
to their original state. ‘The one component is of diferent
order from the other, and is not created by what creates
that other. They are not built to one another’s scale.’
(Strathern 2004 [1991]: 39) They both create extensions
beyond a 1:1 equivalence. Importantly, as Strathern
points out, such enhanced capacities work because the
partial versions ‘are neither proportionate to nor
disproportionate from one another.’ (Strathern 2004
[1991]: 36) There is a displacement, an extra-efect, that
echoing Deleuze we might describe as a ‘variation
(metamorphosis), or: something = x (anamorphosis).’
There is also central place warranted to bodies in
cyborg politics. In
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
a cyborg world… people are not afraid of their joint
kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of
permanently partial identities and contradictory
standpoints. The political struggle is to see from
both perspectives at once because each reveals
both dominations and possibilities unimaginable
from the other vantage point. Single vision
produces worse illusions than double vision or
many-headed monsters.’ (Haraway 1990: 196,
emphases added)
The architect, the micrographer, the illusionist, the
microbiologist… and the cyborg. The eye becomes the
optical metaphor through which the body is made visible
as a conduit of dis/proportional conigurations. Double
vision foregrounds the political body as a igure of scale
of natural and social relations.
Conclusion
If I may sum up my argument to this point, I have tried
to elucidate the terms of a proportional analytic
underpinning in profound ways modernist social theory
and philosophy. This is characterised by the work of scale
and size as modes of explicitation of knowledge. The
point is worth underscoring: it is not that knowledge
takes a size (which in a very crass sense it certainly does)
but that it becomes self-explicitated as an epistemic
object in terms of size and scale, and in particular
through
movements
of
aggrandizement
and/or
miniaturisation. The epistemic productivity of knowledge
appears in this context as being premised on an analytic
of what may be described as a play of scopic
deformations. The igure of anamorph, I have suggested,
may work as both an epistemic and political imago for
these kind of efects.
The anamorphic provides us also with an interesting
commentary on anti- or non-modernist social theory, or in
the words of Martin Jay, with the point of view aforded
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
by a scopic regime that operates at the margins of
modernity, within the vicinity of its material wreckages. 11
A point of view, then, apprehended as such from its own
displaced remainders. Anamorphism is what modernity
looks like when residual vision (the other eye) pushes its
discarded bodies centre stage. When the object, that is,
stares back. In this sense, if there is a form of aesthetic
elicitation that takes the point of view of the non-modern
for granted (including non-human persons and objects),
that would certainly be the anamorphic. We may
therefore say that the anamorphic is the analytics that
elicits ‘perspectivism’ itself as an analytic; the analytic
that allows an object-centred epistemology to come into
view.
In a beautiful image, Michel Serres has described
Thales inauguration, his emplacement of the peg in the
sand, as ‘a strange thing full of water’: the creation of a
‘logos-proportion’ capable of providing accounts of
‘objects whose appearance and birth are independent of
us and which develop by themselves in relation to other
objects of the world’: things that are born from air, ire or
water, and that do not attend to the laws or rules of kings
or gods. The Nile loods to which Thales was a witness
washed away the ields’ crops and his ‘proportion’ came
to the rescue of, indeed, a strange world full of water: a
world which demanded a new logos to measure the land,
re-establish
the
cadastral
register,
net-out
the
outstanding balances between creditors and debtors
(Serres 1995: 122).
Today the proportion has dried-up the world again. In
their examination of the status and place of atlases in the
history of objectivity (and the wider history of
epistemology), Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have
searched for a type of explanation that is ‘on the same
scale and of the same nature as the explanandum itself.’
In their own words,
If training a telescope onto large, remote causes
fails to satisfy, what about the opposite approach,
scrutinizing
small,
local
causes
under
an
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
explanatory microscope? The problem here is the
mismatch between the heft of explanandum and
explanans, rather than the distance between them:
in their rich speciicity, local causes can obscure
rather than clarify the kind of wide-ranging efect
that is our subject here… Looking at microcontexts
tells us a great deal – but it can also occlude, like
viewing an image pixel by pixel. The very language
of cause and efect dictates separate and
heterogeneous terms: cause and efect must be
clearly distinguished from each other, both as
entities and in time. Perhaps this is why the
metaphors of the telescope and the microscope lie
close to hand. Both are instruments for bringing the
remote and inaccessible closer. But relationships of
cause and efect do not exhaust explanation.
Understanding can be broadened and deepened by
exposing other kinds of previously unsuspected
links among the phenomena in question, such as
patterns that connect scattered elements into a
coherent whole. (Daston & Galison 2007: 36)
Although they surreptitiously subscribe to the
language of scale and the playful operations of scopic
deformations, the call to attend the problems of ‘The
mismatch between the heft of explanandum and
explanans’, as they put it, is of course a call to redescribe the weights that inhere in the forms of the
explainer and the explained; in other words, a call to
creatively re-imagine the dis/proportions that exist in the
languages of social-scientiic explanation. We need, they
are suggesting, forms of explanation that escape our
proportional imagination. It is about time a lood washed
ashore a new strange thing full of water.
Notes
1. On the importance of visualisations for the history of
science, see Wise (2006)
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
2. On materialized epistemologies see, for example, Pamela
Smith’s work on ‘artisanal epistemologies’ (2004) and Peter
Galison on the ‘epistemic machinery’ of elementary particle
physics (1997).
3. The praxicology of the anamorphic recalls Don Ihde’s
description of the camera obscura as an ‘epistemological
engine’, involved in the Renaissance coniguration of
knowledge as something instrumentally generated. For
Ihde, the camera obscura operates two optical
transformations with epistemic efects:
The irst is one of escalation — from Alhazen's
observation of an optical efect; to da Vinci's camera as
analogue for the eye; to Locke’s and Descartes’
analogue of camera to eye to mind — by which the
camera is made into a full epistemology engine. The
second is the inward progression of the location where
‘external’ reality, itself an artefact of the geometry of
the imaging phenomenon, interfaces with the ‘inner’
representation. For da Vinci, the interface of
external/internal occurs “in the pupil”; for Descartes, it
is the retina; and, still continuing the camera
epistemology, contemporary neuroscience locates it in
the brain. (Ihde 2000)
What Ihde calls ‘escalation’ describes the kind of relation of
magnitude that I have called proportionality. The movement
between internal and external domains corresponds to my
use of the term reversibility.
4. I should add that an interest in the laboratory runs through
the essay as a possible topos of our contemporary
anamorphism.
5. The disputation is reminiscent of the ‘relation of a child
which remained twenty six years in the mothers belly’
which Monsieur Bayle published in the Philosophical
Transactions in 1677 (cited in Daston & Galison 2007: 68)
and which exempliies the general fascination with the
anomalous and the disproportionate that inlects the
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ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ
Enlightenment’s epistemic way of life. Size igures thus as a
contemporary epistemic quality.
6. Phillipe Boudon makes a distinction between architecture
and architecturology (the study of architecture as a
conceptual practice). According to Boudon, architecture
confronts scale not as a given but as an epistemological
‘shift’: architects encounter scale and proportionality as
something to work with rather than upon (Boudon 1999).
Scale is something that one does to a project, rather than a
geometric or physical constraint; it is a ‘mode of shifting’
one’s conceptual take on an architectural challenge
(Boudon 1999: 10). Thus, the criteria employed to relocate
the giant red escalator in Yaneva’s account above, would
fare as one such ‘mode of shifting’. It would provide an
answer to the question, ‘how does the architect give
measurement to space?’, which is, for Boudon, the
architecturological question par excellence (Boudon 1999:
15).
7. The netting-out of ontology accomplishes purity of form: the
birth of logos or reason as pure relationality. Thus, Serres
observes how
Thales demonstrates the extraordinary weakness of the
heaviest material ever worked, as well as the
omnipotence, in relation to the passing of time, of a
certain logical structure: of the logos itself as long as
we redeine it, no longer as a word or statement, but, by
lightening it, as an equal relation; even softer because
the terms balance each other, obliterate each other so
that all that remains is their pure and simple relation.
(Serres 1995: 78, emphasis added)
The ontological robustness of logic, then, appears in this
context as the result of a proportional equation.
Proportionality is prior to relationality. The world endures
as an intelligible object for as long as we can provide some
kind of proportionate account of it.
This proposition sets the place of ‘measurement’ in reason
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HOW KNOWLEDGE GROWS
in a new perspective. Andrew Barry, for example, has
brought attention to the central role of the history of
measurement in mediating and coniguring the relationship
between science and political economy (Barry 1993). For
Barry, the instrumentation of measurement has been key to
generating political metrologies: ‘measurement and other
forms of scientiic representation have been deployed in the
regulation of social and economic relations over large
‘geographical’ areas of space.’ (Barry 1993: 464) In his
account this is a relatively recent historical phenomenon, in
that ‘If measurement has become a central resource for the
regulation of space, it has only been so to a great degree
since the mid-nineteenth century - the period in which
science has become articulated with the moral, political and
economic objectives of imperialism; and more recently with
those of transnational industry and government.’ (Barry
1993: 467) My suggestion here, however, is that
measurement has been integral to how all forms of
epistemic knowledge have conceptualised themselves in the
modern age. (Note that Serres’ account is of course a
modern account.) Measurement, or what I call
proportionality, is the shape that modern knowledge takes
every time it gets actualised.
8. For example, the relation between perspective and
proportion inlected the manufacture of objectivity in
scientiic practice too. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison
have commented on the case of Bernhard Siegfried Albinus,
professor of anatomy at Leiden, who produced ‘several of
the most inluential eighteenth-century anatomical atlases’
(Daston & Galison 2007: 70). In their words,
worried lest the artist [who drew the illustrations under
Albinus’ guidance] err in the proportions, Albinus
erected an elaborate double grid, one mesh at four
Rhenish feet from the skeleton and the other at forty,
the positioned the artist at precisely the point where the
struts of the grids coincided to the eye, drawing the
specimen square by square, onto a plate Albinus had
ruled with a matching pattern of “cross and straight
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[sic] lines.” This procedure, suggested by Albinus’s
Leiden colleague, the natural philosopher Willem ’s
Gravesande, is strongly reminiscent of the Renaissance
artist Leon Battista Alberti’s instructions for drawing in
perspective (Daston & Galison 2007: 73).
9. David Topper has argued against what he calls the
‘postmodern’ use of anamorphosis for sustaining
subjectivist or relativist epistemological positions (Topper
2000). In his rendering, a postmodern account of
anamorphosis would emphasize the either/or version of an
image: either you see the twelve sultans or you see Louis
XIII. Instead, he makes a cognitive argument about the dual
nature of visual perception. With James J. Gibson, he
suggests that human perception can hold the ‘concurrent
speciication of two reciprocal things’ or ‘in-between
perceiving’ (Topper 2000: 118, 116). A classic example is
our holding together in one integrated vision the lat-depth
distinction between a painting’s surface and the surfaces of
the objects represented inside the painting (Topper 2000:
117). Notwithstanding the fact that some anamorphs are so
distorted that their viewing for the irst time will require a
wholesale surrendering of ‘concurrent’ perception, I think
his argument about ‘in-betweenness’ is nonetheless part
and parcel of the historical analytic of reversibility: the
mode of knowledge that can hold simultaneously internal
and external expressions of itself.
10. The place of the uncanny in thus intuited in the work of
optics. Andrea Battistini recalls in this respect an early
observation of Emanuele Tesauro, who ‘marked the
maximum wit of the optical emblems, “which, for certain
proportions of perspective, through strange and ingenious
appearances, make you see things that you do not see.”’
(Battistini 2006: 19, emphasis added)
11. Hence the baroque’s obsession with still life and material
carcass.
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264
Chapter 10
LANCE ARMSTRONG:
THE REALITY SHOW (A CULTURAL ANALYSIS)
Lee Drummond
Seven successive Tour de France victories, anointed four
times as Sportsman of the Year by the United States
Olympic Committee, countless other awards, a mound of
books, magazine exposés, and newspaper articles
accusing and defending Lance Armstrong of wrongdoing,
a small army of lawyers launching suits and countersuits, multimillion-dollar endorsement deals, and it all
came crashing down around him that fateful day in
January 2013 when he walked out and took his seat on
the set of the most sacred shrine of the American
conscience: The Oprah Winfrey Show.
The show is America’s Confessional, and Oprah the
Grand Inquisitor. In front of millions, under the blazing
studio lights, she can extract confessions of sins
concealed for years by the most distinguished among us.
From best-selling authors of bogus books to repentant
celebrities, Oprah has them in tears, telling all between
car-giveaways and painkiller commercials. The CIA could
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LEE DRUMMOND
have saved all the expense and bad press over its secret
prisons and waterboarding – just trundle Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed out on stage and Oprah would have had him
singing like a canary in time for top-of-the-hour cable
news.
And what about the audience for Lance’s confession,
those couch potato voyeurs who experience life as a
bizarre combination of talk shows, reality TV, cable news
breaking stories, sitcoms, and HBO/Showtime movies,
that is to say, what about us – the great American public?
With her dramatic unveiling of Lance’s charade, Oprah
bestowed the ultimate gift on that audience, better even
than those fabled car-giveaways. For a few brief
moments, before we had to return to our troubled,
occluded lives, she allowed us to experience a true, pure
feeling, hot as a poker, bright as a laser: the righteous
indignation that wells up inside the American breast
when we encounter a fundamental betrayal of trust, a
scam far worse than Bernie Madof’s (who merely stole
from the rich), a con that subverts the balance of the way
things are and are supposed to be. Lance was our
ultimate athlete-hero, and in many ways our ultimate
American Hero of recent times, far more impressive and
sponge-worthy than a Super Bowl quarterback (for all the
weeks of hype, really just a lash-in-the-pan, forgotten
until next season), a muscle-bound home-run slugger, or
an unlikely sort-of-black president with a lawyer’s golden
tongue. Day after day, year after year, mile after
torturous mile, Lance wore that yellow jersey, the
leader’s emblem of the Tour de France. And – the
sweetest treat of all – this gaunt, determined young
Texan from the outskirts of Dallas wore it proudly
through throngs of spectators right there in that citadel
of anti- American snobbishness: France.
Lance’s betrayal of the public trust was especially
painful because he was the ultimate underdog, the heroimage we Americans somehow manage to embrace while
riding roughshod over the rest of the world. It was a
modern miracle that he should have been on that bicycle
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seat at all, that he should even have been alive. At
twenty-ive, with his reputation as a top cycling
competitor already established, he was diagnosed with
advanced testicular cancer, a cancer that had already
spread to his brain and lungs. Following surgery and
chemotherapy he was given less than a 50-50 chance to
live. Survival, let alone a return to sports, seemed a
remote possibility. Yet with excellent physicians and an
innovative regimen of chemotherapy, he not only survived
but three years after his surgeries won the irst of his
Tour de France victories. His is a remarkable story,
perhaps the most impressive come-from-behind living
legend of American history. And, cruelest of ironies, all
made possible by that fount of life-giving, life-extending
wonders, the pharmaceutical industry, which was later to
strike him down.
Lance Armstrong was an athletic prodigy, endowed
with remarkable stamina from childhood and, quite
probably, from birth. While still in junior high school he
became attracted to endurance sports – swimming,
running, bicycling – and, seeing a poster for an “Iron Kids
Triathlon,” entered the competition. He won. He was
thirteen years old. Two years later he was ranked irst in
the under-19 category of the U. S. Triathlon. At sixteen,
he became a professional triathlete. In 1988 and 1989,
aged 18 and 19, he held the title of national sprint-course
triathlon champion. Two years later he became a
professional in the world of international cycling
competition, and put together an impressive series of
victories which culminated in his irst Tour de France win
in 1999. The scandal that erupted around him in later
years should not detract from the remarkable gifts of a
truly exceptional human being. Rather, it adds to the
tragedy: that one so gifted should feel he needed an edge
to remain on top.
But . . . It is precisely at this point, when our moral
compass seems ixed on a steady bearing, that it is
necessary to question the basis of our certitude, to
question whether we inhabit a neatly partitioned social
world in which some deeds and people are good, some
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LEE DRUMMOND
evil, and in which we know for a certain fact when
someone – Lance Armstrong in this case – crosses the
line, goes over to the Dark Side. Oprah, with her
enormous audience of other right-thinking Americans,
does not question the premise that good and evil are
clear to all, necessary anchors to secure us in a rapidly
changing, often bewildering world. Nor does anyone in
her parade of penitents appear to question that premise;
they know the secret wrongs they have done and, under
the blazing studio lights and Oprah's doe-eyed gaze,
confess all to the Grand Inquisitor. It is necessary to ask,
in short, whether Lance Armstrong's deeds violated all
that is good and decent in human life or whether, just
possibly, those deeds actually cast their own inquisitorial
light on our basic values. In the very midst of the public
irestorm of outrage, it is necessary to ask whether Lance
is so awfully bad. [Do you perhaps recall the old joke
circulating during the trial of Lyle and Erik Menendez,
two enterprising teenagers who took a drastic shortcut to
their inheritance by doing away with their parents in
their Beverly Hills mansion: “So we shot-gunned Mom
and Dad – was that so awfully bad?”]
When one begins to turn the Inquisition back on itself,
to consider what the Lance Armstrong afair reveals
about our basic values, it is at once apparent that
Americans have quite speciic expectations of their
athletes. By far the most important, and general, of these
is that the star athlete displays his God-given physical
talent: he performs feats of natural prowess before the
stadium throngs, the crowds lining the race course, the
multitudes of those couch potatoes slumped in front of
their giant lat screen HD sets. Not to get too Lévistrauss on a readership that has mostly turned its back
on the master, Americans believe in a fundamental
division between Nature and Culture. And the star
athlete is the embodiment of The Natural (as played by
Robert Redford). His body is his temple, and anything he
does to deile that temple is dealt with harshly by
bureaucratic agencies established to identify any
violation of that ideal. [And by high school football
coaches who forbid beer – and even sex – for their
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Friday-night wonders] Drug tests have become the norm
in professional sports: the football or basketball player
who tests positive for cocaine or other mind-altering
drugs faces suspension. Gone are the days when Mickey
Mantle could walk up to the plate drunk as a skunk and
swing for the bleachers. But far worse than these
debilitating drugs is the use of drugs intended to improve
performance: steroids and blood-doping chemicals of all
sorts are part of a growing pharmacopeia of the Great
Satan of professional athletics, the dreaded and despised
performance-enhancing pharmaceuticals. These evils
subvert the Natural Order of things.
The Lance Armstrong afair has put one little
bureaucracy in particular in the spotlight: the U.S. AntiDoping Agency. Created in 2000 to enforce strictures on
drug use by Olympic athletes, its lab-coated inquisitors
conduct their studies under the Agency's slogan,
"Inspiring True Sport." Examining their goals in some
detail is at least as revealing of American values as
reading those fanciful documents, The Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, drafted by a small
group of wealthy white slave-owners in the lateeighteenth century:
To be the guardian of the values and life lessons
learned through true sport. We hold the public trust
to:
Preserve the Integrity of Competition — we
preserve the value and integrity of athletic
competition through just initiatives that prevent,
deter and detect violations of true sport.
Inspire True Sport — we inspire present and
future generations of U.S. athletes through
initiatives that impart the core principles of true
sport — fair play, respect for one’s competitor and
respect for the fundamental fairness of competition.
Protect the Rights of U.S. Athletes — we protect
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LEE DRUMMOND
the right of U.S. Olympic and Paralympic athletes to
compete healthy and clean — to achieve their own
personal victories as a result of unwavering
commitment and hard work — to be celebrated as
true heroes. (www.usada.org)
“. . . to compete healthy and clean . . .” The selfrighteous obtuseness of the mediocrities who formulated
these goals does justice to Ward Cleaver, that all-knowing
disciplinarian who dispensed his sage advice every week
to keep The Beaver in line.
What is wrong, misled, or, frankly, stupid about the
pretentious goals of the U. S. Anti-Doping Agency? Why
should we not look to them as an admirable statement of
a fundamental morality that all the world, particularly the
world of professional athletics, should embrace?
The principal problem with those goals is that they fail
to recognize that the dichotomy Nature / Culture
embraced by Americans is in fact an elaborate cultural
construct, a contrivance which owes little to the joint
physical and social endowments of a human being. The
crucial fact the lab coats ignore is that there has never
been a “natural” man or woman “to compete healthy and
clean” in anything. Our bodies are the product of some
three million years of an evolutionary process which
mixed – and often mangled – discrete physical abilities,
technical expertise, and social skills. If it possesses any
distinguishing feature at all – and that is quite debatable
– what we choose to call “humanity” is a loose and evershifting assemblage of biology and culture. For a few
technocrats to stroll into this rats nest and begin to
dispense ill-formed opinions in the guise of scientiic
indings is laughable, and terribly sad.
But even if we set aside these big-picture
considerations drawn from paleoanthropology and
cultural anthropology, the antics over at the U. S. AntiDoping Agency appear quite limited in scope. Let us
begin by granting their premise that professional athletes
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LANCE ARMSTRONG
should be required, under penalty of exclusion from their
sport, to refrain from tampering with their “natural”
abilities through “unnatural” performance-enhancing
measures. This proves to be a slippery slope.
For starters, how do the lab coats identify precisely
which chemicals are to be placed on their Index of
forbidden drugs? The American pharmaceutical industry
is a multibillion-dollar enterprise devoted to creating
more and more new drugs (which they tout as being far
more efective than their earlier products, whose patents
soon expire and fall prey to cheap generic replacements).
In tandem with America’s oficial “war on drugs” (and we
all know how well that’s going), the FDA and other
bureaucracies like the Anti-Doping Agency face the
impossible task of keeping up with, let alone regulating
the lood of new drugs hitting the market every year.
Where the general public is concerned (the trodden
masses without its own army of lobbyists in the Gucci
Gulch corridors of Congressional ofice buildings), the
best these agencies can do is require the giant
pharmaceutical corporations to issue disclaimers and
warnings when they showcase their products in
commercial spots on Oprah and the evening news:
“Feeling depressed? Take our new anti-depression pill!
It’ll make you feel great! . . . Well, actually, it may make
you want to kill yourself. But, hey, your doctor will
prescribe it!”
Closely related to the challenge posed by new
pharmaceutical drugs is the burgeoning group of
vitamins, minerals, and other “nutritional supplements”
which, because they are deemed “natural,” fall outside
the purview of the FDA and similar agencies. When
Mother June sent The Beaver down to the corner grocery
store to pick up a few things for supper, her shopping list
didn’t include items such as acai, ginkgo, kava, bilberry,
satvia, or senna. There are thousands of these
substances, whose efects on the human body are known
only vaguely. And when used in their puriied or
processed form and in an enormous variety of
combinations, it is anyone’s guess what their short or
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LEE DRUMMOND
long-term efects may be. Suppose that Lance and other
professional athletes, rather than raiding the medicine
chest, paid a visit to the local herbalist, who gave them a
god-awful tasting brew compounded of berries from the
New Guinea highlands, roots from the Amazonian forest,
leaves from the Manchurian steppe. After a few weeks of
hooking down this stuf, they went out and did amazing
things on the race course or playing ield. Would our little
band of inquisitors at the USADA hastily revise their
regulations and go forth to strip medals, return prize
money, and generally insure that athletes “compete
healthy and clean”? We are a little further down that
slippery slope, and picking up speed (but hopefully
without any “unnatural” lubricants!).
And here’s another curve ball – no shit spit: Suppose
Lance et al decide to frustrate the lab coats who
routinely sample their urine and blood for tell-tale traces
of proscribed substances. Instead, they ind a few
medical technicians of their own, physicians and
therapists at the vanguard of an established and
expanding ield: ultrasound treatment. Long used to
reduce inlammation, relieve osteoarthritis, and promote
post-surgery healing, innovative ultrasound treatment is
found by these pioneers to strengthen muscle growth and
signiicantly improve stamina. A few weeks of regular
treatment have all the performance-enhancing efects of
steroidal and blood-doping chemicals, but without the
unpleasant side efects (you can still get it up!). Natural?
Unnatural? Permissible? Proscribed? If the oficials
decide such treatments confer an unfair advantage, what
will they say about deep-tissue massage? Whirlpool
baths? The slope grows steeper.
On a not altogether whimsical note, we may extend
this inquiry to a quite diferent scenario. Rather than
take a risk with any physical means of improving their
games, suppose that “Slammin” Sammy Sosa, Mark
McGwire, and Barry Bonds discovered a remarkable
sports hypnotist. Under deep hypnosis, they were told
over and over, “You are a very good long-ball hitter. You
will hit many home runs. You may now wake up and head
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LANCE ARMSTRONG
for the ball park. But irst, that will be ive hundred
dollars.” They then proceeded to hit record numbers of
home runs and garner an impressive list of rewards until
the whiskey-bloated lawyers in Congress, inding it
unfashionable to hunt Communists, hauled them in for
forced testimony that forever tarnished their outstanding
careers.
Taken together these examples seriously undermine
the moral certitude exuded by USADA bureaucrats,
Oprah, her vast audience, and the “wrongdoers”
themselves. Still, we are just coming to what is by far the
slipperiest part of our downward rush, as represented by
the equipment and facilities which are integral to athletic
competition. Virtually every athletic event (perhaps
excepting only nekked female mud-wrassling, which has
not yet been designated an Olympic event, tant pis)
involves the use of complex, manufactured artifacts in a
specialized, often fantastically expensive setting such as
the ball park or Olympic stadium. Kevin Costner’s Field
of Dreams is built on a tract of bulldozed urban blight
rather than an Iowa cornield, and only after the city fat
cats have stufed a whopping bond issue down the
throats of the rube citizens.
Even
a
seemingly
simple
mano-a-máquina
arrangement like a man on a bicycle is hedged around by
a host of technical and inancial matters. The bicycle
itself is not two centuries old; before that the particular
combination of physical ability and mental toughness
required to win a Tour de France was likely expended
harvesting crops in a seigniorial manor. Today’s racing
bicycle is a piece of cutting-edge technology, the product
of advanced metallurgy, engineering, and aerodynamic
tests conducted in a wind tunnel. Lance Armstrong’s
bicycle (rather, bicycles since he required a stable of
them for a single Tour de France) was a $10,000 machine
with incredible lightness and tensile strength. That
machine was essential to his victories. Its importance
cannot be overstated. Suppose that somewhere in
Bulgaria, Romania, or Something-or-other-istan there
lives a strapping farm lad with the metabolism of a
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LEE DRUMMOND
Galapagos turtle and a dream of himself in the yellow
jersey leading the pack through the tortuous course of
the Tour. The only bicycles available to him, however,
weigh twenty-ive pounds and have tires that would it a
light truck. Unless some wheeler-dealer promoter spots
the lad and plucks him out of his rural oblivion, he will
grow old picking beets and riding his two-wheeled
clunker around the town square.
Even when an athlete’s equipment is minimal, as, say,
with a Speedo suit worn by an Olympic diver or swimmer
(but not too minimal – none of those scandalous Riviera
codpieces for our Natural Man), the facilities required for
the sport are monumental. Greg Louganis, the Olympic
diving sensation of the 1980s, grew up in southern
California around swimming pools, trampolines, and
diving coaches (he was later to become yet another star
penitent on The Oprah Winfrey Show). The Olympic
diving pool for the ten-meter platform and three-meter
springboard where Louganis launched his remarkable
aerial displays is at least sixteen feet deep, not exactly
Mom and Dad’s backyard above-ground Target special.
Had Greg grown up in Bayou country as one of the
Swamp People, learning how to dive of the dock of
granddaddy’s crawish hole, he is unlikely to have
perfected his signature reverse 2½ pike.
These examples could be compounded endlessly, and
all underscore the crucial fact ignored by the narrowminded lab coats of the USADA that their so-called “true
sport” involves the seamless meshing of physical ability
and technical expertise. It is almost certainly true that
these technocrats are kept too busy compiling lab reports
and giving legal testimony to keep up with the vastly
more interesting scientiic discoveries in the ield of
paleoanthropology. Tool use has long been thought to be
a distinctive feature of the human species: long before
language evolved to anything like its present state early
hominids were feeding and protecting themselves with
the help of stone tools. The human body and nervous
system (including the brain) evolved to promote tool use;
such is our Natural Man. Moreover, it now appears that,
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LANCE ARMSTRONG
contrary to previous anthropology textbook wisdom,
stone tool use actually preceded the appearance of the
entire Homo genus. The earliest stone tool users (and
possibly makers) were not humans at all, but an
australopithecine lineage that lourished over three
million years ago. The most famous member of that
lineage (whose claim to natural-ness might now be
challenged by the USADA!) is Lucy (in the sky with
diamonds). Her conspeciics, Australopithecus afarensis,
were using stone tools to butcher carcasses some halfmillion years before the appearance of the Homo line
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/science/12tools.htm
l). Human evolution was in large part a consequence of
tool use, not the reverse.
***
Hurtling down this slippery slope, we at last plunge
over the edge of a vast precipice (like James Bond in the
adrenaline-pumping opener of The Spy Who Loved Me)
into a dark and bottomless sea. We have encountered and
must now face (sink or swim!) a stunning paradox: An
athlete’s physical body is in fact less natural than the
implements / tools / machines he employs to display his
skill. For the ancestors of those artifacts created his body
millions of years before all the recent hype about
biotechnology engineering a race of cyborgs. The human
body is basically a particular sort of artifact, which we
happen to ind very special (since we inhabit one).
How might this revelation afect our deeply rooted
belief that Nature and Culture are fundamentally
separate? If that dichotomy now appears far too nuanced
and convoluted for bureaucratic dullards to comprehend,
let alone regulate, what are we to make of our strong
feelings, our love, of the athlete? If not a display of
unblemished physical perfection, what is it about “true
sport” that we celebrate, even worship?
Ironically a clue to the answer to these questions is to
be found in the very language of those who regulate
athletics: their goal is to detect and banish the use of
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LEE DRUMMOND
“performance-enhancing drugs” because they seek to
insure the integrity of performance. Anyone can ride a
bicycle, but only a very few can ride at speed over the
two thousand miles of jumbled terrain of the Tour de
France. We like to see people who can do things very
well.
But only certain things. Warren Bufet is an
exceptional performer when it comes to making money,
but we don’t throng the streets of Omaha to catch a
glimpse of its Oracle. And we don’t award him any gold
medals (since he already has most of the gold). Nor do
we celebrate the people skills and networking abilities of
those we send to Congress; in fact, we’d much rather tar
and feather that lawyerly vermin.
What we value about performance is intrinsic to the
meaning of the word: it is an activity involving display
and focused attention. The performer, as an individual or
member of a small group or team, behaves before an
audience in a way that engages, excites and rivets the
attention of that audience. He is the catalyst essential to
transforming the humdrum doings of daily life into an
event.
We have been hurled over the edge of a slippery slope
into the sea below, but we now ind ourselves in troubled
waters. If we as right-thinking, fair-minded Americans
insist or acquiesce in our government and its lackeys
regulating the performers among us, what are we to
think about the highly discrepant treatment we apply to
those individuals? Performers come in all stripes. We
bestow attention, even adulation, and riches on them
based on their ability to engage and excite us. Some
accomplish this on the playing ield, some on the race
course, some on the three-meter board and still others on
stage, ilm, CD, or even, to invoke a rapidly disappearing
world, through the written word. Yet if it is superb
performance we value, why should we apply diferent
standards to the outstanding performers among us?
Particularly now that we have seen how intractable the
Nature / Culture opposition is, and in deference to the
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cherished American value of fair play, should we not
demand that all our performers adhere to the same
standards of conduct?
Perhaps, to the delight of the bureaucrats in the
USADA, we should greatly extend their mandate, tasking
them with the responsibility of insuring that all our
performers are “healthy and clean” exemplars to the
general public and, especially, to our young people who
emulate them.
Yet as the inquisitors begin their new assignment, they
immediately encounter some deeply disturbing material.
Having decided to begin their new studies with the
performance-arts equivalent of Olympic gold medalists
and, their arch villain, Lance Armstrong, they compile
CDs, DVDs, and journalistic accounts of a musical group
which over the decades has provided the most successful
spectacles of any type of performance, including sporting
events such as the Super Bowl. That group goes by a
whimsical name: The Rolling Stones. The lab coats
conirm persistent and shocking rumors that a prominent
member of that group, one Keith Richards, is often under
the inluence of a variety of controlled substances and,
horror of horrors, sometimes performs on stage while in
that condition. Moreover, they learn that the leader of the
group, a Mick Jagger, is said on occasion to do the same,
prancing around the stage like the drug-crazed maniac
he apparently is. Considering the blatant disregard these
performers show for their bodies and, far worse, for the
multitudes that idolize them, the USADA must act swiftly.
Using their expanded authority, they act to strip The
Rolling Stones of every musical award the group has
received over the past half-century. And the bureaucrats,
supported by a phalanx of lawyers, take steps to impound
and seize the fortune the group has amassed through its
illegal activities. They embark on the daunting task of
removing the group’s songs from YouTube and other
social media while coniscating any CDs and DVDs it
locates in stores and online.
Having snifed out this lagrant violation of our basic
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values, the lab coats are distressed to ind that the stench
goes far deeper than contemporary musicians caught up
in the narcissistic drug culture. Additional research
documents that major igures in literature were anything
but “healthy and clean,” and, even more alarming, that
their work is tainted by unmistakable signs of their
substance abuse. On reviewing the novels and short
stories of Ernest Hemingway the investigators ind that
all exude the strong bouquet of liquor, and that the bloodalcohol content of his later work in particular should be
incorporated in its titles: Islands in the Stream (of Rum)
for example. Fearful of the harmful efect Hemingway’s
conduct may have on the millions of Americans required
to read his poisonous books in school, the authorities
make every efort to eradicate that inluence by seizing
copies of his books and expunging references to him in
textbooks. And just as they did with Lance Armstrong
and his trophies, they strip Hemingway of his Nobel
Prize.
As the expanded USADA digs deeper into the ield of
literature, they ind other cases that require their
inquisitorial attention. They discover that the nation’s
youth, already the victims in a raging war on drugs, are
subjected throughout middle school and high school to
the poetry of an especially pernicious igure: the
notorious opium addict, Samuel Coleridge. Like
Hemingway, Coleridge not only made no secret of his
drug abuse but wove it into the body of his work with
dark, disturbing images. In the Rime of the Ancient
Mariner, which millions of our children are required to
read at a young and impressionable age, we ind deeply
troubling passages:
Alone, alone, all, all alone,
Alone on a wide wide sea!
And never a saint took pity on
My soul in agony.
The many men, so beautiful!
And they all dead did lie;
And a thousand thousand slimy things
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Lived on; and so did I.
I looked upon the rotting sea,
And drew my eyes away;
I looked upon the rotting deck,
And there the dead men lay.
I looked to heaven, and tried to pray;
But or ever a prayer had gusht,
A wicked whisper came and made
My heart as dry as dust.
***
All in a hot and copper sky,
The bloody sun, at noon,
Right up above the mast did stand,
No bigger than the moon.
Day after day, day after day,
We stuck, nor breath nor motion;
As idle as a painted ship
Upon a painted ocean.
Water, water, every where,
And all the boards did shrink;
Water, water, every where,
Nor any drop to drink.
The very deep did rot: O Christ!
That ever this should be!
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs
Upon the slimy sea.
About, about, in reel and rout
The death-ires danced at night;
The water, like a witch's oils,
Burnt green, and blue, and white.
Coleridge’s inal outrage, which prompts the lab coats
to drastic action in removing his name from the record of
world literature, is that he actually composed a large part
of one of his most famous poems, Kubla Khan while in an
opium stupor. Even Coleridge’s decadent English
contemporaries were scandalized by his audacity in
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LEE DRUMMOND
publishing his hallucinations as poetry. Clearly, such
behavior is unacceptable to anyone who values the
integrity of performance.
***
The integrity of performance. At this point in our
inquiry it is dificult to know just what that phrase might
mean. Readers will appreciate that the previous pages
have been an exercise in reductio ad absurdum (although
an occasional reader with ties to the Moral Majority
might endorse these arguments to the letter!), a ixture
of philosophical and mathematical thought since the preSocratics. If we approve the punishments meted out to
Lance Armstrong for his use of performance-enhancing
drugs, then we must condone punishment for other
exceptional performers who have done the same. If that
course of action is untenable, then our treatment of
Lance Armstrong is seriously in error. Something is
deeply amiss in the American socio-logic.
To begin to understand what that might be, it is
necessary to employ the classical reductio argument in a
way that departs from the formal proofs of Russell and
Quine. In the matter before us there is no unambiguous
truth-value: [It is not the case that A implies B and A
implies not-B] does not apply. The law of contradiction, a
bulwark of traditional philosophy, is of no help here.
Why? It is because the Lance Armstrong afair, like every
cultural phenomenon, obeys a “logic” that owes far more
to Camus than to Russell. What most Americans accept
as unquestionably true – the need to assure that athletic
performers be “healthy and clean” – is shot through with
ambiguity and irresolvable conlict. Our moral compass is
not ixed on a true course because there is no true
course; an unlinching examination reveals that compass
to be spinning haphazardly from one point to another.
Any certain truth one proposes is therefore incomplete
and mistaken, and to insist on it, particularly by
legislating it, is an absurd undertaking. It is a page from
Camus’ Rebel, not Russell’s Principia.
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It seems the only honest approach for a cultural
analysis of the Lance Armstrong afair and, by extension,
American society in general, is to identify key dilemmas
at the heart of our set of basic values. [For a detailed
presentation of this proposal, see Chapter 3, “A Theory of
Culture as Semiospace” of American Dreamtime,
available at www.peripheralstudies.org]. Any credo put
forward as a guide for behavior, especially the all-toocommon odious variety which regulates and punishes, is
inevitably skewed, a one-sided distortion of an underlying
absurdity.
The key dilemma (or “elemental dilemma,” following
James Fernandez) in the Lance Armstrong afair is the
irresolvable conlict posed by an extraordinary individual
being both an autonomous actor and a social being
subject to the laws and standards of a group composed of
highly diverse but mostly ordinary individuals. We value
his exceptional performance yet at the same time insist
that he conform to rules set by all-too-unexceptional
people who want to live in a mediocre world.
The unhappy marriage between the individual and
society is a fundamental feature of human life, but it is
particularly strained in the United States. Only in Camus’
world would the slave-owner Thomas Jeferson draft what
is arguably the best-known sentence in the English
language: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal . . .” Founded on absurdity,
American society over the past two-plus centuries has
become a land of irresolvable contradictions (we are the
logician’s excluded middle, the “or” symbol in the
Principia proposition: *2 ⋅ 11 ⊢ p ⋁ ∼p
Nowhere is this more evident than in the matter of
competition. Created equal, everything in life urges us to
get ahead. Of course, it is impossible to get ahead
without leaving others behind. During the irst decade of
the 21st century inancial inequality in the United States
has returned to the extremes reached during the boomand-bust era of the late 1920s that precipitated the Great
Depression:
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The Wealth Distribution
In the United States, wealth is highly concentrated
in a relatively few hands. As of 2010, the top 1% of
households (the upper class) owned 35.4% of all
privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the
managerial, professional, and small business
stratum) had 53.5%, which means that just 20% of
the people owned a remarkable 89%, leaving only
11% of the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage and
salary workers). In terms of inancial wealth (total
net worth minus the value of one's home), the top
1% of households had an even greater share: 42.1%
(“Wealth, Income, and Power,” G. William Domhof
<http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/we
alth.html>).
If competition for wealth and social status has now
largely played out, with one per cent of Americans
owning nearly half of the country’s inancial resources,
we non-one-per-centers are left with a burning need that
has no real-world economic outlet. How can one hope to
get ahead when the odds are so terribly long?
It seems that American culture has generated two
complementary responses to the agonizing problem of
increasing inequality and wage-servitude in this land of
golden opportunity: spectator sports on a massive scale;
and television reality shows. While politicians of a
declining Roman republic of the 2nd century BC devised
the scheme of “bread and circuses” to keep their masses
from rising up in protest at their corrupt regimes, the
American establishment has hit on a more stringent plan:
forget the bread and concentrate on the circuses.
Sporting events have lost most of their former appeal
as local afairs in which ordinary people could
participate: While kids still play ball in vacant lots on
occasion (when they aren’t exercising their thumbs on
their iPods) and while a few oldsters still slog around
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softball diamonds in community parks, much of the
participatory nature of sports has lapsed. Instead,
enormous Colosseum-like structures have been erected
in our cities, and every four years an entire sports
complex – a sprawling athletic village – is built to host
the Olympic Games. Those kids still playing Little League
baseball are inculcated, sometimes violently by dads
frustrated by their own mediocrity, with the hallowed
American value of competition. Yet only a tiny fraction of
those kids wind up in the big leagues, The Show that
mesmerizes the herd made up of their former teammates
who did not make the cut. Baseball, our unoficial
national pastime, has been transformed almost beyond
recognition over the past several decades. Billionaire
owners trade millionaire players in a 21st century slave
market and send them out to play in immense stadiums
erected as municipal shrines at taxpayers’ expense,
stadiums with roofs, climate control, and Astroturf for
grass. Games played at night under batteries of lights
with near-freezing temperatures outside have become
the norm for the World Series (the exigencies of cable TV
coverage demand it). And the playing season, already
long, has been extended to pump up the bottom line. The
team itself has become a specialized corporate unit. The
boys of summer have become the designated hitters and
base runners of November.
Even with their new corporate structure and bigscreen HDTV appeal, however, spectator sports have
taken a back seat to a phenomenon that has exploded at
the heart of American popular culture: reality shows. In a
sense, MLB, the NFL, and the NBA serve up sports
programming that is itself a genre of reality television,
since they are unscripted displays of American
competitiveness in action. But the deinitive shows that
have completely transformed American television are
much more recent than corporate-based sports.
Productions of the 1970s such as The Dating Game, The
Newlywed Game, and The Gong Show prepared the way
for shows of the late 1990s and 2000s that took the
television industry and the American public by storm.
The phenomenal success of the now-iconic shows
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Survivor and American Idol have ushered in a new
viewing environment with a myriad of shows that feature
competition as the supreme value in virtually every facet
of American life. Participants in these shows do not
simply go on vacation to exotic locales ( Survivor, The
Amazing Race), enjoy singing and dancing (American
Idol, Dancing with the Stars), work at advancing in the
world
of
business
(Apprentice),
form
romantic
attachments (The Bachelor and The Bachelorette), or
even, in what may well be the most pernicious of these
shows, play the little-girl game of dress-up ( Toddlers &
Tiaras). JonBenét’s body lies a-mouldering in the grave.
Participants do none of these real world things; instead
they engage in contrived and cutthroat competition to
see who can do reality-show things best, who can be the
winner.
As traditional religious faith and church attendance
wane even in this land of Puritan ancestry, it would not
be an exaggeration to suggest that reality television has
become the new national religion, one that engages and
excites tens of millions of viewers and keeps the most
popular shows at the top of rating charts. From week to
week, we can’t wait to see who gets voted of Survivor
and who the nasty judges of American Idol send home in
tears. It is a “religion” based, not on Christian love or
Islamic orthodoxy, but on raw, unbridled, in-your-face
competition. However, the bitter irony of reality
television is that the situations and made-for-television
personalities and dramas of the shows are hopelessly
artiicial, distorted and contrived versions of competitive
life in an American society which has already picked the
winners – that tiny one per cent who own and control the
bulk of the nation’s resources. The reality of American
life, its stark inequality, racial hatred, rampant gun
violence, perpetual war, untreated medical conditions,
prisons (for-proit!) bursting with a population that
dwarfs that of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag – none of this is
touched on in the breadless American circuses that
enthrall us. For all too many of us, the multitudes that
make up the shows’ audiences, actual life is incredibly
alienating and painful, and so we eagerly grasp at a
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ictional reality composed of the basest stereotypes and
passed of as genuine.
In The Future of an Illusion Freud lays out a
formidable and chilling argument in which he describes
monotheistic world religions as a collective case of a selfdelusion neurosis, a neurosis cultivated by people
incapable of facing life’s problems without a cognitive /
afective crutch. And in Civilization and Its Discontents
he extends that argument to civilization as a whole:
human society is a fabric of palatable lies, woven over
the ages to disguise irresolvable conlicts within each
individual psyche. Here is the reality which our new
national religion, reality television, does everything to
conceal.
In its tentative encounter with its host culture –
ourselves – American cultural anthropology has paid
insuficient attention to these fundamental arguments
which come to us brilliantly presented in the work of
Camus and Freud. Instead, that faltering academic
discipline has preferred virtually to ignore Camus’
penetrating analysis of modern society and to dismiss
Freud and the psychoanalytical approach as inadequate
to the task of the description and analysis of social action
(and incidentally has tarred Lévi-Strauss’ profound
thought with the same brush). Although anthropologists
may occasionally speak of cultural analysis as cultural
criticism, that discussion is generally conined to
economic and political topics. But the problem before us
goes deeper; it goes right to the heart of the system of
basic values we profess to embrace. As suggested above,
a close analysis of those values reveals them to be shot
full of contradiction and ambivalence. Rather than
pursue that line of thought rigorously, cultural
anthropology as it has developed in the United States
tends to put a happy face on social life, taking as its
program the elucidation in meticulous detail of the
symbolic composition of culture – essentially an exercise
in hermeneutics which celebrates the intricate structure
of its subject, and not the discordant systems of nonmeaning integral to the key dilemmas of American and
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LEE DRUMMOND
any culture.
It is much nearer the truth to regard culture, not as a
treasure trove of a people’s vital essence, but as a
disease, a virulent outbreak which infects and poisons its
carriers. To approach culture from this perspective
requires the anthropologist to examine and dissect it
with the cold, analytical precision of the pathologist. It
requires Nietzsche’s coldness, which he advocated
repeatedly to little avail. [For applications of this idea,
Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An
see
Anthropological
Essay,
and
Shit
Happens:
An
Immoralist’s Take on 9/11 in Terms of Self-Organized
Criticality, available at www.peripheralstudies.org] In its
advanced pathological state, it is essential that the
anthropologist approach his analysis of American society
as a pathologist would a diseased organism, seeking out
the speciic toxins and tumors which are in the process of
destroying it.
In that analysis, a particularly malignant tumor
attached to vital organs of our society is the body of
reality shows; these sap whatever creative energy
survives in a sadly diminished America. Those shows are
so virulent because they tap directly into the core tissue
of American values: to tame the wilderness through
individual efort; to make something of oneself starting
with the very little available to the immigrant; or again,
in a phrase, to compete and win. It is often said that
American society owes its distinctive character to the
experience of pioneers and settlers faced with a vast
frontier which they had to conquer or die in the attempt.
[See the classic work by Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land:
The American West as Symbol and Myth ] If the grand
design of American culture may be described in this way,
then one might suggest that the historical theme is
repeated in the host of reality shows now inundating the
airways. That suggestion would come with a crucial
disclaimer, however, which we owe to Marx’s famous
observation in Eighteenth Brumaire:
Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-
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historic facts and personages appear, so to speak,
twice. He forgot to add: the irst time as tragedy,
the second time as farce.
The tragedy of America is part of the larger tragedy of
the Americas. It is the story of genocide and
environmental degradation on an unprecedented scale,
perpetrated by European explorers and colonists turned
loose on the New World, turned loose and intent on
enriching themselves, on winning regardless of the cost
in human lives and established ecosystems:
The discovery of America was followed by possibly
the greatest demographic disaster in the history of
the world. [The Native Population of the Americas
in 1492, William M. Denevan, ed., 1992]
The extent of the carnage and catastrophe was not
widely acknowledged for centuries after the event,
although lone and immediately discredited voices were
raised from the beginning (the work of Bartolomé de las
Casas being an outstanding example). It might be hoped
that the mistake would have been corrected by the young
discipline of cultural anthropology, which in the United
States came of age through exhaustive studies of Native
American societies. [See the impressive volumes of the
Bureau of American Ethnology ] To its lasting shame,
however, the foremost authorities on those groups, Alfred
Kroeber, dean of American anthropology, and Julian
Steward, editor of the canonical Handbook of South
American Indians, grossly underestimated the indigenous
population of the Americas. In a lagrant display of
professorial arrogance, Kroeber and Stewart dismissed
population igures of thirty-ive to ifty million advanced
by Las Casas and other scholars as the inlated and
fanciful work of non-specialists. Instead, Kroeber
proposed a igure of 8.4 million and Steward 15.6 million.
[“Native American population.” American Anthropologist,
n.s., vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 1-25. Alfred Kroeber, 1934; Julian
Steward, Handbook] With their inluence in the ield,
those numbers were not seriously challenged for
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LEE DRUMMOND
decades. They provide a jarring contrast with the best
current estimates of indigenous population at the time of
Columbus’ arrival: 54 to 75 million. [see Denevan] Tens
of millions perished from smallpox, measles, inluenza,
and massacres, and the response by anthropologists was
to count moccasin beads and record the quaint customs
of the few survivors.
On a smaller scale, the tragedy of America unfolded in
an especially agonizing manner: in the Rocky Mountain
west with the coming of the mountain men and their
exploitation by the irst of the robber barons, John Jacob
Astor and his American Fur Company. Perhaps no igure
in American history or legend is imbued with the
independence and supreme competence of the mountain
man: living by his wits in a wild and hostile land, he
survived hunger, bitter winters, and Indian attacks. And
not only survived, he triumphed. In the best American
tradition, he won. At least for a couple of decades. Even
before the beaver began to run out and European tastes
changed to silk, legendary mountain men like Jim
Bridger, John Colter, and John “Liver-Eating” Johnson
(most deinitely not the individual portrayed by Robert
Redford in Jeremiah Johnson) felt the pressure to
abandon their independent lifestyle in favor of a more
regimented existence as employees of a fur company. It
was a fundamental change in a nascent American
culture: the freest of men became pawns in a new world
of big business crafted by Astor and later robber barons
such as Leland Stanford and Cornelius Vanderbilt. Astor
and the others had learned the secret of capitalist
alchemy: how to change the blood and sweat of others
into gold for themselves.
With the advent of reality television, the tragedy of
America has returned as farce. Astor and the robber
barons have given way to an even more crushing
economic force: multinational corporations which
sponsor television shows carefully designed by media
giants to bring in the circus audiences with their
consumer dollars (an insidious reinement of the early
Roman political palliative, with the masses now supplying
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bread for their masters). The most popular shows,
Survivor and American Idol, have replaced immensely
brave and talented personalities like Bridger and Johnson
with shallow caricatures of heroes and heroines who
submit themselves to the abuse of the shows’ directors
and judges in return for a shot at fame and fortune. It is a
pathetic charade of competition in which even the
supreme American value, winning, has lost its meaning,
become a minor ripple in the onrushing torrent of 24/7
cable news. Who were last year’s winners of Survivor and
American Idol? Or the year before, or the year before
that? No one knows; no one cares; it doesn’t matter at
all; the circus opens tonight under the big top/screen
with a new cast of stunted, supericial characters ready
to endure any humiliation for a moment of glory. And we,
the American multitudes, will be glued to our sets.
In what Nietzsche might have called an example of
world-historical irony, one season of Survivor managed to
take things beyond farce into sheer travesty and thereby
expose a fundamental but contingent premise of
American culture: competition and reward are
inseparably linked. Who could disagree with that
premise, which is the basis of the American experience
from grade school to the grave, the underlying force at
school, at work, at play, and, in its distilled essence,
reality television? You compete, win, and are rewarded
with trophies, money, adulation. You compete, lose, and
are rejected and forgotten.
As with all previous seasons, Survivor embraced this
premise in its 2009 installment: Survivor: Tocantins – The
Brazilian Highlands. Set on the Tocantins River, a
tributary of the Amazon in north-central Brazil, the show
followed its usual format of dividing the sixteen
contestants into two “tribes,” thus underscoring its
adventure theme of primitive life in exotic locales. The
names selected for the two tribes were Jalapao, after the
region of Brazil where the show was ilmed, and Timbira,
the name of an actual tribe of Brazilian Indians whose
survivors lived about a hundred miles from the Survivor
camp. It would be interesting to know the circumstances
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LEE DRUMMOND
behind the selection of the latter name; apparently it was
done to add a touch of local color – American contestants
playing at being actual indigenous Brazilians. The series
unfolded with the usual ridiculous tasks, back-stabbing
alliances, hidden immunity idols, the exile island, and
elections to vote out unpopular players. The inal election
ended, as always, with a Sole Survivor, who took the
million-dollar prize and became a television personality
for a few days. Competition and reward, two sides of a
coin.
The travesty perpetrated by the show’s directors on an
unknowing and uncaring American audience was in
selecting “Timbira” as a catchy name for one of the
show’s “tribes.” For everything in actual Timbira life,
with its traditional homeland a bare hundred miles away,
contradicts the premise of competition-reward etched in
American thought and exploited in the Survivor series.
Had the directors and writers for Survivor: Tocantins
bothered to do more than supericial background
research in selecting a site for the 2009 show, they would
have discovered an anthropological classic, The Eastern
Timbira
<http://ia700305.us.archive.org/1/items/timbira/nimuend
aju_1946_timbira.pdf>, by one of the foremost
ethnographers in the discipline’s brief history, Kurt
Nimuendajú.
The Timbira are one of several groups associated with
the Gê linguistic-cultural stock found throughout central
Brazil(others include the Sherente, Shavante, and
Apinayé). [In addition to Nimuendajú’s monograph, for a
thorough discussion of Timbira culture see The Dream
and the Dance: A Comparative Study of Initiatory Death ,
available at www.peripheralstudies.org] A prominent
institution of these groups, and one elaborated in
intricate detail by the Timbira, is the log race. For the
race the Timbira form two teams whose membership is
based on one of several dual divisions, or moieties, in the
social organization of the village (age set moieties, rainy
season moieties, plaza group moieties, ceremonial group
moieties – theirs is, indeed, an intricate society). The
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teams travel several miles from the village into the
galleria forest, where they cut two sections of burity
palm, each weighing 150-200 pounds. The race begins
with a member of each team shouldering the heavy,
cumbersome log and running at full speed toward the
village. When he tires the log is handed of in mid-stride
to a second runner and so on until the exhausted runners
reach the village and deposit their logs in designated
ceremonial locations. A classic competition with a race to
the inish line? A race with winners and losers (hopefully
none of whom have ingested performance-enhancing
drugs that could be detected by a Timbira chapter of the
USADA)? No, on the contrary, the Timbira undertake the
grueling competition for its own sake: it is a race in
which the purpose is to race, not to celebrate a winner
and denigrate the losers.
Log races form the national sport not only of all the
Timbira (p. 141 f.), including the Apinaye, but
probably of all Northwestern and Central Gê. None
of
the
other
numerous
observances
that
characterize the public life of these tribes has so
deeply roused the attention of civilized observers.
This is primarily because, next to the girls’ dances
in the plaza, log racing is the most frequently
repeated ceremony; further, it stands out for its
dramatic impressiveness.
And now we come to the feature that remains
incomprehensible to Brazilians and leads to his
constantly ascribing ulterior motives to this Indian
game: The victor and the others who have
desperately exerted themselves to the bitter end
receive not a word of praise, nor are the losers and
outstripped runners subject to the least censure;
there are neither triumphant nor disgruntled faces.
The sport is an end in itself, not the means to satisfy
personal or group vanity. Not a trace of jealously or
animosity is to be detected between the teams.
Each participant has done his best because he likes
to do so in a log race. Who turns out to be the victor
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or loser makes as little diference as who has eaten
most at a banquet (Nimuendajú 1946: 136, 139).
The farce Marx chronicles in Eighteenth Brumaire
pales in comparison with the travesty of Survivor:
Tocantins, Had old Karl been around to view the show, it
would have had him clawing at his carbuncles and
begging for mercy: Stop! No more of the utter absurdity
of human existence! (After all, that is supposed to obey
the laws of historical determinism, not chaos). Louis
Bonaparte, that caricature of Napoleon, doesn’t begin to
compare with the mediocrities paraded on Survivor.
***
In its obsession with competition and reward,
American culture manages to trivialize athletic activity
beyond recognition, to destroy the inherent joy of doing.
Running or riding a bicycle, along with hitting a baseball,
throwing a football, swimming, and skiing may be done
for the sheer enjoyment of the activity, of experiencing
one’s body in concerted motion. Breath-hold diving over
a coral reef, open-water swimming in Puget Sound (see
Edwin Dobb’s brilliant essay, “Immersed in the Wild”
<http://www.hcn.org/issues/42.11/immersed-in-thewild>), skiing a winding mountain trail beneath a
stratospheric blue sky, running for miles along a deserted
country road, can be, like the Timbira log race, ends in
themselves, instances of genuine re-creation that
transport the individual to another realm of being. That
experience is close to the exhilaration described by those
13th century Provençal troubadours, whose gai saber or
joy-in-knowing/doing Nietzsche commemorated in The
Gay Science, echoing his own dedication to careful
experimentation (suchen and versuchen) rather than to
methodical system-building. To resort to a term no longer
fashionable, it is about the quest.
It becomes almost impossible for us to capture that
sense of exhilaration when our daily existence is subject
to a practice that governs American life: keeping score.
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What did you get on the Chem test? How fast did you run
the mile? How did you do on the SATs? What number is
on your paycheck? How big is your house? Your car?
Even, for God’s sake, your dick? (Time to email that
order for Viagra – comes in a plain brown wrapper! But,
oops, deinitely a performance-enhancing drug!). All
these questions and countless others like them are
distilled in what we do for fun – or have others do for us:
sports. Guys who could not manage even to run the bases
sit slumped in seats at Yankee Stadium, cradling
scorecards they can barely see over their beer bellies,
but they keep score. The activity itself, the lived
experience of superbly conditioned athletes on the ield is
reduced to a pile of lifeless statistics, the raw material for
an endless stream of other numbers that eventually lead
to selecting The Winner, the Sole Survivor in American
society’s reality show of Life.
These absurd questions and activities which permeate
and shape all of life in America conceal a monumental
irony, a cosmic joke: Our obsessive need to keep score, to
identify and reward those who are very good at what
they do, may well lead to missing or misinterpreting truly
exceptional individuals who fall outside the limited
perspectives of the all-too-ordinary individuals who pass
judgment on them.
There is a story here, really an apocryphal anecdote (it
is an Einstein story and, like most, probably is
apocryphal). It concerns an organization that is one of
the most prominent scorekeepers in the country and,
increasingly, around the world: the Educational Testing
Service, creator and administrator of the SATs which
have impacted the lives of oh-so-many Americans. From
an early age children with some intelligence are taught
to dread the SATs; they are told that a high score may
advance their chances of becoming a professional or a
manager of some sort, and thus joining that shrinking
middle class (nineteen per cent and going down) which
Domhof described (see above). A low or even average
score may doom a child of a family with ordinary means
to a dificult life of labor and menial jobs; he will sink into
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LEE DRUMMOND
that vast pool of eighty per cent of the population who
are just surviving. The story goes like this:
It seems that when the ETS was just getting
organized in the late 1940s, its button-down
executives were anxious to determine the
efectiveness of the math section in particular –
mathematical facts being irrefutable, they wished to
calibrate their set of questions so that the test
would accurately identify how students performed
on a scale of dull to brilliant. Since the ETS was
located in the intellectual Mecca of Princeton, New
Jersey, someone had a bright idea: just up the road,
at the Institute for Advanced Study, there was an
individual who was making quite a stir in the world
of mathematics and physics, one Albert Einstein.
Why not have him take the SAT math test they had
just put together? Certainly he would establish a
benchmark against which young test-takers could
be ranked. So they approached Einstein, he agreed,
and they sat him down with the test. Now a major
portion of the math SAT tests a student’s ability to
discern a pattern in a series of numbers. A question
would supply a four-number series, say 2-4-6-8 and
a multiple-choice set of possible answers, say 16,
24, 10, 1. The student is required to select the
answer which best its the pattern established by
the four-number series, in this case the “10.” As
Einstein went through this section of the test, for
each question he thought of an equation that would
it each of the multiple-choice possibilities. Then he
picked the answer which gave him what he found to
be the most interesting equation – almost always
not the answer the test designers wanted.
This little experiment doubtlessly disappointed the
ETS executives, but judging from the content of the SAT
math test which has been inlicted on students for the
past sixty-plus years, its results did nothing to dissuade
them from their course of action. Einstein was obviously
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LANCE ARMSTRONG
an anomaly, an oddball, and his toying with their sacred
exam could safely be disregarded.
A thought which might have given them pause, but
clearly did not occur to the right-thinking, compete-andwin executives of the ETS, is that if anomalies occur in so
highly structured a world as theoretical physics, what
bizarre deviations from agreed-on, socially acceptable
norms might be found in other walks of life? In order to
keep score it is necessary to have an authoritative scale,
a means of ranking and grading individual performance.
But there are in this life those rare individuals whose
extraordinary gifts defy ranking; they go of the scales
ixed by mediocrities like the executives of ETS. People
are diferent, and a few people are so vastly diferent that
it is senseless to tabulate, to score their performance. In
a catch phrase from the failed cultural revolution of the
late 1960s, now but a sad and haunting memory, there
are indeed the haves and have-nots, but there are also
the have-something-elses. Those remarkable individuals
either go of the charts or, more often and tragically, fall
between the cracks of the charts. In that case their
exceptional ability, which initially establishes them as
stars (or what our punitive society would call “persons of
interest”) dooms them to censure and sometimes ruin
when they allow their exceptional abilities, whether in
mathematics (John Nash), chess (Bobby Fischer),
engineering (Nikola Tesla), aviation (Chuck Yeager),
philosophy (Friedrich Nietzsche), poker (Stu Ungar), or,
in the case at hand, bicycle racing (Lance Armstrong), to
run afoul of standards of acceptable behavior.
Even if we insist on maintaining scales to rank people,
we encounter the next insuperable obstacle: There is not
a single scale or even a few which adequately evaluate
individual ability. Rather, there is a tangled multitude of
scales which cross-cut and often conlict with one
another, so that any attempt to implement one hopelessly
distorts the over-arching truth of boundless diference.
As a thirteen-year old Lance Armstrong already
possessed an unprecedented combination of raw physical
ability and mental determination. Yet everything about
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his society and his immediate circumstances – he was,
after all, named after a star wide-receiver of the Dallas
Cowboys; such was his family tradition – led him to
embrace organized sport as the means of realizing his
potential. And that decision, taken in the context of a
judgmental and punitive society, proved his undoing.
None of us can experience or perhaps even imagine the
tremendous stamina and mental toughness required to
stay at the head of the pack of the Tour de France, day
after day, year after year, but all too many of us are quite
prepared to thwart those remarkable displays, to declare
them illegal, not suficiently “healthy and clean” for the
fearful and vengeful herd of non-entities that makes up
American society.
A parting thought:
The vast sea of seven billion human beings awash on
this fragile planet, those multitudes, are akin to the night
sky – dark, without depth or substance, obscure,
formless. That sea makes up a background for the stars,
each star impossibly isolated from the others, alone,
blazing in the dark immensity of space, each with its own
history, its birth, evolution, and death. There is no race
course, no set of standardized tests, no contest of any
description that a star must strive to win. The star’s light
radiates aimlessly, forever, illuminating the darkness of
space and imparting to it whatever form it may possess.
Here or there its beams happen to strike a random atom,
perhaps, on the rarest of occasions, an atom in the retina
of a sentient being . . . That is all there is, that is the
“career” of the star. Here or there . . . here or there an
individual star blazes so brightly that it consumes itself,
devours its own matter, reaching the point at which it
collapses in on itself in a spectacular explosion, a
supernova of cosmic proportions, incinerating or
scorching everything around it. Then it sinks into oblivion
forever. Lance Armstrong.
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Th-th-th-that’s all folks!
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Chapter 11
RITUAL MURDER
Jean La Fontaine
Ritual murder is a phrase used by many people but what
does it actually mean, or imply? To remind you – ritual is
a religious performance and embodies authority; its aim
is public, the personnel that perform it and, ideally, their
actions, are speciied and cannot be varied without
weakening its eficacy.1 Its aim beneits those for whom it
is performed. Ritual concerns the sacred and it is a
truism of anthropology that it also invokes the highest
cultural legitimacy, activating spiritual powers, whether
they be of gods, spirits, or ancestors, in order to achieve
a beneicent result.
Murder is, by contrast, immoral and illegal; it is an act
carried out in secret that attracts a severe penalty. In all
societies killing human beings is subject to some form of
regulation that deine what is illegitimate killing, that is
to say murder.2 Murder commonly pollutes the murderer
who must be ritually cleansed; the victim’s kin incur the
duty to seek vengeance or compensation. In Western i.e.
Christian doctrine all killing is wrong: thou shalt not kill;
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in other societies there may be exceptions to a general
rule. These exceptions generally designate categories of
person who are virtually rendered non-human by their
exclusion. Killing them is not murder. In Bugisu, where I
irst worked, sorcerers and homosexuals were excluded
in this way; killing them was not murder and entailed no
blood guilt. Murder then is the opposite of a religious act;
it is the prototype of illegitimate action. Murder
performed as part of a ritual implies the existence of
religious acts which are not legitimate and which are,
like murder, illicit and morally wrong. Ritual murder is
thus an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms and for any
anthropologist this requires investigation.
Several forms of killing may also be referred to as
ritual murder. There is also a common synonym, human
sacriice, which is used in much the same sense. What
the killings seem to have in common is a link to the realm
of spiritual power. One of the aims of this paper is to
compare these concepts and show that whereas human
sacriice involved real killings, ritual murder is a much
more shadowy concept, invoked often enough to describe
grisly events or denigrate particular communities, but
never pinned down by reliable evidence. In fact, as I shall
argue, the idea of ritual murder is just that, an idea that
in Britain represents the epitome of evil and which
denotes the alien nature of other people outside what
may be known as “the civilised world” or, worse still, the
horror of the evil within. In this respect it resembles
witchcraft. I shall come back to this.
While it is sometimes said that academics are too
prone to spend their time arguing about deinitions and
distinctions I would argue that such discussions
frequently lead to clariication of ideas and this is my aim
here. In my approach though, I follow the French
historian Muchembled who wrote of the risk carried by
an analysis of ideas without taking into account their
social context; this is the risk that “the investigator will
describe his own mental processes rather than the
subject of his research” (Muchembled 1960:141). That he
wrote this in an article about witchcraft makes his
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remarks even more relevant. To avoid this risk I shall
consider try to give at least some of the social context of
the relevant ethnography.
The impetus to write this paper was given by the
reactions evoked by a ilm in the television series,
Dispatches, which some of you may have seen. It
concerned a series of murders in Uganda that were
referred to both as ritual murder and as human sacriice,
although I would argue that they were neither. This set
various anthropologists, myself included, against the
ilm-makers who can be said to represent the general
(British) public, although I am aware that journalists are
usually believed to be more sceptical than most people.
Professor Pat Caplan wrote an article about this
controversy for Anthropology Today (26 (2) 4-7) which
provides a useful summary of what happened. The cause
of this major disagreement between ilm-makers and
anthropologists was the alleged existence of a rapid
increase of killings, particularly of children, who were
murdered and then mutilated. It was this that was
referred to as “child sacriice” or ritual murder. In
support of their view the ilm-makers relied heavily on a
man who confessed to having killed 70 individuals but to
have reformed. He claimed to be mounting a campaign
against child sacriice. Most of the anthropologists did
not believe him, recognising the type of Christian leader
whose conversion gains added lustre from the contrast
with the blackness of former sin, and considering what
people say as weak evidence without reliable information
on what they do or have done. While the ilm-makers
reported that they had been told by reliable witnesses of
multiple
killings
and
mutilations,
a
Ugandan
anthropologist from Makerere referred to the situation as
“hysteria” and linked it to the popularity of Nigerian
(Nollywood) ilms in which such killings feature. A series
of fairly heated emails were exchanged most of which
found their way to Adam Kuper’s London Review of
Books blog.
Caplan’s aim was not to decide either way but to
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discuss the two main topics she thought had been raised
by
the
controversy:
the
irst
concerned
“the
interpretation of witchcraft and other forms of alleged
ritual killings in contemporary Africa …” while the
second, which I shall not consider, had to do with the
media and what she calls ‘public anthropology’. She
argued that anthropologists are inclined to interpret
allegations of witchcraft as ideas and moral values in the
classical tradition, implying that this leads them to deny
the reality of such beliefs. She does not spell out whether
she means that they deny that people actually are
witches or that what they do works. She points out that,
in an alternative view of ‘occult phenomena’: “some
anthropologists working in Africa have accepted that
there has indeed been an increase in allegations of
witchcraft, but also in its material manifestations,
including killing and the removal of body parts ….” Here
killing for body parts is identiied with witchcraft; the
other material manifestations are not speciied. So, not
only is there a dispute between anthropologists and the
journalists about what is going on in Africa but there are
opposed views among anthropologists. I shall try and
show that this situation is in part a confusion of
terminology.
I turn now to what we know about killings that are
linked with beliefs in occult phenomena and I start with
human sacriice.
Human sacriice
The killing of a living creature as a ritual ofering to a
god or spirit used to be termed a blood sacriice, an oldfashioned term that focuses attention on the spilling of
blood. The blood may be important, less in itself, than as
a manifestation of the dispatch of a victim’s life as
ofering to the spiritual being or beings to whom the
ritual is addressed. Usually a return is expected in the
form of good fortune, whether generalised or as the
granting of a particular prayer. Blood sacriice might also
be used to cleanse suferers from sin, prevent misfortune
or failure and avert evil. In some cases the blood spilled
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was human.
However, not all sacriices entail the spilling of blood;
victims were killed in other ways and in some societies,
and on some occasions, it was actually important not to
spill the victim’s blood. The reference to blood has been
dropped now and we consider sacriice in general. This is
a part of rituals in many parts of the world, though
usually the ofering takes the form of an animal or even a
bird. Most anthropologists in the ield in Africa have seen
at least one of these sacriices, usually involving a
chicken or a goat. The more valued the creature
sacriiced, the greater the honour done the recipient of
the ofering.3
The most valuable of all life is that of a human being
and human sacriice, where it occurred, was the greatest
possible ritual gift. Human sacriice has been recorded in
many parts of the world although, as historians have
pointed out, executions and other killings of human
beings have sometimes been wrongly interpreted as
human sacriice (Wilks cited in Law 1985). The most
famous example is perhaps that of the Aztecs, whose
human sacriice allegedly consisted of a heart taken from
a living victim.
There is evidence that human sacriice took place in
antiquity in societies, including some in what is now
Britain, bordering the Roman and Greek Empires, whose
members sacriiced only animals and birds. Rituals
including it have been described by outside observers. In
Central America the practice of human sacriice among
the Aztecs and Incas was recorded by the invading
Spaniards in early modern times and in parts of Africa by
the Europeans who came irst as traders and then as
colonisers. There is most information on human sacriice
in Africa where it has been described in relatively recent
times by travellers, missionaries and by oficials of the
colonising powers, so I will draw largely on that material
as summarised in a useful article by the historian Robin
Law.4 There is no doubt that this killing took place as part
of public rituals and was considered legitimate.
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In Africa, human sacriice was a practice largely
conined to some kingdoms of West Africa, such as
Asante, Benin, Dahomey, Calabar and the riverine Ibo,
although disregard of human life was much more
widespread.5 Human beings were sacriiced as oferings
to gods and to the dead, particularly dead kings and
other elite forbears. In the West African kingdom of
Dahomey, a regular ritual of remembrance ofered to
dead kings, known as the Annual Customs, required the
sacriice of human victims to strengthen the dead rulers’
spiritual powers and by showing the ilial piety, engage
them on behalf of his successor. It also demonstrated the
mundane power of the ruler and the legitimacy of his
position (Law 1985), the former function being explicitly
recognised by one such ruler, King Kpengla of Dahomey,
who explained succinctly the need for human sacriice to
a European enquirer in the 1780s as follows: “You have
seen me kill many men at the Customs. This gives a
grandeur to my Customs, far beyond the display of ine
things which I buy. This makes my enemies fear me and
gives me a name in the bush.”6
In West Africa, as in ancient China and elsewhere,
funerals might entail the killing of human beings to
accompany the dead. A great ruler might be buried with
his wives and/or members of his entourage to provide
him with a suitable retinue in the afterlife. The
individuals who were killed were not, strictly speaking,
sacriiced, since they were not killed as oferings either
to the gods or the spirit of the dead king or ruler.
Moreover it is alleged in some cases that the close
associates of the dead man volunteered to die, much as
Indian widows were traditionally expected to commit
suicide on the funeral pyre of their dead husband 7.
Nevertheless, the term human sacriice may be used to
refer to these practices, since the additional deaths were
an integral part of the funeral ritual. In parts of West
Africa, individuals might also be killed as messengers to
the dead in addition to the normal human sacriices. Fear
of the approaching colonial powers resulted in many
human sacriices to avert military disaster.
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Killings as oferings to the dead may not seem to
Westerners to be sacriices, in that they are not oferings
to gods. However in many African religions, ancestors
are holy beings, with spiritual powers to reward or
punish their descendants. There may be some
recognition of a vaguely conceptualised creator god but
as a remote deity, uninterested in human afairs; the
ancestors are usually the spirits to whom one appeals for
help in trouble. Thus in Dahomey when human sacriices
were made “to water the graves of the ancestors” they
were as much part of their religion as other religious
festivals. Hence we may call these sacriices and where
the victim was human they were human sacriices.
Two patterns among the selection of victims can be
seen. The victim for sacriice may be chosen either as a
particularly pure or valuable human being: a child, a
virgin or a young warrior; alternatively the opposite
choice is made; the victim is an outsider: captive,
representative of a defeated enemy, or a slave. Slaves
might also be bought to be sacriiced, thus avoiding the
need to kill a member of the community. However, where
the tally of captives and slaves was inadequate, victims
might be taken by force from among them.
The Greeks and Romans ofered blood sacriices to
their gods but they were never human sacriices,
although both they and the Greeks kept slaves whom
they might have sacriiced. In fact the Romans
characterised some societies on the margins of their
empires as barbarians because they did perform human
sacriices. The failure to draw a distinction between
human beings and animals which the existence of human
sacriice implied, was to both Greeks and Romans clear
evidence of the lack of civilisation of those people who
practised it. Those they conquered, such as the tribes in
what is now Britain, were strongly discouraged from the
practice. In the early centuries of the Christian Era from
which this information comes there were increasing
number of Christians within the Roman Empire who
believed that the death of Jesus was “a full, perfect and
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suficient sacriice for the sins of the whole world” 8 and it
rendered any sacriice, not merely unnecessary, but a
failure of faith. Pagans who ofered sacriices to their
gods were barbarians. Thus sacriice and in particular,
what was sacriiced, was a powerful symbol for both
communities, dividing them and justifying to each the
inferiority of the other.
Human sacriice is no longer practised, even in those
societies where it used to be part of the traditional
religious rites. Apart from the disapproval of the Romans,
the spread of Christianity in territories taken as colonies
by European powers, starting with Spain and Portugal in
southern America in early modern times, have rendered
it immoral and illegal in many areas where it used to be
practised. Islam, spreading southwards from North Africa
into Africa south of the Sahara, put an end to the practice
in the north of many West African states and further
colonisation by the European powers in the nineteenth
century has forcibly ended the practice in the southern
areas9. There may be talk of its revival in independent
West African states where it has only been a century or
so since the practice was stopped, but the stories are, so
far, only unconirmed rumours. There has been no public
revival of the practice. But people persist in associating
Africa with human sacriice. Since the practice is
abhorred in Britain it is also seen as ritual murder.
There are also practices that are sometimes confused
with human sacriice or considered to be necessarily
linked to it. Cannibalism is not an inevitable consequence
of human sacriice nor are the victims dismembered for
use in some other way, although the Aztecs were reputed
to eat the hearts of human sacriices. Some peoples, in
many diferent parts of the world – the Ijo of West Africa
are an example – ate parts of their dead enemies as a
means of magically taking over their strength. Marshall
Sahlins describes with some gusto similar practices in
Fiji (Anthropology Today 19 (3) 3-5). Such practices have
been referred to as ritual cannibalism, since they have
magical and spiritual connotations to the participants.
However, in Africa, although animal sacriices were
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normally eaten at the end of a ritual, in a feast whose
participants were carefully selected for their relation to
the spirit (usually an ancestor) in whose honour the
sacriice had been ofered, human sacriices were not
eaten. Speaking generally, cannibalism, even as a ritual,
was always much less frequent than human sacriice.
The rationale for eating human sacriicial victims or
enemies who had been killed in battle, was that power
was thought to be inherent in parts of the human body,
even after death. The same belief lies behind the use of
body parts in ‘medicines’10 records of which in Africa go
back as far as the 17th century. These ‘medicines’ are
magical concoctions but their purposes are purely
secular; they are put together by specialists, who charge
for their services and they purport to ensure success,
wealth and the confounding of enemies. The magicians
often referred to as witchdoctors may employ killers to
obtain what they need or may kill themselves. The use of
human body parts is said to give the 'muti' very great
power. This is a form of magic or sorcery, concocted in
secrecy for the beneit of the sorcerer’s client and of
course to increase the renown and wealth of the
magician. Universally stigmatised as ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ the
practice has nevertheless been reported widely in Africa.
The early records of this ‘medicine’ came from West
Africa but it probably occurred elsewhere as well. In
modern times, from the end of the twentieth century to
the present, murders for the purpose of making medicine
(the South African term muti may be used) have been
reported in large numbers from South Africa and from
much of East Africa. The murders of albino Tanzanians
for ‘muti’ were widely publicised in the international
press. The acquisition of body parts does not always
require killing. Some unfortunate victims have been left
alive after limbs have been severed.
The “child sacriices” in Uganda were killings for such
magical purposes. The police reported that some corpses
lacked limbs or organs. (Killing was not always
necessary; in Kenya recently two men have been arrested
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for dealing in body parts obtained from a crematorium).
But murders for body parts are not oferings to any god
or spirit but killings for gain: both the client who orders
and the magician/ sorcerer who prepares the ‘medicine’
proit by the death. While the belief in the power of
human body parts may be called magical thinking, as can
the idea that albino body parts have greater power than
normal African ones, the killing is not part of any ritual.
Children and young people may be chosen as victims
more often because of their purity and the potential for
growth in their bodies, but their selection may be simply
the more mundane one of greater ease of capture. We do
not know, as everything about these ‘medicine’ killings is
secret until the mutilated body is found. Whereas human
sacriice was performed openly and as part of rituals that
were believed to beneit the community, these murders
are furtive and hidden, fuelled by individual ambitions
and the lust for wealth and power. They are
manifestations of continuing belief in the power of magic
(or sorcery if you prefer) but not of witchcraft which has
never rested on material proof except the misfortunes
that are, with hindsight, attributed to it. Killings for
‘muti’ are openly condemned by members of the
communities where they take place but they are not
human sacriices or even ritual murders.
Ritual murder
If ritual murder is not human sacriice or killing to
obtain ingredients for powerful magic, what is it? The
term implies a killing to obtain spiritual powers that are
not recognised as morally right, but are evil and
dangerous. So far from being the same as human
sacriice it is its antithesis.
It is in Western Europe that one inds this idea of ritual
murder and it has a long history. In the second century
AD, Christians may have despised the religion of their
pagan neighbours for the blood spilt in their rituals, but
much worse allegations were made against these small
dissident groups within the Roman body (Rives 1995).
Christians were said to worship their god in secret,
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performing rites in which there were sexual orgies, often
incestuous and cannibal feasts. The central act of the
ritual was the killing and eating of a child or baby,
perhaps stolen for the purpose. Since the early Christians
were forced to conceal their gatherings, meeting in
secret, the conviction that they were engaged in
shameful acts seemed plausible. In AD 177 in Lyons, a
number of Christians were publicly tortured and killed by
the Roman authorities and these allegations played a
large part in their condemnation. Some of those who died
cried out denials of the accusations, proof of the role they
had had in these horrible deaths.
When Christianity became the dominant religion in
Europe, the idea of secret groups practising ritual
murder did not disappear; Christian authorities took over
the myth that had earlier been used to justify their own
persecution. Like their Roman predecessors they used
the accusation of ritual murder to denigrate and
persecute opponents. In this case it was those divergent
religious communities such as the Waldensians or the
Cathars who were designated heretics and accused of it.
Centuries later, in a more elaborate development of the
story, ritual murder was believed to be carried out by
covens of witches, gathering to worship the devil and
feast on the lesh of human sacriice.
They represented the opposite of all that was
considered good and their pleasure was to do evil and
ultimately to destroy society. The rituals they performed
were the opposite of Christian services: they took place
at night, not in the daytime and in secret locations, not in
public buildings that were known and open to all; most
sinister of all, the rites included practices that
represented all that was believed to be against human
nature: cannibalistic feasts, incest and other perversions.
It was these ideas that triggered the infamous witchhunts
of early modern Europe.
The picture that I have drawn was built up gradually
during the centuries. The people who were accused of
ritual murder, or suspected if they were not accused,
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RITUAL MURDER
were people seen as non-believers, outsiders, whose very
existence threatened the fabric of society. Belief in
hidden conspiracies, secret societies whose members
aimed to rule the world, were rife from the eighteenth
century onwards. Subsequently Jews, Freemasons, and,
in
twentieth
century
America,
conspiracies
of
communists, were seen in a similar light, as people of evil
intent, whose aim was to destroy society as it then
existed. It is important to recognise the historical depth
of our beliefs in a secret and conspiratorial group, the
epitome of evil characterised by the ritual killing they are
believed to indulge in. The depraved actions of these
hidden beings are very similar to those of witches the
world over: they commit incest, kill and eat human
beings and commit the most lurid crimes. This is part of a
cultural deinition of evil, just as beliefs in witchcraft as a
manifestation of evil, are part of the world view of most
Africans (see Pocock, Parkin et al The Anthropology of
Evil.11
The colonisation of Africa may have suppressed human
sacriice but it allowed for the development in Europe of
the myth of ritual murder in another direction. The
former existence of human sacriice in West Africa
encouraged the most sinister beliefs about African
culture. Events in Africa seemed to conirm these as
realistic portrayals. From the end of the nineteenth
century onwards there were outcrops of serial killings in
diferent parts of Africa that local people claimed were
the work of human beings who had transformed
themselves into animals, usually leopards or lions. Given
the belief that occurs in many parts of Africa that witches
can transform themselves into wild animals for the
purpose of killing and ‘eating’ other human beings, an
anthropologist would expect that both the killing and the
eating were spiritual rather than actual. However the
deaths were real and the death blows appeared to have
been dealt by an animal, showing wounds apparently
inlicted by teeth and claws, although sceptics claimed
that these mutilations might be inlicted by special
weapons designed to conceal the fact that the killer was
another human being. Given the existence in Sierra
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Leone, where the irst such cases emerged, of secret
societies of witches associated with leopards it was
thought that these societies might be to blame and that
the killings were oferings to their secret shrines. Some
witnesses claimed to have seen leopards attacking the
victims, others claimed that the murderers were human
beings disguised as leopards. The European colonial
servants who were responsible for the areas in which
these murders occurred and who shared to a greater or
lesser extent existing fantasies about Africa were unable
to decide whether the killings were ritual murder or not.
But reports of the deaths contributed to a whole genre of
literature that embedded the notion of ritual murder ever
more deeply into the European imagination. 12
Ritual murder is still murder and hence a crime. If we
treat it as such, we have to consider what the evidence
for it is. Over the course of history, many people have
been accused of ritual murder and many have been
executed for it, but the evidence for their guilt has been
unsatisfactory from a modern point of view. Two kinds of
evidence have been accepted as ‘proof’ of participation
in ritual murder: irst accusations by people who claimed
to have sufered the evil attacks and/or to have seen the
secret meetings or secondly confessions from the
accused, in former times often extracted by torture.
Checks as to whether personal malice or pre-existing
quarrels were the cause of accusations seem not to have
been made although the accused have often claimed that
the allegations were the result of malice. Independent
evidence or material evidence such as would be
demanded in a prosecution today has never existed. Yet
the idea persists because it represents in a dramatic form
what is the ultimate in inhuman evil and by contrast
emphasises what it is to be human.
At the end of the twentieth century people across the
world asserted their belief in rituals that included the
sacriice of children as oferings to the devil. In the
United States, Britain, Europe, Australia and New
Zealand accusations were made. The rituals were said to
include a modern sin, that of the sexual abuse of
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RITUAL MURDER
children, but in other respects they resembled the
accusations made across early modern Europe and
included allegations of human sacriice and cannibalism.
But when investigated, the evidence for the conviction
that ritual murder was being perpetrated was very like
that of early modern Europe: allegations, often from
children, and the ‘confessions’ of adults who claimed to
have been participants. There was no forensic evidence.
As one journalist put it, despite modern sophisticated
techniques of investigation, police found: “no bodies, no
bones, no blood, nothing”.
Yet seven years after the ritual abuse panic died down,
when a little boy’s mutilated body was found loating in
the Thames, some of the same people who had publicised
their belief in Satanism claimed it as justifying their
beliefs. The Catholic Herald proclaimed: “Boy’s torso
prompts new ‘Satanic abuse’ fears (March 2002). Was
this the proof of ritual murder that had not been
available before? It was presented as such in the media.
Amazing detective work by the Metropolitan Police
traced the child, referred to as Adam, irst by the police
and later from its use in the media, by everyone in
general. Medical science showed the mutilations had
been performed after death. The origin of the only
garment he was wearing, shorts, were traced by their
label. Forensic science indicated from the contents of his
stomach where he had originally come from, Nigeria,
from a village in the south-east of the country. This is all
material evidence on which conclusions may be based
and it can only be challenged by similar but contrary
evidence.
Yet, despite the good work of the police, they could not
show why Adam was killed and then mutilated or who did
it. Nevertheless his death continues to be cited as
evidence for the existence of ritual murder. It was the
fact that ‘Adam’ was found to be African turned attention
to the possibility of ritual murder. According to one BBC
report, (BBC News July 9th 2002 accessed April 13 2010)
police were investigating whether Adam’s death “was a
West African voodoo killing involving human sacriice.”
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The use of the term voodoo is an example of how
ignorance about a non-Christian religion can support this
myth of ritual murder. Vodun is a religion that developed
in the Caribbean among West African slaves, from a
mixture of Catholic Christianity and the traditional
beliefs preserved in memories of their homeland. Its
rituals do not include human sacriice, but the whites in
the Caribbean, for reasons that were partly political,
claimed it was devil worship and that evil reputation has
clung to it ever since. Voodoo became a term denoting
evil magic and ritual practices, even in Africa.13
When it was discovered that the child Adam was
probably brought to London from Africa, which has for
centuries been subject to myths about ‘The Dark
Continent’, certain people hastened to claim that it
‘proved’ the truth of satanic ritual abuse and of human
sacriice continuing to occur among the ‘uncivilised’. The
general attitude has been described very nicely by David
Pratten who wrote: “…Africa represented a blank space
in Europe’s collective imagination and could therefore be
populated by all manner of invented creatures,
sometimes noble, sometimes monstrous, that were the
visual and visceral products of European fears and
desires” (Pratten 2007:9) Over simplistic ideas about
‘leopard societies’ and secret organisations that kill for
pleasure, have inluenced Christian missionaries in
Nigeria and kept the idea of ritual murder alive.
While Sanders (2001) has done a good job of pointing
out how the continued emphasis on the African
provenance of ‘ritual murder’ has deepened existing
prejudices about Africa and Africans, he stufs all the
evidence of British cultural concepts into that vast
portmanteau labelled The Other. Unfortunately this
neither illuminates nor analyses the ethnographic
material that is thus bundled together. What I have tried
to do here is to show how British concepts of evil –
particularly the ideas of ritual murder and human
sacriice – emerge in the way they think about the African
killings. 'Ritual murder' is a European representation of
great evil; its historical origin has been demonstrated by
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RITUAL MURDER
historians who have demonstrated its role in generating
the Christian pursuit of witches in early modern Europe.
It is hardly surprising then that the present rash of
accusations of witchcraft against children (which I have
no had time to deal with) owes as much to Christian
fundamentalist missions as to ‘traditional’ African ideas
of witchcraft. In today’s Africa the Pentecostal belief in
Satan’s demonic servants as the source of the power of
witchcraft links the two concepts irmly together into a
single contemporary image of the grossest evil.
Beliefs in ritual murder and in witchcraft are similar
cultural traditions and both are worthy of anthropological
study and of comparison, since if it is to be anything
anthropology must be comparative. While I have not
attempted this yet, a brief indication of the diferences
and similarities between the concepts might be a itting
end to this article.
Both the idea of ritual murder and the concept of
witchcraft concern activities and persons who do not, as
far as we know, exist. While real people may be accused,
the evidence supporting the accusations is not rationally
founded or supported by hard evidence So we are talking
about ideas, not behaviour, but ideas that motivate strong
reactions. The actions and the people who perform them
represent evil in its most extreme forms. The actions of
witches and in ritual murder include the same acts of
evil:
incest,
sexual
perversion,
infanticide
and
cannibalism; the cannibalism ills a lust for human lesh,
rather than any ritual or symbolic requirement which
may surround cannibalism in societies that do undertake
it This may be what makes it so evil. In efect, these
persons are inhuman and their lack of humanity may be
further emphasised by attributing to them nonsensical
reversals of behaviour. By opposition then, both concepts
deine not merely inhuman but human nature, not merely
evil but the bounds of what is permissible in human
society.
Both concepts also are linked to the distribution of
unfortunate events although the power raised by ritual
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JEAN LA FONTAINE
murder is not directed by individuals against their
personal enemies. But neither allows for the random
event, drawing everything into a framework of human (or
near human) causative power. Moreover both concepts
embody the possibility of social destruction whether of
social life or of interpersonal relations and relate this to
the power of evil, whether generated by organised
groups or seen in individual malice. Evil can and may
destroy the world.
Of course there are diferences. In Western society evil
is characterised by a group whose individual members
act in concert to worship the fount of all evil, their
demonic master. Witchcraft is essentially a matter of
individuals, although Western witches undertook a
collective worship of Satan. While African witches may
attend communal feasts, the emphasis usually lies on the
debts created by the provision of the lesh, the substance
of the feast that create indebtedness between provider
and receiver. Hence perhaps the elaboration of
diferences in behaviour and appearance of witches, the
unnatural human beings, that does not appear to
characterise participants in ritual murder. Indeed ritual
murder does not depend on the people who enact the
killing being inhuman, merely evil. Ritual murder, then,
brings destructive evil within the range of human
possibilities.
Notes
1. Ritual is also used as a technical term in the psychological
disciplines to indicate an individual’s repetitive behaviour
that has meaning but no material efect or purpose. It is
usually not public but may be secret without incurring the
designation of evil unless it disregards customary rules or
breaks the law. Like public ritual it must be invariant and
may beneit the performer. I am not concerned with that
here.
2. See Bohannan, P. (ed.), 1960. African Homicide and Suicide,
314
RITUAL MURDER
Oxford University Press.
3. Evans-Pritchard recorded that Nuer might ofer a wild
cucumber if no animal were available but that it was clear
that this was merely a stand-in and an undertaking to
perform the usual sacriice when possible.
4. See Law, R., 1985. Human Sacriice in Pre-Colonial West
Africa, African Afairs, 84 ( 334) 53–87.
5. Speke records seeing the King of Buganda shoot the head of
a passing slave to demonstrate to his European visitor the
efectiveness of the guns he had bought from Arab traders.
6. Dapper History of Dahomey, cited in Law p74.
7. Given the pressure of the expectation of the husband’s kin
and of society in general, it is hard to say that widows who
committed ‘suttee’ as it was called, always died absolutely
voluntarily.
8. Book of Common Prayer – service of Communion.
9. Historians have pointed out that the fact of human sacriice
was used by some apologists for the slave trade to justify
selling slaves because otherwise they might be taken for
sacriice (Law op.cit.)
10. The term denotes a concoction, made by specialists for
their clients, which is magically rather than materially
efective. It is thus not medicine in a modern Western
sense, which is why I use the word in inverted commas.
11. See Parkin, D. (ed.), 1991. The Anthropology of Evil,
Blackwell.
12. I think it no coincidence that Lawrence Pazder, author with
Michelle Smith, irst his patient and later his wife, of
Michelle Remembers, a book which had a considerable
inluence in generating belief about Satanic Abuse in the
USA in the 1980s, had once been a missionary in Nigeria
13. Bettina Schmidt explains vodun as it is properly called. See
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La Fontaine, J. (ed.), 2009. The Devil’s Children, Ashgate.
References
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Clendinnen, Inga. 1995. Aztecs: An Interpretation,
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Coggins Clemency and Orrin C. Shane III. 1984. Cenote
of Sacriices, The University of Texas Press.
Girard, René. 1979. Violence and the Sacred, translated
by P. Gregory, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Girard, René. 2001. I See Satan Fall Like Lightning,
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Green, Miranda. 2001. Dying for the Gods, Trafalgar
Square.
Heinsohn, Gunnar. 1992. The Rise of Blood Sacriice and
Priest Kingship in Mesopotamia: A Cosmic Decree?
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Hughes, Dennis. 1991. Human Sacriice in Ancient
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Hughes, Derek. 2007. Culture and Sacriice: Ritual Death
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Hutton, Ronald. 1991. The Pagan Religions of the
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Kahaner, Larry. 1994. Cults That Kill, Warner Books.
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Africa, African Afairs, 84 (334) 53–87.
Muchembled, Robert. 1990. Satanic myths and cultural
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Modern European Witchcraft: Centres and Peripheries,
Clarendon Press.
Pratten, David. 2007. The Man-Leopard Murders,
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Sanders, Todd. 2001. Save Our Skins: Structural
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Witchcraft and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa (eds)
Moore, HL and T. Sanders, Routledge.
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Valerio Valeri. 1985. Kingship and Sacriice: Ritual and
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Van Baaren, Th. P. 1964. Theoretical Speculations on
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Willems, Harco. 1990. Crime, Cult and Capital
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Williams, Cliford. 1988. Asante: Human Sacriice or
Capital Punishment? An Assessment of the Period 18071874, The International Journal of African Historical
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Chapter 12
AN EXTREME READING OF FACEBOOK
Daniel Miller
I welcome the development of internet forums such as
the Open Anthropology Cooperative and Medianth. One
question they raise is what we might use such public
sites for as opposed to more conventional publications. I
guess one answer I have seen is draft papers. Another,
which I will explore here, is for taking arguments beyond
those likely to be accepted for publication in more
conventional media. In this instance I am going to take
an actual publication and extract three of its component
arguments. I will then take them a bit beyond the form
they are given in that publication, simply because I didn’t
think more extreme readings would be acceptable, and
also because, despite being a self-proclaimed extremist
(2010:1-11) I am not at all sure if I even agree with them.
But like any academic I see an intellectual merit in
pursuing such logics, and I would hope that they also suit
these public forums as a means for provoking debate.
The publication these excerpts are taken from is called
Tales from Facebook (Polity April 2011). As it happens, it
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DANIEL MILLER
is a rather unconventional publication in its own right. It
consists of twelve portraits of individual Trindidadians
written in a similar style to a previous book of mine The
Comfort of Things (2008) and uses these to consider the
impact of Facebook on these individuals, although each
also thereby also seeks to make some academic point.
These are followed by three short essays. One takes the
question of how Trinidadian Facebook is; the second
looks at 15 tentative theses about Facebook more
generally; and the third, which is summarised in this
paper, develops an extended analogy between Kula and
Facebook in order to construct an anthropological theory
of the latter.
The three propositions I propose to push to more
extreme lengths here are as follows:
1)
That Facebook radically transforms the premise
and direction of social science.
2)
That Facebook is a medium for developing a
relationship to god.
3)
That Facebook, like Kula, is an ideal foundation for
a theory of culture mainly because Facebook and Kula
are practically the same thing.
I am optimistic that academics will ind grounds for
disagreement with these three assertions.
Proposition 1: Facebook radically transforms the
premise and direction of social science.
SNS (Social Network Sites) are already a major global
phenomenon. While some of the initial sites such as
Cyworld in South Korea have largely remained regional,
Facebook is approaching 500 million users spread right
across the world. Where Facebook is banned in China,
QQ is used on an average day by 111 million people.
Other major populations such as Brazil are dominated by
alternative social networking sites such as Orkut, though
shifts can be rapid as, for example, currently in South
East Asia with the migration in the last year from
Friendster to Facebook. Other sites with diferent
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AN EXTREME READING OF FACEBOOK
functionality such as Twitter and Foursquare are also
emerging as potentially highly signiicant.
The starting point for this proposition is that such
developments ly in the face of the central tenets of social
science. Foundational to Western social science has been
the belief that human societies exhibit a slow but
constant trajectory away from what are taken to be an
earlier state in which people lived in communities, based
around close kinship ties and devotion to immediate
social relationships. Whether starting from the writings
of Tonnies, Durkheim or Simmel, social scientists have
assumed that under such conditions we do not study
people just as individuals, but rather each person can be
understood as a site of social networking. This became
the premise for the development of anthropology. With its
emphasis on kinship, any given person was seen
primarily through their place in such a network, for
example the category of being someone else’s `mother’s
brother’. So, long before Facebook, networking acted as
a kind of shorthand for the way social science understood
small-scale and traditional societies.
In contrast to anthropology, sociology was principally
concerned with the consequences of an assumed decline
from this condition as a result of industrialisation,
capitalism and urbanism. Still today many of the most
inluential books in sociology such as Putnam’s Bowling
Alone (2001) or Sennett’s Fall of Public Man, (1977)
along with works by Giddens, Beck and Bauman remain
clearly within this dominant trajectory. In all such work
there is an assumption that older forms of tight social
networking colloquially characterised by words such as
community or neighbourhood are increasingly replaced
by the dominance of individuals and individualism. My
own recent book The Comfort of Things based on a single
street in London gave strong conirmation to such
arguments, since households proved to be largely
detached from those who lived nearby and often from all
other forms of community or wider social groupings
(2008).
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DANIEL MILLER
How then should social science respond to an
extraordinary phenomenon that has arisen within the last
decade and most especially during the six years when
Facebook has been in existence? When the internet irst
developed similar claims were made about its
revolutionary impact on social science theory. Research
by myself and Don Slater (2000) was among the irst to
show that that while the internet may be hugely
important in other ways the evidence for this `reversal’
in macro social change towards individualism was very
limited. At that time we were keen to pour cold water on
any such speculation that the internet somehow lew in
the face of conventional social science. We pointed out
that just because one could ind extensive material on the
internet that claimed to represent some sort of
community was no evidence in itself. In fact many people
ended up putting such materials on the internet precisely
because these had been dismissed by all other media and
no one took them seriously. A place on the internet could
be evidence for how insigniicant something was rather
than the reverse. Others such as John Postill provide
many good reasons for being careful with regard to any
glib use of the term community in this regard and Steve
Woolgar devoted a whole research project to a sceptical
perspective on these early claims (Postill 2008, Woolgar
2001).
However in 2009-10 I carried out research in Trinidad
which revealed a very diferent situation. This is the irst
work to document what happens when social networking
matures into a facility increasingly popular with older
people and in countries other than the US. The initial
literature on social networking sites (from Boyd and
Ellison 2007 through to Kirkpatrick 2010) was based on a
period when these seemed to be the plaything of college
students (especially in the US), for whom Facebook was
invented.
My Trinidad research represents a more mature phase
in the development of Facebook. It is based on more than
a year participating with many Trinidadians on Facebook
itself, supplemented by two months there discussing
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AN EXTREME READING OF FACEBOOK
Facebook face-to-face with those same participants,
including over ifty more formal interviews, most of them
carried out with Mirca Madianou, since they overlapped
with another research project we are conducting jointly
on the impact of new media on transnational
communication, with case studies of Filipino domestic
workers as well as Trinidadians.
The research in Trinidad demonstrates that there
really is a case for saying that SNS reverse certain key
trends presumed by most of social science. What had
become regarded as the natural attrition of relationships
is reversed. Previously we tended to lose touch with
groups we once knew well who become replaced by new
sets of friends. But almost inevitably the irst action in
using Facebook seems to be the resurrection of all lost
relationships, for example, with ex-school friends or
relatives who have migrated. Many of the participants in
our study used these networks for several hours a day in
order to resurrect what might be seen as a more
traditional devotion to close social relationships that do
come close to classical ideas of community.
Once this issue arose from the ieldwork, I decided
deliberately to target research on people who still live in
small villages and hamlets and who are well aware of the
nature and character of such communities. It seemed
right to let such people comment on the degree to which
Facebook was or was not analogous to their own
experience of living in a community and in other social
networks such as kinship ties.
So let me summarise a portrait of someone who
exempliies this aspect of the research in the book:
Alana is a college student who lives in a kind of
settlement that has become quite rare in contemporary
Trinidad. Modern Trinidad is a pretty mobile place and
one meets relatively few people of any age who live
where they were born. Her hamlet, Santa Ana, is quite
small. There are around twenty-ive houses straddling a
ridge in the foothills of the mountains that form a spine
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DANIEL MILLER
pointing north. These houses, with only two exceptions,
represent the descendants of the same three or four core
families. So by now pretty much everyone in the village is
related to everyone else. When it comes to any kind of
signiicant event, such as a wedding or a wake, any
remaining lack of relationship is ignored. For all intents
and purposes this village is a family writ large. It also has
those other hallmarks of community, for example Alana’s
family have a running feud with their neighbour that has
gone on for years. Every time a pause arises that might
lead to a rapprochement, it gets extended by disputes
about where children shouldn’t be playing or when dogs
shouldn’t be barking.
Alana has two main times when she is involved in
Facebook. She was originally persuaded to go on
Facebook by a score of younger cousins who like to play
the game FarmVille. She admits that this can add up to
something like two hours a day of online labour. But the
consequence is a thriving online cousinhood that is
efective in developing her extended family relations. In
order to detach from the family she goes to sleep around
8 pm. She then gets up at midnight and from then to 3
am she is on Facebook with most of her college class.
Almost all of them have adopted the same diurnal
rhythm. Alana reckons that only about 20% of the
subsequent conversation is purely discussion of
homework and joint projects.
Amongst my various conversations with Alana, one
centres on this question of an analogy with community.
What was it like growing up in and continuing to live in
Santa Ana? As a student at university she is used to
thinking abstractly about such comparisons and
concepts. Nor does she have the slightest dificulty
appreciating the meaning of community. In her mind
there is a clear analogy but in various respects Facebook
is not a patch on the real thing. However much one
blames Facebook for malicious or ill-informed gossip,
Alana feels it doesn’t even begin to approach what
happens routinely in a small place like Santa Ana. She
tells of how, in a community like this, people would look
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AN EXTREME READING OF FACEBOOK
at or the youths in the village, at how their friend’s
children are growing up,. They wouldn’t take time to get
to know them, they would just sit and talk about whether
a child is neglected or a youth is into drugs. She says
`Yeh, it’s much much worse. I think people still have
some level of respect on Facebook, well at least the
people that I socialize with. They wouldn’t blatantly put
something very ofensive. We recently had a stranger
that came in. I think he dating a girl out the road and she
girl, she pretty young. And she and a guy in the village
always had an exchange of words. Like throw talk for one
another and stuf like that. So he was passing and
something she said and her boyfriend get up and try
swing a blade at him. And he hold it and pull it away from
his hand. All his ligaments and everything gone. He came
out of the hospital about three days ago. His right hand,
he can’t do anything right now. He have strings and stuf
on his hand trying to get it back... yeah terrible’.
The point can also work in the other direction. People
congregate online and help each other with homework.
But that doesn’t represent the kind of commitment
people make to each other in the village. Santa Ana is a
place where you can spend the whole day cooking
something up for a neighbour who is hosting some
communal occasion. There had just recently been a wake
that is celebrated on the irst year’s anniversary of a
death, with food cooked by many neighbours and the
community playing cards into the night. In a village such
as this, whatever the internal quarrels, there is still the
foundation for deep and sustained solidarity in relation to
an external threat. When someone is ill or in crisis, you
know instinctively what being in a community means, the
responsibilities it gives you and the hold it has on you.
When judging the nature of Facebook as a community
Alana is clear that it can only be assessed relative to
oline community. She regards her situation, living in
Santa Ana, as exceptional in contemporary Trinidad.
When you are living in a place like that, the community is
incredibly intense and her use of Facebook, however
sociable, is a means to give herself some sort of break
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DANIEL MILLER
from that intensity. If people in Santa Ana turn to
Facebook as a kind of milder version of community, it is
to achieve some sort of distance, because the reality of
living within such a close-knit community is simply too
intense and invasive.
She contrasts her experience with that of a friend who
lives in a much more typical settlement within Trinidad,
near Tunapuna: ‘it’s more of a small town and you don’t
really see people going by each other. But she will keep
in contact via Facebook’. For her friend there simply isn’t
enough actual community. She is frustrated at how little
she knows or interacts with the people who live close to
her. So her experience of Facebook does the opposite. It
helps create a bit more social intensity in a situation
where people have an insuficiency of direct
communication and contact with each other. So Alana
concludes that Facebook is used to balance out the
degree of oline community.
Facebook has all the contradictions found in a
community. You simply can’t have both closeness and
privacy. You can’t have support without claustrophobia.
You can’t have such a degree of friendship without the
risk of explosive quarrelling. Either everything is more
socially intense or none of it is. This is one of the ironies
of the huge emphasis on the loss of privacy that we ind
in journalist’s accounts. It’s the same public discourse
that goes on and on about how we have lost
neighbourhood and community and everyone is so
individualistic and lonely. Well if you really do want to
have more community and less isolated individualism
then that means trading privacy. But popular discourse
wants it both ways, they want a community that is totally
private and anthropologists should be pointing out this
kind of contradiction.
So the most important thing Facebook provides is a
means to complement the oline version of community
and to live with those same contradictions.
I found Alana’s account the most plausible I have come
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across and the one that accords best with the indings of
my research. I don’t have the space here to examine in as
much detail the relationship of Facebook to other aspects
of close social relations such as kinship, but my
conclusions there are similar. What this means is that the
best way to understand Facebook is in relation to
anthropological studies of close-knit and intense society,
not as part of sociology’s encounter with contemporary
individualism and the kind of networking envisaged by
Castells (2000) Facebook seems like the end of what
previously was the natural attrition of social networks. It
brings all those who were once disregarded back into the
frame of current regard, such as lost kin and school
friends. Equally important is the ability of Facebook to
bring back Diaspora populations and ameliorate the
efect of their residence in diferent countries.
Facebook is six years old, but if it continues on its
currently trajectory and a billion people use it for several
hours a day mainly for actual social networking, with the
resultant intensiication of those social networks, then we
will see a kind of shift from sociology to anthropology
that we never dared expect. This is perhaps the most
profound challenge to the basic presuppositions of social
science for a century.
Proposition 2: Facebook is a medium for developing
a relationship to god.
I have always been fascinated by the Akheda, the
section in the bible where Abraham ofers to sacriice his
son Isaac to god. This is when a covenant is established
and we see thereby the efective institutionalisation of
that monotheism that develops unto Judaism, Christianity
and Islam. For theologians such as Levinas, the key
moment within the Akheda is when Abraham says the
word ‘Here I Am’. By standing before god, he establishes
humanity in the moral gaze of the divine. From a secular
perspective one could turn this around and argue that
this is equally the moment which establishes the divine
as the projected vantage from which humanity sees itself
as being seen. It is culmination of a journey a `going
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DANIEL MILLER
forth’ (lek lek’ha) that Abraham makes from the irst
mythic portion of the bible which has much in common
with Sumerian myths such as Noah and the Flood to the
main `historical’ narrative which leads to this
monotheistic trajectory.
If this is viewed, however, only as a movement from
myth to history it raises the question of whether
Abraham should be regarded as some kind of freakish or
unique episode based on the speciic latent propensity of
this individual patriarch to search out such a relationship
to the divine as witness and thus moral encompassment
of humanity, which leads in turn to the religious
conceptualisations of these three monotheistic religions
and eventually to further ethical and political orders of a
secular kind. Or should the story of Abraham be seen as
neither myth nor history, but rather as a pointed to some
broader latent propensity towards a vision of moral
humanity with analogies that make it a characteristic of
being human? In which case this same `going forth’ or
journey towards the conditions of the Akheda is
something we might expect of people generally, including
those who may be polytheistic of atheist in their beleifs,
in which case it could be equally prevalent in the secular
conditions of the contemporary world?
When investigating Facebook, the irst step is to take it
at
`face-value’
simply
an
efective
means
of
communication to multiple audiences, that helps people
keep in touch, post photos and everything else that
makes up a simple description of what Facebook appears
to be and do. But after a while it becomes clear that
there is a sort of surplus communicative economy to
Facebook, in that people seem to do all sorts of things
with it, and think of it in various ways that are hard to
reduce either to some kind of communicative
instrumentalism or indeed to any other kind of
instrumentalism.
When I irst started to try and understand this surplus
communicative economy, I came up with the question of
whether Facebook should be considered some kind of
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AN EXTREME READING OF FACEBOOK
meta-friend. What if, instead of seeing Facebook as a
means to facilitate friendships between people, many of
us use friendships between people in order to facilitate a
relationship to Facebook itself? I had this fantasy that
what most people should really be typing under the title
of relationship status was: Married to Facebook lol? A
common trope in modern discourse is that we feel we live
in an era of materialism or fetishism, such that proper
relationships between people are being replaced by
relationships to things instead. This is a rather simplistic
rendition of our world. As I have argued many times with
regard to Mauss’s The Gift (1990), an anthropological
sensibility is surely very diferent from a colloquial one.
We have never regarded culture as a medium
constructed to facilitate friendships between persons. On
the contrary, relationships and exchange between
persons, for example kin relations, are usually seen as a
means to grow culture, for example through exchange.
So for anthropologists, a relationship to Facebook as a
thing is not axiomatically morally inferior to a
relationship with a person. We do not resort to such
simple judgments; we try to understand these cultural
processes.
Given that Facebook is a social network, perhaps the
simplest idiom for conceiving of this relationship to
Facebook itself is to think of it as a sort of meta-bestfriend. In the popular culture of TV, on programmes such
as Sex and the City, a best friend is the person we can
turn to when we are feeling lonely, depressed or bored,
when life seems to have less purpose than usual. Our
best friend is the one who is least likely to mind being
disturbed when having a meal, or wanting to go to sleep,
because they sense our deep need to engage in long
gossipy discussions about ourselves or others, just to
make us feel better. One advantage of Facebook is that it
is a totally reliable best friend. Even at 3 a.m., when not
even our best best-friend wants to be disturbed, we can
turn to Facebook and feel connected with all those other
lives, and come out of it less lonely and bored. Though, of
course, we may also end up being more depressed or
jealous because of the revelations about all those very
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DANIEL MILLER
active other people who don’t seem lonely and bored. But
this can happen after face-to-face chats with actual best
friends also. There are people who see themselves as
irredeemably unattractive and shunned by those who, in
public, don’t want to be associated with them. Fieldwork
suggested to me that this was not uncommon, especially
for school-age children. Such people often ind Facebook
a lot more forgiving and benign. You can’t say that the
photos on someone else’s Facebook site were posted
speciically for you to see, but also you can’t say they
weren’t. Once there, they are part of your social life.
Journalism is already full of extreme stories about
Facebook’s negative impacts. It is held responsible for
people becoming jealous and murdering their lover, or for
paedophilic grooming. To a lesser extent there are also
positive stories about how Facebook stopped someone
from committing suicide and helps those who are
depressed. With 500 million users, we can be pretty sure
that most stories and anecdotes about what Facebook
might be capable of doing are true, however extreme.
But that is a good reason to replace journalism and
anecdote with more systematic research, which can
demonstrate that such instances may be so exceptional
as to be largely inconsequential, except for the people
directly involved in those cases. It is not necessary to
suggest that Facebook as a meta-best-friend necessarily
cures depression or prevents suicide. We can still
recognise that it is plausible, for a number of people, that
it does act to complement oline friendships and to
become signiicant as a friend in its own right.
Facebook is somewhere we can talk as much as we
like, with or without responses from others. It is a site
that genuinely addresses the perennial problem of
boredom,
especially
teenage
boredom,
without
necessarily imposing on the time of others. It has its
limits; it doesn’t get drunk when we do. It doesn’t always
comment back when we want it to. You can only ‘sort of’
have sex with it. But at a meta-level it may serve a
purpose. Some of the most poignant examples we found
were of a person who posted constantly about a baby that
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was born prematurely and another who posted about a
parent alicted with a terminal illness. We observed that
these individuals seemed not too concerned whether or
not the responses they received were from people they
knew well. Facebook allowed the public sharing of
sufering. It was a ‘witness’ to sufering that might be
cathartic in its own right. The fact that Facebook is made
up of actual people may give it unprecedented power and
plausibility to act like a meta-person in this way. The
downside to this relationship would be its potential to
become so extreme that it does become appropriate to
talk of fetishism or indeed pathology. One of the stories in
Tales from Facebook is about a man who feels his
partner’s addiction to Facebook has become pretty much
on a par with heroin addiction; at least it became fatal to
their relationship. There was no evidence that this sort of
thing was common, but I believe that some sort of bestfriend like relationship with Facebook is.
This is a work of anthropology rather than psychology,
but it is worth at least speculating about Facebook’s role
in facilitating the fantasy worlds of individuals. Imagine a
novel in which two work colleagues have barely
exchanged more than a few sentences, an occasional
comment on what the other is wearing, but little more.
Yet one of them dissects each word actually spoken, each
glance, in copious detail. The man thereby convinces
himself that he is now completely in love and in thrall to
this work colleague and would surely leave his wife for
her if only he didn’t have children. He knows exactly
which Greek island will be the site of their passionate
tryst. A little molehill of conversation becomes the
mountain that moves Tristan and Isolde. My evidence for
the impact of Facebook in this regard is very limited. But
it seems likely that people’s increased ability to observe
and follow another person passively gives even more
licence to their internal fantasy world, where they can
imagine whatever they might choose to happen between
them. It is therefore possible that one of the most
signiicant impacts of Facebook will be on internal worlds
of fantasy and imagination, where many people spend
much of their time.
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One of the irst discussions of the internet’s impact
that looked more deeply into its possible consequences
was The Second Self by Sherry Turkle (1984). But much
of her discussion concerned the implications of being
anonymous and how people could appear to be someone
quite diferent from their oline selves when online.
Although she doesn’t make explicit use of his work, her
discussion leads back to Erving Gofman, the author of
the most rewarding of all social science writings about
the self (1956, 1974). Yet Facebook points us in the
opposite direction to this concern with anonymity,
indicating rather an end to anonymity. This alone should
give pause for thought to anyone who thinks such digital
technologies lay down a consistent path in any given
direction. In either case, such debates release us from
any simple or colloquial assumption that there is
evidently a more true or less true self, or that these
correspond to the distinction between online and oline
selves. What Gofman and Turkle reveal is that all
versions of the self are to some degree performative and
based on frames of expectation. We play a variety of roles
in life with degrees of attachment and distance.
To determine whether or how far Facebook itself
makes a diference to the nature of the self or selfconsciousness is extremely dificult. For example, one
could argue that the sheer number of photographs a
person posts online must create a new self-consciousness
about their appearance. As someone commented, ‘I think
for teenagers Facebook is just dangerous, and seeing
everybody’s photos makes you so supericial. It’s like
constantly looking in a mirror and seeing yourself
relected. But through other people’s eyes. So you have
everybody’s opinions coming down on you, because
everyone will comment on your photos. “And, oh I love
your top” or this and that and you never know, it’s just
constant. So I don’t think it’s healthy for teenagers at all
or anybody who has insecurities’. There were many
versions of this idea that Facebook makes us more
concerned with appearances and thus more supericial.
But often such arguments work by contrasting the
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concrete present with a mythical, more authentic past. I
was conducting ieldwork in Trinidad long before the
invention of the internet, and at times I would spend
hours with young women who were getting changed to
go out for an evening. They would try on seven diferent
outits to get the right image. It’s hard to imagine they
could be any more self-conscious about their public
appearance now than they were then. At that time I
argued that, in an egalitarian society such as Trinidad,
the concept of the self depended less on some interior
being or institutionalized position or role. The self is a
more transient creation, largely formed from other
people’s responses to your appearance, which alone tells
you who you are. So if the truth of who you are exists
largely in other peoples responses to how you look, it is
not that unreasonable to be obsessed about your public
appearance.
Lets move this from an issue of psychology to one of
anthropology. The idea that making visible relationships
is far more than just a representation of those
relationships
has
become
widely
accepted
in
anthropology largely through the writings of Marilyn
Strathern. In her work a person is constituted by a
network of relationships which are not just made
manifest, but come to exist through becoming apparent.
So in The Gender of The Gift the birth of a child was
signiicant in particular because it objectiied the
relationships that are made evident through the
existence of that child (1986). Obviously having a child is
what makes people related as parents.
Scroll on a few years and it looks as though Strathern
was not merely a theorist but a rather prescient prophet.
Since today, when so many of us regularly use social
networking sites, it seems almost common sense to see
an individual on our computer screen as constituted by
their network of relationships and to regard social
networks as a medium of objectiication that makes these
not only visible, but also constitutive. A student
increasingly discovers who they are by going online and
checking to see in what regard they are held by how
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DANIEL MILLER
many people and how they have engaged with them and
each other. Social networks also seem to generate their
own compulsion to visibility. Just as people don’t feel they
were not actually on holiday unless they can see
photographs of themselves enjoying that holiday, so today
some people don’t feel they have experienced an event
unless they have broadcast it through Facebook or
Twitter. It is as though we have all read Strathern and
want to transform our lives to accord better with her
understanding of the nature of social networks.
This idea that making a relationship visible also
creates that relationship can extend to the self. Facebook
is a place where you discover who you are by seeing a
visible objectiication of yourself. Central to Trinidadian
cosmology, as found in Carnival, is the belief that a mask
or outward appearance is not a disguise. As something
you have crafted or chosen and not merely been born
with, the mask is a better indication of the actual person
than your unmasked face. This is why one of my
informants states that the true person is the one you
meet on Facebook, not the person you meet face-to-face.
It follows that the truth about yourself is revealed to you
by what you post on Facebook. On Facebook you ind out
who you are.
I believe, however, that there is a inal stage in
accounting for this surplus economy of communication
that is Facebook. What becomes clear from studying
Facebook after a while is that, whatever the reason why
we irst friended them, most people are well aware that
there are two main layers to their network. There is the
active layer they respond to and who respond to them
and the inactive layer of hundreds of others who have
come to represent a generic other consisting of the
anyone or everyone. We may not actively engage with
them, but we are well aware that they are there and the
question remains what their role is in relation to our
personal postings.
The idea of witnessing comes in dozens of diferent
philosophical and theological guises. In the next section I
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turn to Nancy Munn on Kula; she makes considerable use
of just such a concept of witnessing which she derives
from Jean-Paul Sartre. There are powerful religious
undercurrents to the idea that everything we do is seen,
or should be seen, by another, perhaps divine force. A
common trope in the various forms of Christianity found
in Trinidad is the idea of an all-witnessing God from
whom nothing is or should be hidden. An increasing
proportion of Trinidadians follow various kinds of
Pentecostal and Apostolic churches where concepts of
witnessing are central. But even without any religious
beliefs, there are plenty of secular equivalents. Consider,
for example, Freud’s concept of the superego, the
introjected image of one’s own parents, who see
everything and again become the foundation for our
moral evaluations.
This is what leads me back to my starting point when
considering the Akheda and to Levinas’ proposition that
we are constituted as moral agents only in relation to this
third observing other, which corresponds to the divine
before whom Abraham can proclaim `Here I am’ (Levinas
1985). It is manifested as the belief that there is a
witness out there that is often the driving force behind
moral action.
In Trinidad it is clear that people are increasingly
aware that Facebook postings are also a form by which
one sets oneself up for moral adjudication. It may be
intentional presentations of ones best face or the fact
that one inevitably ends up being posted while drunk and
disorderly and often with the wrong partner, all of which
shows why Facebook corresponds readily with a
Trinidadian concept of truth. So here perhaps we reach
the logical end of the search for an explanation of the
surplus economy of Facebook.
These relections imply a sort of necessity that people
may feel with regard to ensuring there is a higher and
wider scrutiny of their personal exchanges and selfpresentations. That is, people may want an assurance
that there is some higher moral evaluation and they use
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DANIEL MILLER
Facebook to ensure that it exists. In which case, what
Facebook provides is not only some particular friends
who may comment on you nor even just a meta-bestfriend. We have reached the point where Facebook may
be regarded as providing a crucial medium of visibility
and
public
witnessing.
It
gives
us
a
moral
encompassment within which we have a sense not only of
who we are but of who we ought to be. Facebook is
normative not just in the sense of a consensual
netiquette, but also as a force for witnessing the moral
order of the self. Not for all people and not necessarily.
But without some kind of explanation of this ilk, it is hard
to account for what often appears as a compulsion to
place things under a generic public gaze rather than to
post them to any particular person. Such an argument
would render Facebook anything but supericial. It may
be, for some, their equivalent to the presence of the
divine as witness in their lives. In which case perhaps the
Akheda really is a story about the latent propensity of
humanity with regard to something we have in the past
generally regarded as divine.
Proposition 3: Facebook, like Kula is an ideal
foundation for a theory of culture, mainly because
Facebook and Kula are practically the same thing.
As I have made clear in several previous publications,
my all-time favourite ethnography is The Fame of Gawa
by Nancy Munn, a book that seems to me the culmination
of Malinowski’s project (Munn 1986, Malinowski 1922).
Social scientists are not natural scientists, but I want to
suggest that, if we imagine The Fame of Gawa as a
theorem, than Facebook would be its proof. Kula has
become the ur-example of culture for anthropology. We
might spend the day like animals obtaining and
consuming food, mate, protect our young till they are old
enough to survive for themselves and then die. By
contrast, human societies such as the people of Gawa
create vast arrays of custom and expectation, rituals
based on spirits of good and evil, arts and artefacts,
etiquettes of behaviour, all of which make for a vastly
more elaborate world. This wealth of culture rests on
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fundamental values by which people are expected to live
and are judged. In turn these values create goals in life
that make it rich and complex. Not only that, thanks to
the Kula ring, the cultural universe of Gawa in turn gives
rise to the excitement and challenge of Malinowski’s
Argonauts within a still more expansive universe, where
those who negotiate transactions with other islands make
even wider possibilities and accomplishments beyond the
shores of Gawa itself. The Fame of Gawa is so called
because it rests on a series of sanctions and exhortations
designed to create, maintain and increase these values. If
there were not a great world out there in which we can
do deeds and become known for them, there would be no
possibility of fame and much less to live our lives for.
Culture provides the platform that allows every person to
become a player. Kula activity inally comes back as
Fame; and the people who exchange the valuables
become the ‘celebrities’ of the Kula ring. To use modern
parlance, culture is what ensures that the people of Gawa
‘get a life’.
Munn reasons that this activity represents an
expansion of what she calls inter-subjective spacetime:
the scale of the world within which people can live and
gain Fame. Positive transformations expand this
spacetime and negative transformations shrink it. The
irst chapters of The Fame of Gawa are mainly concerned
with the establishment of positive transformations, the
complex systems of exchanges based on principles of
reciprocity and mutual obligation and expectation that
grow spacetime: irst exchanges within Gawa and then
through Kula with other islands. The inal chapters are
more concerned with witchcraft, an aspect of these same
activities that can destroy and shrink our social
relationships and the ield within which we can gain
Fame. So culture itself can grow or shrink.
If Facebook may be regarded as a kind of social ‘big
bang’ leading to an expanding social universe, then an
analogy seems warranted with Munn’s argument about
culture. For this analogy to be useful, we would have to
see in Facebook something equivalent to both the
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positive expansion and negative shrinking of spacetime.
To start with expansion, in Gawa a contrast is drawn
between just eating the food you grow yourself and
sending it out into ever expanding networks of exchange.
Similarly, in Trinidad, a person might use some
experience or relection in dyadic exchanges with
someone close to them, reporting it in a personal
conversation with another person. I tell you about
something that happened to me and that’s as far as it
goes. But, with Facebook, they can harvest those same
observations from the garden of their experiences and
post them onto a site, where not just one other person
will be able to consume them, but hundreds. Even if no
direct messages are sent to and from individuals, they
are made aware of aspects of others lives through textual
and visual posts. As spacetime, it allows this information
to carry across continents and diasporas, allowing news
and information to travel vast distances with
extraordinary efect. There is an unprecedented
simultaneity, but also a digital inscription that lasts. As
such, Facebook is a positive transformation and
expansion of spacetime through social media.
Trinis are, in general, just as keen as the people of
Gawa that their individual reputations should lead to
enhanced respect for the island of Trinidad itself. Thanks
to Facebook, the achievements of Trinidadians abroad,
the degrees they pass, the children they have, are reinternalised within the local networks of Trinidad, ready
for discussion and assessment. By the same token,
Facebook internationalises events in Trinidad, initially to
the Diaspora and then, if they are of suficient interest, to
others. Similarly, there is a consensual desire to export
interest in particular aspects of Trinidadian culture, such
as Steelband or Carnival. In the book, I also show how
Facebook rests on reciprocal exchanges analogous to
Munn’s reliance on Mauss and indeed Mauss’s on
Malinowski. Munn, as noted above, also uses Sartre’s
concept of wider witnessing ‘In Gawan images of kula
fame, the virtual third party is the distant other who
hears about, rather than directly observes the
transaction……As iconic and relexive code, fame is the
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virtual form of inluence. Without fame a man’s inluence
would, as it were, go nowhere: successful acts would in
efect remain locked within themselves in given times
and places of their occurrence or be limited to immediate
transactors’ (1986: 116-117). My last proposition rests on
the idea that Facebook represents a realisation of this
ideal as a virtual component in the construction of Fame.
Again in my book I demonstrate the application of
Munn’s theory of the ‘qualisign’ to the analysis of
Facebook.
The last chapters of The Fame of Gawa are devoted to
negative transformations of spacetime. This implies that
any cultural form that creates expansion has to have
within itself the opposite quality which would destroy and
shrink spacetime. I argue that the Trinidadian concept of
Bacchanal corresponds to the Gawan concept of
witchcraft because it derives from gossip and the
exchange of news, which is part and parcel of what
makes Facebook work. But it is equally the aspect that
destroys its ability to expand spacetime positively. The
very irst portrait I introduce is one where viewing turns
into stalking, stalking into jealousy and jealousy destroys
a marriage.
There were many other stories circulating in Trinidad
about inadvertent or sometimes deliberate exposure of
sexual material, ranging from school girls to people’s
own relatives. Such as when a photographer has
recorded something and tagged the photograph or, as is
common with teenagers, the mere hint that one person’s
boyfriend was observed with another girl. These can
cause an explosion of recrimination publically aired on
Facebook itself. When such bacchanal occurs it often has
the efect of either demolishing speciic relationships or
of making people in general frightened of the
consequences of beinf exposed through participation in
their online community. Bacchanal thereby directly
contributes to the negative transformations of spacetime
made possible by Facebook as. It shrinks social worlds.
The other signiicant impact of bacchanal is that, like
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DANIEL MILLER
witchcraft in The Fame of Gawa, it also operates as an
important sanction which secures normative and moral
use of Facebook. In Gawa, witchcraft provides a sanction
against those who would rather not bother to take part in
these complex exchanges. We could call them the ‘couch
yams’ of Gawa who just can’t be bothered to help build a
canoe or participate in a ritual, but come to fear
witchcraft. In Trinidad, deining culture itself as
bacchanal creates a ierce and continual debate about
netiquette: how to determine what is proper and
improper
behaviour
in
the
use
of
Facebook.
Conversations about the immaturity of teenagers who fail
to see the consequences of their desire to look more sexy
than the girl next door or about how much they will
regret losing their temper when they vent their spleen
against a parent or best friend on Facebook are typical.
Equally, many negative comments appear about people
who photograph private quarrels or tag too many photos
or otherwise behave inappropriately. This negative
potential, the bacchanal inherent in Facebook that could
destroy community, is one of the main factors that help
people build consensus as to how they should behave
there. At least if they want to stave of destructive acts of
witchcraft.
The extended analogy can be found in the book, where
it is used to demonstrate my claim that, if Munn’s book
were a theorem about culture, then Facebook would be
its proof. The true signiicance of her arguments only
really becomes evident when they are applied, not only to
Gawa, but to an entirely diferent context. Her theory can
work not just for a few hundred people on an island in
Melanesia but helps us to comprehend the vast network
that is Facebook. By the same token, this act of
theorisation makes another point that is central to my
decision to study Facebook from an anthropological
perspective. It follows from this essay that, if Kula
exempliies what anthropologists mean by the word
culture, then so does Facebook.
I would prefer to ofer the evidence of the book rather
than these short examples, in order to make such
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extreme points more plausible; but the world of
publishers seems inexorably slow and the book will not
be out until April. Meanwhile, I hope there is enough
here at least to show why I think anthropology has the
potential to appreciate aspects of Facebook that might
not emerge from discussion by other disciplines. That we
have have a responsibility to at least push things well
beyond the incredibly supericial idea promulgated by
ilms such as The Social Network that Facebook is best
understood by an investigation of its invention by Mark
Zukerberg. I confess that I have pushed things to
extremes, partly because I get intellectual pleasure from
doing so. I am sure that some of you out there will see
this self-indulgence as detrimental to the larger goals of
our discipline, so by all means attack.
References
Boyd, D. and Ellison, N. 2007. Social network sites:
deinition, history, and scholarship, Journal of ComputerMediated Communication, 13(1), article 11, October.
Castells, M. 2000. The Rise of the Network Society. New
Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gofman, E. 1974. Frame Analysis. New York: Harper and
Row.
Gofman. E. 1956. The Presentation of Self in Everyday
Life. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Social Sciences
Research Centre.
Kirkpatrick, D. 2010. The Facebook Efect. New York:
Simon and Schuster.
Levinas, E. 1985. Ethics and Ininity, trans. Richard
Cohen. Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press.
Malinowski, B. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Paciic.
London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul.
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DANIEL MILLER
Mauss, M. 1990[1925] The Gift. London: Routledge
Miller, D. 2008. The Comfort of Things. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Miller, D. 2010. Stuf. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Miller, D. and Slater, D. 2000. The Internet: An
Ethnographic Approach. Oxford: Berg.
Munn, N. 1986. The Fame of Gawa. Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press.
Postill, J. Localising the internet beyond communities and
networks, New Media and Society 10(3):413-431.
Putnam, R. 2001. Bowling Alone. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
Sennett, R. 1977. The Fall of Public Man. New York:
Alfred Knopf.
Strathern, M. 1986. The Gender of the Gift. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986.
Turkle, S. 1884. The Second Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Woolgar, S. Virtual Society? Technology, Cyperbole,
Reality. Oxford University Press, 2002.
342
Chapter 13
FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
Liria de la Cruz and Paloma Gay y Blasco
The relexive turn that made anthropologists protagonists
of their texts did not alter the role of informants: they
remain objects rather than creators of anthropological
knowledge.
Through
their
concepts,
analytical
frameworks, and debates, ethnographers talk to each
other, not to their informants. As interlocutors,
informants belong irmly in the ield, not in the academy.
It is as if informants were what happened to
ethnographers before they started writing. And so,
although ethnographies deal with the lives of informants,
informants are kept out of the conversation of
ethnography.
Here we collaborate, acknowledging that ethnographic
knowledge is made by ethnographers and informants,
and should be owned by both. We write together, an
informant and an anthropologist, a Gitana (Spanish
Gypsy) and a Paya (non-Gypsy), a street seller and an
academic, two women born in the same city, in the same
year, two mothers, two friends. We write about our
343
LIRIA DE LA CRUZ AND PALOMA GAY Y BLASCO
worlds and about us: this text is ethnographic and
biographical. We talk about being women, mothers,
wives, lovers, and workers in a world shaped by
inequalities to do with gender, class, ethnicity and
wealth. And we talk about anthropology: not just as
writing, although that too, but as a powerful presence in
our lives.
By relecting together on our lives and on how we have
inluenced each other through the years, we try to
challenge divisions that have been fundamental to
anthropology since its beginnings. These are the
divisions between ield and academia, between the ones
who write and the ones who are written about, those who
do the knowing and those who are known. We also
consider other divisions: between men and women,
Gitanos and Payos, people for whom everyday survival in
twenty-irst century Spain is easier and people for whom
it is harder. These are the divisions that have moulded
our lives and that underlie our friendship.
We irst met in 1992, when Paloma was doing her
ieldwork in a government-built Gitano ghetto in the
south of Madrid where Liria had some close relatives.
The two of us were twenty-three at the time, since we
were born in Madrid towards the end of the Francoist
dictatorship. Our lives, however, had developed in very
diferent directions. Liria, a Gitana, had grown up in the
expanding suburbs where the cheapest council housing
mixed with shanty-towns. Until leaving to start university
in Britain aged eighteen, Paloma, a middle-class Paya,
had lived in a large apartment in an aluent district of
the city. When we met, Liria was a young mother of two
sharing a council lat with her husband and children near
the ghetto, in an inner-city estate where Gitano families
mixed with low-income working-class Payos. Paloma was
working towards her anthropology PhD for Cambridge
University in the UK, and was looking for a Gitano family
with whom to stay. Liria and her husband, Ramón,
ofered their home. Quickly, we two became close friends.
Nineteen years later, Liria no longer lives with Ramón
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FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
and their children. In 2008, she met a young Moroccan
immigrant, Younes, fell in love, and had to lose her whole
family in order to start a new life with him. She is
shunned by other Gitanos and lives instead amongst
North African and Latin American immigrants. Paloma is
now an academic, a wife, and a mother of two working in
Scotland. On the cusp of middle-age, we are still close
friends. Until recently, we have remained ixed in our
roles as informant and anthropologist. Now we have
decided to challenge these roles: we have things to say,
and we believe we can say them best together. In this
project, Liria is not the provider of raw material, of
‘ethnographic data’ for Paloma to analyse and argue
about. We each talk, about ourselves and about each
other, from our own particular standpoints, with our
histories, our own interests, fears and desires as a
foundationincluding
a
deep
involvement
with
anthropology. In these pages both of us speak, sometimes
apart, sometimes together, sometimes with each other.
The strength of what follows lies not only in the story we
tell but also in the way we tell it. We mix voices and
styles because we want to foreground our complicity and
also the tensions, negotiations, agreements and
disagreements
involved
in
doing
and
writing
anthropology.
How we work together
In order to write this article, we started by discussing
what we wanted to write, and how we would do it. Since
we were apart for the majority of the time, Liria in
Madrid and Paloma in St Andrews, we talked on the
phone and emailed each other with the kind assistance of
Younes Bziz, Liria’s partner. Liria wrote in Spanish, by
hand, the sections where she speaks in the irst person,
and Paloma typed them, added punctuation and
translated them into English. On her laptop Paloma wrote
in English the sections where she speaks in the irst
person and translated them into Spanish for Liria to read
and suggest changes. Paloma also wrote in English irst
drafts of the sections were we speak together, using the
plural ‘we’. She translated these drafts into Spanish, and
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LIRIA DE LA CRUZ AND PALOMA GAY Y BLASCO
Liria made changes and additions, sometimes very
substantial, which were then incorporated into the
English text. We had Paloma’s ieldnotes, and her letters
from the ield to her PhD supervisor in Cambridge,
Stephen Hugh-Jones, but only Liria’s letters to Paloma
since Liria had left Paloma’s letters behind when she
eloped. We also had many hours of taped conversations
in which we talked about our lives, past and present, and
our friendship. Because Liria is unfamiliar with
anthropological literature, we have not quoted other
authors. We have only made a short explicit reference to
anthropological debates in the introduction, and Paloma
is responsible for this interpretation. We hope that
readers will be able to make their own connections with
other anthropological texts.
In order to make our joint and separate voices clear to
readers, we use three diferent fonts. We use Garamond
when we speak together, Cambria for Liria’s sections, and
Calibri for Paloma’s.
Beginnings
I would like it if, with what I am going to write, people
could understand how wonderful and important it was to
meet my friend Paloma. No matter how much I write, it
will never be enough to express so much gratitude
towards just one friend. Because everything started with
just a ieldtrip. We never thought this would reach so far
into both our lives. We had barely started to live, we were
both twenty, she was single and I was married with two
children, Nena and Angel. We have had so much in
common although we grew up in very diferent settings
because I was Gitana and she Paya, and because we
belonged to diferent ethnicities ( etnias). That never
pulled us apart, the very opposite. I even believe this was
the interesting thing about our friendship, the desire to
get to know new worlds and diferent people from what
we were used to living with.
For this reason I remember very well the day I met
Paloma. My elder sister Carmen had already talked to me
346
FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
about her. She had told me that she had met a Paya girl
who came to the Villaverde church and who was doing a
study about the Evengelical Gitanos and about all our
surroundings and anything related to the Gitanos of the
neighbourhood. Back then Paloma lived in Tío Basilio’s
house, the most respected Gitano in the area of Madrid
and some provinces. He was also my father’s uncle,
although we have been brought up very diferently in our
two families, in particular we in my father’s house. And so
when my sister told me that a young Paya girl was staying
at Tío Basilio’s, I was surprised, not because they are bad
people but because, as Gitanos, they still lived by rather
old customs. When my sister introduced her to me, I
thought she appeared ignorant and shy, but I recognise
now that we were the ignorant ones, and she was also
very brave to be in a neighbourhood full of Gitanos, most
of them poor and with little schooling. For this reason I
recognise that she was doing a very diicult job because
she had started with the hardest part, and she still had a
long way to go.
My irst impression was that she was intelligent and a
little serious. After introducing us my sister had told me
that Paloma needed to live with a family in the
neighbourhood but nobody was ofering their house and
all her studies hung on her living with a family. I hardly
knew Paloma, only from seeing her in church, I had never
talked to her, but my sister had said very good things
about her and she told me that they couldn’t have her in
their house because her husband was an Evangelical
pastor. They could be given a church to lead at any time,
and they would have to go outside Madrid, so they
wouldn’t be able to pay the necessary attention to Paloma
to help her do her work. But I also know they were
inluenced by gossip because they were a young couple,
and people’s tongues and their enviousness are very bad.
I too was advised not to take a Paya girl into my house
because she would bring problems to my marriage. But
my marriage could not go to waste more than it already
had, even though back then he was not so bad with me.
So I felt very sorry for this girl who had so much interest
in our lives and our way of life, that we would not give her
347
LIRIA DE LA CRUZ AND PALOMA GAY Y BLASCO
the chance to realise her project and her future. It was
then that my parents supported my decision to have
Paloma in my house. They have always been very liberal,
in particular my mother, who had friends of all ethnicities
(etnias), not minding about race, or colour, or
circumstance. She put that in our hearts, and without a
doubt this helped me a lot in my decision to open my
house to Paloma and to show myself the way I was. And
also I acknowledge that I too was interested in knowing
more about her world, because the irst friends I had as a
girl were Payas who went to school with me and I liked
very much their way of being, so simple. For Payos live
more independently in their lives, without thinking about
others’ opinions or gossip. And it has always bothered me,
having to do things so that people will let you be and not
be criticised for no matter what. For this reason I wanted
to have a Payo friendship in my life, because since I
married all my friends were Gitanas. I had a good group of
friends, and got along with everybody, but I also wanted
to make new friends, diferent from what I was used to.
And so, listening to my heart and my instinct, I said
yes, she could come to my house to live with us and inish
her research. Although in some ways I also researched
her, because I was fascinated by her world and her way of
life, even though I did not know what Paloma’s family
thought about us, the Gitanos. I admit that I have never
been bothered by what her family or my family think,
although I have to say that my parents behaved rather
well with Paloma, and they were never negative about her
work and our friendship. The truth is that Paloma earned
their trust through her behaviour. She adapted very well
to the Gitano world, and she knew how to get in, through
the elders and then through the church, and coming to
live with me was the icing on the cake.
It was an experience for both of us. In our free time we
used to go to the university behind Ramón’s back,
because Gitanos, and in particular the men think that a
woman goes to places like that because she wants to
meet boys and do bad things. They do not think that two
people can just be friends, without going any further. And
348
FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
in that they were wrong, because I met friends of Paloma,
and nothing bad ever happened.
Paloma’s ieldnotes, March 1993
Liria and I talked today about what it has meant for her
to have me in her house, and about what other people
have been asking and telling her. She told me that people
have been amazed that she has a young Paya in her
house, in particular because her husband is very young.
Young men are easily tempted, she said, and any tiny
event would make people gossip: ‘you know what
people’s tongues are like…’ For example, she said that if it
was hot and Ramón took his shirt of, and I happened to
be in the same room then, people would say ‘Ramón is
having it of with the Paya’, and specially ‘how stupid Liria
is, they are doing it in her own house’. Even people who
have known me well for a full year were, according to
Liria, shocked to learn that I was living in her house. The
two pastor’s wives, Carmen and Emilia, who are always
friendly and open with me, refused to take me in on the
grounds that ‘people would talk, and it would damage
very much out testimony, our standing’. Today I began to
understand the implications that having me in her house
has for Liria, since even those who seem to accept me
best and talk freely with me would not have me.
According to Liria, even these people ask her if I pay her
money, and if I help her in the house, and she said she
feels compelled to say that I do, because it is a kind of
justiication. I said to Liria that, in my opinion, for them it
is a question of inding out who is fooling who, who is
being tricked, and who is doing the tricking, a very Gitano
thing: Gitanos won’t accept that ours could be a
relationship on equal terms. So when her grandmother
‘innocently’ asked me where I was staying (she already
knew) Liria told her, ‘poor wee Palomi, she is very good,
poor thing, she helps me a lot in the house and with the
children.’ Although I see that Liria could have done little
else, I was rather ofended at this, being made to look like
a dimwit. But I didn’t say anything.
349
LIRIA DE LA CRUZ AND PALOMA GAY Y BLASCO
Informant and anthropologist
Our friendship started with her kindness, taking me into
her house although she barely knew me and even though
I was bad news. I was a Paya, young, unattached, not
really managing to gain acceptance in a strongly
marginalised community where the dominant Payos were
distrusted and despised, and where Payas were
considered uniformly immoral and sexually promiscuous.
It was only because Liria looked beyond the stereotypes
and the conventions that dominated interactions between
Payos and Gitanos, because she questioned what most
around her took for granted, that we became friends. Her
generosity, her compassion, and her curiosity were the
foundation of our friendship. From the irst time we met
and throughout twenty years, she has loved, helped and
supported me.
We were fascinated by each other, perhaps because we
were both dissatisied with our lives and because we
embodied for the other the deep unfulilled desire to
belong somewhere else. I had had an average childhood
in an upper-middle class, conservative family. I had learnt
languages and travelled abroad relatively often, but had
also been immersed in a world of rigid conventions
regarding such things as class, upbringing, occupation,
dress and accent. I looked to anthropology as an escape
into imagined, alternative worlds, but all I did was
exchange the inward-looking, sufocating atmosphere of
the Madrid middle-class for the inward-looking,
sufocating atmosphere of a Cambridge college, and I felt
at ease in neither. Among the Gitanos of Villaverde I was
even more out of place: by the time I met Liria I had been
doing ieldwork for nine months and was increasingly
frustrated and convinced that I would never ‘get in’.
To start with, Liria seemed to me certain of her place
and of her path in life. She was a well-respected young
matron, a good street seller and money-maker, strict in
her adherence to the highly elaborated Gitano code of
conduct for women, always dressing modestly in long
skirts, not smoking, drinking, or interacting with unrelated
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FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
men. Her parents were well of by comparison with other
Gitano families nearby, and they were very well liked, her
father’s patrilineage was large and powerful and
controlled much of Gitano life in the ghetto. At ifteen, her
mother had arranged her betrothal to an older relative,
Ramón, and she had married well, at a wedding ceremony
where her virginity was tested and displayed, rather than
much less prestigiously by elopement like some of her
cousins and friends. She itted in, and yet I soon learnt
that she was discontented, with her marriage to a man
she did not love and who could not love her, with the
routine of wifely everyday life, and with the restrictions
that being a ‘decent Gitana’ imposed on her. Above all,
she was desperately curious to know what things were
like among the Payos, the Others who surrounded her but
were beyond her reach. She had a deep intuitive
understanding of what anthropology was about and
embraced the informant role with enthusiasm.
Liria wanted to learn, about the Payos and so about me
and what she called ‘your world’. Together we took what
seemed like huge risks, lying to Ramón and going for
secret outings into Madrid so that she could see what my
life was like. We dressed Payo-style, discarding our long
skirts and putting on trousers, which the Gitanas never
wore, and we visited museums, parks, middle-class
restaurants, and the home where I grew up. Since she had
opened up her house and her life to me, and she was so
curious about mine, I felt I had to reciprocate and took
Liria to my mother’s lat, where she met not only my
family but the housekeepers who worked for us, and to
the university where we had lunch with my childhood
friends, well-of boys and girls who studied business, law
or economics. Just like ieldwork amongst the Gitanos for
me, these trips into middle-class Madrid were a great
adventure for Liria. Having spent all her life on the
periphery of the city, she literally discovered a new
Madrid. And, at the university, she talked freely with
unrelated men of her own age for the irst time in her life.
Our outings were interludesfrom the strain of
ieldwork for me, from the monotony of everyday life for
351
LIRIA DE LA CRUZ AND PALOMA GAY Y BLASCO
herand they made us accomplices. Aged 22, we were
excited, by life itself and by our friendship. We talked
endlessly, while selling in the streets, cooking, taking care
of the children, and at night while Ramón watched TV. We
talked about men and about sex, about our pasts and
futures, about being Gitana and Paya, and about
anthropology. We argued about whether, as a Paya, I
really had more freedom than her, and of what kinds. I
read to Liria from San Román’s classic Gitano
ethnography, and we discussed together the rights and
wrongs of the anthropologist’s account of Gitano
patrilineages. I also read to her from my ieldnotes, and
we laughed about things we had said only days or weeks
before. Liria’s friendship was a wonderful gift.
Looking back, I see that we were not preoccupied by
the material inequalities between us, which now seem so
blatantly important and which worry me so much. I was
very aware of the large-scale hierarchies and inequalities
that framed Gitano marginality, and of our relative
positions within these, but in our everyday life in the
ghetto I was out, wanting in. Yes, my parents were better
of and I had reaped the beneits, having a comfortable
life and going to study abroad. But Liria came from a
Gitano family which was highly respected in Villaverde
and she was secure in her role within the Gitano
community, where the hierarchies and inequalities that
mattered were among Gitanos, and where Payos were
despised outsiders. In Villaverde Liria belonged and had
status where I had none. Similarly, it did not occur to me
that opening my life to Liria might be unethical. Later on,
talking about our friendship to anthropological audiences
in the UK, I have been criticised for not considering the
impact that allowing Liria to meet my family might have
on her, for not envisaging that it might make her
dissatisied with her lot as a poor Gitano woman. Back
then, both of us knew that that I could not ask to be let
into Liria’s life whilst keeping mine out of her reach.
352
FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
Friends
Paloma and I, after spending so many moments
together from when she came to my house to do
ieldwork until now, we have lived so many experiences
together that I would not have notebooks enough to tell
all the good things and the bad ones. Today I can say with
all my heart that between myself and Paloma there is a
relationship as if we were sisters, because friends are not
just for when things go well, but for when things go badly.
And throughout many years I think that both of us have
realised that our relationship as friends has been very irm
and sincere. Even when we were separated by a large
distance because she had to work in England, nothing
prevented us from staying in contact, by letters or by
phone, and whenever she came to see her mother in the
holidays she kept some days exclusively to share with me.
Nothing has stopped our union as great friends. Even
though one was Gitana and the other Paya, and even
though we had such diferent customs, we knew very well
how to share our ideas and our tastes. My whole world
revolved around the Gitano environment ( entorno), and
when Paloma was living with me just seeing her was an
eye-opener. I saw that a woman is not just good for
marrying and having children and cleaning, even though
within the Gitano world I used to go out with my sisters, to
the beach in the summer, and in winter to the malls and
shopping. But with Paloma I did other things, like visiting
museums, or going to the university, and many more
things that I loved. And above all she made me see my
qualities as a woman. She always used to tell me that I
was intelligent and a very good person, but in my family I
was always treated as a something of a moron, and I used
to be taken for a ride. One of the people who helped me
see my good qualities and my worth was Paloma. In
particular with Ramón, he knew how to have me all mixed
up, psychologically, with the idea that I wasn’t suiciently
clever, or pretty, and he told me so often that I came to
believe it. Until one day a great friend turned up to tell me
that this was not true, and through the years I have had
other Paya friends, I had the pleasure of working with
them when I was president of the parents’ association in
353
LIRIA DE LA CRUZ AND PALOMA GAY Y BLASCO
my daughter’s school and they also encouraged me.
From the irst time I met Paloma I opened my heart to
her, as sincerely as possible, because as time went by I
realised that I could tell her any secret since I knew she
would keep it, and she knew she could also tell me
anything, because with me it would be safe. The truth is
that in this life you never know when you are going to
need your friends. I think that in life, if you do good, the
future can return it to you, although I never helped
Paloma out of any kind of interest, and she knew it.
Because when I helped Paloma I never thought that later
on she would return the help to me with increase. When I
decided to leave my Gitano environment ( entorno) to ind
my happiness in a completely diferent world with a
Moroccan partner (he was prepared to ight for our love
against the Gitano people, Younes Bziz is his name), that
is when I received all the support and the unconditional
love, something never seen before, from my great friend
Paloma. This is why we decided to write together. We both
know we have many experiences to tell, together and
apart, but our lives are always intertwined, the lives of
two people, a Paya anthropologist with a great heart, and
a sincere Gitana.
The middle years
Between 1993 and 2008 we wrote to each other, back
and forth. We also talked on the telephone often and met
whenever Paloma was in Madrid, at least once a year. As
time went by, we continued to share our preoccupations –
with pregnancies, children, schools, husbands, work, and
our families. Liria and Ramón continued to earn their
living by selling textiles at open air markets. They were
resettled by the local government to a diferent lat, even
closer to the ghetto where Paloma had carried out her
ieldwork. Earning a livelihood became increasingly
dificult as they became indebted and lost irst one and
then another permit to sell at weekly markets. Villaverde
changed around them as immigration into Spain grew
and more and more North Africans and Latin Americans
came to the southern periphery of the city. Meanwhile,
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FRIENDSHIP, ANTHROPOLOGY
Paloma and her husband obtained tenured academic
positions, moved to Scotland and bought a house. They
settled into a typically British middle-class life.
All along Paloma wrote about Liria and her relatives
and neighbours, a book and articles: we were friends, but
we were also anthropologist and informant. Liria helped
Paloma with her anthropology because she was a friend.
She had a sense of what Paloma’s anthropological
interests were but did not fully know what Paloma did
with what she learnt, how she communicated her
knowledge and to whom, and who beneitted or how.
Paloma felt that she could only explain to Liria in very
basic terms what her work was about, or how academic
anthropology is produced. The jargon and theories
through
which
Liria’s
life
could
be
made
anthropologically meaningful seemed to Paloma almost
impossible to convey to her. The fact that Paloma wrote
in English meant that Liria could not even read what
Paloma produced.
Throughout these years our friendship continued
whilst our personal lives changed. Liria’s marriage
deteriorated and she left Ramón several times. She took
her children to her father’s house, but was always
persuaded by her family to return. But as her dificulties
inside the home increased, Liria found satisfying rewards
outside it. In 2008 she became president of the parents’
association at her daughter’s school. She found herself at
the helm at a time of serious crisis, when the local
government decided to transfer the children (mostly
Gitano) to a smaller building of poorer quality, to make
way for the children of a neighbouring school (mostly
Payo). Liria became a key player in the campaign against
the plans, making several appearances on national radio
and television. Although the ight was lost, Liria
discovered in herself new capacities and needs, the
desire to become something else than a Gitana wife and
mother. In the meantime Paloma too found herself
moving in new directions. She become a mother by birth
and adoption in her thirties, engaged in political
activism, and let her career take second or even third
355
LIRIA DE LA CRUZ AND PALOMA GAY Y BLASCO
place in her life. For both of us our horizons opened up
throughout the 2000s: for Paloma to the world beyond
anthropology and academia, for Liria beyond her family
and the Gitano Evangelical Church. And then Liria met
Younes, by chance, and our lives were brought closer
than ever before.
Lives transformed
One morning like so many the unexpected happened .
There was a young man working with some friends of
mine at a stall nearby, we were separated only by some
fruit sellers. I don’t know how one morning I came to the
stall of my friends to say hello, and to see the clothes
they were selling, because often they had very pretty
things and I liked to buy from them. The truth is that I had
already seen that boy before, but shame and fear to fall in
love, especially because he was younger than me, those
things did not allow me to pay attention to him or to
anybody else. But I don’t know how something made me
look at him that morning, and his eyes were ixed deep
into mine. I felt that he talked with me through his eyes. I
had never felt like that before.
One morning like so many the unexpected happened .
Liria’s sisters phoned me from Madrid. She had
disappeared the day before, and they were desperate.
They had found a small piece of paper with a man’s name
and a telephone number in one of Liria’s handbags, and
they suspected that she had eloped with him. I was to
ring them immediately if she got in touch. I tried and tried
Liria’s phone, and texted her, ‘Where are you? Everybody
is worried. Is everything ok? Please get in touch, I’m dying
of anguish here.’ That evening she rang. She had left with
Younes, her sisters had realised she was having an afair
and she felt she had no option but to elope, straight away.
She had tried living with Ramón for twenty years, and
Younes loved her. She hadn’t been able to take her young
daughter along: according to Gitano customary law, which
is often violently enforced, in cases of adultery children
must remain with the blameless spouse. And so her family
were looking for her, to bring her back and perhaps
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punish Liria, and Younes too. She was terriied. I was to
pretend she had not been in touch, keep her secret, help
her be safe.
I had no alternative but to return , because my sisters
and their husbands found me, and my family threatened
to kill Younes, and so I had no other option. Today I realise
I allowed myself to be intimidated, and that my fear did
not let me think straight. Now I see they could easily have
harmed him before coming up to fetch me from the lat
where I was hiding, because they were with him
downstairs quite a while, but they did not. The thing is
they convinced me, with threats and with kindness, they
did all they could because they were desperate at that
time. For me it was very painful, in two ways. First there
was Younes, and being forced to leave him. I didn’t know
how to explain to him that my family feared that he had
tricked me, or pressured me somehow to be with him,
because I had never done anything like this before. And
then there were my children, and when I returned my
heart broke to see how much they had missed me. ‘How
am I going to recover my family, and my children?’, that is
what I was thinking back then. But it was too late, nobody
trusted me, they kept me under watch all the time. They
tried to make me see I was deluded, that it was all an
illusion because I had never had happiness with Ramón.
And so they thought I was very confused, and a little bit
mad.
She had no alternative but to return and, when three
weeks later I went to Madrid, all her family wanted to
make sure I understood why she had done wrong. ‘This is
how we Gitanos do things, you know us, you understand
us, you know how terrible this is for us, we are not like
you Payos, this is beyond the pale, there is nothing worse
than this.’ I had to talk to her, they said, convince her not
to elope again, help to keep her in the house, under their
control. Ramón, Carmen and Liria’s other sisters, her
children, her daughter-in-law… they were the voice of
Gitano reason. They knew how close Liria and I were, and
were desperate for me to take sides. These were ‘the
Gitanos’ of whom I had written for so many years, and
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what they said itted all I had learnt about them: women’s
virtue and subservience to men were central to how they
saw their place in the world. And yet she asked for my
help, and she was Liria, my friend, a woman whose fears
and desires I knew, who had shared with me her wishes
and disappointments, who loved me and whom I loved. So
I did not say ‘leave’ or ‘stay’, but I helped her meet
Younes clandestinely, taking our young children along as
cover, knowing that the family would never think we
would try something like that. When she decided she
would leave for good, I helped again, sorting out plans,
listening to Liria’s fears, anxieties, and hopes, and gving
some of the money they needed to try to start again.
After she and Younes went into hiding, I became the point
of contact between Liria and her family, relaying her
children’s
heart-wrenching
pleas,
receiving
and
forwarding Ramón’s desperate letters.
My heart is broken in two. Every day that passes I feel
worse, for my daughter. Whenever I see girls of her age in
the street I die inside, it is true. Something is killing me
inside. I try not to tell Younes and I go into the bathroom
to cry. I tell myself, ‘Be happy’. How can I be happy
knowing that my daughter needs me? Then I say, ‘What if
I return, and I die of longing for Younes?’I can’t think of
anything else, I only think about her.
Her heart is broken in two. Liria spent six months of
living with Younes, in lats shared with African and Latin
American immigrants, working as a domestic, hiding her
Gitano identity from her middle-class employers, people
very similar to my own family. We talked almost every
day, and I visited her in Madrid every few weeks. I could
see how much she and Younes loved each other, how
much fun and freedom she had in her new life, but also
how deeply cutting her pain was. I saw her cry with my
daughter in her arms. I raged at Ramón and her sisters,
who were unwavering: so long as she stayed away, she
would not see her child. And if she took the child, they
told me, they would kill both her and Younes. I understood
well the cultural logic that underlay their actions, and
knew I could not expect them to behave in a diferent
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way, yet I did. I began to ask myself about the force of
compassion and of hatred too: could Ramón and Liria’s
sisters not take pity on her, just because they were
Gitanos? Were they so irm because they were Gitanos, or
because they hurt? Liria asked for my help and from
Scotland I rang women’s NGOs in Madrid, government
agencies, social workers, solicitors, but nobody seemed to
be able or willing to give any help. They were all puzzled
by the complexities of the Gitano world, unable to
understand why Liria would not simply apply for a divorce,
request access to her child through the usual legal routes,
why she was frightened, why there were threats. We could
not see a way forward and so she went back once again.
When for the second time I had to return it was much
worse. I thought that after so many conversations with my
sisters and my children’s father, the situation was going
to be better. But it was much worse. I could feel a
tremendous hatred from Ramón. Earlier on, even when I
was an honest and stupid woman our marriage did not go
well, so imagine the situation after living six months away
from home, with another man, and Ramón swallowing his
pride of Gitano man, fooled by a woman who was inferior
to him. So the last night I spent with my daughter I made
her a promise, and I told her, ‘Darling, whatever happens I
want you to know I love you very much’, and told her that
if one day we had to be apart from each other for
whatever reason, I would ight for her, until we could be
together again. She looked into my eyes and said, ‘Mama,
you are going to leave again’. And with pain in my soul,
and so as not to worry her, I said no, but that if that
happened I would go back to get her. And I looked at her
straight and said, ‘You believe me, don’t you?’ So the irst
thing I did when I returned with Younes was ind a solicitor
to get custody of my child, and my divorce from Ramón. I
got on with it, ready to face the world for the sake of my
daughter.
When for the second time she had to return it was
much worse. Ramón knew I had helped Liria with money
and emotional support during her time away: although he
allowed us to talk on his mobile phone, he was always
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nearby, listening closely to our conversations. Younes was
heartbroken, thinking that she had left him for good, and
would not sleep or eat. We talked often, but there was
little I could do for him. Liria had managed to hide a
mobile phone, and she would go into the bathroom at
three of four in the morning, to ring Younes and me. In
whispers, she told me about her life: she had no freedom,
Ramón was in touch with a solicitor to get sole custody of
her child, he wanted to have sex in spite of her
reluctance, and she missed Younes desperately. When her
sisters brought a Gitano Pentecostal priest to exorcise her,
she thought it was the last straw, and decided to leave
knowing that this time there would be no turning back.
Sharing our lives
When Liria left her home for the very irst time, but
also later, she and Younes were in dire need of money.
Since they had to hide from Liria’s family, they also lost
their livelihoods. Liria could no longer sell with Ramón
and Younes could no longer work for Gitano streetmarket sellers loading and unloading stock. As the
economic crisis deepened and Spain’s unemployment
reached 20%, inding work became almost impossible.
Without papers the only jobs Younes could ind were
sporadic and very badly paid. They could not aford to
lose Liria’s small disability pension, so she worked
without contracts for two or three euros per hour,
cooking in bars, as an ofice cleaner or as a domestic
servant.
Knowing it would be dificult to provide substantial
economic help on a long-term basis, Paloma applied irst
to her Department and then for a small grant to pay Liria
for writing down her life. What began as a way to ind
money became a project that came to fascinate us both.
We started to tape long conversations, about Liria’s
elopement, our earlier lives, and our families and
friendship. Liria wrote, and Paloma wrote too. Liria went
to Scotland, visiting Paloma abroad for the irst time ever.
She talked to Paloma’s colleagues and students, and we
gave a talk about our relationship. As Liria’s and Younes’
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life unfolded, and as Paloma shared in it, we thought
together about what it meant. Since Paloma was not just
an observer, but a player in the story, it became clear
that what we wrote had to include her too.
In March 2011, two years after she irst eloped, Liria
went to court to claim visiting rights to her child. She
was the irst Gitano woman to turn to the Payo courts to
challenge Gitano traditional law and custom. Paloma
went with her, and we came face to face with Liria’s
sisters, their husbands, and Ramón. In spite of repeated
requests, we had not managed to be allocated police
protection, and we were frightened that Ramón or Liria’s
brothers-in-law would manage to hurt one or both of us.
All in Liria’s family thought Paloma had betrayed them
and had shown her true nature as a Paya, helping Liria in
her transgression. They were wrong in thinking that
Paloma had encouraged Liria to leave, but right in
identifying the strength of our bond.
Paloma’s Spanish family too have seen our friendship,
and are disturbed by it. One of Paloma’s sisters
suggested a solicitor and a social worker who might help.
Another opened her home to Liria and Younes when they
needed a place to stay for a couple of nights. But their
middle class, comfortable lives have very little in
common with Liria’s and Younes’s, and they are keen to
keep their distance. They have a highly developed sense
of class and ethnic distinctiveness, like many other wellof, culturally conservative Madrileños. They believe
irmly in their economic and moral superiority. Paloma’s
family see Gitanos like Liria and immigrants like Younes
as unfortunate parts of Spanish society, to be blamed for
their ‘situation’, victims of their inability to join in or
‘integrate’. They perceive Younes, like other Moroccan
immigrants, as one of the lowest of the low, a member of
an abject tide that threatens to engulf Spain. They call
him, pejoratively, ‘el moro’ (‘the Moor’), and have been
adamant that he must under no circumstance visit their
homes, where Paloma stays during her visitsto Madrid.
The majority of Paloma’s Spanish relatives are not unlike
Liria’s Gitano family in the efort they make to keep
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themselves distinct, and in their conviction that they, and
only they, live righteous and beautiful lives. But while
Liria’s family were the amongst the irst Gitanos to open
their lives and their homes to Paloma, most of Paloma’s
family want to have as little as possible to do with Liria
or Younes. For them, Paloma’s friendship with Liria is a
sign of her unfortunate eccentricity. The fact that Paloma
spends more time with Liria than with her own sisters or
her mother, demonstrates that Paloma has failed in her
responsibilities to her family.
Writing together
I learnt what anthropology was when Paloma came to
live in my house. I had a vague idea of what anthropology
was, but it was living together day by day, seeing
Paloma’s ieldwork, that I learnt its meaning. I think it is a
very beautiful work that opens frontiers onto new worlds.
Because it is not just writing about other people, but
getting to know their lives, their customs, religions, and
their ways of being. I ind it fascinating, writing not only
about my life, but about Paloma’s life. Because I have
always been the informant, but now we are breaking the
mould. We know that telling our lives, together and
united, is going to be something never done before. Two
women, a Paya and a Gitana, but very close from youth,
breaking the barriers between two diferent levels and
ways of life, although that distance never pulled us apart.
Since I started writing about anthropology I have found it
wonderful to have the opportunity to express my feelings
towards other people, and to understand them. As I write
about Paloma, I also learn to see things in a diferent way,
especially because we two have been brought up so
diferently, in our customs. I know for sure that what I am
doing right now is that I would like to do for the rest of my
life, because getting to know people, their customs, their
experiences,
their sadness and their joys, and especially having
another person opening their heart to you, is wonderful.
I want people to know what the world of a Gitana is
like, told by herself, and also how my life has changed so
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that through circumstances I ind myself in the Payo
world. I want to tell how I see everything, and also how
my life changed, and also how things changed for Paloma
and those who surround us, like Younes, and Paloma’s
husband and her children… All of us have come much
closer together. Being able to become united while you
work, that is the beauty of anthropology. For me
anthropology is about complicity and union, so that we all
of us can build a better world, a world with more love.
I have learnt what anthropology is alongside Liria , and
my understanding has changed as we have become older
and our lives have been transformed. For many years
after I irst did ieldwork among the Gitanos I thought that
my task was to extract information, make knowledge,
weave patterns with words. I wrote and I looked away
from those parts of experience I could not make sense of
easily, from what did not it into the moulds I had built.
And so much of Liria’s life, and of the lives of her relatives
and neighbours, was invisible to me. Over the last few
years I have been drawn into Liria’s life much deeper than
ever before, and she into mine. Sharing our happiness
and our diiculties, I have had to confront the nitty-gritty
of experience, as a person and as an anthropologist.
The bedrock of anthropology is ieldwork, because
ieldwork is what brings us into deep contact with people,
with their daily miseries and joys, their fears and their
hopes. And it is during ieldwork that we anthropologists
open ourselves up to others. But then those others, our
informants, are left behind, they do not continue the
journey with us. Imagine the possibilities if the deep
mutual commitment that is so often seeded in ieldwork
were allowed to grow, to spread into other areas of life. I
do not know how successful our experiment has been. But
I know that, if I want to learn and write about Liria, I have
to let her learn and write about me. We share our lives,
this is why we write together.
We meet in the spaces between worlds : between
Gitanos and Payos, between immigrants and middle-class
Spaniards, between informants and anthropologists.
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These worlds touch and interpenetrate, but they are also
sealed away from each other, in many senses far apart.
Anthropology is what has enabled us to come together,
yet anthropology also erects barriers between us: until
now Paloma has watched, investigated, looked for,
written; Liria has been in a way in the dark. Our relation
has been unequal, not because of Paloma’s greater
wealth, but because Liria was a friend above all while
Paloma was always a friend and an anthropologist. For
anthropology to reach its potential to change the world,
barriers like these need to be not just acknowledged, but
undermined. By writing together, about our lives, our
friendship, and our worlds, we hope to have contributed,
in a small way, towards this project.
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