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Human Rights Quarterly 24.1 (2002) 126-151



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Indigenous Peoples and Multicultural Citizenship:
Bridging Collective and Individual Rights*

Cindy L. Holder

Jeff J. Corntassel


I. Introduction

Many heralded 1998, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a milestone for universal legal protection of individuals. For others, this anniversary was a time for critical reappraisal of existing human rights instruments and norms. 1 Two pressing issues for critics of existing human rights mechanisms are the lack of progress in promoting universal recognition of group rights and the continued exclusion of indigenous groups from political, economic, and social participation in many parts of the world. For many, the problem lies in the individualistic nature of existing human rights discourse. The concern is that existing [End Page 126] instruments emphasize individual needs and entitlements in a way that inadequately compares the collective nature of groups with non-Western world-views and priorities. In this regard the preference of many human rights documents for the language of "populations" and "persons who are members" over the language of "peoples" is one important example of an atomistic bias that does not adequately protect those for whom communal life is vital. 2

Debate over the limits of existing rights discourse is often pursued within a framework of liberal-individualism versus corporatism. 3 For example, Peter Jones distinguishes two different ways in which a group claim might be incorporated into human rights discourse: 1) as the claim of a collectivity that is ultimately reducible to individual members; or 2) as the claim of a corporate body the reduction of which to constituent members is not possible. 4 Jones, among others, has argued that groups should not be recognized as subjects of human rights that can conflict with and potentially override the claims of individual members. 5 For many proponents of [End Page 127] minority claims, however, protecting the ability of groups to determine for themselves the terms on which members interact with outsiders and with one another is an essential part of protecting their right to self-determination and so represents a goal toward which any fight for group recognition must aim. 6 If reducing group claims to those of individuals is incompatible with treating group autonomy as in itself important then liberal-individualist accounts of human rights will be incompatible with not only corporatism but with the political demands of most of the groups actually claiming groups rights around the world.

Local and international rights claims of indigenous peoples often appear as test cases in theoretical discussions of this problem. Indigenous groups tend to practice a political and cultural philosophy in which the connections between individual and group identity are given as much weight as the boundaries. And so their practice seems to offer a good testing group for the theoretical works of both liberal-individualists and corporatists claiming to model their work after indigenous philosophies.

On close examination, however, the ways in which indigenous groups conceive of groups and their relation to respect for individual dignity are not only more complex than the liberal-individualist or corporatist approaches that they have been used to illustrate, but offer a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between individuals and groups than either theoretical approach. Many indigenous groups 7 emphasize the interdependence of individual and collective claims and gravitate toward solutions [End Page 128] such as dual-standing group rights (rights which are predicated of a group but can be claimed by particular members as well as collectivities). As we shall demonstrate below, indigenous peoples generally recognize that collective and individual rights are mutually interactive rather than in competition. Duties of citizenship are grounded in interactions at multiple levels (the host state, indigenous group, and individual members) as are the claims that individuals may make of their governing institutions and of one another.

This practically-grounded perspective on group rights is markedly different from views prevalent in the existing theoretical literature. And, we argue, it offers a more promising avenue for the development of theory in this...

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