¹ This paper was originally delivered to the Oxford Philological Society in January 1969, and subsequently parts of it were read at seminars in the Institute of Classical Studies, London University, and in Princeton University. I learnt much from the discussion at these meetings, and I am especially grateful for private comment and criticism from Mr M. F. Burnyeat, Professor M. I. Finley, Mr J. T. Hooker, Professor A. D. Momigliano and Professor Gregory Vlastos.

² DK 84 B1.

³ Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960).

⁴ See Robinson, Richard's review, Philosophy xxxvii (1962) 277 f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See in particular Fränkel, H., Dichtung und Philosophie (New York 1951) 51–7Google Scholar; von Erffa, , Philologus suppl. 30, 2 (1937) 36 fGoogle Scholar, and below n. 58.

⁶ As Finley, M. I. says, ‘The Trojan War’, JHS lxxxiv (1964) 2 Google Scholar, ‘By what reasoning do we permit oral transmission so much latitude with the supernatural side of the story while denying it equal freedom with the human side?’

⁷ What may loosely be called ‘intelligence’ certainly enters into some Homeric judgments of value; but I think Lionel Pearson goes too far in isolating ‘intelligence’ as a criterion of moral worth in Homer, , Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece (Stanford 1962) 52.Google Scholar

⁸ Thus Chalchas wants Achilles to support him πρόφρων in words and deeds (Il. i 77), cf. (Il. ii 164, etc.); receiving someone πρόφρων means performing the appropriate social courtesies, Od. xiv 54; the king who is πρόρρων, ἀγανός and ἤπιος (Od. ii 230 ff.) is praised not for his intentions but for the behaviour which distinguishes him from one who is χαλεπός and performs αἴαυλα.

⁹ I think that Adkins establishes the relative unimportance in Homer of ‘intentions’, in the sense of moral will, decision or purpose, where explicit judgments of value are concerned. But I do not agree that Homer has no room for intentions where that term means ‘trying one's best to succeed’. Thus it seems to me that ‘giving up the attempt’ as well as ‘failure to achieve a desired result’ is involved in such phrases as (Il. ii 298). It is αἰσχρόν that the Greeks have not yet succeeded in defeating the Trojans (119–21); but it is also αἰσχρόν (in a different sense?) to give up trying. Odysseus cannot issue the command ‘succeed’, but he can say (299). Similarly, Idomeneus (Il. xiii 232 ff.) is reproached by Poseidon for advocating withdrawal. Voluntary abstention from fighting is inexcusable: a zealous effort is needed, (236). Poseidon appeals for efforts (he cannot ask for more). In the event Idomeneus succeeds in killing many Trojans; he fails in his final attempt to complete the stripping of Oenomaus' arms, but there is no suggestion that any disgrace thereby attaches to him. Later in the same book Hector reproaches Paris, αἰσχροῖς ἐπέεσι, because many of the Trojan leaders are now dead or wounded in a war for which Paris is responsible (768–73). Paris ducks this charge, but he has no difficulty in defending his own prowess; he and his men have fought ceaselessly (778–80), and he will continue to do so, (786 f.). A man can only try his best. Rather differently, compare Od. xiii 276 ff. where Odysseus, pretending to be a Cretan fugitive, guilty of homicide, excuses the Phoenician sailors who failed to ship him to Pylos or Elis, they did not mean to cheat him, and they were sorry. He has no similar excuses for the Phaeacians who he supposes failed to conduct him to Ithaca (ibid. 209–16).

¹⁰ For χρή in general cf. Redard, G., Recherches sur χρή, χρῆσθαι. Étude sémantique (Paris 1954).Google Scholar As a means of denoting what must or should be done χρή in Homer is very strong. In military contexts cf. Il. x 479 f. (Diomedes should not stand idle); xii 315 f. (Sarpedon and Glaucus should take their position in the vanguard); xvi 492 f. (Glaucus must show his military excellence); ibid. 631 (Meriones should fight, not waste time talking, cf. Il. xix 149 f.).

¹¹ Cf. Il. xiv 104 f. where Agamemnon acknowledges the appropriateness of Odysseus' charge of unkingly behaviour in the same way,

¹² Cf. Il. xv 553 f. Hector's rebuke to Melanippus for failing to rush to the defence of the newly slain Dolops,

¹³ Merit and Responsibility 33, 35; Adkins cites this example in paragraphs concerned to show that in peace, as in war, failure (or failure in certain situations) is decried by elenchistos and aischron.

¹⁴ Two examples will illustrate this. Antilochus yields to Menelaus, when accused of cheating in the games, since he does not wish to fall out of favour with him (Il. xxiii 592–5); he is thereby πεπνυμένος (586) which I take to be more than a conventional epithet here. Again, Euryalus, (Od. viii 401 ff.)Google Scholar makes amends to Odysseus for insulting him without justification, under pressure from Alcinous and the other Phaeacian nobles ( 397).

¹⁵ See Adkins 36, and next note.

¹⁶ For an excellent discussion of the descriptive and evaluative uses of ‘good’ see Hare, , The Language of Morals (Oxford 1960, corrected second impression) 111–26.Google Scholar I would not venture to say that ἀγαθός in Homer ever becomes wholly descriptive, but we have to reckon both with its evaluative function becoming relatively conventionalised, and also with the requirements of formulaic diction. Thus (or accusative) is a common line-close, for ἀγαυός like ἀγήνωρ is a stock-epithet of the suitors. So far as I can see they are never, as a group, just termed ἀγαθοί or ἐσθλοί, contra Adkins 32. Indeed, at Od. xviii 383 Odysseus charges Eurymachus with thinking himself to be a great man because he consorts with (i.e. the other suitors)!

¹⁷ The other contexts are Il. i 131; xv 185; xix 155; xxiv 53 (discussed below), and cf. also Od. xvii 381 f. Il. ix 627 does not count for this purpose, since the reference of ἀγαθός is μοῑρα. A useful treatment of is given by Hoffmann, M., Die ethische Terminologie bei Homer (Tübingen 1914) 73 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The evidence just cited confirms Ebeling's judgment, Lexicon Homericum ad loc, that ὥς is equivalent here to quoniam.

¹⁹ The force of the comparatives κάλλιον and ἄμεινον is a little difficult to establish. The closest linguistic parallel seems to be Od. vi 182 where τοῦ γε makes the comparison explicit, οἱ in our passage serves a quite different function, and persuades me to take κάλλιον and ἄμεινον as comparative for superlative, cf. Kühner-Gerth i 22.

²⁰ νεμεσσηθέωμεν is the form attested by Aristarchus, a presumed metathesis for νεμεσσηθήομεν. But the position of οἱ casts grave doubt on the line. Its sense, however, which led the scholiast on B and T to athetise (see main text below), is neither doubtful nor difficult.

²¹ Il. xxiv 22–6 asserts that Hera, Poseidon and Athene opposed the rest of the gods who urged Hermes to steal Hector's corpse from Achilles.

²² Stanford, in his edition of the Odyssey ad loc., takes said of Echeneus (157), to be the comparative reference for κάλλιον.

²³ If anyone doubts this let him consult Hoffmann, M.'s Die ethische Terminologie bei Homer (Tübingen 1914).Google Scholar Hoffmann like Adkins shows convincingly that prowess in war is the first thing expected of the Homeric hero. But he also sees how the heroic qualities, based on the priority of victory, wealth, beauty, etc., may not prevent a hero from earning censure. Hoffmann sees the emergence of specifically moral thinking in the clash which arises from the condemnation which a hero may earn in spite of his satisfying all requirements of the heroic code, p. 100.

²⁴ αἰσχρόν (Il. ii 119; 298), of what it would be for Agamemnon to return to Greece without victory. Other forms of αἰσχρός do occur: αἴσχιστος, Il. ii 216 (of Thersites); αἴσχιον, Il. xxi 437, cf. αἰσχρῶς, Od. xviii 321; and three instances from the Iliad of (iii 38; vi 325; xiii 768, cf. xxiv 238). αἰσχρός is not found in Hesiod.

²⁵ In descriptions of actions, apart from dying or warding off death, we find the following repeated line-closes: (Od. iii 265; xi 429; xv 236; xxii 222; Il. xiv 13); (Od. xx 394; xxii 432) (Il. xxii 395; xxiii 24; cf. ἀείκιζεν (or ἀεικίζει) μενεαίνών, xxiv 22; 54). These include references to the murderous act of Clytemnestra (for Aegisthus, cf. ἀεικέα μερμηρίζων, Od. iv 533), Achilles' maltreatment of Hector, and the suitors' behaviour in Odysseus' house.

²⁶ Il. ii 119, 298, 285, see Adkins 33 and supra n. 13.

²⁷ Il. xxii 104 ff., see Adkins 47 ff.

²⁸ Od. x 72 ff. These are the words with which Aeacus rejects Odysseus' pleas to the winds. He goes on,

²⁹ Cf. Il. vi 524, of Paris.

³⁰ Od. xi 433 ‘she brought αἶσχος on women of time to come’. Adkins explains this instance of αἶσχος as due to the fact that Clytemnestra is a woman, 45: ‘similar condemnation of Agamemnon and the suitors is not found … the demands of success are too strong in the case of men'. But Agamemnon and the suitors did not commit the same kinds of act (though I shall give reasons for thinking that the suitors are condemned in very strong terms). What Adkins does not mention in this context (but see p. 43) is the fact that both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are described as doing or planning something ἀεικές (Od. iii 265; iv 533); they are both δολόμητις (Od. iii 259; xi 422).

³¹ After Athene learns the full situation from Telemachus she urges him to take thought for expelling the suitors (269 ff., 295 ff.) and to adopt Orestes as a model, in order to be well-spoken of by posterity. This the heroic code requires, but Athene does not charge Telemachus with αἶσχος at the present time, and he receives her words as ‘kindly, fatherly and unforgettable’ (306–8), hardly the reaction of a man censured in the strongest terms.

³² Cf. Il. vi 325; vii 95; xiii 623.

³³ Cf. von Erffa, C. E., ‘ ΑΙΔΩΣ und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit’, Philologus suppl. 30, 2 (1937) 36.Google Scholar Laroche, E., Histoire de la racine NEM- en grec ancien (Paris 1949) 91 f.Google Scholar

³⁴ So von Erffa, op. cit. 21 ff.

³⁵ The persuasion in Athene's remarks is directed at Telemachus in this respect. He should react with νέμεσις, as he does in his speech at the assembly (cf. μένος ἄσχετε 85, κεχολωμένον, 185).

³⁶ I have been unable to find any adequate discussion of this passage. Merry-Riddell and the Budé editor, Bérard, appear to take lines 64–9 as a particular reference to the suitors, whereas the λάος is addressed from σχέσθε, φίλοι 70 ff. Eustathius and the schol. take the addressees as the λάος throughout and many modern editors and translators follow suit. Since Telemachus is appealing to national sentiment at the destruction of ‘his house’ this seems, on balance, preferable, νεμεσσήθητε will then mean ‘be angered at yourselves’ (sc. for allowing the suitors a free hand), cf. νεμεσσήθητε δὲ θυμφ (Il. xvi 544), an exhortation to military prowess; or ‘share my anger’, active for passive, cf. Ebeling on νεμεσσηθέωμεν, Il. xxiv 52 and n. 20 above. My argument is not affected by this problem, though it gains a supplement if the reference is to the suitors.

³⁷ Interestingly, Apollo, under the promptings of αἰδώς (468 f.) tells Poseidon, ‘You would not think me σαόφρονα if I fought with you for the sake of pitiful mortals’ (462 ff.); this shows that σαόφρων (confined to the ‘quiet’ sphere in Adkins’ view) could be used of someone who had good grounds for fighting. For the parallelism between gods and men, as this affects motives, see Lloyd, G. E. R., Polarity and Analogy (Cambridge 1966) 195 ff.Google Scholar Athene's rebuke of Ares (Il. xv 129) for his loss of αἰδώς and νόος is a good example, contra Wilamowitz, , Glaube der Hellenen i 353 f.Google Scholar

³⁸ Here again, the main burden of Hector's speech is Paris's cowardice. But κατηφείη, in its context, must refer to ‘reproaches’ brought against Paris for the consequences of his abduction of Helen, cf. ibid. 57.

³⁹ For κατηφείη coupled with ὄνειδος in hypothetical statements involving military failure, cf. Il. xvi 498; xvii 556.

⁴⁰ Professor Page has convincingly shown that elements of Iliad ix, especially the speech of Phoenix, introduce the language and moral thought of a time later than the rest of the poem, History and the Homeric Iliad (Berkeley, California, 1963) 300 ff. (The passage quoted above is immediately preceded by the unique phrase, 256.) I am not concerned here with the undoubtedly late introduction of sentiments based on a ‘guilt culture’, but those which relate restraint and malleability to the heroic code τιμή.

⁴¹ Cf. Mondolfo, R., Problemi del Pensiero Antico (Bologna 1935) 8 ff.Google Scholar As Mr J. H. Kells points out to me, in Il. xxiii 570 ff. Menelaus, having been cheated in the chariot-race by Antilochus, does not enforce his superior ἀρετή by seizing the prize, lest he should be thought to have compelled Antilochus by lies. Instead, Menelaus offers Antilochus either arbitration (by the Achaean elders) or evidentiary oath (presided over by Poseidon) as to the facts of the case. Menelaus is here bowing to δίκη of some kind and θέμις, cf. line 581 and comments by Adkins 56.

⁴² In addition to Od. xxi 331 ff. discussed above, he refers to Od. xvi 418 ff., and Il. ix 341 f., pp. 39–40.

⁴³ Of possible interest here is the remark by Zeus, to Poseidon, (Od. xiii 41 f.)Google Scholar that it would be difficult or dangerous Odysseus himself attacks the suitors on the argument that crime does not pay, cf. Od. xviii 125 ff., where he presents a grim warning, based on his own feigned experience, of what happens to ἀθεμίστιοι, the doers of ἀτάσθαλα, and then relates this to the suitors' conduct, see Adkins 65 ff. on ‘moral gods’; Hoffmann, , Ethische Terminologie 39 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ So Adkins on κατὰ μοῖραν, ‘“You have spoken with due reference to the present situation and/or to your place in society” is implied’, 20 f.

⁴⁵ The World of Odysseus (London 1962, Penguin Books) 79; 122.

⁴⁶ Il. xix 147; xxiii 537; Od. viii 389.

⁴⁷ Il. v 326; xiv 92; Od. viii 240; xix 248.

⁴⁸ Il. i 286; x 169; Od. iii 268; xvi 202, etc. Absence of or failure to acknowledge θέμιστες (and δίκαι) is a characteristic of the Cyclopes singled out by Odysseus, Od. ix 112; 215. But it is notable that this does not exclude maintenance of order in each family-group: ‘the Cyclopes issue mandates (θεμιστεύει) over their wives and children as individuals, without regard to one another’. In other words, θέμις normally covers wider spheres of activity than internal family relationships.

⁴⁹ Il. ii 73; ix 33; Od. iii 268; xi 451; xiv 56; xxiv 286.

⁵⁰ μοῖρα has a sense which it is impossible to fix precisely; but its social reference is well illustrated by this passage. Odysseus denounces Polyphemus for his cannibalism by observing, ‘how would anyone from the cities of men come near you in the future? For you have acted οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν’. Thomson, G., Aeschylus and Athens (London 1941) 50 Google Scholar, makes the economic and social functions of μοῖρα primary.

⁵¹ The same expression is used to comment unfavourably upon Thersites' taunts (Il. ii 214); Ares' destruction of the Achaeans (Il. v 759); Odysseus' begging (Od. xx 18i) and Euryalus' challenge of Odysseus (Od. viii 179). Kerschensteiner, J., Kosmos (München 1962) 5 ff.Google Scholar, rightly associates with such expressions as She observes ‘Es wird vor allen von der Tätigkeit des Heerführers gebraucht’, p. 5.

⁵² Cf. Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, California 1951) 109, n. 26.Google Scholar

⁵³ Il. xxiv 214–16.

⁵⁴ Cf. Od. xx 170 f.; ii 282; see in general Greene, W. C., Moira (Camb. Mass. 1944) 17 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁵ On this aspect of τιμή and ‘giving’ see Adkins', valuable paper, ‘Honour and Punishment in the Homeric Poems’, BICS vii (1960) 26–8.Google Scholar See also Verdenius, W. J., ‘Aidos bei Homer’, Mnemosyne xii (1944) 58 ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ As Adkins puts it, BICS loc. cit., ‘in phrases like τίνειν τιμήν or ἀποτίνεσθαι, τιμή is thought of as something concrete, some commodity which may be transferred from one person to another’, p. 27.

⁵⁷ The World of Odysseus 130 f. Jaeger, , Paideia i 6 Google Scholar, considered it improbable that in living speech ἀρετή had the narrow Homeric sense. See also von Erffa, op. cit., 36, ‘nur der Stand der ἀγαθοί ist für den Dichter von Bedeutung’.

⁵⁸ I do not accept with Adkins that an historical reference for Homeric ‘society’ can be found in the individual oikos, such that Homeric values can be seen to derive consistently from its needs (see above p. 122). No doubt Homer gives us much valuable evidence on this and other institutions of his own past, which have been so skilfully analysed by DrFinley, Moses (The World of Odysseus [London, 1962]Google Scholar; ‘Homer and Mycenae: Property and Tenure’, Historia vi [1957] 133–59; ‘Marriage, sale and gift in the Homeric world’, Seminar xii [1954] 7–33). But the plain fact is that a consistent pattern of society does not emerge from Homer. In addition to the autonomous household the poems also recognise different political groups with their shepherds of the people or kings of men. A function of kingship appears to be the administration of δίκη, though the application of this function is not called upon by the events of either epic (cf. Bonner, and Smith, , The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle i [Chicago 1930] 30–42)Google Scholar unless we count Menelaus’ decision to δικάζειν in his suit with Antilochus, , Il. xxiii 579 f.Google Scholar, cf. ibid. 486. The voice of the people in assembly at Ithaca has not been heard in the twenty years since Odysseus' departure; but on the shield of Achilles the λαοί are assembled to hear a dispute over manslaughter (Il. xviii 497 ff.). At the same time concepts like themis and moira invoke something wider than the security and well-being of the oikos. The poet gives us glimpses of a sense of community, perhaps drawn from his own experience, which is only a glimpse because, I would argue, his heroic world demands the elevation of great individuals.

⁵⁹ Cf. Il. vi 208; ix 783.

⁶⁰ The World of Odysseus 137.

⁶¹ See Allen, W., ‘The Theme of the Suitors in the Odyssey’, TAPhA lxx (1939) 104–24.Google Scholar

⁶² For a very good account of the standardised forms of description in the portrayal of ἀρετή, see Strasburger, Gisela, Die Kleinen Kämpfer der Ilias (Stuttgart, 1954).Google Scholar