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The Benefits of Coming into Existence

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Abstract

This paper argues that we can benefit or harm people by creating them, but only in the sense that we can create things that are good or bad for them. What we cannot do is to confer comparative benefits and harms to people by creating them or failing to create them. You are not better off (or worse off) created than you would have been had you not been created, for nothing has value for you if you do not exist, not even neutral value.

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Correspondence to Krister Bykvist.

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Bykvist, K. The Benefits of Coming into Existence. Philos Stud 135, 335–362 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3982-x

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