International Security

Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War Roger Dingman I n January 1956, Life magazine published an article that purportedly explained how the Eisenhower administration had ended the Korean War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles revealed that he had conveyed an "unmistakable warning" to Beijing that the United States would use nuclear weapons against China if rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement was not made. He asserted that it was "a pretty fair inference" that this nuclear threat had worked. Dulles made this claim in defense of the notion that nuclear weapons were useful, indeed essential, tools of statecraft: When nuclear capability was combined with communication of intent to use it if necessary, deterrence and even compellence-worked.' Dulles spoke in response to partisan critics at the beginning of an election year, but his words influenced policy and history long after the 1956contest ended. They defined the parameters of a debate about the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons generally and the outcome of the Korean War in particular.2However, the secretary of state's claim was doubly deceptive. It focused analysts' attention on the six months of Republican conflict management, to the neglect of the preceding two and one-half years of Democratic stewardship. Moreover, Dulles's claim prompted a debate over This essay was prepared for a conference on the study o f nuclear weapons held at Columbia University with the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. I am especially indebted to Roger M. Anders, Dennis Bilger, William H. Cunliffe, David Haight, Brigadier General John W. Huston, USAFR, and Edward Reese for archival guidance; to Robert Jervis, Franklin D. Mitchell, and colleagues at the School of Modem Asian Studies, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, for comments on earlier draft portions of the manuscript; and to the US.Naval War Collegeand the Department of History, University of Southern California, for financing my travels to necessary archives. I alone bear responsibility for the arguments advanced herein. Roger Dingman is Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California. He has also served as Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and is Distinguished Visiting Professor of Hisforyat the U.S. Air Force Academy for 7988-89. 1. James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, January 16, 1956, pp. 70-72ff. 2. Edward C. Keefer, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," Diplomatic History, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer 1986), pp. 267-268, summarizes the historiographical debate triggered by Dulles's claim. A recent restatement of Dulles's argument, based primarily upon published sources, is Daniel Calingaert, "Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War," Iorrrnal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 177-202. Intmtioml Security, Winter 1988/89(Vol. 13, No. 3) Q 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. 50 Atomic Diplomacy I51 the effects of Washington’s atomic diplomacy that deflected attention from its substance and character. The result was to reinforce an essentiallypartisan interpretation of what occurred and to leave unconsidered more fundamental questions as to how, when, and why the United States tried to use nuclear weapons to its advantage in managing a limited war. This article attempts to answer those basic questions. It focuses on Washington ’s attempts to derive political and diplomatic rather than tactical military advantage from the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. What follows differs from earlier explorations of this subject in three vital respects. First, it reviews the entire war to demonstrate that atomicdiplomacy was an element of American statecraft throughout the conflict and not just in its concluding months. Secondly, the story rests upon a deeper and broader documentary foundation than earlier treatments of this subject. The availability of previously top-secret documents from the papers of key individuals , the several armed services, the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council (NSC), and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) pennits a more detailed analysis of Washington’s attempts to use nuclear weapons as tools of conflict management.3 Finally, the examination goes beyond words to deeds. By tracing military and diplomatic actions as well as parsing political intentions...