Elsevier

Orbis

Volume 54, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 35-45
Orbis

How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2009.10.004Get rights and content

Abstract

Years of strategic missteps in oceans policy, naval strategy and a force structure in decline set the stage for U.S. defeat at sea in 2015. After decades of double-digit budget increases, the People's Liberation Army (Navy) was operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea. The United States, in contrast, had a declining naval force structured around 10 aircraft carriers spread thinly throughout the globe. With a maritime strategy focused on lower-order partnerships, and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts how China destroyed the USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015. The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented China's position as the Asian hegemon.

Section snippets

Red Sky in Morning—Sailor's Warning

The warning signs—the series of political, diplomatic and strategic missteps—had been unfolding for more than two decades. Globalization, developments in the international law of the sea, and the revolution in military affairs aided the emergence of China and other new naval powers. Globalization was a democratizing force among navies. The wealth effect of expanding trade and rising economies combined with the spread of doctrine, training and operational art, serving as a force multiplier. The

The Day After

Americans woke up to a different world the day after the attack. The war was over almost as soon as it had started. Outmaneuvered tactically and strategically, the United States suffered its greatest defeat at sea since Pearl Harbor. The incident—could it really be called a “war”?—had been preceded by a shallow diplomatic crisis between the two great powers. No one in the West expected the dispute to spiral out of control. George Washington was conducting routine patrols off the coast of China

Oceans Policy Blindness

How did the United States arrive at this place? The 2008 DOD Capstone Concept for Joint Operations described the new ocean operating environment:

Foreign sensitivities to U.S. military presence have steadily been increasing. . . . Diminished access will complicate the maintenance of forward presence, a critical aspect of past and current U.S. military strategy, necessitating new approaches to responding quickly to developments around the world as well as more robust exploitation of existing U.S.

The Lesson of History: Tectonic Shifts Occur Quickly

History shows how the maritime balance of power can shift suddenly, rearranging global order. Naval power has been particularly – indeed, even uniquely – associated with the rapid, as opposed to evolutionary, rise of new major powers. Historically, even great shifts in global politics have occurred rapidly: “In 1480, Spain was a collection of little kingdoms, as eager to fight each other as to defend their common interests. Twenty years later, Spain held title to half the globe.”11

James Kraska is a guest investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the former Oceans Policy Adviser for the Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views presented are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense. He may be reached at [email protected].

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James Kraska is a guest investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the former Oceans Policy Adviser for the Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views presented are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense. He may be reached at [email protected].

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