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Queer Intellectual Curiosity as International Relations Method:
Developing Queer International Relations Theoretical and Methodological
Frameworks
Cynthia Weber
University of Sussex
Forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly
Abstract:
This article outlines two theoretical and methodological approaches that take a queer
intellectual curiosity about figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as
their core. These offer ways to conduct international-relations research on “the
homosexual” and on international-relations figurations more broadly, e.g. from “the
woman” to “the human rights holder.” The first approach provides a method for
analyzing figurations of “the homosexual” and sexualized orders of international
relations that are inscribed in IR as either normal or perverse. The second approach
offers instructions on how to read plural figures and plural logics that signify as
normal and/or perverse (and which might be described as queer). Together, they
propose techniques, devices and research questions to investigate singular and plural
IR figurations – including but not exclusively those of “the homosexual” – that map
international phenomena as diverse as colonialism, human rights, and the formation of
states and international communities in ways that exceed IR survey research
techniques that, for example, incorporate “the homosexual” into IR research through a
“sexuality variable.”
The new persecution of the peripheral sexualities entailed an incorporation of
perversions and a new specification of individuals….Homosexuality appeared as one
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of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a
kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.
- Michel Foucault (1980:42-43)
Like being a woman, like being a racial, religious, tribal, or ethic minority, being
LGBT does not make you less human. And that is why gay rights are human rights,
and human rights are gay rights….The Obama Administration defends the human
rights of LGBT people as part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a
priority of our foreign policy.
- US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton (2011)
We are unity, and we are unstoppable.
- Eurovision Song Contest Winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst (2014)1
What is “homosexuality”? Who is “the homosexual”? How might theoretical
and methodological frameworks draw out the relevance of these questions for
International Relations (IR)?
I outline theoretical and methodological approaches that take a queer
intellectual curiosity about figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as
their methodological core. These approaches offer ways to conduct IR research on a
broad range of subjects. A queer intellectual curiosity – akin to Cynthia Enloe’s
(2004) feminist curiosity – refuses to take for granted the personal-to-international
institutional arrangements, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that
figure “homosexuality” and “the homosexual.” It investigates how these figurations
powerfully attach to—and detach from—material bodies and hence become mobilized
in international politics. In doing so, it challenges the common assumption that
(homo)sexuality is a trivial matter in world politics.
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Separating the drag artist Neuwirth from his creation Wurst is difficult if not
3
The quotations that open this article demonstrate the historically variable
character of understandings of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual.” For 18thcentury Victorians, homosexuality referred to sexual practices of sodomy between
men. Not only did Victorians consider homosexuality an aberrant sexual practice, but
they also specified “the sodomite” as a new “alien strain” (Foucault, 1980:53-73)—a
new “species” called “the homosexual” (also see Somerville, 2000; Hoad, 2000). The
invention of a new population—composed of the perverse “homosexual” as an
“abomination” of normal sexuality—occurred by discursively implanting the
“perversion” (Foucault, 1980:Chapter 2) of “homosexuality” into the bodies of
individuals (Foucault, 1980:36). Subjected to scientific study and biopolitical
management, this white Western European “homosexual”—with his naturalized
“homosexual” desire for same-sex sodomy—was pathologized and became subject to
moral, medical, and psychological correction.
These dominant understandings of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as
perverse persist, even in an era when many increasingly see “homosexuality” and “the
homosexual” as normal. For example, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s 2011
Human Rights Day speech describes “homosexuality” not as perverse sexual conduct
but as love within a same-sex couple. In many circles, the “cringe-worthy” term “the
homosexual” that connotes perversion (Peters, 2014) disappears altogether, to be
replaced by “the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered”— “the LGBT” for short.
Imagined in the image of the white, modern, Western neoliberal citizen, “the LGBT”
emerges as a normal minority human being within a universal population of normal
human beings. What distinguishes “the LGBT” is unjust discrimination associated
with the object of its love/affection. Such discourse surrounding “The LGBT”
naturalizes “homosexual” desires for same-sex love. It domesticates “The LGBT”
through gay marriage, gay consumerism, and gay patriotism (Duggan, 2003).
Indeed, it is not uncommon for people to understand “homosexuality” and
“the homosexual” as either normal or perverse. This binary becomes particularly
salient when statespeople and religious leaders mobilize its underlying understandings
for political gain. We see this in how some European leaders took up the 2014
Eurovision Song Contest winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst (hereafter
Neuwirth/Wurst) as a figure who embodied either a normal or a perverse image of an
integrated Europe. Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, for example,
claimed Wurst signified “the end of Europe” because, “They don’t have men and
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women any more. They have “it”” (Davies, 2014). In contrast, Austrian Green
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Ulrike Lunacek commented, “Conchita
Wurst has a very important message that…has to do with what the EU stands for:
Equal rights, fundamental rights, the right to live your life without fear, for LGBT and
other minorities” (EurActiv, 2014). The figure of Neuwirth/Wurst inspired such
strong views not because Neuwirth/Wurst could be read as exclusively normal or
perverse but because Neuwirth/Wurst could also be read as normal and perverse at the
same time—and across a number of different registers. Certainly, Neuwirth/Wurst
appeared as normal and/or perverse in the registers of sex (male and/or female),
gender (masculine and/or feminine) and sexuality (heterosexual and/or homosexual),
as the name Conchita Wurst in part implies. The name combines the Spanish slang for
vagina (“conchita”) with the German word sausage (“wurst”) and – read together – is
Austrian slang for, “It doesn’t matter.”2 But Neuwirth/Wurst can also be read as
normal and/or perverse in registers that matter intensely in international relations.
These include nationality (where Neuwirth/Wurst is Austrian and/or German and/or
Colombian) and “civilization” (where Neuwirth/Wurst is Indigenous and/or Hispanic
and/or European). What proves so striking about these figurations of
Neuwirth/Wurst, as I elaborate later, is that Neuwirth/Wurst’s IR registers of
normality and/or perversion always function through—and never function
independently of—Neuwirth/Wurst’s and/or sex, gender, and sexuality.
These three very different figurations of “homosexuality” and “the
homosexual” matter not simply because they mark major historical shifts in dominant
Western perspective on “the homosexual” and “homosexuality.” They also illustrate
how specific figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” make it
(im)possible for Western “experts” to categorize people and geopolitical spaces as
normal or pathological—and to react to them accordingly. Indeed, specific
figurations of “homosexuality” and of “the homosexual” enable and contest specific
modes of organization and regulation of national, regional, and international politics.
For example, figurations of “the savage, the primitive, the colonized” (Stoler,
1995:7) and “the underdeveloped” (Hoad, 2000) all appear in Victorian colonial
discourse as sexualized and racialized degenerate and/or deviant “perverse
homosexuals.” These figurations played a role in licensing Victorian sovereign states
2
Thanks to Melanie Richter‐Montpetit for this translations.
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to subject entire colonialized populations to imperial rule, as Stoler’s (1995) analysis
of colonial educational practices illustrates. Traces of these figurations linger in
contemporary Western figurations of “the unwanted im/migrant” and “the terrorist,”
which inform policies on immigration and security (Luibhéid, 2008; Puar and Rai,
2002; Puar, 2007). Figurations of “the homosexual” as “the LGBT” justified the
Obama Administration’s global support for gay rights as human rights. This support
both promised to extend human rights to all “LGBT populations” (Langlois, 2015:28,
34) and justified the Obama Administration’s monitoring of how some states
performed against US standards of tolerance toward “the LGBT” (Rao, 2012).
Finally, figurations of “the homosexual” as normal and/or perverse sparked debate in
contemporary Europe about how the (dis)ordering of sex, gender, and sexuality in
traditional binary terms might progress or imperil Europe “itself.” In these debates,
European leaders “weaponized” Neuwirth/Wurst (Black, 2014) by deploying some
elements of Neuwirth/Wurst’s “unstoppable unity” to enable or disable specific
renderings of European integration and of Europe “itself,” Yet because there were at
least three legitimate readings of Neuwirth/Wurst circulating in debates about Europe
– Neuwirth/Wurst as normal, Neuwirth/Wurst as perverse, and Neuwirth/Wurst as
normal and/or perverse – attempts to use Neuwirth/Wurst to anchor any singular
vision of an integrated Europe did as much to disorder (knowledge about) European
integration as they did to order it/them.
Because policymakers occasionally employ these figurations to construct and
legitimate how they order international politics and tame anarchy, figurations of
“homosexuality” and “the homosexual” participate in constructing “sexualized orders
of international relations” —international orders that are necessarily produced
through various codings of sex, gender, and sexuality. Such encodings carry with
them practical empirical consequences for individuals, populations, nation-states, and
the conduct of foreign policy. Viewed through queer intellectual curiosity, a plethora
of sexualized and queer IR figurations, as well as their stakes for international
relations, come into focus.
These include how figurations of Thai “ladyboys” function in international sex
trafficking and “the asexual Japanese couple” inform domestic and international
scenarios that link sexual and economic (re)production. But less familiar to IR
audiences might be the growing body of Queer IR scholarship that analyzes less
obviously sexualized and queered IR figurations: “the terrorist” (Weber, 2002; Puar
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and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007), “the torturer” (Richter-Monpetit, 2014), “the slave”
(Agathangelou, 2014), “the nationally bordered body” (Weber, 1998; Sjoberg, 2014;
Peterson, 2014), “the human rights holder” (Wilkinson and Langlois, 2014; Rao,
2014a; Picq and Thiel (2015), “the revolutionary state and citizen” (Weber, 1999;
Lind and Keating, 2013) and “the homosexual” more generally (Weiss and Bosnia,
2014). Together these analyses demonstrate how, for example, (inter)national
conjunctures of homophobia (fearing “the homosexual”) and “homoprotectionism”
(protecting “the homosexual”; Lind and Keating, 2014) complicate IR theories and
practices about/of war and peace, state and nation formation, and international
political economy.
Available space prevents a discussion of each sexualized and queer IR
figuration and its importance in IR.Thus, I limit my analysis to the three illustrations
that open this article: Victorian colonial practices, Obama administration foreign
policy leveraging of gay rights as human rights, and EU Euro-vision debates about
Neuwirth/Wurst. I do so for three reasons. First, each illustrates a different alignment
of “homosexuality” with (ab)normality, producing three distinct sexualized
figurations of “the homosexual” for analysis – the perverse Victorian “homosexual”,
the normal Obama administration “homosexual,” and the normal and/or perverse
Euro-visioned “homosexual.” Second, separately and together these examples
demonstrate that by placing a queer intellectual curiosity about figurations of
“homosexuality” and “the homosexual” at its methodological core, this particular
Queer IR method does more than just “add (homo)sexuality” to IR. It offers ways to
map phenomena as diverse as colonialism, human rights and the formation of states
and international communities that provide vastly different renderings of international
politics than those that emerge when we include a “sexuality variable” in our survey
research instruments, for example.
In this article, I develop two theoretical and methodological approaches that
put a queer intellectual curiosity about “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” at the
core of their investigations of international relations. I develop one such approach by
mining classic texts in Queer Theory, Feminist Technoscience Studies,
Poststructuralist International Relations, and Queer International Relations for
theoretical concepts and methodological procedures. Specifically, I use Michel
Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1980) to recover three specific elements
from his analysis: putting sex into discourse, productive power, and networks of
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power/knowledge/pleasure. I suggest that these elements—together with Feminist
Technoscience Studies scholar Donna Haraway’s conceptualization of “figuration” as
the distillation of shared meanings in forms or images (1997),3 Feminist and Queer
Theory scholar Judith Butler’s theory of performativity (1999), and Poststructuralist
IR scholar Richard Ashley’s arguments about “statecraft as mancraft” (1989)—
provide the necessary concepts and devices to analyze figurations of “the
homosexual” and sexualized orders of international relations that are inscribed in
international discourse and practice as either normal or perverse.
These theories in combination generate important research questions, but they
neglect to analyze plural figures like Neuwirth/Wurst that defy categorization as
either normal or perverse. They therefore lack the tools to assess the sexualized
(dis)orders of international relations to which such categorizations give rise. In a
second reading of these theories – especially Ashley’s statecraft as mancraft – I
attempt to correct this oversight by turning to Roland Barthes’ logic of a pluralized
and/or (1974 and 1976). Barthes offers instructions for reading plural figures and
logics that signify as normal and/or perverse through what can be vast matrices of
sexes, genders, and sexualities. I view those plural figures and logics that are
constructed in relation to—but not necessarily exclusively through—sexes, genders,
and sexualities as queer. In doing so, I follow Eve Sedgwick’s description of queer as
“the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses
and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of
anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically”
(1993:8). Reading Ashley’s statecraft as mancraft with Barthes’ queer logic of a
pluralized and/or, I propose an additional lens through which to investigate
figurations of “the homosexual,” sovereign man, sovereign states, and sexualized
orders of international relations – what I call “queer logics of statecraft.”
Some may view these Queer IR methods as additional instruments in IR’s
conceptual toolbox “for organizing empirical material and practical research designs”
(Aradau and Huysmans, 2013:2; also see Jackson, 2011). Others may see them as
lacking the status of proper or unique methods. They might understand them as a
queer lens attached primarily to feminist and poststructuralist techniques (Plummer,
2003:520). Still others may understand them as performative devices “experimentally
3
Thanks to Maureen McNeil for this formulation.
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connecting and assembling fragments of ontology, epistemology, theories, techniques
and data” through which “substantive worlds” are called into being and are acted
upon (Aradau and Huysmans, 2013:3, 18).
Regardless, engagement with Queer IR methods enriches how we analyze core
IR concerns like hierarchy and anarchy (Lake, 2009, Bially Mattern, forthcoming).
Queer IR methods broaden our thinking about how to study a wide array of IR
mobilizations of normality, perversion and stigma (see Towns, 2010; Adler-Nissen,
2014; Zarakol, 2011). Scholars might consider how “the homosexual” – like “the
woman” – becomes another “standard of civilization” (Towns, 2014; Hoad, 2000;
Puar, 2007; Rao, 2014a). They might challenge the incorporation of “homosexuality”
into IR as primarily “a sexuality variable” (Weber, 1998a). Or they might ponder the
intellectual and political effects of employing critical methods in IR and in
international politics (Aradau and Huysmans, 2013).
In my view, these Queer IR methods make especially plural figures and plural
logics easier to identify and analyze. They thereby highligh the roles of plural figures
and plural logics in the organization, regulation and conduct of international politics.
Queer IR methods hold the potential to disrupt intellectual practices that either
exclude or apriori fix understandings of “the homosexual” and other plural figures –
from “the woman” (Enloe, 2004; Town, 2014) to “the human rights holder”
(Wilkinson and Langlois, 2014) to variously normalized and/or stigmatized
subjectivities (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Zarakol, 2011) – as a condition for the conduct of
research.
Developing Queer IR Methods
Discourse, Productive Power, and Networks of Power/Knowledge/Pleasure
Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (hereafter HoS) instructs
its readers how to analyze modern sexuality by offering four primary
recommendations:
1. Analyze how sex is put into discourse;
2. Analyze the functions and effects of productive power;
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3. Understand productive power as working through networks of
power/knowledge/pleasure; and
4. Analyze how understandings of “the normal” and “the perverse” are frozen,
without assuming they are either true or forever fixed.
In this section, I offer a reading of HoS that draws out these instructions.
All of these instructions follow from Foucault’s central claim in HoS that the
organizing principle of sexuality from 18th century Europe to “the contemporary
West” is how “sex is ‘put into discourse’” (Foucault, 1980:11), e.g., how specific
meanings of sexualities and sexual subjectivities are produced through specific – even
repressive – discursive formulations that bring sexualities like “homosexuality” and
sexual subjectivities like “the homosexual” into being. For while Victorian
institutions from law to medicine certainly repressed “deviant” sexual practices and
sexuality, in so doing they also discursively invented both sexual norms and the
“sexual deviants” who defied them. Foucault’s “Instruction 1” follows from this
observation – analyze how sex is put into discourse.
How specifically did Victorians put sex into discourse? Foucault’s answer is
through scientific discourses about sexuality – a “scientia sexualis” including biology,
physiology, and psychology – that sought to make “the homosexual body” confess its
scientific truth. “Scientia sexualis,” Foucault claims, functioned as a kind of
productive power to invent “the homosexual” and other sexual figurations like “the
hysterical woman” and “the masturbating child” during the Victorian era. This is why
Foucault offers us “Instruction 2” – analyze the functions and effects of productive
power.
How specifically did productive power work to figure “the homosexual”?
Working on every surface of “the homosexual body” and penetrating deep into “the
homosexual soul”, theologians, doctors, and psychiatrists medicalized, surveilled, and
managed “the homosexual.” Their biopolitical apparatuses produced “the alien
strain” of “the homosexual” as scientific fact (Foucault 1980:42-44, 53-73). “The
homosexual”, then, was not a discovery whose empirical reality Victorian scientists
examined. Rather, it was through the scientific examination of his “sexual deviance”
and the therapeutic correction he was subjected to that Victorian society brought “the
homosexual” into being.
This scientifically-produced “homosexual” was prescribed a regimen of
normalization, presumably to make possible his sexual reconstitution from one who
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desired perverse sex4 to one who desired normal sex, where normal sex was
represented by the presumptively white, Christian, bourgeois, able-bodied, cisgendered, procreative heterosexual “Malthusian couple.” But what this regime of
normalization also did was subject “the homosexual” to constant surveillance,
management and correction. This is how “the homosexual” was located in a complex
nexus of what Foucault calls the system of power/knowledge/pleasure. This brings us
to Foucault’s “Instruction 3” – understand productive power as working through
networks of power/knowledge/pleasure.
Why did Victorian society invent “the homosexual,” diagnose individuals as
afflicted with “homosexuality,” and subject them to processes of normalization?
Foucault offers several reasons. One reason is that “the homosexual” (like other
perverse Victorian figures) made it possible to identify normal sexual behavior,
discursively implant normality in the procreative heterosexual Malthusian couple, and
circulate social understandings of this couple as exemplary of normal, healthy, moral
Victorian sexuality. Thus, a perverse/normal dichotomy produced all manner of
Victorian sexual subjectivities and organized them socially, scientifically, and morally
in ways that made the “normal,” privileged heterosexual procreative couple appear to
be coherent and whole.
It is only by abandoning what Foucault calls “the repressive hypothesis” –
“the hypothesis that modern industrial societies ushered in an age of increased sexual
repression” (Foucault, 1980:49) – that we can appreciate how systems of
power/knowledge/pleasure actually function. “Pleasure and power do not cancel or
turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another.
They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and
incitement” (Foucault, 1980:48). What they make possible are figurations of
sexualized subjects like “the homosexual” as well as “institutions, structures of
understanding, and practical orientations that make [normative sexualities like]
heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organized as a sexuality – but also
privileged” (Berlant and Warner, 1995: 548, footnote 2; my brackets).5
Foucault takes seriously the question “who is “the homosexual”?”, then, not so
he can get to “the truth” about “the homosexual” but to understand how systems of
4
Or, in the case of “the hysterical woman”, desired no (heterosexual) sex.
5
This is Berlant and Warner’s definition of heteronormativity (1995).
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power/knowledge/pleasure function to produce the “perverse homosexual” and his
“opposite,” “normal” Malthusian couple. This makes possible exploration of the
circulation of these apparent representations in intimate as well as national, regional
and international contexts. For example, we can explore how our knowledge of “the
underdeveloped” as perverse and “the LGBT” as normal are in part produced
by/through some of the same scientific systems of power/knowledge/pleasure that
produce “the perverse homosexual” and “the normal homosexual” respectively. In
IR, we see this in how Modernization and Development Theory draws upon Talcott
Parson’s structural-functionalist evolutionary sociology to mark “the underdeveloped”
as “the perverse homosexual” who is the deviant, dysfunctional remainder of social,
biological, and political development (Weber, 2016). This is in contrast to how
Hilary Clinton extents “the normal” to include “the LGBT couple” that is
reproductive for their nation-state, to refigure “the perverse homosexual” as “the
normal homosexual” (Clinton, 2011; also see Peterson, 2014). What disconcerts
many scholars and statespeople is how Neuwirth/Wurst combines aspects “the
perverse, underdeveloped homosexual” (e.g., as the rural Colombian Conchita Wurst)
and “the normal, developed homosexual” (e.g., as the European “LGBT”) at the same
time.
Foucault’s “Instruction 4” – analyze how understandings of “the normal” and
“the perverse” are frozen, without assuming they are either true or forever fixed –
exposes figurations of “the homosexual” as “the underdeveloped,” “the LGBT,” and
“the Euro-visioned bearded drag queen” not as true or false but as powerful apparent
representations whose meanings and functions vary radically throughout history and
across the globe.
Foucault’s genealogical method highlights the changeable nature of
figurations of “the homosexual”, by focusing on different historical representations of
“the homosexual” and asking “How did these very different understandings of “the
homosexual” as, for example, the Victorian sexual and developmental “primitive” or
“underdeveloped” and the Obama administration’s normal “LGBT” come about?”
Yet because Foucault’s instructions about analyzing modern sexuality and sexual
subjectivities are very sweeping, it is useful to look to additional theorists to provide
more precise concepts and devices. In this vein, I turn to Donna Haraway’s Butlarian
theorization of figuration.
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Figuration
What exactly might we look for when we examine figurations of “the
homosexual”? Writing in a very different context to Foucault’s,6 Donna Haraway
discusses some specific techniques of “figuration” that allow us to employ figuration
as a critical conceptual devise (Kuntsman, 2009:29). Haraway’s conceptualization of
figuration – which is compatible with Foucault’s analysis and builds upon Butler’s
notion of performativity – can help us explore in more detail the figure of “the
homosexual.”
Figurations are distillations of shared meanings in forms or images. They do
not (mis)represent the world, for to do so implies the world as a signified pre-exists
them. Rather, figurations emerge out of discursive and material semiotic assemblages
that condense diffuse imaginaries about the world into specific forms or images that
bring specific worlds into being. This makes figurations powerful signifiers that
approximate but never properly represent seemingly signified worlds, even though
figurations are evoked as if they did represent pre-existing worlds. It is this latter
move that reifies figurations and the worlds they create, making both potentially “flat,
unproductive, stifling and destructive” (Grau, 2004:12; McNeil, 2007). This is why
we need techniques like Haraway’s to analyze precisely how figurations are crafted
and employed.
Haraway explains figuration as the employment of semiotic tropes that
combine knowledges, practices, and power to (in)form how we map our worlds and
understand the actual things in those worlds (1997).7 Unpacking Haraway’s
description, we are left with four key elements through which figurations take specific
forms: tropes, temporalities, performativities, and worldings (1997:11).
Tropes are material and semiotic expressions of actual things that express how
we understand those actual things. Tropes are figures of speech that are not “literal or
self-identical” to what they describe (Haraway, 1997:11). Figures of speech enable us
to express what something or someone is like while (potentially) at the same time
6
Haraway employs figuration to capture ideas about embodiment and materiality in
the context of Feminist Technoscience Studies.
7
My explanation of figuration condenses and paraphrases a longer discussion in
Weber (2015), which explains why there appears to be no queer international theory.
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grasping that the figuration is not identical to the figure of speech we have employed.
This is what makes figuration something that both makes representation appear to be
possible and interrupts representation in any literal sense.
Haraway argues that language necessitates deployment of figuration and its
inability to achieve literal representations. This is because all types of language –
whether textual, visual, artistic – involves “at least some kind of displacement that can
trouble identifications and certainties” (Haraway, 1997:11) between a figure and an
actual thing. Investigating figurations of “the homosexual” as “an alien species” to
the Victorians as opposed to “the homosexual,” as “the LGBT rights holder” to the
Obama administration and as both “an alien species” and “the normal LGBT rights
holder” in the figure of Neuwirth/Wurst allows analysis of what makes these
figurations possible but also what keeps them from referring to specific material
bodies engaged in specific forms of sexual practices, specific forms of loving or
specific forms of (singular) being.
Haraway’s second element of figuration is temporalities. Temporality
expresses a relationship to time. Haraway notes that figurations are historically
rooted in progressive, eschatological temporality because they are embedded within
“the semiotics of Western Christian realism.” Because Western Christian figures hold
the promise of salvation in the afterlife, they embody this progressive temporality
(Haraway, 1997:9). This medieval notion of developmental temporality persists as a
vital aspect of (some) contemporary figurations, even when contemporary figures take
secular forms (e.g., when it is science, not God, that promises to deliver us from evil
through technological innovation; Haraway, 1997:10).
But this developmental time may not be applied to every figuration in the
same way. For example, because the Victorian “homosexual” was figured not only
through European scientific discourses but also through discourses of race and
colonialism (Stoler, 1995), how “the homosexual” was related to developmental
temporalities depended very much on who it was (colonizer vs. savage) and where it
was (Europe vs. the colonies). It was in part thanks to how developmental
temporalities were racialized (Stoler, 1995) and spatialized (Hoad, 2000) that it was
possible for the white Western European “homosexual” to be put on a course of
progressive correction so he could live within Victorian society, while figurations of
whole populations of racially darkened colonial subjects endlessly oscillated between
the irredeemable “non-progressive homosexual” and the redeemable “morally
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perfectible homosexual” (Bhabha, 1994:118), both of whom must live under
Victorian imperial rule.
Centuries later, these racialized and colonial legacies of “the homosexual” live
on, but in ways that appear to be completely different from those of their Victorian
predecessors. For example, Clinton’s “LGBT rights holder” is not cast as
progressing. Rather, “the LGBT” is a temporally static figure articulated in universal
moral terms. By definition, this figure always was and always will be a human being
like every other human being. This is what empowers “the LGBT” to “claim gay
rights as human rights, as every human being has a claim to human rights.
This does not mean that a developmental temporality is absent from Obama
administration discourse on “the LGBT”. Rather, developmental temporality is
central to Obama administration discourse, albeit differently than it was to the
Victorians. This is because developmental temporality is not implanted in the figure
of “the LGBT” itself. Instead, it is located in relations between sovereign nationstates, where the Obama administration uses a state’s progress toward their
appreciation of gay rights as human rights as their measure of development. This is
evident in US policies toward Uganda and Russia, for example (Rao, 2014b;
Wilkinson and Langlous, 2014). Striving toward this specific kind of development is
what it means to the Obama administration “to be on the right side of history”
(Clinton, 2011; also see Rao, 2012).
It is, somewhat surprisingly, Tom Neuwirth’s Euro-pop bearded drag queen
Conchita Wurst that most closely engages with Western Christian realism and its
progressive, eschatological temporality as described by Haraway. While
Neuwirth/Wurst’s declaration, “We’re unstoppable” aligns Neuwirth/Wurst with a
modern progressive developmental temporality, as a cis-male styled with long
flowing hair and a beard while wearing a gown and singing “Rise like a Phoenix”,
Neuwirth/Wurst has been read as a resurrected Christ-like figure (Ring, 2014). This
has lead some European political and religious leaders to debate whether
Neuwirth/Wurst is a developmental vision of salvation or sacrilege for contemporary
Europe (Weber, 2016).
These differences in how figurations of “the homosexual” relate to
temporalities underscore the importance of Haraway’s third element –
performativities. Coined by Judith Butler to explain how sexes, genders, and
sexualities appear to be normal, natural and true, the term performativity expresses
15
how repeated iterations of acts constitute the subjects who are said to be performing
them (Butler, 1999:xv). Applying Nietzsche’s idea that there is no doer behind the
deed and that the deed is everything (1999:33) to an analysis of sexes, genders and
sexualities, Butler argues that enactments of gender make it appear as if sex – which
Butler understands as a social construct – is natural and normal, and as if particular
sexed bodies map “naturally” onto particular genders. It is through the everyday
inhabiting of these various sexes, genders, and sexualities by everyday people who
performatively enact them that the subjectivities of these doers of sex, gender, and
sexuality appear to come into being. This does not mean that – once enacted –
performativities freeze sexed, gendered, and sexualized subjectivities and the
networks of power and pleasure which are productive of them. Rather, because each
enactment is itself particular, it holds the possibility of reworking, rewiring and
resisting both “frozen” notions of sex, gender and sexuality and their institutionalized
organizations of power.
Following Butler, Haraway argues that “[f]igurations are performative images
that can be inhabited” (Haraway, 1997:11). In the case of the Victorian
“homosexual”, “the LGBT rights holder,” and “the Euro-pop bearded drag queen,”
this means these figurations – these figures of speech – through their repetition under
specific conditions come to be understood as inhabitable images of oneself (or, e.g.,
one’s vision of Europe) or of others. “The homosexual” may choose to
performatively inhabit these figurations, or this inhabiting might be imposed upon
“the homosexual.” For example, it is hard to imagine the Victorian “homosexual”
willingly embracing himself as “perverse.” It is even harder to imagine colonial
subjects embracing their figuration by Victorians as akin to the “homosexual” in their
perversion while distinct from the “homosexual” because their racialization and
“primitiveness” designate them as incapable of progression or slow to progress.
In contrast, the contemporary figuration of “the homosexual” as “the LGBT”
may seem to be uncontroversially positive. Many “homosexuals” welcome the
opportunity to inhabit the image of “the LGBT rights holder” because of how it
appears to signify both normality and progress. At the same time, other contemporary
“homosexuals” find the image of “the LGBT rights holder” too constraining. Their
objections center on how “the LGBT” is produced by and is productive of institutions,
structures of understanding, and practical orientations that value only
hetero/homonormative ways of being “homosexual” (in marriage, the military, and
16
consumption) and devalue queer ways of inhabiting one’s sexuality (Duggan,
2003:50), illustrating a tension between IR conceptualizations of norms as uniformly
beneficial (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and queer critiques of
norms/normalization. As for Neuwirth/Wurst, by both embracing and exceeding
hetero/homonormativities, his/her/their performative figuration complicates both “the
LGBT” and a hetero/homonormative vs. queer dichotomy.
These illustrations suggest figurations are never stable. For every
performance of a figuration depends upon innumerable particularities, including:
historical circumstances, geopolitical context, spatial location,
social/psychic/affective/political dispositions as well as perceived/attributed traits
(racial, sexual, classed, gendered, [dis]abled) of individuals in relation to the
figurations they are presumed to inhabit, an individual’s success, failure or jamming
of their assigned/assumed figuration as they performatively enact it, and how these
performativities are received and read by others. Because no two performative
enactments are ever identical (Butler, 1999), every repetition and inhabitation
introduces some, even tiny, amount of difference. What this means for figurations of
“the homosexual” is they are never completely frozen, for they are always only
distilled forms or images that change – even in small ways – through their every
iteration and inhabitation. Therefore, institutional arrangements of
power/knowledge/pleasure – be they heteronormativities and/or homonormativities –
are likewise less stable than they appear to be.
All of these aspects of performativity – in combination with how tropes and
temporalities are deployed – combine to produce the final element of figuration –
worlding (in IR, see Agathangelou and Ling, 2004). Worlding “map[s] universes of
knowledge, practice, and power” (Haraway, 1997:11). In the cases of the Victorian
“homosexual,” the Obama administration’s “LGBT rights holder,” and European
debates over Neuwirth/Wurst, knowledge about these figurations, the way they are
performatively put into practice, and the power relations running through them
combine so differently in each case that it is sometimes difficult to remember that we
are speaking about the same general figure – “the homosexual.”
The sometimes extreme differences in how the figure of “the homosexual” is
worlded emphasizes another of Haraway’s points – the maps produced by worlding
practices are as contestable as the figurations to which they give specific form
(1997:11). In Foucault’s terms, this means neither understandings of “the
17
homosexual” nor the networks of power/knowledge/pleasure that produce this figure
are ever frozen. Rather, they are products “of the encroachment of a type of power on
bodies and their pleasures…[that define] new rules for the game of powers and
pleasures” (Foucault, 1980:48). These games are played not only in intimate relations
but also in national, regional and international relations.
Statecraft as Mancraft
Combining Foucault’s insights about discourse and productive power with
Haraway’s Butlerian unpacking of figuration makes it possible to offer a more
nuanced account of the figuration of “the homosexual.” By layering this analysis
with Richard Ashley’s “statecraft as manscraft,” what comes into sharper focus is
how states (and other political communities) attempt to freeze meanings of “the
homosexual” when they enter international games “of powers and pleasures”
(Foucault, 1980:48). Ashley argues it is impossible to understand the formation of
modern sovereign states and international orders without understanding how a
particular version of “sovereign man” is inscribed as the necessary foundation of a
sovereign state and how this procedure of “statecraft as mancraft” produces a specific
ordering of international relations. I unpack Ashley’s argument by making two
moves. I illustrate Ashley’s argument with reference to “the homosexual” in
Victorian and in Obama administration discourse. I use the analyses above of
Foucault, Haraway, and Butler to argue that Ashley’s “statecraft as mancraft”8 both
furthers understandings of figurations of “the homosexual” generally and provides
specific IR research questions for analyzing figurations of “the homosexual” in
sexualized orders of international relations.
Writing about international relations from a poststructuralist perspective,
Ashley’s arguments build upon Foucault’s analysis of the constitution and
problematization of subjectivities. Yet Ashley adds Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive
critique of logocentrism to this analysis, based upon his reading of Derrida’s texts
from the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., 1977, 1981).
Logocentrism refers to how “the word” –a singular, specific word signifying a
specific presence – grounds all meaning in a linguistic system because of how it is
8
Ashley's use of the gendered term "man" is intentional.
18
positioned as a universal referent that is located outside of history. In the classical
age, “God” was the most common example of a “logos” in a logocentric system. In
the modern age, as Nietzsche argued, “man” displaced “God” from this logocentric
position. Understood as “a pure and originary presence – an unproblematic,
extrahistorical identity, in need of no critical accounting” (Ashley, 1989:261), it is
now “modern man” who functions in modern discourse as “an origin, an identical
voice that is regarded as the sovereign source of truth and meaning” (Ashley,
1989:261).
Derrida argues that by identifying one word, one being, one presence as an
originary “logos” from which all other meanings flow, logocentric systems create
conditions of possibility for both hierarchies in linguistic systems and specific
narratives of history. Applying Derrida’s ideas to modern renderings of international
politics and international theory (especially to Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory),
Ashley explains how “the logos” is the “sovereign source of truth and meaning” in the
manifestation and analysis of the modern nation-state and in specific renderings of
domestic and international orders.
Specifically, Ashley argues that in international relations theory and practice,
“modern man” as sovereign man functions not only as “the logos” of modernity in
general but also as the foundation of the sovereign nation-state. This is because since
the move from monarchical to popular sovereignty, “modern man” has given the
modern nation-state its sovereign authority. The state’s sovereign authority that had
previously been vested in the monarch – as transcendental, as reasonable, as the
interpreter of meaning – is now vested instead in “modern man”. To be sovereign,
then, every sovereign nation-state inscribes a particular sovereign man as an always
already existing domestic presence as the foundation of its authority domestically and
internationally.
What emerges from Ashley’s analysis are three key points that I illustrate with
reference to the Victorian “homosexual” and to Clinton’s gay right’s holding
“homosexual”. First, because the modern sovereign nation-state is intimately tied to
“modern man”, the sovereign inscription of the modern state is intimately tied to the
sovereign inscription of “modern man”. To put it in Ashley’s terms, “Modern
statecraft is modern mancraft. It is an art of domesticating the meaning of man by
constructing his problems, his dangers, his fears” (1989:303; italics in original).
These are projected into the dangerous realm of international anarchy that sovereign
19
man with his foreign policies attempts to tame. For example, Victorian modern man
as “imperial man” required the dangerous, unruly, racially darkened and sexualized
“savage” as his “colonial (perverse homosexual) subject” to justify both the
reasonableness of Victorian “sovereign man” and his imperial rule. In contrast, some
have argued (Rao, 2012) that the Obama administration’s modern man as “neoimperial man” requires the dangerous, unruly, racially darkened and sexualized “postcolonial (perverse homosexual) state” to justify both the reasonableness of an
enlightened US “sovereign man” who internationally proclaims gay rights as human
rights to legitimize his neo-imperial rule. These examples illustrate why “paradigms
of man are themselves tools of power” (Ashley, 1989:300).
Second, this has implications for understanding how international relations are
ordered. For, as Ashley argues, “modern mancraft” does not just give rise to the
modern sovereign state; it also gives rise to modern understandings of international
order. For just as the “logos” in Derrida’s logocentric system makes it possible to
establish hierarchies, the “logos” of “modern man” as the “logos” of the modern state
organizes international relations according to hierarchies as well.
These include: reasonable man/pure danger, civilized/barbaric,
security/danger, peace/war, domestic/international and order/anarchy. In this
logocentric system, whatever can be narrated from the point of view of “the logos”
and made to “speak from a sovereign voice” is what is valued and protected; what
cannot be made to speak from a sovereign voice (e.g., anarchy and terror) must be
violently opposed (Ashley, 1989:284). Specifying “modern man” in “the Malthusian
couple” as their civilized, secure, domestic logos, Victorians narrated the deviant
“homosexual” as an intimate, national and international source of barbarism, danger
and instability to “modern man” (Stoler, 1995). Expanding hetero/homonormative
figurations of “the normal couple” to include “the LGBT couple”, the Obama
administration in contrast narrated those unreasonable states that do not recognize the
gay rights of “the LGBT” as sources of barbarism, danger and instability to “modern
man”, established neo-colonial education policies to enlighten unreasonable state’s
leaders (e.g., by distributing “LGBT” human rights tool kits to foreign embassies) and
imposed sanctions on some states that failed to embrace gay rights as human rights
(Clinton, 2011). This is how “modern man” as sovereign man authorizes the potential
use of violence by the sovereign state on behalf of his presumed transcendental reason
(Ashley, 1989:268).
20
Third, Ashley argues that none of these figurations – of “modern man,” of the
modern state, or of international orders that we in IR understand as variations of order
vs. anarchy – are stable or ahistorical. For the reasonableness of “modern man” can
always be shown to be unreasonable, just as the order of domestic politics can always
be shown to contain aspects of anarchy. To put it in Derrida’s terms, the binaries that
order domestic and international relations constantly deconstruct themselves, making
them both unstable and (because unstable) unreliable. What this means is that various
invested actors – from citizens to states to formal international institutions –
constantly attempt to stabilize these unreliable hierarchies and the figurations that
authorize them so they appear to be ahistorical, given, and true so that they might
more reliably function in domestic and international politics. The anxious labor that
both the Victorians and the Obama administration employ(ed) to construct their
opposed figurations of “the homosexual” – often in the face of international
resistances by colonial states (in the case of the Victorians; Stoler, 1995) and by postcolonial and post-communist states (in the case of the Obama administration; Rao,
2012; Wilkinson and Langlois, 2014) – are cases in point. This in part explains why
international politics is inscribed as dangerous by sovereign nation-states (Ashley,
1989:304). For by not ceding to the will of a particular national sovereign man,
international politics (anarchy) always threatens to expose sovereign man and the
sovereign order he guarantees as historical and contingent. That explains why the
order/anarchy boundary is so highly policed, both in international practice and in
international theory.
Ashley’s Derridian analysis, like Foucault’s and Haraway’s analyses, suggests
contemplating how figurations and the orders (and anarchies) they produce and that
are produced by them are fixed and frozen as well as unfixed and unfrozen. But
because Ashley’s analysis is IR-focused, it additionally provides specific IR research
questions that allow analysis of both how “modern man” is figured as sovereign man
on behalf of sovereign nation-states and how specific figurations of “modern man” as
sovereign man participate in the production of domestic and international orders.
These research questions are:
•
How does speaking “the truth” about “homosexuality” and “the
homosexual” participate in the organization and regulation of international
relations?
21
•
What ordering principles of sexuality generate and sustain – and are
generated and sustained by – figurations of “the homosexual,” and how do
they function in international relations?
•
How do figurations of “the homosexual” function as instances of
“statecraft as mancraft,” and how specifically is his normality or
perversion figured as “the logos” of or against “sovereign man”?
•
How do these ordering principles of sexuality and figurations of “the
homosexual” as or against “sovereign man” work together to order
international relations?
•
What do various practices of statecraft as mancraft make possible in world
politics, and what contingencies are rendered necessary by and through
these practices (Ashley, 1989; also see Hopf, 2010)?
From Statecraft as Mancraft to Queer Logics of Statecraft
The above research questions go some way toward elaborating Queer IR
research programs informed by a queer intellectual curiosity. Yet I suggest here that
they are limited by Derrida’s initial understanding of deconstruction and its
relationship to “the logos” and “the plural”. In the texts Ashley consults, Derrida
argues deconstruction is not something we bring to a text; rather, it is something that
is inherent in a text. This is because meanings in a text (or, in Foucault’s broader
terms, a discourse) are always already plural. The logocentric procedure that tries to
impose a singular meaning upon a text or a discourse, then, is always as political as it
is impossible. This explains why politics – like the politics of statecraft as mancraft –
endlessly loops through circuits in which states (or other political communities)
attempt to impose order onto anarchy. By critiquing the logocentric procedure as it
functions in domestic and especially international politics, Ashley’s analysis takes us
some way toward understanding how “paradigms of man are themselves tools of
power” (Ashley, 1989:300), not just in specific times and places (as in e.g.,
Kuntsman, 2009; Puar and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007) but more generally. For Ashley
explains how these impossibly singular normal or perverse paradigms of sovereign
22
man attempt to figure impossibly singular normal or perverse international orders in
their own image. This is how actors attempt to impose order onto anarchy.
As powerful as this account is, I suggest it overlooks a crucial aspect of how
figurations of sovereign man are mobilized to craft domestic and international orders.
What is missing is an account of how not just a singular logos but a plural logoi
potentially figures sovereign man and orders international politics in ways that
construct and deconstruct these figures and orders. Why this matters in Queer IR
contexts is because this plural logoi can be understood as simultaneously normal
and/or perverse as it is enacted through sexes, genders and sexualities as well as
through various registers of authority (something I will explain further with reference
to Neuwirth/Wurst).
A plural logoi – especially a normal and/or perverse logoi – appears, on the
face of it, to be counterintuitive. This is especially the case because of how Derrida
initially sets up “the logos” as the necessarily singular (and presumptively normal)
“word” that he opposes to the necessarily plural (and possibly perverse) “text.”9
Following Derrida, Ashley analyzes accounts of sovereign man as the necessarily
singular (and presumptively normal) “sovereign orderer” who is opposed to the
necessarily plural (and presumptively perverse) “anarchy.” While Ashley insists on
the plurality of man (1989:308), he does not consider how this plural man might
function as a sovereign man who might be necessarily plural.10 As a result, Ashley
neglects to consider how the plural might be empowered not just because it is
foundationally normal(ized) but because it is also foundationally perverse (perverted).
Ashley’s analysis therefore misses opportunities to investigate how the normal and/or
perverse plural might function as a possible or even necessary foundation of meaning
9
In his later work, Derrida relaxes his account of the logocentric procedure. See
Derrida on aporia (1993). For an extended discussion, see Weber (2016).
10
Ashley’s account of statecraft as mancraft implicitly recognizes and/or logics – as
they produce modern man and as they produce domestic and international orders – to
make arguments that deconstruct the figure of sovereign man and the orders sovereign
man makes possible as absolute, durable or indeed actual. Where Ashley stops short
in his analysis is in considering how and/or logics might not always be aschewed by
those wielding sovereign logics in the logocentric procedure but embraced by them to
make the logicentric procedure possible.
23
in a logocentric system, rather than always in opposition to the singular
(presumptively normal) logos.
What might a plural logoi look like, and what might its implications be for
understandings of statecraft as mancraft? My notion of a plural logoi comes from
Roland Barthes’ (1994 and 1976) description of the rule of the and/or. To explain
what the and/or is and how it functions, I use illustrations of sex, gender, and
sexuality first to contrast the and/or with the more traditional “either/or” and second
to pluralize the rule of the and/or itself.
The “either/or” operates according to a binary logic, forcing a choice of either
one term or another term to comprehend the true meaning of a text, a discipline, a
person, an act. For example, in the binary terms of the “either/or”, a person is either a
boy or a girl. In contrast, the and/or exceeds this binary logic because it appreciates
how the meaning of something or someone cannot necessarily be contained within an
“either/or” choice. This is because sometimes (maybe even always) understanding
someone or something is not as simple as fixing on a singular meaning – either one
meaning or another. Instead, understanding can require us to appreciate how a person
or a thing is constituted by and simultaneously embodies multiple, seemingly
contradictory meanings that may confuse and confound a simple either/or dichotomy.
It is this plurality that the and/or expresses.
According to the logic of the “and/or”, a subject is both one thing and another
(plural, perverse) while simultaneously one thing or another (singular, normal). For
example, a person might be both a boy and a girl while simultaneously being either a
boy or a girl. This might be because a person is read as either a boy or a girl while
also being read as in between sexes (intersexed), in between sexes and genders (a
castrato) or combining sexes, genders, and sexualities in ways that do not correspond
to one side of the boy/girl dichotomy or the other (a person who identifies as a “girl”
in terms of their sex, as a “boy” in terms of their gender, and as a “girlboy” or
“boygirl” in terms of their sexuality). In these examples, a person can be and while
simultaneously being or because the terms “boy” and “girl” are not reducible to
traditional dichotomous codes of sex, gender, or sexuality either individually or in
combination, even though traditional “either/or” readings attempt to make them so.
While Barthes’ rule of the and/or is derived from his description of the
castrato’s body that he reads as combining two sexes and two genders (1974), the
plural that constitutes a subjectivity can also be more than one thing and/or another.
24
For a subjectivity can be one thing and another and another, etc. as well as one thing
or another or another, etc. in relation to sexes, genders, and sexualities, as there are
multiple sexes, genders, and sexualities individually and in combination (FaustoSterling, 1993). This suggests both the limitations of deploying Barthesian plural
logics as if they expressed a singular rule of the and/or and the expansive possibilities
of plural logics that pluralize the rule of the and/or itself.
This discussion makes two significant points. First, the singular choice we are
forced to make by an “either/or” logic (e.g., boy or girl) excludes the plural logics of
the and/or. Plural logics of the and/or contest binary logics, understanding the
presumed singularity and coherence of its available choices (either “boys” or “girls”,
either normal or perverse), their resulting subjectivities (only “boys” and “girls”), and
their presumed ordering principles (either hetero/homonormative or
disruptively/disorderingly queer) as the social, cultural and political effects of
attempts to constitute them as if they were singular, coherent, and whole. Therefore,
it is only by appreciating how the (pluralized) and/or constitutes dichotomy-defying
subjectivities that we can grasp their meanings. Second, when the (pluralized) and/or
supplements the “either/or”, meanings are mapped differently. For in the (pluralized)
and/or, meanings are no longer (exclusively) regulated by the slash that divides the
“either/or”. Instead, meanings are (also) irregulated by this slash and by additional
slashes that connect terms in multiple ways that defy “either/or” interpretations.
Importantly, Barthes does not argue that “either/or” logics are unimportant.
He suggests it is both the “either/or” and the (pluralized) and/or that constitute
meanings. Yet he stresses texts should not be reduced to an “either/or” logic, so we
can “appreciate what plural constitutes” a text, a character, a plot, an order (Barthes,
1974:5; emphasis in original). “[R]eleasing the double [multiple] meaning on
principle”, the logic of the (pluralized) and/or “corrupts the purity of
communications; it is a deliberate ‘static’, painstakingly elaborated, introduced into
the fictive dialogue between author and reader, in short, a countercommunication”
(1974:9; my brackets). The (pluralized) and/or, then, is a plural logic that the
“either/or” can neither comprehend nor contain.
It is how the (pluralized) and/or introduces a kind of systematic, nondecidable plurality into discourse as “that which confuses meaning, the norm,
normativity [and, I would add, antinormativities]” (Barthes, 1976:109, my brackets;
on antinormativities see Wiegman and Wilson, 2015:1-3) around the normality and/or
25
perversion of sexes, genders, and sexualities rather than just accumulating differences
(as intersectionality suggests; Crewshaw, 1991) that makes it a queer logic (Weber,
1999:xiii; also see Weber, 2014). For a (pluralized) Barthesian and/or accords with
Sedgwick’s definition of queer as “the...excesses of meaning when the constituent
elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to
signify monolithically” (1993:8) as exclusively “and” or as exclusively “or.”
Identifying these often illusive figurations, the now queer Barthesian and/or suggests
how we should investigate queer figures. Barthes’ instruction is this – read (queer)
figures not only through the “either/or” but also through the (pluralized) and/or.
While Barthes offered this instruction in the context of reading literature
(1974), his queer rule of the (pluralized) and/or applies equally to foreign policy texts
and contexts. For “sovereign man” as a plural logoi in a logocentric procedure can
figure foreign policy and (dis)order international politics.11 For example, consider the
case of the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest winner Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita
Wurst.
At least since winning the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest and announcing in
her/his/their acceptance speech, “We are unity, and we are unstoppable,”
Neuwirth/Wurst has been taken up by some Europeans as a figuration who embodies
either a positive or a negative image of an integrated Europe. This places
Neuwirth/Wurst in an “either/or” logic of statecraft as mancraft (Ashley, 1989), in
which the crafting of a singular “sovereign man” for the European Community
functions through a traditional understanding of sovereignty as “a complex practice of
authorization, a practice through which specific agencies are enabled to draw a line”
between who can legitimately be included and excluded from the political community
11
Weber (1998b, 1999) argues “the revolutionary state” of Castro’s Cuba was figured
as a pluralized and/or sovereign logoi through its multiple codings of sex, gender, and
sexuality that prompted a “queer performative” foreign policy response by the US.
Lind and Keating (2013) argue President Correa’s figuring of Ecuador’s sovereign
logoi “revolutionary citizen” as complexly “homoprotectionist” and/or “homophobic”
effects wider Latin American policy. Also see, e.g., Agathangelou, 2014; Peterson,
2015; Picq and Thiel, 2015; Puar and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007, Rao, 2014a; RichterMonpetit, 2014; Sjoberg, 2014; Weber, 2002; Weise and Bosnia, 2014; Wilkinson
and Langlois, 2014.
26
this “European sovereign man” grounds (Walker, 2000:22). In this traditional
“either/or” logic of statecraft as mancraft, what is debated is whether or not
Neuwirth/Wurst as a proposed “sovereign man” of the new Europe is/should be
licensed to draw a line between properly integrated and normalized Europeans and
improperly integrated and perverse Europeans in a Europe that has been striving for
integration in one form or another since the end of World War II. This is in part why
Neuwirth/Wurst’s Euro-vision of Europe engendered such strong expressions of
disgust or approval. For example, far right Bulgarian MEP candidate Angel
Dzhambazki remarked that, “This bearded creature, called with the European name
Conchita Wurst is like genetically modified organism and won the Eurovision. And I
wonder, if the vice of our time is that we tolerate the perversity. I don’t want such a
song contest for my children” (Kosharevska, 2014:np). In contrast, the UN
spokesperson for Ban Ki-Moon commented:
Everyone is entitled to enjoy the same basic rights and live a life of worth and
dignity without discrimination. This fundamental principle is embedded in the
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Conchita is a
symbol in that sense and I think it's good for them to meet. [The meeting allows
us] to reassert his [Ban Ki-Moon’s] support for LGBT people and for them to
ensure that they enjoy the same human rights and protection that we all do
(Duffy, 2014:np; my brackets).
Understanding Neuwirth/Wurst as either normal or perverse required
Europeans to read Neuwirth/Wurst as a figure who is knowable and placable along an
“either/or” axis – in relation to Europe and in relation to traditional European debates
about European integration. And yet, while Neuwirth/Wurst certainly seems to be
making a call for some kind of unity from a platform that has traditionally promoted
European integration, Neuwirth/Wurst does so as a figure who defies traditional
understandings of integration across multiple axes. These include (but are not
necessarily confined to): sex, gender, sexuality, nationality, race, civilization and
authority.
For example, Neuwirth/Wurst’s and/or sexes, genders, and sexualities are
evident in how this bearded drag queen is read through vast matrices of sexes,
genders, and sexualities that minimally include either male or female, masculine or
feminine, heterosexual or homosexual, normal or perverse as well as simultaneously
male and female, masculine and feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, normal and
perverse. This figures Neuwirth/Wurst as queer, because he/she/they do not signify
27
monolithically around sexes, genders, or sexualities. Neuwirth/Wurst, then, is a
performative embodiment of a plural logoi that functions as a deliberate static which
confounds and confuses traditional understandings of sexes, genders, and sexualities
(Barthes, 1974, 1976). Neuwirth “himself”, however, seems to signify (more)
monolithically around sex, gender, and sexuality, identifying as a male “homosexual”
who eschews descriptions of himself as trans* (Davis, 2014)12. This and his
statements in support of gay marriage, for example, make him compatible with “the
LGBT” Clinton describes (2011), whose “homosexuality” can be classified,
domesticated, and homonormalized.
At the same time, Neuwirth/Wurst embodies a pluralized and/or logic in
international politics in the registers of nationality, race, civilization and authority that
confound a simple understanding of Neuwirth/Wurst in “either/or” terms. This is
evident in the various official biographies of Neuwirth and/as Wurst that appeared
since Neuwirth/Wurst’s selection as Austria’s representative to Eurovision 2014.13
These bios state Neuwirth was born and raised in Austria, while Wurst was born “in
the mountains of Colombia” to a Colombian mother and German father and “raised in
Germany.” They position Neuwirth as a “natural” European citizen and Wurst as a
diasporic Colombian and/or German subject who has relocated from the global South
to the global North. This has implications for how Neuwirth/Wurst is read nationally,
racially, civilizationally and as a “sovereign authority.” Nationally, Neuwirth/Wurst
is Austrian (like Tom) and/or Colombian (like Conchita’s mother) and/or German
(like Conchita’s father). Racially, Neuwirth/Wurst is white (presumptively like Tom
and like Conchita’s father, because neither are marked as non-white) and/or mestiza
(because Conchita’s Colombian mother who is from rural Colombia is likely to be
indigenous or mestiza). Civilizationally, Neuwirth/Wurst is European (like Tom and
like Conchita’s father) and/or indigenous and/or Hispanic (like Conchita’s mother).
All of this puts Neuwirth/Wurst’s ability to function as a singular “sovereign man” for
12
As Sam Killermann explains, “Trans* is an umbrella term that refers to all of the
identities within the gender identity spectrum.” See
http://itspronouncedmetrosexual.com/2012/05/what-does-the-asterisk-in-trans-standfor/.
13
Must of this information was on conchitawurst.com during the Eurovision Song
Contest but has since been removed.
28
a new Europe in doubt – whether that Europe is normal or perverse. This is because
Neuwirth/Wurst pluralizes by crossing and combining so many of “fortress Europe’s”
boundaries territorially, racially, and civilizationally because of how Neuwirth/Wurst
crafts his/her/their sexes, genders and sexualities through “the two hearts beating in
[the one] chest”14 of Tom Neuwirth and/as Conchita Wurst. At the same time,
Neuwirth/Wurst’s plurality – not just singularity – in all these sexualized international
registers make this figure repulsive and/or attractive to statesleaders. This figures
Neuwirth/Wurst as both a plurally anarchical force – a potentially unruly threat to
bring “the violence of the world we live in at the heart of the home, at the heart of the
national [and regional] self” (Fortier, 2008:60; my brackets) and as a singular
“sovereign man” upon whom a normal or perverse European order might be founded
and as a plural “sovereign man” upon whom a normal and/or perverse European
order might be founded. This is because Neuwirth/Wurst is both one things or
another (normal or perverse) while simultaneously being one thing and another
(normal and perverse), with respect to European integration and with respect to
integration more broadly. This makes Neuwirth/Wurst a potentially singular
“sovereign man” in a traditional logic of statecraft as mancraft and a potentially plural
and/or foundation of what I call queer logics of statecraft, whose call for unity from a
European integration platform is far more complex than it might at first appear to be
(Weber, 2016).
This regional illustration of statecraft as mancraft suggests that statecraft as
mancraft is less straightforward than Ashley suggests. Because the logos/logoi of the
logocentric procedure can be plural as well as singular by being normal and/or
perverse around sexes, genders, and sexualities and around numerous important
registers of international politics, sometimes statecraft as mancraft is (also) a queer
activity that results in unusual sexualized orders of international politics. We cannot
account for these queer instances of statecraft simply by adding the singular
“homosexual” – as either sovereign man or his foil – to our analyses. Rather, tracing
how plural logics of the and/or function in global politics – as queer logics of
statecraft – is to appreciate how the normal and/or perverse plural sometimes scripts
sovereign figures and/as their adversaries as well as the unusual orders these mixed
figures produce and are productive of.
14
Conchitawurst.com
29
Queer logics of statecraft are evident in those moments in domestic and
international relations when actors or orders rely upon a queerly conceptualized
Barthesian and/or – an and that is at the same time an or in relation to sexes, genders,
and sexualities – to perfomatively figure sovereign man, the sovereign state or
another political community, or some combined version of the order/anarchy and
normal/perverse binaries as normal and/or perverse. Analyzing international relations
through a lens of queer logics of statecraft directs us, following and then extending
Ashley’s arguments, to categories that connect and/or break apart foundational
binaries like order/anarchy and normal/perverse, by understanding the stabilizing
“slash(es)” in these binaries as multiplying and complicating connections, figures,
orders and anarchies rather than reducing and simplifying them. It leads us to ask
how “the plural” as “a deliberate static” (Barthes, 1976:5, 9) is introduced into these
binaries to both establish and confound their meanings and the meanings of “men,”
“states,” “orders,” and “anarchies” as well as the meanings of “sexes,” “genders,”
and “sexualities” which are foundational to them. In a Butlerian vein, queer logics of
statecraft require us to take seriously how the plural is performatively enacted,
enabling a plethora of national and international figurations and logics that can be
(queerly) inhabited. Following Sedgwick, queer logics of statecraft are attentive to
how sexes, genders, and sexualities that fail or refuse to signify monolithically are
productive of and are produced by unexpectedly normal and/or perverse “sovereign
men,” “sovereign communities,” and sovereignly-ordained orders and anarchies.
Queer logics of statecraft, then, do not just describe those moments when the
performatively perverse creates the appearance of the performatively normal. Nor do
they describe only the opposite, when the performatively normal creates the
appearance of the performatively perverse, although those can be among their effects.
Rather, queer logics of statecraft describe those moments in domestic and
international politics when the logos/logoi as a subjectivity or the logos/logoi as a
logic is plurally normal and/or perverse in ways that “confound the norm,
normativity” [and anti-normativity] (my brackets; Barthes 1976:109; Wiegman and
Wilson, 2015:1-3) of individually or collectively singularly inscribed notions of
sovereign man, sovereign communities or sexualized orders of international relations.
This is not to say that queer logics of statecraft do not give rise to “institutions,
structures of understanding, and practical orientations” (Berlant and Warner,
1995:548, footnote 2) that make “sovereign men,” “sovereign states,” and
30
international orders appear to be singular, coherent and privileged. In this respect,
they can be akin to sexual organizing principles like heteronormativies and
homonormativities (Berlant and Warner, 1995:548, footnote 2; Duggan, 2003:50).
For, by “confusing the [singular] norm, normativity [or antinormativity]” (Barthes,
1976:109; Wiegman and Wilson, 2015:1-3), queer logics of statecraft can produce
new institutions, new structures of understanding, new practical orientations that are
paradoxically founded upon a disorienting and/or reorienting plural. This can make
them more alluring, more powerful, and more easily mobilized by both those who, for
example, wish to resist hegemonic relations of power and by those who wish to
sustain them (Weber, 1999, 2002; Puar and Rai, 2002; Puar, 2007). Unlike
heteronormativities and homonormativities, though, we cannot name in advance what
these institutions, structures of understanding and practical (dis)/(re)orientations will
be. We cannot know if they will be politicizing or depoliticizing. To determine this,
it is necessary to both identify the precise plural(s) each particular queer logic of
statecraft employs to figure some particular “sovereign man,” “sovereign state,” or
other “sovereign community” and international order, always asking, “For what
constituency or constituencies does this plural operate?”
The case of Neuwirth/Wurst is striking, then, because it illustrates how
Europeans leaders debated – albeit very briefly – a plural logoi as a possible ground
for contemporary Europe, whether they recognized Neuwirth/Wurst as a plural logoi
or not. In discussions about the “new Europe”, both sides in this debate employed
Neuwirth/Wurst to construct and authorize their Euro-visioned hierarchies of order vs.
anarchy, as if they were true. In this way, Neuwirth/Wurst generated not only
competing sexualized orders of contemporary Europe; he/she/they also practically
(dis)/(re)oriented and (de)/(re)railed any idealized contemporary European-wide
vision of an already united Europe.
It is not surprising that in their mobilizations of Neuwirth/Wurst, European
leaders attempted to claim him/her/them as either normal or perverse, for this is how
traditional logics of statecraft as mancraft operate. Because European leaders failed
to consider Neuwirth/Wurst through the lens of queer logics of statecraft, they
generally failed to appreciate what plural(s) constituted him/her/them and how the
plural and/or logic he/she/they embodies is what made their attempts to claim or
disown – to normalize or to pervert – this normal and/or perverse figure both possible
and impossible. Yet it is this very failure on the part of European leaders to read
31
Neuwirth/Wurst through the plural(s) that constitute(s) him/her/them that suggests an
additional set of research questions for international theory and practice, including:
•
Can a paradigm of sovereign man be effective without being – as Ashley
claims the ideal type of sovereign man must be – “regarded as originary,
unproblematic, given for all time, and, hence, beyond criticism and
independent of politics” (Ashley, 1989:271)?
•
What happens when a political community like a state or the EU considers
grounding itself upon a pluralized and/or logoi?
•
Under what conditions might this be desirable or even necessary, and what
might it make possible or preclude?
•
How might queer logics of statecraft effect the organization, regulation, and
conduct of international politics?
Conclusion
By placing queer intellectual curiosity about figurations of “homosexuality”
and “the homosexual” at its methodological core, my proposed Queer IR methods
refuse to take for granted personal-to-international institutional arrangements,
figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual”, attachments (and detachments)
of these figurations to/from material bodies, and the mobilization of sexualized bodies
in international politics. This article makes three key points. It demonstrates the
historical instability of figurations of “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” by
illustrating how discourses of power/knowledge/pleasure put sex into discourse to
figure “homosexuality” and “the homosexual” as perverse (for Victorians), normal
(for the Obama Administration) and normal and/or perverse (for Neuwirth and/as
Wurst). It show how figurations of “the homosexual” (might) function as both a
singular logos and a plural logoi of statecraft as mancraft. And it makes clear how
figurations of “the homosexual” participate in both the deconstruction and
construction of political communities and international orders.
Because figurations of “the homosexual” and other potentially plural logoi –
from the variously normalized (Towns, 2010) to the variously stigmatized (AdlerNissen, 2014; Zarakol, 2011) – affect the organization and regulation of international
politics, they constitute important objects/subjects of study in IR. Rather than
32
detracting from the serious business of analyzing international practice and producing
IR theory, investigating these figurations furthers understandings of core IR concerns.
For example, Adler-Nissen’s insightful analysis of Austria’s rejection of stigma is
complicated by the Austrian state’s embrace of the pluralized normal and/or perverse
figure of Neuwirth and/as Wurst. This plural figure calls schemata of stigmatization
themselves into question. It thereby erodes and displaces how “stigmatization helps
clarify the boundaries of acceptable behavior and identity and the consequences of
nonconformity” for states (Adler-Nissen, 2014:149). Additionally, understandings of
human rights that equate “the norm” and “the normal” with “the good” and “the
beneficial” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) are complicated by Queer IR analyses of
“homonormative” foreign policies—such as those of the Obama administration. For
these analyses expose the (potential) violence of not just excluding plural subjects but
also including plural subjects as singular subjects. These practical, empirical
concerns deepen IR understandings of state and nation formation, human rights policy
and diplomacy more generally. Yet they cannot be interrogated if IR excludes from
its consideration plural logoi and logics, or if IR reduces them to a singular logos or
logic.
IR methods that attempt to analyze plural figures as if they were historically
static or singular – either by reducing them to a variable or by analyzing them
exclusively through an “either/or logic” of statecraft as mancraft – miss opportunities
to appreciate what plural(s) constitute(s) these figures and how plural(s) make and
unmake national, regional and international political communities that anchor various
arrangements of international hierarchy and anarchy. The Queer IR methods
proposed here provide techniques, devices and research questions to investigate
singular and plural figurations, including those of “the homosexual”. It thus offers
ways to further IR analyses seeking to investigate how both a singular logos and a
plural logoi effect the conduct of international politics.
33
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Note:
This article has benefited from the invaluable input of several individuals and groups,
including (in no particular order) Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Anne-Marie Fortier, Rahul
Rao, Mary Hawkesworth, Ilan Kapoor, Amy Lind, Momin Rahman, Lene Hansen,
Mark Hoffman, Cristina Masters, Laura McLeod, Maureen McNeil, Veronique PinFat, Andreja Zevnik, Louiza Odysseus, Melanie Richter-Montpetit, Darcy Leigh,
Andrew Neil, Xavier Guillaume, Halit Mustafa Tagma, Angela Chnapko, Patrick
Thaddeus Jackson, Laura Sjoberg, three anonymous reviewers, the editors of ISQ, and
audiences at the LSE, the University of Manchester, Edinburgh University, the
Sussex/Copenhagen Research Network and the 2015 International Studies
Association Conference in New Orleans. Preliminary research assistance was
provided by Aristea Fotopoulou, and administrative support was provided by Joanna
Wood. Thanks to all for your insights and assistance.