Terror and elections: Lessons from Spain
Section snippets
Theoretical considerations on elections and terror
There is a dearth of theoretical studies expressly focusing on terrorism and elections, therefore to answer the general research questions, how and why a terrorist attack may alter citizens' opinions and electoral behavior, we must build upon various related literatures. Specifically, previous work on terrorism and its strategies, international crises and rallies, and issue salience and electoral behavior can begin to guide our expectations.
The Spanish context
The Spanish elections of March 14th 2004 were scheduled legislative elections in this constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. Five years after the return of democracy and from 1982 to 1996, the Socialist Party (PSOE) led the government with Felipe Gonzalez in the presidency. Between 1996 and up to 2004, the Popular Party (PP), Spain's national conservative party, led the government with José Aznar in the presidency. The third national party, the United Left (IU), a coalition of
Data and methodology
To assess the impact of the Madrid bombing attacks on the 2004 Spanish electoral outcomes I examine three aspects of the voting process: the decision to turnout to vote, the vote choice decision, and whether the attack influenced a citizen. The decision to turnout to vote and the event of being influenced by the attack were estimated with a binary logit specification, and the vote choice decision was estimated with a multinomial logit (MNL) specification.
Results
To begin the analyses I examine selected frequencies of turnout and vote choice from the actual election returns and from the CIS and OPINA surveys. These are shown in Table 1. The first set of rows shows actual returns as well as pre-electoral expectations. The following set of rows presents CIS post-electoral frequencies, including counterfactual ones, that is, assuming the attacks had no influences. The last set of rows presents OPINA post-electoral frequencies.
Both the CIS and OPINA
Conclusion
The March 11th 2004 attack and its aftermath had a substantial effect on the Spanish electorate. Both actual reports and analyses show that some citizens were induced to vote by the attacks when they would otherwise not have done it and some citizens were induced to switch parties. The attacks and the government's response mobilized voters that are traditionally less likely to participate in the electoral process: the young and the less educated. These voters as well as those from the center
References (55)
Who Abstained and Why? Voter Turnout for the Referendum on the Treaty to Establish a European Constitution
(2005)- et al.
Patriotism or opinion leadership? The nature and origins of the “rally'round the flag” effect
Journal of Conflict Resolution
(2001) The constituent foundations of the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon
International Studies Quarterly
(2002)- et al.
On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
(2004) - et al.
Overreporting voting: why it happens and why it matters
Public Opinion Quarterly
(2001) Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support
(1991)- et al.
Policy failure and public support: the Iran-Contra affair and public assessment of President Reagan
Political Behavior
(1989) - et al.
Las Bases Sociales de la Abstentién en las Elecciones Generales Españolas
Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas
(2000) Conciliation, counterterrorism, and patterns of terrorist violence
International Organization
(2005)- et al.
The American Voter
(1966)